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“It is a nuisance, but God has chosen to give the easy problems to the physicists.” 
(Lave and March, 1975) 
 
 
“There is no such thing as a perfect democracy.  
Democracy is not an all-or-nothing affair, but rather a shifting continuum.” 
(IDEA, 2008) 
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A CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE ON EU’S  
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN TURKEY 
 
André Pereira Matos 
 
The European Union, as a regional actor and an example of stability and well-
being, has embraced a set of principles it has stood for and which constitute its own 
identity. The diffusion of these values among third countries is one of the objectives of 
EU’s External Policy. Democracy can be found among the principles that are sought to 
be exported through comprehensive and complex strategies within different 
frameworks, such as neighbourhood relations, trade partnerships and the accession 
process. Focusing on the latter, candidates are object of an intensive process of 
Europeanisation that operates through different mechanisms like socialisation and 
conditionality. 
Turkey, on the other side, has decided to apply for full membership several 
decades ago and, ever since, it has been pressured to Europeanise, which includes 
improving its unstable democracy. This case, however, is different from all other 
previous enlargements; for its special socio-cultural and civilisational features, Turkey 
constitutes a more complex novelty for the European Union. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to study the influence of the European Union on the 
democratisation process of Turkey, focusing on the period ranging between 1999, the 
year the European Council recognised Turkey’s candidacy status, and 2009 that marks 
the 10-year period of that condition. It is the intention of this project to assess the 
impact of the European Union at that level through the study of the democratic 
evolution of the country and its co-relation with other variables related to the presence 
or pressure of the EU. 
As this is a challenging objective, it will require a deep reflection upon central 
concepts like democracy and democratic consolidation, and a diversified use of 
methodological techniques, such as statistical analysis and mathematical co-relations, 
historical analysis, literature review and in-depth interviews. This study will privilege a 
Constructivist approach, emphasising the social construction of reality and the role of 
the ideational aspects – identity, perceptions and the broader socio-cultural dimension – 
in Turkey-EU relations. 
 
Keywords: Accession process; Constructivism; democracy; democratisation; European 
Union; Turkey.  
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A CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE ON EU’S  
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN TURKEY 
 
André Pereira Matos 
 
A União Europeia, enquanto ator regional e exemplo de estabilidade e bem-
estar, representa e defende um conjunto de princípios que constituem a sua própria 
identidade. A difusão destes valores junto de países terceiros é um dos objetivos da 
Política Externa da UE – o princípio da democracia e os valores democráticos no geral 
estão entre essa promoção e existe uma tentativa de exportá-los através de estratégias 
abrangentes e complexas, enquadradas em contextos diferentes, tais como as relações de 
vizinhança, parcerias comerciais e o processo de adesão. Os candidatos a este último 
tornam-se, assim, objetos de dinâmicas intensivas de Europeização que atua através de 
diferentes mecanismos como a socialização e a condicionalidade. 
A Turquia, por outro lado, decidiu candidatar-se à adesão plena há várias 
décadas atrás e, desde então, tem sido, também ela, objeto de pressão no sentido de 
europeizar-se, o que obrigatoriamente inclui melhorar a sua democracia instável. O caso 
turco, contudo, apresenta traços que o distinguem de todos os alargamentos anteriores, 
nomeadamente devido às suas caraterísticas socioculturais e civilizacionais, que 
transformam este país num caso inédito e mais complexo para a UE. 
Assim, um dos principais objetivos desta tese consiste em estudar a influência da 
União Europeia no processo de democratização da Turquia, no espaço cronológico que 
medeia entre 1999, o ano em que o Conselho Europeu reconheceu o estatuto de 
candidata à Turquia, e 2009, que marca o final da primeira década nessa mesma 
condição. Nesse sentido, é intenção deste projeto avaliar o impacto da União através da 
análise cuidada da evolução democrática do país e a sua correlação com outras variáveis 
relacionadas com a presença ou pressão da UE.  
Atendendo à natureza especialmente complexa deste objetivo, será necessária 
uma reflexão profunda acerca de conceitos centrais como os de democracia e de 
consolidação democrática, assim como a utilização de um conjunto diversificado de 
técnicas metodológicas, tais como a análise estatística e correlações matemáticas, 
análise histórica, revisão de literatura e entrevistas qualitativas. Este estudo privilegiará 
uma abordagem Construtivista, caraterizada por relevar a construção social da realidade 
e o papel de aspetos ideacionais – como a identidade, as perceções e toda uma dimensão 
sociocultural abrangente – nas relações UE-Turquia. 
 
Palavras-chave: Construtivismo; democracia; democratização; processo de adesão; 
Turquia; União Europeia.  
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Problem Statement 
 
The European Union1 constitutes an international organisation that, in the world 
scene, seeks to promote the values and principles it stands for, such as Human Rights 
and democracy. Over time, this concern increased and began to be a cornerstone in its 
relations with third countries – neighbours, trade partners and candidates. For the latter, 
the EU was more demanding and the results are considered by many as the most 
successful policy in terms of foreign action, due to the appealing reward the Union 
offered: membership. On the other side, Turkey applied to membership and has been 
going through a process of democratisation for decades. Nevertheless, as a candidate 
country, many doubts emerge regarding the role of the Union in this process. Thus, it is 
the final aim of this thesis to find out to what extent the European Union successfully 
contributed to the Turkish democratisation within the scope of the enlargement process 
– between 1999, the year the European Council declared Turkey a candidate country, 
and 2009 that marks the 10-year period of that condition.  
Turkey constitutes, therefore, a case study to assess EU’s influence. It was not a 
random choice: for the country’s nature and features, it seems to be one of the most 
problematic cases of interaction between the Union and a candidate. Several reasons 
justify that complexity and simultaneously the choice for this case study – among them: 
Turkey-EU relations are uncommonly long and turbulent; the country’s Muslim 
majority is something completely new in a candidate country; Turks’ euro-enthusiasm 
vs. the lack of interest on the European side; the geo-strategic power of Turkey and its 
problematic neighbourhood; a territory divided between two continents; a weak 
democracy in consolidation but without an established and solid democratic culture; an 
unstable economic situation despite its growth; a tradition of participation in Western-
linked organisations (NATO, Council of Europe, etc); unusual civil-military relations; 
some difficulties in dealing with Human Rights and certain freedoms; and a very 
heterogeneous population. These are some of the reasons behind this choice and the 
ones that make this a special case that provoke the European Union to re-analyse its 
                                                          
1 Henceforth, European Union, Union and EU will be used interchangeably. 
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own project, identity and position in the world scene, as most situations it is facing are 
new and have never been considered before. 
In order to achieve the final result mentioned above, it is necessary to clearly 
define “democracy” and to operationalise it, so that it eventually becomes clearer the 
country’s evolution in terms of its democratic performance. Later, it will be necessary to 
co-relate that development with the European Union’s commitment. Developing such a 
model comprises a very challenging task, given, among others, the complexity of this 
reality, the number of the actors involved and the theoretical divisions among 
academics. In fact, achieving some of the objectives proposed for this work is a 
challenge as well, due to the different limitations that can hamper the efforts made to 
achieve them. For instance, as mentioned, there are various (external) actors involved in 
the promotion of democracy in Turkey. However, this work attempts to study the 
influence of the European Union, which means that the contribution of other institutions 
or organisations has to be isolated, so that the conclusions are not contaminated by their 
action.   
The reasons for undergoing this complex study are linked to various aspects. 
First, at the time this thesis began to be developed, there was lacking a systematic and 
holistic approach to the theme, and more encompassing studies were scarce – as it can 
be perceived after reading The State of the Art.  
Second, as Soares (2005: 28) mentions, to innovate in Social and Human 
Sciences can also include presenting the same subject in a different way, through a 
different look.2 This means that, in this particular case, as most approaches to the 
subject focus on material questions and interests of both parts, my intention is to 
highlight the ideational side of the problem (although not disregarding the material one), 
applying a Constructivist perspective. Therefore, Constructivism is expected to generate 
fresh hypotheses on the issue and to provide less used concepts, such as identity, norms, 
motivation and perception, which will certainly help develop a different and 
complementary angle to analyse the question through, probably reaching some 
explanations missed by other analyses. This view aims to combine material forces and 
the power of ideas, which implies a delicate awareness of cultural differences and 
similarities so that it is possible to establish a stronger connection between both sides 
                                                          
2 Unless stated otherwise, all the translations from Portuguese, French, Germany, Spanish and Italian are 
of my own. 
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and therefore to promote a healthy and profitable dialogue that enhances the relationship 
between European Union and Turkey. 
Third, despite the growing attention to the topic by academia, the ongoing 
debate is far from being solved in terms of a solid, widely-accepted answer to the 
question: if many authors believe the EU has exerted considerable influence on the 
democratisation process of Turkey (or even more broadly in the country’s general 
development), many others do not accept this premise3, creating a clear split among 
researchers. This thesis pretends to be another contribution to the discussion and 
hopefully to facilitate reaching a broader consensus. In fact, Magen (2004: 9) wrote that 
the effect of external factors on Turkey still needs to be studied. 
Finally, and after carefully analysing the questions involved in this general 
subject, it would also be very positive if this work would strengthen the ties between 
both parts, while contributing to a more aware, informed and responsible public and 
private decision-making. In this sense, the present thesis seeks to provide another input 
to the development of a more general framework of analysis of the questions here 
involved and to be able to go beyond this specific case, extending itself to other case 
studies in the future – be it in terms of academic research or of political decision-
making. 
Thus, this work, although focused on a subject already studied by many 
researchers, tries to bring a fresh perspective to the discussion in progress, developing 
the knowledge concerning Turkey-European Union relations, more precisely in what 
comes to the improvement of the Turkish democracy as a response to European 
impulses.  
 
2. The State of the Art 
In order to pursue the achievement of the objectives of this thesis, four different 
areas of study had to be dealt with: democracy and democratisation; European Union 
and democracy promotion; Turkish culture and democracy; as well as Turkey-EU 
relations. These diverse but interconnected fields constitute the keystones of the whole 
project and their joint analysis is expected to bring the answers to the raised questions. 
Therefore, scrutinizing the most recent and relevant literature on the above mentioned 
                                                          
3 That will become perceptible throughout the thesis. 
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fields was part of the research project: the first two will be approached in their 
respective sections; and the last two are to be deepened in this section, as they constitute 
the central hub of this thesis. 
The knowledge already produced by other authors was taken into consideration 
and composed the foundations of this work; it is unfair to consider any type of scientific 
production without the influence and insights of previous studies and contributions. 
Nevertheless, the intention of this thesis is to enlarge and deepen the whole corpus of 
knowledge with an alternative perspective and new considerations on the subject – even 
though many of which are eclectic approaches inspired by other authors’ work. 
 
Turkey constitutes the case study of this thesis and, therefore, had to be object of 
a deep analysis that sought to comprehend this entity in its whole in order to reach the 
most faithful results it is possible for a study of this kind. Thus, the first step was an 
initial incursion into Turkey’s history, making use of the contributions of various 
authors in this area, who were able to provide a valuable insight on the background of 
the country. 
In his book, Kitsikis (1985: 3) reflects upon the history of “one of the most 
important civilisation of the second millennium” – the Ottoman Empire – and deals with 
its historical evolution, as well as with more specific subjects, such as the Ottoman 
multinational features, religion and its relations with the West. Similarly, Quataert 
(2000) described in detail the history of the Ottoman Empire since its birth to its end, 
whereas Faucompret & Koning’s (2008) began their study after the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire and finished with Erdogan’s government. Fernandes (2005) included the history 
of the Ottomans and highlighted, in a sociological and historical perspective, Atatürk’s 
construction of a nationalist and secularist Turkey. Andrew Mango (2005) began his 
study in the 11th century and reached some recent events of Turkey, and Mario Losano 
(2009) also devoted some attention to the history of the country always vis-à-vis its 
relations with Europe. Burdy and Marcou’s (2008) book contextualised the evolution of 
the Turkish state since the birth of the Ottoman Empire and although this does not 
constitute a novelty per se, what is interesting in their work is that they (successfully) 
sought to co-relate that evolution with Turkey’s identity and with the relationship with 
the West. The authors even devoted a chapter to analyse the country’s choice of Europe, 
studying the dynamics of interaction between both parts since the World War II, as well 
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as the social and cultural changes that have been occurring in Turkey at various levels 
(women’s rights, education, media, etc.). Another important contribution comes from 
Yurdusev (2010) whose main argument is that the Ottoman Empire and Europe (since 
the emergence of the state system) have never been isolated from each other – both have 
influenced and interacted with each other. The author provides some examples of this 
statement and seeks to demystify some conceptions regarding Ottoman-European 
relations. Focusing on identity issues, Yurdusev analysis the Ottomans’ otherness in 
relation to the Europeans and concludes that they were in Europe, but not of Europe.    
In terms of Turks’ identity, Fernandes (2005) called it a “fragmented identity” in 
line with Grigoriadis (2009) and Waxman (2010), who scrutinise the evolution of this 
repeatedly reformulated and reinterpreted identity. Kentel (2011) reflects upon 
nationalist questions and the idea of alterity, while Losano (2009) focuses on the 
secularism/Islamism debate. Andrew Mango (2004) used his knowledge and experience 
about Turkish studies to elaborate a book in which the profile of today’s Turks could be 
drawn. Beginning with the birth and development of the Ottoman Empire, Mango 
analyses in depth several aspects that he regarded as fundamental for the construction of 
the Turkish identity. In that sense, Mango presents the historical evolution of the 
Turkish modern state trough the ruling of Kemal Atatürk and Inönü, and reflects upon 
the introduction of free elections (its causes and consequences), the military coups and 
the elections until 2002. Particular subjects are also scrutinised, including women’s 
rights, Turkish lifestyle, religion, torture, etc.  
Also linked to Turks’ identity, Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007) conducted a 
research project that resulted in their 2007 publication about religion, politics and 
society in general in Turkey. In this work, they approached various fundamental 
questions that enable the reader to realise how the Turkish society is currently shaped in 
terms of their position regarding the turban issue, the Islamist/Secularist debate, identity 
issues, early and forced marriages, the role of women, the role of the military, Islam, 
terrorism, internal politics, democracy and many other fields that resulted in a very 
interesting and relevant work to understand Turkish society. On the other hand, noticing 
the high proportion of autocratic regimes among Muslim countries, Moataz Fattah 
(2006) led an impressive study about the Muslims’ opinion about democracy and how it 
would hamper their countries’ democratisation. Through a survey conducted in 32 
Muslim countries (including Turkey), discourse analysis, interviews and other 
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techniques, Fattah was able to reach several important conclusions. For example, that 
Muslims are highly influenced by opinion-makers (Idem: 7) and that there are three 
patterns of Muslims’ attitudes towards Islam and democracy (traditionalist Islamists; 
modernist Islamists and Secularists) (Idem: 9-25). He also carefully analyses the impact 
of various factors on the support for democracy (demography, income, age, gender, 
etc.), reaching very interesting conclusions, like the profile of the typical prodemocratic 
Muslim (Idem: 33-64). 
Concerning Turkey’s democracy, many authors study its evolution in time, its 
limitations, the perception of the population in relation to this regime, etc. Fernandes 
(2005) explores the Turkish political-constitutional system, Düzgit (2009) mentions the 
decline in the democratic efforts since 2005 and the constraints to the consolidation of 
Turkey’s democracy and Evin (2005) wrote a chapter on Turkish history since the late 
1970s to the early 2000s, mainly focusing on Özal’s contribution to the Turkish political 
culture, but also including a brief glance at Erdoğan’s European vocation and Turkey’s 
secularism. 
In an extensive and deep work on Turkey’s internal dynamics focusing on the 
balance of powers, Isabel David’s PhD thesis scrutinises in detail the country’s 
Westernisation since the Ottoman era and includes the description and reading of key 
moments, such as the Tanzimat, the Young Turks movement and the creation of the 
Modern Republic with Kemal’s decisions during his ruling. David also studies the 
recent history of the country, Turkey’s accession process and the path of AKP in 
government. Conjugating all these fronts, the author is sceptical concerning the 
consolidation of Turkey’s democracy, since late developments have revealed the 
continuation of old habits and practices – for example, the tradition of the strong leader 
and the reinforcement of the authoritarian culture, indirectly promoted (or at least 
allowed) by the EU that has been undermining the remaining Kemalist principles, 
strengthening other political drives like the AKP. 
Another article related to the country’s democratic evolution (and the EU 
process) is “The Impact of European Union 2007 Enlargement on Turkey’s Democratic 
Commitment” (Matos, 2012), whose conclusions point to a noted decrease in Turkey’s 
democratic performance from the first (2004-2006) to the second (2007-2009) periods. 
The breaking point was the 2007 enlargement of Bulgaria and Romania, which is 
believed to have negatively affected the Turkish democratic commitment (as well as its 
commitment to the European accession) due to the lack of motivation and the feeling of 
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frustration caused by the perception of double standards and lack of coherency on the 
European side. Besides, these issues of coherency, credibility and clearness were more 
carefully analysed in Matos (2013a). 
A very prolific area in terms of academic production is security and civil-
military relations. In general, theorists think about the evolution in time of the civilian 
control over the military (or the lack of it) (Akay, 2010; Greenwood, 2006; Gürsoy, 
2010; Heper & Güney, 1996, 2000), compare those relations with practices of other 
countries (Duman & Tsarouhas, 2006; Gürsoy, 2008), pay attention to the military 
involvement in politics and their interventions (Brown, 1987; Gürsoy, 2010), try to 
figure out the reasons behind the military’s popularity (Sarigil, 2009, Varoglu & 
Bicaksiz, 2005), consider the position and criticisms of the European Union 
(Greenwood, 2006; Güney & Karatekelioglu, 2005), correlate civil-military relations 
and democracy consolidation (Demirel, 2005; Gürsoy, 2008; Matos, 2013b; Satana, 
2008), analyse the theory of civil-military relations per se (Burk, 2002; Schiff, 1995), 
etc. 
 
Regarding Turkey-EU relations, Usul (2011: 144) recognises that “there has 
been an underdevelopment in studies that analyse the role of foreign factors on 
democratic consolidation in Turkey”. Even so, wide-ranging studies regarding this field 
can be found in the work of Düzgit & Keyman, 2007; Faucompret & Konings, 2008; 
Losano, 2009; Sarokhanian & Stivachtis, 2008; and Stivachtis, 2008. In this literature, it 
is possible to find, among others, the evolution of Turkey-EU relations since its 
beginning in the1950s, the conundrums of those relations, some technical and 
procedural aspects of the accession process, the actors involved and comparisons with 
other previous candidates. 
More specifically, the works of Düzgit & Keyman, (2007); and Faucompret & 
Konings (2008) consider the changes operated in Turkey caused within the framework 
of its accession to the EU and the application of the European criteria. Moreover, 
another abundant area of research is the question of identity and how the otherness of 
Turkey, societal perceptions, socio-cultural constraints, Islam, euro-scepticism, etc. can 
affect the process of membership. This problematic can be found in Akşit, et al. (2010); 
Çarkoğlu (2004); Cenker (2008); Duran (2004); Kuran-Burçoglu (2007); Onis (1999);  
Robins (1996); Spiering (2007); Tacar (2007). 
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Magen and Morlino published in 2009 a book entitled “International Actors, 
Democratization and the Rule of Law: Anchoring Democracy”. This commendable 
work constitutes an attempt to create a model that assesses the evolution of democracy 
in countries with different types of relations with the EU. The authors’ hypothesis was 
that autocracies have tended to transform themselves into hybrid regimes, mere electoral 
democracies, to avoid international stigma and criticism. Therefore, the editors 
proposed to study a specific dimension of democracy (what they call the “prima inter 
pares”): Rule of Law. But the evolution of this dimension, divided into five indicators to 
allow the comparison, had to be linked to the role of international actors. Magen and 
Morlino announced their position in relation to the old domestic/international debate, 
clarifying that the premises of their study and combining both Rationalist and 
Constructivist approaches, reached the eclectic middle ground of “democratic 
anchoring”. In other words, according to the authors’ views, there is an interaction 
between the two dimensions, but the international actors are constrained by the 
domestic context, the stage where everything happens, and dependent on domestic 
actors, which means that they cannot be perceived as independent variables in a 
country’s democratisation process; their actions as democracy promoters are limited by 
the internal context. Nevertheless, the international dimension is not disregarded. In 
fact, it is taken into consideration and conceived as an external “democracy anchoring”. 
In order to assess its role and leverage power, the authors developed the 
EUCLIDA4 model that combined three layers of impact, cycles of change and other 
variables to apply to the five dimensions of the Rule of Law in a set of countries: 
Romania, Turkey, Ukraine and Serbia (each of the countries is at a different stage or 
type in its relationship with the EU). It is noteworthy that this model encompasses not 
only formal rule adoption, but also its implementation and internalisation, that, despite 
de difficulty to observe, were included in the scheme. In the same volume, Baracani 
makes a general overview of EU’s role as a democracy promoter, mainly in relation to 
the case studies encompassed in the book, and includes the institutional relations, 
financial assistance, socialisation through specific projects and even compares these 
with other international democracy promoters 
Aydin and Çarkoğlu (2006), in the same line of reasoning of Magen and 
Morlino, state that reforms in Turkey cannot only be explained by external factors, but 
                                                          
4 EUCLIDA: EU Cycles and Layers of International Democratic Anchoring. 
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by their interaction with the domestic realm. Therefore, these authors analysed the role 
of domestic actors in Turkish democratisation, such as the AKP, civil society and the 
military. However, these authors also recognised that, despite Turkey’s relations with 
various international organisations, “the EU is undoubtedly the most influential external 
actor” (Idem: 83), putting the responsibility of EU’s success in the credibility and 
consistency of its conditionality process. 
Kubicek (2005) studies the role of forces “from below”, i.e., the author focuses 
on Turkey’s civil society and political culture. His conclusion is that, although in the 
last decades Turkish civil society has been being reinforced, as well as the popular 
support for democracy, the EU-led changes are not a “revolution from below”, but 
rather a set of reforms taken without public support. However, if that means the EU 
plays a major role in the country, it also raises doubts concerning the depth of those 
reforms. In the same line of thought, Amichai Magen (2004), in a 2004 paper, analyses 
the evolution of the consideration of the external factors in the democratisation process 
and seeks to understand how influent they were on Turkey’s abolition of death penalty – 
mainly the EU. The study’s conclusions point out that the changes are hardly the result 
of normative external pressure alone; the existence of real incentives, on the other hand, 
helps trigger the reforms and decrease the lack of motivation on the Turkish side, 
However, the EU is important to set the agenda and the pressure it puts on certain 
subjects usually leads to reforms that are undertaken without internal “genuine and 
legitimate” (Idem: 79) acceptance. 
Tocci (2005) concluded from her study that the change process in Turkey is an 
endogenous one, but recognises that its timing is tightly linked to the accession process 
– sharing Magen’s views regarding the power of the EU as an agenda settler. However, 
these changes are increasingly perceived as taken for Turkey’s sake and not due to the 
process. Tocci believes that what the EU does is to give a “European twist” to the 
democratisation process of the country. Buhari (2009) adopts a very critical position 
towards the EU as a democracy promoter in Turkey, claiming (and trying to prove) that 
the studies that believe changes in the country would be impossible without the EU 
have several faults – they only adopt a top-down approach, they do not distinguish 
between policy adoption and implementation, they overlook EU’s internal dynamics. 
Besides, Europeanisation studies in general have various shortcomings and the lack of a 
clear definition produces different “academic results”. 
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McFaul (et al., 2007) and his team share with Buhari the concerns over the 
shortcomings in the study of the international dimension. According to this paper, 
current works need to overcome the traditional domestic/international dichotomy and 
open up the research to an interdisciplinary approach; moreover, academics tend to 
focus on the democratisation efforts of individual countries (that are never alone in this 
task), even creating geographical and temporal fragmentation that create disconnecting 
findings. Besides, the authors point out the tendency to study successful cases and to 
mix explanations with different types of outcomes. Therefore, they propose an approach 
that takes into consideration the internal/external interactions, specifying the type of 
transition, including cases of success and failure, among other suggestions that aim to 
improve the quality of these studies. 
More specifically about Turkey-EU relations, Kalaycıoğlu’s (2011) opinion is 
that “it is also fair to argue at the same time that Turkey’s relations with the EU have 
correlated with the country’s democratic reform process” (Idem: 265). To reach this 
conclusion, the author analysed the Turkish Constitutional amendments between 1982 
and 2009 and postulated that one should distinguish between two periods: 1993-2002 
was marked by a multi-partisan approach to the reforms in the country; and since 2002, 
in which the AKP monopolising the project and ignoring the opposition’s legislative 
initiatives. In a similar vein, Müftüler-Baç (2005) argued that Turkeys candidacy “has 
stimulated the Turkish political and legal reforsm and intensified the Europeanization 
project in Turkey” (Idem: 17). Therefore, this author attributed to the EU an effective 
leverage power over Turkey, based on the study of the political reforms between 2001 
and 2004. Diez (2005), after warning about the existence of four different meanings of 
the concept of Europeanisation (and not only one as most academics treat it – policy, 
political, societal and discursive Europeanisation), shares the view that the European 
dimension has influenced Turkey’s democratisation. 
Similarly, Özbudun and Gençkaya’s (2009) book links Turkish democratisation 
and Constitution-making. They analyse the Constitutional amendments achieved under 
the EU pressure and conclude that the Union is “a significant external actor that 
promotes democracy in Turkey” (Idem: 43). The authors scrutinise not only the 
Constitutional amendments, but also other legislative reforms, and devote particular 
attention to the impact of EU’s conditionality on legislative change in Turkey. They 
assume the efforts to improve the country’s legislation come from the European 
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Union’s stimuli and from the internal demands of a society that looks for a more 
democratic regime.   
As far as the main theme of this work is concerned – the influence of the 
European Union on the Turkish democratisation in the scope of the accession process –, 
there are three main works that come very close to it in terms of the subject they 
approach and that are, for that reason, analysed in detail: Açikmeşe (2010), Börzel & 
Soyaltin (2012), Usul (2011). In common, these works have their recent publication – 
two of them were published after the beginning of this thesis – and the fact that they 
came to fulfil a gap in the literature. Despite some similarities, these pieces of academic 
literature also present several differences.  
Beginning with the most recent, Börzel and Soyaltin (2012) wrote the paper 
“Europeanization in Turkey. Stretching a concept to its limits”5 using Turkey as a case 
study to understand the conditions for EU-induced domestic change, focusing on the 
Europeanisation process. The authors use the lens of rational choice and sociological 
institutionalism and claim that the conditions for domestic change are power 
asymmetries, regime type, domestic incentives and degrees of statehood. The 
conclusions point out that the acquis adoption in Turkey is selective, “decoupled from 
behavioural practices” and that domestic actors use the EU to legitimise their own 
political interests. Therefore, domestic change in Turkey is led by the domestic political 
agenda – there is a “Europeanisation a la carte” (Idem: 16).  
On the other side, the central thesis of Açikmese’s (2010) “Cycles of 
Europeanization in Turkey: the domestic impact of the EU political conditionality” is 
that this mechanism alone cannot result in domestic change – only when combined with 
internal and external factors. The author presents a set of perspectives on 
Europeanisation (historical, anthropological, and economic) and sums up stating that it 
constitutes an interactive process of change and a synthesis of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches. However, real change involves the implementation, acceptance and 
internalisation of those changes, and the impact of EU conditionality has to be 
perceived through a set of mediating domestic and external factors, such as the costs of 
compliance, government’s commitment, EU legitimacy, etc. Using this model, 
Açikmese studies two periods of Europeanisation (1999-2005 and from 2005 onward) 
                                                          
5 As a working paper and for its nature and characteristics, this article cannot be compared to a thesis – 
the common point is the subject under consideration. 
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and concludes that the first period was the “golden-age” of Europeanisation in Turkey 
(mainly since 2002), due to several constitutional amendments, harmonisation packages 
and other changes prompted by a favourable domestic and international environment. 
However, since 2005, Açikmese claims that Europeanisation was reversed, again 
because of internal and external conditions that diminished the enthusiasm and the 
results in terms of domestic changes. The present thesis will reassess these questions 
and seek for its own conclusions that may, or may not, confirm Açikmese’s findings. 
In a longer and more developed work, published as a book, Ali Usul (2011) 
analyses EU’s impact on Turkey democracy focusing on the conditionality process. 
After considering some theoretical concepts such as democracy, democratic 
consolidation and conditionality, the author divides Turkey-EU relations in two periods: 
pre and post-Helsinki, listing the reforms led by Turkey triggered by the influence and 
pressure of the EU. 
In the first period, Usul concluded that the EU was not an anchor for Turkish 
democratisation due to the lack of response and feedback from the side of the Union. 
The Helsinki summit, however, was the turning point of this situation. Afterwards, in 
the second period (1999-2007), there was higher compliance with European standards, 
which ended up being used by political elite to legitimise the changes. The new status of 
Turkey as a candidate and the employment of mechanisms to assess its performance 
increased EU’s influence on the country. Nevertheless, that influence could have been 
stronger if there was a clear signal regarding the beginning of negotiations, if 
conditionality did not become harder with time and if some European politicians would 
not have questioned Turkey’s Europeaness and the country’s possibility to join the 
Union. These raised doubts and harmed the Turkish effort. Usul’s conclusions partially 
match the ones reached by Açikmese (2010) but a comparison between the two works 
has to take into consideration their different lengths and the researchers’ options 
concerning time limits and periods. 
As it seems clear, this book touches some points that will be developed and 
matured in this work and some line are actually really close to this project. There are, in 
Usul’s book, very interesting points and approaches that this thesis does not ignore: it is 
a very good source of tertiary data and useful information or conclusions. For example, 
the analysis of democracy as a concept, the review of the existent literature on that field 
and the final conclusions constitute valuable arguments that will be presented at 
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opportune moments, enriching the discussion. Nonetheless, there are some differences 
that have to be highlighted.  
First, the author opted for emphasising material objective aspects (“material and 
political incentives”) in a “logic of consequences”; as showed, the approach of this work 
recognises this side, but also values ideational aspects, such as identity and the meaning 
attached to those material realities. Second, the separation of the issues proposed may 
have created an over-partitioning of all the measures and changes and hence losing the 
bigger picture, i.e. a more holistic perspective. Third, and although the results of this 
research have not become known yet, it seems that Ali Usul expected too much from 
Turkey, considering that the EU failed because the country “has not been radically 
transformed” (Usul, 2011: 163). However, one should be aware of the complexity of 
processes such as Europeanisation; it takes time (and much time) to accept, adopt, 
implement and internalise a whole set of new values, beliefs and practices. Any radical 
transformation, besides the high probability of its immediate rejection, could jeopardise 
all the efforts made in the last decades and develop a “reform fatigue” that may be 
already occurring currently. Finally, Usul’s work provides neither the perspective nor 
the action of other international organisations in the country and they should be taken 
into consideration as they revealed themselves very useful as an “alarm bell”, as it will 
be showed later. Therefore, Ali Usul’s work of deepening the understanding on this 
subject proved to be very important, as the research on the topic had been clearly 
insufficient, and it constitutes another relevant contribution to the improvement of the 
knowledge and the enrichment of the related literature.  
Thus, it became clear that this research area has been object of the academics’ 
attention in its diverse aspects. All the above mentioned studies contributed to the 
improvement of the comprehension of these questions and all of them constitute a solid 
base on which this work has been founded. In relation to them, this thesis has the 
advantage of being able to be inspired by a bigger amount of literature and to extend the 
study until the end of 2009, including some dynamics that occurred in the meanwhile. 
Moreover, it aims to fulfil the gaps that were mentioned in due course and to seek to 
clarify the greyer and blurred areas that divide the community and create difficulties in 
establishing theories widely accepted that consolidate and strengthen the knowledge 
about the subject.  
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3. Questions, objectives and concepts 
 
Taking into consideration what was mentioned above, there is one major 
question that this work seeks to answer: 
The European Union seeks to promote democratic transition and consolidation 
through its enlargement process; Turkey, as a candidate, has been required to improve 
its democracy. Therefore, in this context, which role has the EU played in Turkey’s 
democratisation process? 
This main question embraces the more important aspects this research pretends 
to cover and thus it includes a reference to the actors involved (European Union and 
Turkey) and the core dynamics under analysis (accession, democratisation and external 
influence). Moreover, several other subsidiary questions emerged when reading the 
literature in question. The function of those queries is also to pave the way to the final 
answers; they constitute guiding lines for the present research and the outline of this 
work respects this inquiry. Some of the questions are the following: 
 
1. What is the role of IR theories in research? [Part I, Chapter 1] 
1.1. What are the main assumptions of the most important IR theories? 
1.2. What does Constructivism proposes at the epistemological, 
ontological and methodological levels? 
2. What are Constructivism’s main contributions to the thesis? [Part I, Chapter 
2] 
2.1. What are Constructivism’s main contributions to European 
integration? 
2.2. What do substantive theories of European integration propose? 
2.3. What are Constructivism’s main contributions to Turkey-EU 
relations? 
3. What is democracy? [Part II, Chapter 3] 
3.1. What is democracy transition? And democracy consolidation? 
3.2. What is the difference between transition and consolidation? 
3.3. How can democracy be measured? 
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4. How does the European Union promote democracy abroad? [Part II, 
Chapter 4] 
4.1. What is the importance of democracy for the European Union? 
4.2. What is the role of the accession process in promoting democracy 
abroad? 
4.3. How do Europeanisation and conditionality work? 
5. How can EU’s democracy promotion be assessed? [Part II, Chapter 5] 
5.1. What variables need to be considered? 
5.2. What are the main methodological concerns to take into account? 
6. How has Turkey’s state evolved since the Ottoman Empire? [Part III, 
Chapter 6] 
6.1. What have been the main changes of Turkish society? 
7. How has Turkey’s relationship with West evolved since the Ottoman Empire 
era? [Part III, Chapter 7] 
7.1. How have Turkey and the West related to each other? 
7.2. How were the beginnings of Turkey-EU relations? 
8. What are Turkey’s social and cultural characteristics? [Part III, Chapter 8] 
8.1. What is the role of identity? 
8.2. What are Turkey’s current main social, cultural and political 
issues? 
8.3. What is Turkish political cultural like? 
9. How have Turkey – EU relations evolved since 1999? [Part IV, Chapter 9] 
9.1. Which legislative changes have been accomplished since 1999? 
10. How has the model to asses EU’s influence on Turkey been built? [Part IV, 
Chapter 10] 
10.1. How has Turkey’s democracy evolved from 1999 to 2009? 
10.2. How have the independent variables evolved from 1999 to 2009? 
11. How co-related are Turkish democratic performance and the independent 
variables? [Part IV, Ch. 11] 
11.1. What may the results epitomise in terms of the EU’s role on 
Turkish democratisation? 
11.2. What are the most and the least important factors for the 
consolidation of Turkish democracy? 
11.3. What lessons can be drawn from these results? 
16 
 
As a consequence, many research objectives come out as well with the same 
function of leading this research and targeting it towards the final aim of bringing new 
answers or supporting existing ones. The research objectives of this thesis are the 
following:  
 To understand Constructivism’s main ontological, epistemological and 
methodological assumptions [Part I, Ch. 1]; 
 To present the main aspects of the inter-paradigmatic debate [Part I, Ch. 1]; 
 To analyse the research problem under the Constructivist perspective, introducing 
concepts used by this theory, such as identity, socialisation and norms [Part I, Ch. 
2]; 
 To define and operationalise key-concepts, such as ‘democracy’, ‘transition’ and 
‘consolidation’ [Part II, Ch. 3]; 
 To analyse the evolution of democracy as a central value for the European Union 
[Part II, Ch. 4]; 
 To understand the functioning of external democracy promotion [Part II, Ch. 4]; 
 To explain EU’s enlargement policy and its relation with democracy promotion 
[Part II, Ch. 4]; 
 To understand the dynamics of mechanisms and processes involved in democracy 
promotion by the EU, such as Europeanisation and conditionality [Part II, Ch. 4]; 
 To create a model that seeks to assess EU’s action as a democracy promoter [Part 
II, Ch. 5]; 
 To explore Turkey’s historical, cultural, political and philosophical background 
[Part III, Ch. 6, 7 and 8]; 
 To describe the recent history of Turkey [Part III, Ch. 6]; 
 To understand Turkey’s approach to Europe [Part III, Ch. 7]; 
 To describe the characteristics and dynamics of the Turkish society (identity, 
representations, values, beliefs, culture, etc.) [Part III, Ch. 8]; 
 To analyse the history of Turkey-EU relations prior to 1999 [Part III, Ch. 7]; 
 To analyse the history of Turkey-EU relations since 1999 [Part IV, Ch. 9]; 
 To assess the evolution of Turkey’s democracy according to different sources [Part 
IV, Ch. 10]; 
 To correlate Turkey-EU relations with different phases of europeanisation/ 
domestic change [Part IV, Ch. 11]; 
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 To understand EU’s influence on the Turkish democratisation process [Part IV, Ch. 
11]; 
 To recognise the strengths and weaknesses of EU’s mechanisms of democracy 
promotion in Turkey [Part IV, Ch. 11]. 
 
Regarding concepts, these are, as Blaikie wrote (2001: 129), the “building 
blocks” of social theories. And, according to the same author, there are four traditions 
regarding the use of concepts in Social Sciences. In harmony with our research project, 
both the operationalisation and hermeneutical traditions fit our purposes. 
Following the first one, the concepts are defined and transformed into 
measurable variables. This approach aims to reach a considerable level of accuracy and 
replicability. Variables are conceptualised and operationalised through their 
identification, establishing relations, hypotheses, specifying measurement procedures, 
indicators, and so on. This tradition is, understandably, criticised by the fact that it 
assumes that a limited number of selected values reflect all the aspects, ignoring the 
interpretation of those values and data. Therefore, the hermeneutical tradition is 
eclectically used, putting more emphasis on the interpretative process. For this 
approach, researchers constitute a mediator between daily language and the Social 
Sciences’ technical language. This bottom-up approach implies, more than a translation, 
an interpretation of the gathered data, capturing people’s concepts and their meanings: 
“the social actors have to teach the researcher how they understand their world, i.e. what 
everyday concepts and interpretations (lay theories) they use to make sense of it.” 
(Idem: 139). 
As usual, these concepts have to be displayed in theories or theoretical 
assumptions that relate them, in order to reach the answer to the central problem. Our 
theory development is based on the “researcher’s theory” type (Idem), according to 
which the researcher uses the theory as a source of hypotheses to be tested, usually 
including a set of connected statements about the relations between concepts, with a 
certain degree of generalisation and possibly empirically testable. 
In this sense, the central concepts for this project are the following: 
conditionality; democracy; democratic transition and consolidation; 
enlargement/accession; Europeanisation; identity; perception; socialisation. 
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4. Research strategies: methodology, sources and investigation cycle 
From the four options of research strategies (induction, deduction, retroduction 
and abduction) Blaikie (2001) presents in his book on social research, this study will 
adopt two of them: deductive and abductive. 
The European Union is considered to be a regional power that promotes 
democracy in third countries worldwide – it is, as matter of fact, one of the main 
objectives of its Foreign Policy. This is the central assumption that will lead this work 
to the analysis of a specific case: Turkey. This case study will provide the arguments to 
support or refute that main assumption, in a deductive manner. In other words, the goal 
is to confirm if the general theory that states that the EU effectively promotes 
democracy among candidate countries is correct in this particular case. In this case, data 
will be gathered not simply to accumulate knowledge, but to test the theory. This is the 
logic of a deductive case study:  
“The analyst begins with a theory, uses it to interpret a case, and 
simultaneously utilizes the case to suggest important refinements in the 
theory, which can then be tested on other cases or perhaps even on 
other aspects of the same case.” (Levy, 2002: 136) 
It is this perspective that will take us to the already stated objective of measuring 
democracy and democracy quality, as well as to use quantitative data and statistical 
analysis, for instance, in order to evaluate the evolution in time and the path of Turkish 
democracy, having always in mind the presence of the Union in the process. Other 
methodologies will be used too, namely qualitative ones. 
Nevertheless, apart from this side of the analysis, it matters to understand not 
only the formal aspects of EU’s influence on Turkish democracy, but also the 
population’s perception in relation to democracy and European Union itself. It is 
precisely at this point of the investigation that concepts like identity and perception will 
take the lead, as it is sought to find out and to describe an internal vision of the problem 
and not only imposing an external one – discourse analysis and interviews, together 
with other mainly qualitative tools will be used here in the scope of an abductive 
research strategy – our second choice. Once statistical patterns and correlations are not 
understandable per se, it is necessary to discover the meanings and motives people give 
their own actions, reinforcing and consolidating the conclusions. As Blaikie (2001: 115) 
writes: 
“Interpretive social science seeks to discover why people do what they 
do by uncovering the largely tacit, mutual knowledge, the symbolic 
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meanings, motives and rules, which provide the orientations for their 
actions.” 
It is this research strategy that meets the ‘intersubjectivity’ concept that 
constitutes one of the cornerstones in the Constructivist reasoning: 
“Members of a particular group or society share common meanings and 
interpretations, and they maintain them through their ongoing interaction 
together. Therefore, social explanations need to go beyond the specific 
meanings that a social actor gives to his/her actions and needs to deal 
with typical meanings produced by typical social actors. This involves the 
use of approximations and abstractions.” (Idem: 115). 
 
In this sense, it is found a close connection between the Constructivist thought and the 
principles of the abductive research strategy.  
Thus, bringing together these two research strategies, this work is pretended to 
reach the explanations, predictions and evaluations allowed by the deductive thought, at 
the same time abduction permits the exploration, description and understanding of the 
problem.  
 In terms of data sources and types, this research will include primary, secondary 
and tertiary data: primary data in the form of interviews and official documents; 
secondary data will consist of statistics and other figures presented by institutions; and 
finally, tertiary data will be based on other authors’ contributions.  
Both quantitative and qualitative research strategies will be used, as already 
mentioned. The analysis of numerical data (like indexes, evaluations and other scores 
from international institutions that provide information on democracy or any of its 
components) is included in the first type of data collecting. This kind of figures will be 
transformed into scales and indices, used to build graphs and to provide information for 
further understanding of the reality in question.  
Focused and in-depth interviews and content analysis are two examples of 
qualitative data whose results are to be carefully analysed so that it is possible to can 
describe, associate and categorise the information and reach the project’s research 
objectives.  
 As mentioned above, one of the tools used to pursue the objectives of this thesis 
was interviewing. The reasons behind this choice are various, but interconnected. First 
of all, collecting data through interviews is a way of bringing new information and 
perspectives to the study. Not only that: data collected represents the vision of insiders, 
that is, the perceptions of Turks that are either somehow more directly related to the 
20 
 
process of democratisation or are affected by it. This is one of the most important 
reasons why interviewing was chosen – it aims to “understand the meaning of the 
phenomenon under analysis in the way it is perceived by the participants” (Savoie-Zajc, 
2003: 279). More than recognising the “reform fatigue” caused by a long accession 
process, it matters to listen to those that feel the lack of motivation and the frustration 
for working with the EU in a daily basis. 
 Theoretically speaking, opting for interviewing as one of the research methods 
implies sharing a set of assumptions. As Warren (2002: 83) wrote, it is a more 
constructionist than a positivist approach that regards participants not as “passive 
conduits of information”, but “meaning makers”. Therefore, the aim of the interviews 
was “to derive interpretation, not facts or laws, from respondent talk” (Idem: 83). In this 
context, Foucault’s conception of discourse as something that overcomes mere speaking 
emerges; it constitutes a social practice itself (Iñiguez, 2004: 90). Again, this implies 
another previous assumption: language is more than a representation of reality; in fact, 
it constructs reality itself or, as Ibáñez (2004: 33) stated, it “makes realities” and, when 
something is said, “there is always a sense that goes beyond the meaning those words 
convey” (Iñiguez, 2004: 64), which is part of the phenomena under scrutiny. There is, 
Part I presents, some significant Constructivist proposals about the role of language and 
its meaning for reality and research. 
 Thus, and having these and other authors in mind, interviewing was a research 
option that sought to enrich the thesis. The interviews were conducted during the visits 
to Turkey. The first set of inquiries was done in Istanbul in April 2013 and the second 
round was conducted in Ankara in May 2013. On the European side, a stay in Brussels 
(March 2013) allowed the conduction of brief interviews (or rather almost informal 
conversations) with officials working at the European Commission who used to deal 
with the Turkish accession process. However, as these interviews have not been 
recorded and as the interviewees asked for anonymity, there content is only used in very 
specific contexts and in broad lines.  There was also another interview to the Turkish 
Ambassador in Lisbon, in March 2013. The planning of the interviews took into 
consideration the suggestions given by the relevant literature on the subject and they 
were conducted in the institutions of the interviewees for about an hour each. The 
selection of the interviewees was based on their distribution among four groups: 
Turkish academic elite; Turkish political elite; Turkish civil society representatives and 
EU representatives in Turkey.  
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 Concerning the first group, interviews had been led to several academics from 
the University of Ankara, Fatih University and METU and focused on their academic 
vision as regards the general subject of Turkey-EU relations and more specific questions 
about the EU’s influence on the country. The Turkish political elite’s group embraced 
diplomats and officials from the Ministry for EU Affairs; finally, the representatives of 
civil society came from different types of organisations: a Business Editor from a media 
group; a member of the Journalists and Writers Foundation and a coordinator of a 
women’s rights NGO6. The visions of these interviewees helped the reinforcement of 
some arguments; they provided fresh and different opinions on the subject and all of 
them have positively contributed to the improvement of this thesis – they revealed their 
perspectives, their interpretation of the events and offered some real examples to 
support their discourse. 
 Yet, qualitative interviews were not the only method used to gather data. In fact, 
a very brief on-line survey has been made and asked to be answered by Turks7. The 
objective of this approach was not to introduce a representative study on how some 
people perceived the role of the European Union on their country (or on the country 
they, as researchers, were studying). The results from this survey will only be used to 
support or weaken other arguments and hypotheses; it matters, most of all, to realise 
whether different types of individuals and their occupation (as academics, university 
students, government officials, etc.) see the EU differently and whether there is a 
consensus regarding this organisation’s contribution to the improvement of the Turkish 
democracy.  
  As a conclusion, these research steps are schematised below (Figure 1): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 More details on the interviews can be found on Appendix 1, Table 1 (page 391). 
7 Appendix 2 (Figures 2 to 6) provides the characterisation of the respondents at various levels 
(geographical origin, education, age, etc.). 
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5. Thesis outline 
 
Taking into consideration the problem, questions and objectives delineated for 
this work, its structure was developed around four main parts, each of them divided into 
chapters and sub-chapters. Part I, Constructivism and the inter-paradigmatic debate, 
constitutes an attempt to contextualise the subject in the light of International Relations 
theories, which are known for embracing a very active and dynamic debate. In this 
sense, the main tenets of Social Constructivism are analysed, as well as some of the 
divergences within the Constructivist group (Chapter 1). At the same time, this 
approach will be compared to other theoretical proposals, like Realism and Liberalism. 
In the end of the first part, the theoretical considerations earlier analysed are linked to 
the subjects under study (Chapter 2). 
Researcher’s theory 
Refinement 
THEORY 
Hypotheses 
Testable 
propositions 
Data collecting 
Data analysis 
Empirical 
generalisations 
Interpreting 
deduction 
operationalisation 
abduction 
hermeneutics 
Source: Adapted from Blaikie, 2001: 158 
 
Figure 1: Research strategies 
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In Part II, Democracy and the European Union, theoretical considerations 
regarding the concept of ‘democracy’ are made, in order to clarify its definition and 
utilisation in the present context. Many authors’ contributions are taken into account to 
achieve the most comprehensive definition that will guide the rest of the thesis. The 
same happens with the reflection upon the concepts of ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’, 
whose boundaries are rather blurred, harming the academic work (Chapter 3). After the 
definition of these initial assumptions, some thoughts are devoted to the possibility of 
measuring democracy – one of the objectives of this thesis. As a matter of fact, 
matching a good definition with the best operationalisation possibility is one of the key 
elements of the work, given the fact that it will provide the tools needed to achieve its 
main objectives (Chapter 5). Besides, the European Union will be studied in the context 
of democracy promotion – how important this value is for the EU and how it promotes 
democracy abroad are two questions to be developed on chapter 4, as well as the 
investigation of the accession process and the mechanisms of conditionality and 
Europeanisation involved.  The model that resulted from the operationalisation of the 
concept of ‘democracy’ and that will be applied to the Turkish case is presented on 
chapter 5, together with some important considerations regarding this conceptualisation. 
Part III, The case study: Turkey, encompasses a wide approach to this country: 
Chapter 6 is a brief survey on the Turkish history since the Ottoman Empire until the 
2000s, with a special emphasis on construction and consolidation of Modern Turkey 
and on Mustafa Kemal’s action and the first steps of the Turkish democracy. On chapter 
7, it is possible to find the country’s history vis-à-vis its relations with the Western 
world – mainly Europe and the European Union (until 1999). The socio-cultural profile 
of the country is outlined in the following section (Chapter 8) and provides a set of 
information and interpretation of some features of both the country and its population. It 
is important to understand here what is Turks’ mindset like, how their identity has been 
interpreted and re-interpreted in time, their views on many important subjects - their 
integration in the European Union, the way they perceive their democracy, the relation 
with the military, the role of Islam, etc. The contextualisation provided by this third part 
is of utmost importance because it is only through it that it is possible to understand 
some fundamental dynamics. 
Finally, Part IV is Bringing everything together: EU, Turkey and democracy. 
Therefore, it will be in this last section that all the components of this thesis will after 
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all meet and intersect with the aim of finding answers for our initial questions and 
doubts. The history of Turkey-EU relations since 1999 will bring the moments of 
change induced by the EU and the Turkish reaction to those requirements (Chapter 9), 
the model created and presented previously will be further explained and applied on 
chapter 10 and in the end Chapter 11 will embrace the interpretation and final results of 
all the process. It is part of the plan to find answers to the questions raised initially, to 
look again at the hypotheses proposed and ultimately to come to important conclusions 
regarding the initial theory. 
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PART I – IR, CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE INTER-
PARADIGMATIC DEBATE  
 
1. International Relations and the theoretical debate 
1.1. Acknowledging a reality, building a science 
 
 Relations between states are not a recent phenomenon. Batistella (2006: 21) 
traces back to the seventeenth century the birth of a real international system; real in the 
sense that only then were the interactions between sovereign states “sufficiently regular 
so that the behaviour of each and all of them would be a necessary factor” to take into 
consideration when studying one’s behaviour (Idem). This international dimension was 
further consolidated with the Treaties of Westphalia which politically organised the 
European societies and emphasised the principles of both internal and external 
sovereignty (Idem: 22). From that moment onwards, interactions at the international 
level have grown: trade, politics, diplomacy, war and peace were some of the domains 
in which this increasing exchange between states has been noticed. In fact, interactions 
were intense enough to trigger the First World War some centuries later.  
 After the War, in 1919, the discipline of International Relations (IR) was created 
at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth, as an attempt to assemble a corpus of 
knowledge that would contribute to prevent atrocities like the ones experienced in the 
recent war. The emergence of IR within this context supports Schmidt’s (2005: 4) 
argument that important developments in international politics shape the evolution of IR 
as a science. However, Schmidt (Idem) also warns about the more complex and less 
known history of the discipline; according to him, the contribution of several authors 
have been erased from the memory of theorists and sometimes contemporary 
approaches are the repetition of past discourses.8 
 Although the discipline was formed in the early twentieth century, its autonomy 
from other fields has been questioned ever since (Idem: 5). As a matter of fact, various 
other sciences dealt partially with what would have become International Relations’ 
                                                          
8 The historiography of IR exceeds the scope of this thesis and cannot be developed here. For further 
details, cf. Schmidt, 2005. 
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object: International Law, Diplomatic History, Geography, Anthropology, etc. But IR 
emerged with a transdisciplinary character and as a means to build a coherent body of 
knowledge, synthesising the other disciplines. Yet, and although in the UK it has been 
created as an independent field, American IR have been developed under the scope of 
Political Science (Idem: 6). 
 As Batistella (2006: 15-15) explains, IR’s object of study is widely accepted 
either; on the contrary, it is quite controversial, mainly due to philosophical 
considerations about science. The international (or global) phenomena are not 
reproducible in a lab and therefore cannot be considered irrefutable. These assumptions 
are based on the belief that social sciences should follow the model of exact or natural 
sciences, even though their objects of study represent completely different phenomena. 
But the point here is that not only scientists outside IR think like that; there are 
internationalists who conceive IR in that way, supporting one of the several divisions 
within International Relations. The lack of unity of this discipline is also another matter 
for concern when trying to prove its autonomous status. On the other hand, however, it 
is due to these major inter-paradigmatic debates that this so recent discipline has been 
able to mature its assumptions and to develop the body of knowledge it is already able 
to provide in less than a century of existence. Schmidt (2005: 15) recognises that these 
debates contributed not only to the consolidation of the intellectual autonomy of the 
science, but also to the split between political theory and the theories of IR. 
 Since the beginning of IR, theorists started to establish their own paradigms 
(Idem: 9). Idealism was the first approach to the discipline, the one that emerged in-
between the two world wars. The first grand debate of IR was exactly between Idealism 
and Realism (defined by many as the “traditional paradigm” and created after the II 
World War) (Idem). This opposition was unavoidable since “the central features [of 
Idealism] are the exact antithesis of the tenets attributed to Realism” (Idem: 10): the 
former sought to build institutions that would prevent war and the latter focused on 
states as “power-maximiser” actors.9 The second debate was influenced by the 
behaviourist turn in other Social Sciences and was based on methodological issues that 
opposed traditionalists and behaviourists (Kurki & Wight, 2010: 18; Schmidt, 2005: 
11). The latter were against a historicist and interpretive approach in IR; on the contrary, 
they supported Positivism in the sense that only observable data would allow its 
                                                          
9 Further details on these theories will be provided later on the chapter. 
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collection and the subsequent disclosure of patterns that, in turn, would allow the 
discovery of laws. They would even criticise the realists for not adopting measurable 
core concepts that would bring a scientific character to their theories (Kurki & Wight, 
2010: 18). Morton Kaplan was on the positivist side (Schmidt, 2005: 11), while Hedley 
Bull and Morgenthau argued that the study of IR, on the contrary, “involved significant 
conceptual and interpretative judgements” (Kurki & Wight, 2010: 19). Kurki and Wight 
(Idem) concluded that behaviourism has lost its impetus in IR theory; yet, it left 
enduring principles still nowadays reflected in the emphasis put on hypothesis testing, 
statistical analysis and data manipulation as very common and widespread practices. 
 Finally, concerning the third debate, opinions diverge. Schmidt (2005: 11) 
quotes the literature that conceives the third debate as the opposition between realists, 
structuralists and pluralists. In this trend, Realism began to be questioned and 
alternatives criticising its premises arose. Kurki and Wight (2010: 19-20) adopted a 
different perspective: a third debate occurred in the 70s and 80s and was based on 
theory choice questions (since paradigms cannot be compared, which one to choose?). 
As Realism, Marxism and Pluralism were incommensurable, “theory choice became 
largely a matter of aesthetics” (Idem: 20). From the mid-1980s onwards, the debate was, 
in fact, several “sub-debates”: explaining vs. understanding; Positivism vs. 
Postpositivism; and rationalism vs. reflectivism (Idem: 20-25). 
 The first sub-debate opposes a “scientific” and an “interpretive/hermeneutic” 
approach. The dilemma a researcher faces in this regard is whether to choose or to 
follow the model and methods of natural sciences (interpretation is not able to be 
included within a scientific framework, as it implies empirical10 justification) or to focus 
on internal aspects that require their interpretation, such as beliefs, measures and 
reasons (Idem: 21, 22). 
 Another choice an IR theorist is faced with is between Positivism and 
Postpositivism. Postpositivism, as mentioned, values systematic observation and 
collection of data. It is important to safeguard, nevertheless, that positivists do not have 
necessarily to be empiricists. On the other side, postpositivists cannot be said to 
constitute a group per se; in fact, they share the rejection of Positivism to study social 
processes, but they subscribe to a wide variety of intellectual traditions (Idem: 22-23). 
                                                          
10 Empiricist epistemology supports that valid knowledge is built from facts experienced by human 
senses.  
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Accepting the importance of meaning, beliefs and language, they are automatically in 
line with the interpretive approach, the best way to “uncov[er] the deep meanings that 
exist beneath the surface appearance of observed reality” (Idem: 24). 
 Rationalism and reflectivism are two concepts used by Keohane in 1988 to 
represent a theoretical debate that was taking place: rationalism was methodologically 
linked to Positivism and regarded individuals as utility maximisers, whose social 
dimension was ignored by a deductive strategy that sought for universal laws; 
reflectivism was pointed out as having rejected Positivism and emphasising 
reflexitivity. Nonetheless, reflectivists were criticised by the same internationalist for 
not presenting a coherent research programme (Idem: 24, 25). In truth, more than two 
decades have passed since this criticism and reflectivists (organised in several schools) 
have started to present theoretical proposals and to make important contributions to IR – 
one just needs to consider the growth of Feminist School, the Green Theory or, more 
significantly, Constructivism. This fourth debate can, therefore, be summarised under 
these two concepts: rationalism and reflectivism. They are the most abstract 
denominations between which all theoretical discussions have taken place over the past 
two decades. In fact, Fearon and Wendt (2005: 52) highlight that both rationalism and 
Constructivism should be “viewed pragmatically as analytical tools, rather than as (...) 
empirical descriptions of the world”. This implies that neither one nor the other can be 
regarded as substantive theories of IR; on the contrary, they may be seen as meta-
theories. 
 Meta-theories make general ontological, epistemological and methodological 
proposals (Segbers, et al., 2006: 11) and, through those assumptions, they guide how 
researchers see the world and theorise it (Kurki & Wight, 2010: 15). For example, 
rationalism has an individualist ontology, while Constructivism prefers a social (holist) 
ontology (Fierke, 2010: 180,181). These positions bring effective consequences for the 
research activity – whether the individual is the centre of the research as the unit of 
analysis (and ‘individual’ here can also mean ‘state’) or he needs to be framed within a 
broader social context and, in that case, the environment has to be taken into 
consideration as well, shifting the focus of attention. Other differences between both 
meta-theories will certainly become clearer when the Constructivist premises are 
presented later on. However, it is worth emphasising that both contribute to IR 
indirectly; substantive theories play a more direct role and are based on meta-theories, 
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although they cannot be “read off of it”  (Wendt, 1999: 6). 
As Finnemore and Sikkink (2001: 393) confirm, Constructivism has a different 
level of abstraction than the one of theories like Realism or Liberalism, for example, 
and, since it is based upon the Social Theory, it “offers a framework for thinking about 
the nature of social life and social interaction, but makes no claims about their specific 
content”. Wendt (1999: 7) had already stated that “Constructivism is not a theory of 
international politics. Constructivist sensibilities encourage us to look at how actors are 
socially constructed, but they do not tell us which actors to study”.  
As mentioned above, Rationalism follows an individualist ontology, a kind of 
reductionist approach that stresses smaller composing elements rather than the whole 
system. Besides, for rationalists, actors are pre-social beings and the only role the 
environment plays is to constrain the action of those same actors, who are perceived as 
followers of the logic of consequences (Barnett, 2008: 167) – individuals, thus, are 
“self-interested utility maximizers” (Guzzini, 2000: 163) and choose rationally based on 
a (rational) ranking of preferences, which eases the deduction of their behaviour, since 
their preferences are acknowledged (Idem: 163). Truth is, therefore, possible to be 
achieved through scientific methods of observation that allow the establishment of 
causal links. These premises certainly inspired theories such as Neo-realism and are 
tightly related to Positivism – hence its distance from the post-positivist schools of 
thought. 
Positivism, similarly, recognises that reality is exogenous to the scientific 
endeavour, but that it is not impossible to be grasped through the correct methods of 
investigation; through Rational Choice, for instance, all elements can be described and 
analysed and although the output of actors’ behaviour may not necessarily be wise, the 
input that originated it was rational, because the principles behind the decision-making 
process are based on their own roadmap, which allows their analysis and subsequent 
predictability (Segbers, et al., 2006: 8, 9). Empirical data about reality can be, according 
to positivists, extracted through operationalisation (Behnke, 2006: 52) and knowledge 
arises from gathering observable data that is, in its turn, transformed into patterns and 
subsequent laws (Kurki & Wight, 2010: 18). This is not something unexpected for a 
researcher, but the difference from pos-positivists, for example, lies in the fact that the 
latter consider data the very reality; rather than representative of a reality, data (in the 
form of discourses and narratives)  is “productive of that reality” (Behnke, 2006: 52).  
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In fact, both within the rationalist and reflectivist or positivist and post-positivist 
fields, it is possible to find some theories that, based on those meta-theories, draw more 
specific considerations about international relations. Idealism was the first and inspired 
the creation of the discipline, but Realism followed it and gained a great importance in 
IR theoretical debate. Others made their contribution as well, strengthening IR maturity 
and widening its answers (sometimes too broadly to be considered one single discipline 
or science). 
Thus, along the axis whose extremes are constituted by the concepts of 
Rationalism and Reflectivism, a wide variety of ontological, epistemological and 
methodological assumptions are discussed and negotiated, fulfilling that line with 
various options for all IR researchers to be able to frame or contextualise their 
investigation, because, as Sørensen (2008: 5) wrote, “since facts do not speak for 
themselves, theories are necessary in the discipline of International Relations (…), in 
order to structure our view of the world”. Segbers, et al. (2006: 5) go further on this 
consideration and argue that even if the researcher is not aware of IR theories, it is not 
possible to produce knowledge without them, as they constitute general assumptions 
about the reality one is trying to produce theoretical knowledge about.  
Yet, when reflecting upon the current state of theoretical debates, Wæver (2010: 
311) stated the following: 
“The [IR academic] journals do not want to publish new theories 
all the time – the disciplinary rationality is that we should have a 
relatively limited set of theories (produced by the scholars at the 
top of the pyramid), and then others are supposed to use, test, 
and modify mildly. (…) Today, articles use lots of theory, and 
apply or test it – only it is not IR11 theory! The IR theory map 
lurks in the background as meta-references, but the operative 
theory in a typical IO article is a branch of sociological 
Institutionalism, then a theory from economics, and then an ad 
hoc home-made model of norms or institution building”. 
These considerations are worth being taken into account. Although meta-
references are present (and this applies to this thesis), there are room for manoeuvre in 
terms of combining different perspectives and (hopefully) producing innovative 
accounts on such a complex and dynamic reality that is the one analysed by the 
International Relations discipline. Thus, and as it will be explained in the next chapter, 
                                                          
11 IR in this context signifies the academic journal “International Relations” and not the discipline. 
Similarly, below, IO signifies the journal “International Organization” and not the institutions. 
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this thesis combines Constructivism with Sociological Institutionalism, and not only 
uses postpositivist methodologies, but also some more traditional ones, such as data 
manipulation and statistical analysis. In an article in which the authors sought to 
combine Rationalism and Constructivism and show that these two conceptions may 
have some common points, Fearon and Wendt wrote that “there may be much to be 
gained by using the tools of one to try to answer the questions that tend to be asked 
primarily by the other. Such cross-paradigmatic exchange (...) is (...) the most fruitful 
way to advance”. Yet, as it will be shown, not all constructivists (and rationalists, 
probably) agree with this eclecticism. 
  
1.2. IR theories: several options 
 
 This section does not pretend to provide a complete guide through all the 
theories of IR available to a researcher or student of the discipline. In point of fact, it 
pretends to formulate very briefly some of the main arguments of a couple of schools of 
thought, as well as to justify why those proposals were not selected for this thesis. 
Another important disclaimer at this level is that the choice of Constructivism to guide 
this work does not constitute a militant position for this theory (or meta-theory) and a 
stance against all the others. As mentioned above, researchers are given room of 
manoeuvre to choose the best theory that fits their purposes in terms of investigation 
given the subject they select or even the objectives they have in mind – improving 
knowledge and diffusing it among the academic peers is different from intervening 
politically and influencing the decision-making policies; although possibly 
complementary, these rationales are not commonly conjugated and they may entail 
different theoretical approaches too. 
 Idealism was the first grand theory of IR. Although Cravinho (2002: 107) 
recognises that it is reductionist to call the set of intellectuals that devoted their research 
to IR between the two world wars ‘idealists’ for they were too diverse, the fact is that 
this school was named like that because there was a strong commitment by the 
intellectuals to “understand and influence” (Idem: 108) the changes at the international 
level. Norma Angell (Nobel Peace Prize in 1933), in her IR best-seller “The Great 
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Illusion”12, argued that the changes the world was experiencing reshaped the way the 
objectives of war were able to be achieved; in other words, Angell believed that the use 
of force was not an effective way to reach those objectives anymore and that, therefore, 
it would be necessary to focus the efforts on an internationalist education and on the 
development of pacifist techniques of conflict resolution (Idem: 110). Due to this 
normative and idealist approach, the first generation of IR intellectuals have been 
regarded as the followers of a “nice but absolutely naïve” Idealism (Idem: 108). 
 Batistella (2006: 155), despite de considerations of the previous author about the 
lack of a common ground among all idealists, puts forward some fundamental principles 
of this school, such as the belief in the progress and the equality of all individuals; they 
emphasised cooperation, the existence of an international community and believed that 
there would not be social or political obstacles to a rational external policy (Idem: 156). 
In 1918, Woodrow Wilson’s speech originated the creation and development of the 
liberal idealist approach that stressed its pacifist tenets, the belief in human kindness 
and the need to institutionalise the international society to eliminate anarchy, war and 
injustice (Idem: 158, 159). Based on the Kantian thesis, liberal idealists supported the 
theory of democratic peace and favoured the creation of the Society of Nations, 
emphasising the importance of civic education and interdependence (Idem: 164-168). 
 Andrew Moravcsik, influenced by Locke, reinforces the role of individual 
Liberalism by postulating that the state simply represents the individual at the 
international scene – it is not the main actor, it is not the only actor and it is not a 
unitary actor (Idem: 176). In this sense, Moravcsik moves away from the state-centric 
version of Liberalism of Hedley Bull (follower of the English School, the first variant of 
the modern Liberalism) (Idem: 157, 171). In fact, these represent Idealism’s evolution 
towards Liberalism; the latter denied Idealism’s normative character and the privilege of 
the institutional dimension (Idem: 157), even though the promotion of peace (and 
democracy) remained as a central principle of Liberalism, since it was a major condition 
for trade. 
 Idealism and Liberalism do not constitute, given the above presented 
characteristics, the most suitable theories for dealing with the subject under 
consideration in this thesis. In fact, and when dealing with Turkey-EU relations and the 
democratisation of this candidate country, Liberalism would emphasise the role played 
                                                          
12 This book was originally published in 1909 and sold 2 million copies (Cravinho, 2002: 110). 
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by the economic dimension in the development or improvement of Turkey’s democracy 
and would, as well, base all the interest of the Turks concerning the accession on its 
material (economic) dimension. From our perspective, that seems reductionist; a wide 
variety of other variables need to be taken into consideration when analysing these 
relations: their historical tradition and context, the socio-cultural profile of the country 
and of the organisation, their mutual need for adaptation, etc. Democracy is a major 
value for Liberalism, but not in the way it is used here. Besides, Idealism has long been 
discredited as a theory of IR per se. It does not mean that it does not constitute a 
valuable “lens” to look at reality and to provide the enthusiasm for any researcher to 
pursue with a pacifist agenda of an institutionalised world; however, the construction of 
an interdependent world (which it already is these days) is not necessarily synonym 
with peace or mutual understanding; it goes beyond that and implies the actors’ 
perceptions on each other’s attitudes and behaviours. 
 Yet, the major rupture with Idealism was made by realists. As the denomination 
itself reveals, realists did not share the utopian side of the existing trend and proposed a 
different (sometimes opposing) view on the international reality. One major point of 
contend is the belief in human nature: idealists trust in the possibility of change (or 
improvement) of human behaviour, as long as the external conditions it is embedded in 
are changed. Following that reasoning, the highest thoughts of humans are of peace and 
international institutions should listen to that and represent that (Dougherty & 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 2003: 82, 83). On the other hand, realists underline power and interests 
instead of ideals; Realism is “essentially conservative, empirical, prudent, suspicious of 
idealist’s principles and respects the lessons of history” (Idem: 84). Through this 
description, it is easy to realise how far these two conceptions were and are from each 
other. As the same authors continue, power is the central concept of Realism and it 
adheres to a more pessimistic rather than optimistic vision; hence its criticism regarding 
idealists’ visionary objectives instead of a scientific analysis (Idem: 84). Carr wrote that 
“the most profound meaning of the contemporary international crisis [between the two 
world wars] is the collapse of all utopian structure based in the concept of the harmony 
of interests” (Carr cited in Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 2003: 84).  This debate 
was extended to neo-realists and neo-liberals. At this new level, the disagreement 
between both does not lie on the recognition of the existence of anarchy (which the two 
did), but on its meaning and implications, as well as on the capacity of international 
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organisations to overcome the anarchical structure of the international system 
(Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 2003: 85). 
 This leads to the main principals and assumptions of one of the most influential 
theories in IR: Realism. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (2003: 87) trace Realism back to 
the Ancient World and Thucydides’ considerations regarding war and power; they quote 
major names of the Philosophical thought like Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hegel and Weber, 
who are said to have contributed (indirectly, through their intellectual productions on 
several subjects) to the consolidation of the realist perspective (Idem: 87-89). 
 After the Second World War, Realism became the dominant paradigm of 
International Relations (Batistella, 2006: 113). Some of the arguments of this theory 
have already been disclosed in the previous pages, but a more systematic presentation of 
this approach is needed to understand why it has not been used as the main orientation 
for the development of this work either. One of the first concepts that may be associated 
with Realism is anarchy. For realists, the international system constitutes a set of 
individual states (independent political units) that co-habit in an anarchic environment 
due to the lack of a central authority accepted by all (Sørensen, 2008: 6). Hence, as 
there is no central authority capable of preventing armed conflicts, the “natural” state of 
the international system is at war (which is a legitimate means of conducting foreign 
policy). As Waltz wrote (cited in Batistella, 2006: 129), “war exists because nothing 
prevents it”, implying that the state of peace that some countries may experience is 
nothing more than a (more or less enduring) break in the violence between states 
(Batistella, 2006: 496). 
 This topic leads to other central tenets of Realism, namely state-centrism. For 
this school, states are the main actors of international politics. In fact, states’ agency is 
so emphasised by realists that even international organisations are not regarded as actors 
since they are only able to exert some influence through states, according to this vision 
(Idem: 114, 115). Behind this conception, in fact, there are two very relevant 
assumptions. The first is rationality: states, seen as the only actors, are perceived to act 
rationally, since they are led by a representative whose main concern is to maximise the 
national interest (defined in terms of power). This individual, responsible for important 
decision-making processes at the external level, behaves rationally too and, weighing 
the alternatives, objectives and interests, makes the decision guaranteeing the 
maximisation of the advantages and minimising the disadvantages (Batistella, 2006: 
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114, 115, 325-328). This Machiavellian approach also discloses the conception that 
clearly divides and separates foreign policy from domestic policy – the former is high 
politics, whereas the latter is low politics; in that sense, public opinion is an obstacle to 
diplomacy due to the importance given to the internal factors, but also due to its 
unpredictability, incoherence and instability (Idem: 115, 347; Schmidt, 2005: 9). 
 The role attributed to individual units, such as the individual that represents the 
state or even the state as a unit among several other states, reveals Realism’s 
individualist ontology, as well as the realist conception of human nature: the human 
being is willingness to survive (and strives for it), but his willingness to have power and 
pride is even greater (according to Niebuhr) (Batistella, 2006: 117).  Morgenthau 
defined human nature as the set of elementary bio-psychological instincts of life, 
reproduction and domination, added to a selfish character that, contextualised within a 
world of limited resources, leads to an attitude of dominance (Idem: 117). Thus, the 
balance of power in international politics is the only way to ensure the (precarious) state 
of non-war and, since progress is not possible (human beings are condemned to those 
instincts), states seek to guarantee their own security as their top priority – according to 
realists, the list follows with the search for tranquillity, profit and power (Waltz cited in 
Batistella, 2006: 131). As a consequence of these assumptions, states, faced with a 
hostile environment surrounding them, cannot count on any other state or entity but 
themselves (Cravinho, 2002: 141)13. Besides, in a criticism to the normative dimension 
of idealists’ research, realists opted for studying international relations not how they 
ought to be, but how they truly are. This “true” means that Realism accepts the fact that 
there are true facts and universal laws about international phenomena; actually, for this 
school, international politics are governed by objective laws rooted in human nature 
(Morgenthau cited in Kurki & Wight, 2010: 18) and the role of science is to disclose 
those rules and patterns. 
As a response to several criticisms concerning the weaknesses of Realism, some 
authors introduced alterations to the paradigm and originated a renewed version of this 
paradigm, Neo-realism. One of the most visible changes was the acceptance of a new 
dimension: economy (Batistella, 2006: 135) was aimed to be used along with the key-
concepts of power and the centrality of politics. For example, Gilpin argued (contrarily 
                                                          
13 “Un système du chacun pour soi est un système dans lequel ceux qui ne s’aident pas (...). La peur de 
telles conséquences non voulues incite les États à se comporter de façon à créer des équilibres des 
puissances” (Batistella, 2006: 131, 132). 
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to other realists) that only a unipolar system would be able to provide the international 
system some stability, making both military and economic powers the pre-conditions 
for the achievement of that stage. Using this newly introduced concept, this neorealist 
believed states make cost-benefit calculations with the options they have, and that is 
how they reach their decisions (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 2003: 103) – it is 
nonetheless interesting to notice that, despite the introduction of this economic variable, 
the realist postulation about the rationality of the actors remained. Moreover, he also 
recognised that the system (and its regulation) can change and the state is not the only 
actor in international politics (Batistella, 2006: 136-138). These assumptions constitute 
a meaningful adaptation of the paradigm to a difficultly deniable reality, shaping it to 
the demands of a growingly complex international system.  
 Mearsheimer developed what later would have been called the offensive 
Realism. According to him, states’ ultimate objective is to survive and as there is no 
central authority common to all states, they get involved in continuous fights for power 
not to be destroyed. This vision implies a slight shift in the realist thinking because it 
presupposes that it is the need for survival that makes states aggressive and not their 
nature (Idem: 142, 143). Still, this originates a “security dilemma”: in the pursuit of 
their own security, states create a feeling of insecurity in other states (“instrumentally 
rational behaviour”) (Sørensen, 2008: 7). Thus, neo-realists maintain their materialist 
approach, arguing that “state behaviour is largely shaped by the material structure of 
the international system. The distribution of material capabilities among states is the key 
factor for understanding world politics” (Mearsheimer cited in Sørensen, 2008: 7). 
 Although realists and neo-realists emphasise this materialist dimension and 
consider material forces as agents in themselves, the truth is that they cannot speak for 
themselves; they imply interpretation, as the mere physical description of the 
phenomenon is not enough (Sørensen, 2008: 7) to understand it deeply. For example, 
national interest depends on national identity, which is a mental construction. When 
shared with other actors, it helps create patterns of interaction, which proves that some 
factors – interests, in this case – are not a product of material factors only (Dougherty 
and Pfaltzgraff, Jr, 2003: 124). This is not, however, the only flaw of the realist 
tradition. In fact, several authors point out some of the weaknesses of this approach by 
enumerating them through a critical analysis. 
 Realism does not accept the importance or at least the interference of ideologies 
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and values in the Social Sciences (Cravinho, 2002: 143). Since the phenomena studied 
by IR (a Social Science itself) are nothing but social phenomena, this may bring some 
disadvantages to the realist perspective. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr (2003: 124) argue 
that realists focused so much on the structure that they ignored the social basis and the 
social limits of power. In summary, they are a paradigm of a Social Science and refuse 
the social dimension of the phenomena they study. Limiting IR only to political rules is 
reductionist, because the international phenomena involve people with psychological 
and spiritual concerns; they imply economic transactions (already recognised by 
neorealists) and juridical strcutures, among other factors that are belittled by this 
paradigm (Cravinho, 2002: 144). 
 Besides, the realist account that it is possible to clearly divide the domestic and 
the external domains when analysing a certain phenomenon is illusory and, as Cravinho 
(Idem: 143) wrote, it is an “easily contested idea”. Excluding the domestic factors from 
the scientific analysis of the phenomena (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr, 2003: 120) is 
another shortcoming of this paradigm at the ontological level, as well as the taken for 
granted rationality of the state (Idem: 120). As it will be perceived through other 
theories, the state (regarded as comparable to human beings or not) cannot be said to be 
a rational actor, since it is led by men who do not always act rationally, but based on a 
set of other fundamental variables – some of them social, which are disregarded by 
realists a priori. Maybe also because of that, some authors believe Realism was not able 
to explain adequately the Cold War (Idem: 119), especially the dynamics that led to its 
end.  
 Epistemologically speaking, Realism, in its demand for eternal truths, makes it 
hard to explain change in the international system, as its theorists intend to prove that 
rules are valid for all epochs, which does not leave much room for change (Cravinho, 
2002: 144). Concerning realists’ approach to history, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr 
(2003: 124) call it an “alleged disregard” for the discipline as the school has difficulties 
in accepting history as a process that is constantly redefined and in which individuals 
give their contribution to shape each and every historical epoch (Idem: 124). Finally, 
and the list is not exhaustive, two further weaknesses pointed out by the same authors 
who consider first that several historical events contradict (Neo)realism and second that 
theorists (such as Cusack and Stoll) have identified several inconsistencies among 
realists, namely concerning the degree of importance attributed to power distribution 
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(Idem: 120-122), which reveals lack of cohesion of the paradigm – although this 
criticism is not only applicable to Realism. 
 As a response to these “mainstream” approaches, several other theories emerged 
to give their insights to IR. As it goes beyond the scope of this thesis, they will not be 
analysed with detail here. However, it is important to know that mainly since the 1960s 
and 1970s Realism began to be seriously questioned as its focus and premises seemed 
not be adaptable to a changing reality of growing interdependence and interaction 
between states and other actors. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism made their 
proposals on the liberal side; Critical Theory made other contributions to the debate 
adopting a more radical stance (Cravinho, 2002: 171). They are all under the reflectivist 
and postpositivist umbrellas. Critical IR Theory, for example, is a set of theories that 
includes postmodernists, constructivists, neo-Marxists and feminists (Wendt, 1995: 71). 
Despite the differences between these theories or approaches, believing in the social 
construction of world politics is what brings them together. Two main positions derive 
from this: “fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly 
material” and “these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just 
their behaviour” (Idem: 71-72). In other words, they deny both materialism and 
rationalism. However, there are differences among them, which led to different theories: 
some are statists, others are non-statists; some believe in science, others do not; some 
emphasise the process, others the structure; etc. (Idem: 72). 
 This section aimed to provide a brief overview of the several theoretical options 
available to deal with the subject of this thesis. Only with a structured approach and a 
presentation of those options is it possible to select the one that has been selected to 
develop the study. In fact, theoretical debates continue to play a major part in IR theory, 
since this incipient science is still being defined through these reflections.  As 
Constructivism emerged as an appropriate framework to embed this theory in, it is of 
much relevance to briefly describe its main considerations and assumptions, so that the 
rest of the work and the choices made in the meanwhile are understood in the light of 
this meta-theory. 
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1.3. Constructivism: main assumptions and internal divisions 
 
 In the context of the postpositivist critique, emerged a “new generation of 
internationalists” (Batistella, 2006: 284). Constructivism has begun to have some 
influence on IR since the 1980s (Adler, 2005: 96), but it took more years for it to 
strengthen its position among the other theories of International Relations. Although it 
was mentioned above that Constructivism constituted a meta-theory, Adler (Idem: 90) 
argues that it entails three levels and that therefore it is not accurate to define it merely 
as a meta-theory. Besides that, it is also a social theory, as well as a theoretical and 
empirical perspective of IR. In this latter case, Constructivism is based upon solid 
ontological and epistemological foundations and focuses on the role of identities, 
norms, national interests, etc., which justifies, for the author, its inclusion at this level.  
 Constructivism in IR is also the result of a set of influences that shaped the way 
this (meta-)theory has developed for the last decades and their analysis matter to realise 
the importance of some key aspects for this theoretical proposal.14 For some authors, 
Kant is the pioneer of Constructivist thought, for his objective hermeneutics and for 
having introduced the concept of social construction, as well as the intersubjective 
nature of knowledge (Idem: 96), even though usually this philosopher is linked with 
Idealism, namely due to his work in “Perpetual Peace”. The second influence is 
linguistics’ subjective hermeneutics, which highlights the role of language and 
subjectivity; according to this trend, social facts are constituted by language structures. 
This assumption would be followed by several Constructivists who would maintain 
their approach very close to this conception, as it will be showed ahead. Moreover, it 
also subscribed to the preposition that science is incapable of producing objective 
knowledge (Idem: 97). In fact, when considering the influences received by 
Constructivism, one realises that the different approaches within this theory also come 
from its diverse influences; combining Kantian objective hermeneutics and linguistic 
subjective hermeneutics allows much room for theorists to conceive the Constructivist 
assumptions one way or another.  
 Thirdly, Critical Theory, as already mentioned in this chapter, (through the 
School of Frankfurt and the contributions of Jürgen Habermas) emphasises the social 
                                                          
14 The list here presented is based on the four influences received by IR Constructivism listed by Adler 
(2005: 96-97). 
40 
 
theory of communicative action and deliberative democracy (Idem: 97). Finally, 
Pragmatism also influenced the development of Constructivism – through the focus on 
the role of choice, deliberation, judgement and interpretation (Idem: 97). It is important 
to underline, however, that although these are the influences Adler recognised as having 
some impact on the Constructivist thought, the truth is that their varied origins and 
positions gave rise to an also varied set of types of Constructivism, as it will be further 
developed. 
 As a matter of fact, neither the inspirations of Constructivism nor its origins are 
unifying or consensual. Several hypotheses are raised by several authors; some of them 
are complementary, some others are not. Guzzini (2000: 154-155) selects the end of 
Cold War as a decisive moment, since it brought to light important Constructivist 
assumptions, such as that status quo is not inevitable and, subsequently, that change is 
possible; Adler (2005: 98) points out the popularity of the postpositivist Constructivist 
message after the Cold War and Guzzini refers to a modernity that has become 
reflexive, disappointed with progress and with Rationalism’s incapacity to solve the 
problems it had somehow created (Guzzini, 2000: 153). However, it is also possible to 
trace the beginning of a more influential period of Constructivism with Onuf and 
Wendt, who raised this perspective to another level with widely read and commented 
articles and books which included Scientific Realism in the discussion and tried to find 
a common ground between the two approaches (Idem: 98). Or should it be traced back 
to Deutsch and Haas’ contributions in the 1950s, who underscored the importance of 
identities and social communication (Adler, 2005: 98, 99)? Or with Adler himself who 
introduced the concept of cognitive evolution as the interpretation of social collective 
meaning (Idem: 98, 99)? Nogueira and Messari (2005: 169) contemplate the possibility 
of including the English School as a Constructivism’s predecessor, since the former had 
already pushed norms into the debate in IR – however, they also dismiss that option, 
because Constructivism stresses discourse analysis more than the English School and 
the latter attributes to power a centrality that it does not have for Constructivists. Yet, 
for having these differences does not make it impossible for Constructivism to have 
originated from the English School, after which it had made other choices, for example. 
Concerning the presence of Constructivism in IR, the same authors (Idem: 162) point its 
première in the works of Onuf in 1989 (with the World of Our Making) and Wendt in 
1992 (with Anarchy is What States Make of It), and despite the initial difficulties to be 
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recognised among IR theorists, Constructivism gained an important stance in the 
meanwhile and, in the second half of the 1990s, it already had a visible position in ISA 
meetings (Idem: 164-165). Alexander Wendt (1999: 3), on the other hand, postulates 
that the Constructivist thinking can be found in Grotius, Kant and Hegel; in Idealism 
and in Deutsch, Haas and Bull. Such varied contribution, however, (as stated above and 
explained ahead) originated different types of “Constructivisms”, according to different 
types of inspirations.  
 Apart from this debate and the real origins of Constructivism, what really 
matters is that a theory has been able to question Rationalism and to present a viable 
alternative that has been increasingly used by IR theorists since the 1990s. When 
wondering about the significance of Constructivist contributions to IR, Adler (2005: 
101-103) refers the improvement in the understanding of important concepts (such as of 
knowledge, change, rationality, language and power) and the amounts of literature this 
approach has created on empirical investigations within the discipline. Besides, Stefano 
Guzzini (2000: 148) believed in the early 2000s that Constructivism was a promising 
theory to provide IR theory with important insights, as it is a middle-ground that avoids 
the extremes: it is theoretically located between empiricism and Idealism; individualism 
and holism;  truth and relativism. 
  
1.3.1. Constructivist ontology 
 1.3.1.1. Social construction of reality 
 
As mentioned above for more than once, Realism is not the only paradigm with 
internal disagreements; Constructivism is also known for its wide variety of positions 
within its field. In truth, Nogueira and Messari (2005: 184) conclude their chapter on 
this theory by arguing that it is even difficult to talk about a Constructivism in singular. 
Therefore, it is of much relevance to move forward to the main assumptions shared by 
most Constructivists and later on to present the main divisions among them, in order to 
get the whole picture of the theoretical debate. 
 The central tenet of Constructivism is the social construction of reality. This 
premise is among the few that are accepted by all Constructivists and constitutes the 
core of this theory. It follows that one of the main interests of Constructivism is to study 
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the way objects and practices are socially constructed, especially those that are usually 
taken as natural (Fearon & Wendt, 2005: 57). It basically means that, when studying 
any phenomenon, even when one is dealing with material, tangible facts, they always 
mean something that goes beyond their materiality; they are a construct subject to 
human action and they attributed a meaning by the individuals. The world itself is a 
social construction that results from the action of the agents (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 
166). This is a central aspect of the Constructivist ontology. As Adler (2005: 98) puts it, 
all versions of Constructivism converge ontologically in the sense that all accept the 
idea that “material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the 
structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded” (Wendt cited in Adler, 
2005: 98). This leads to another important ontological question: whether Rationalism 
adopts an individualist approach, Constructivism follows a holist perspective. Even 
though Fearon and Wendt (2005: 53) do not regard this division as useful, it reflects one 
of the central differences between both, because, as they recognise (Idem: 53), they see 
society from different “strategic positions” – Rationalism from the bottom to the top; 
Constructivism from the top to the bottom. These options involve focusing on different 
aspects of social life and consequently of different images of world politics, and they 
are a direct consequence of the ontological choices each (meta-)theory makes. Although 
it is possible to subscribe the view of the authors when they consider that the two 
visions may involve complementary accounts on the international life, it is not possible 
to ignore that those same accounts come from different ontological positions.  
 Another fundamental premise that derives from this analysis (and also shared by 
all Constructivists) is the postpositivist character of Constructivist ontology. This 
implies a set of important assumptions that need to be clarified. 
  
  1.3.1.2. Intersubjectivity and language 
 
First, as Batistella (2006: 285) explains, a postpositivist ontology means 
accepting that reality is neither objective nor subjective; it is intersubjective. In other 
words, reality and the meanings attributed to it are not “merely the aggregation of 
individual beliefs but have some independent status as collective knowledge” (Fierke, 
2010: 183). Social facts are, therefore, things that exist only because people collectively 
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believe they do and act accordingly (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 393). Money, rights 
and sovereignty are examples the authors give to explain this premise: unless there is a 
shared understanding of what a note or a coin is, money would not have any particular 
meaning and would not be capable of being used as an exchange tool to get something 
one wants. There is nothing intrinsically given to any object that would make it suitable 
for any purpose unless its perception is collectively shared. Sovereignty is another 
example: if neither a certain group in a certain territory nor the other national 
communities recognise it, it has no meaning, no value, and no actual existence. Fierke 
(2010: 179) uses wood to exemplify it: wood exists in nature, but it is only through 
human action that it can acquire different forms to which different meanings, according 
to different contexts, are attributed; “explicitly social phenomena (…) may build on the 
basic material of human nature, but they take specific historical, cultural, and political 
forms that are a product of human interaction in a social world” (Idem: 179). 
This is another important difference between Constructivism and Rationalism, 
since the latter focuses on the rationality of decisions and the former brings the social 
dimension to the individual. The individual (human being or state) does not act alone or 
based on his or its belief; rather they act within “intersubjective structures (…) 
constituted by collective meanings” (Zehfuss, 2004: 40). Therefore, intersubjectivity 
emphasises the social dimension of humans and the shared ideas constrain and shape 
their behaviour (Copeland, 2006: 3). As Guzzini (2000: 149) explains, an action “cannot 
be reduced to cognitive psychology or to choice, based on interests”; on the contrary, 
the general context has to be taken into consideration; the individual knows, thinks and 
feels “only in the context of and with reference to collective or intersubjective 
understandings, including rules and language” (Adler, 2005: 100). 
 Stefano Guzzini (2000: 164) provides an insightful example of a case of 
intersubjectivity.15 A first assumption is that language exists and cannot be reduced to 
the material support of communication, whether it is voice or a printed newspaper. 
Secondly, it does not exist independently from its use, but, at the same time, it cannot be 
reduced to the individuals’ choices, i.e.: language is neither reducible to objective 
materialism nor to subjective individualism; it is intersubjective. Batistella (2006: 286) 
                                                          
15 Although this constitutes a good example of intersubjectivity, it is important to highlight that it is 
certainly not shared by all constructivists, since language is a disputed theme inside the paradigm and, 
therefore, it cannot be included in the field of the general assumptions of Constructivism. However, it is 
an astute analogy and will also be used to introduce the subject of language and structure. 
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recognises that Constructivism pays much attention to speech as it reflects the societies 
and is capable of shaping the beliefs and interests of the individuals as a group, 
establishing the patterns of the accepted behaviour. However, as mentioned in the 
footnote, language and the linguistic turn constitute one of the divergences among 
Constructivists; it is a fundamental subject for theorists like Onuf, Kratochwill and 
Fierke, for example, but not for Wendt (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 168). Kratochwill, 
influenced by Linguistics, Critical Theory and Habermas, “sought to identify in the 
discourses – more particularly in the rules that guide and organise those discourses – the 
rules that enable us to understand the reality we live in” (Idem: 170). For theorists like 
Kratochwill, language is action per se (Idem: 170) and for Onuf, it is mandatory to 
analyse the rules that guide behaviour for “acts are the expression of the discourse and 
of meanings, and cannot be understood outside of or independently from them” (Idem: 
173).   
 Thus, and despite the disagreements on the subject, accepting that all events are 
socially constructed and that even material realities are given meanings, language seems 
to play a major role, since actors (individuals and states) need language to reflect upon 
and to interpret that reality, pushing this variable into an important spotlight when 
studying social phenomena.  
 
 1.3.1.3. Ideas, identity and interests 
 
 As it is not difficult to realise through the above stated assumptions, ideas (or 
ideational factors) acquire a fundamental role in the Constructivist paradigm: ideas 
define the meaning of material factors. In other words, material objects are not only 
their materiality, but also the meaning the individuals (collectively and within a context) 
attribute to them. However, as Fearon and Wendt (2005: 57) remind, Constructivism is 
not pure Idealism; instead, Constructivism underlines the role of ideas over the 
emphasis traditionally put on material factors (like technology and geography, for 
example); it does not mean that materiality is refused – on the contrary, it is believed by 
Constructivists alike that the impact of material conditions is always mediated by the 
ideas that give them meaning: “material factors matter at the limit, but how  they matter 
depends on ideas” (Idem: 58). 
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 Nonetheless, as Barnett (2008: 163) emphasises, ideas in this context are not 
psychological states or personal beliefs; instead, they are social phenomena, collectively 
held, such as knowledge, symbols, language and rules. Guzzini (2000: 159) reinforces 
these assumptions: Constructivism accepts “a phenomenal world external to thought”, 
what it does not accept, however, is that those material (usually natural) phenomena are 
able to constitute themselves objects of knowledge independently from discursive 
practices; moreover, their existence can be independent from thoughts, but their 
observation is not “language-independent” (Idem: 159).16  What is also relevant in 
terms of ideas is that they are considered as constitutive of actors’ identities and 
interests – this is the reason why these three concepts are linked and why they have been 
brought together in this section. 
 On Chapter 8, there will be some reflection upon the concept of identity and its 
application to the case study. Yet, what it is worth underscoring at this point is that 
Constructivism regards identity as a central issue in the study of International Relations. 
First off all, because it is an ideational factor; secondly, because it is essential to 
understand the behaviour, the practices and the changes at the international level (Adler, 
2005: 103); thirdly, as a social construct, identity is object of change – contrarily to the 
realist conception – and, therefore, if identity is mutable, it can create or promote 
different dynamics and develop security communities, for example. In a 1994 article, 
Wendt (cited in Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 176) explains the process of construction of 
collective identities endogenously; for this author, identity is the product of processes of 
interaction that may change in time. Thus, identities are shaped in the relation with the 
“other”; the feeling of “commonness” of collective identities is, by extension, 
emphasised by the difference in relation to other communities (Risse, 2005: 167) – 
these relations may change over time, as identities do as a consequence.  
A more positive or negative identification with other peers propels a state to be 
more or less willing to engage in collective structures (Zehfuss, 2004: 40). And 
although Constructivists recognise the change of identities is not an easy endeavour, as 
“transforming definitions of self is more than altering behaviour and therefore a 
demanding process”, identities are “not carved in stone” (Idem: 41).  When dealing with 
the mechanisms that promote identity change, Wendt defines the social acts as 
                                                          
16 This final premise is not accepted by all Constructivists, as it will be explained in the section on 
epistemology. 
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processes of signalling, interpreting and responding that, through repeated interaction, 
create and sustain identities and interests (Idem: 43). This repeated interaction along 
with the willingness to change identity and a more passive social learning contribute as 
a whole to transform identity and, subsequently, interests (Idem: 46). The novelty of 
this assumption in relation to the realist proposals is that national interest is defined 
according to the identities that are in its origin, making it not a previously determined 
factor, but a dynamic one that is able to be altered (Idem: 176, 177). The rationalist 
vision of a static world with asocial egoists primarily concerned with material interests 
(Fierke, 2010: 182) is opposed to the Constructivist perspective according to which 
“neither identity nor interests can be detached from a world of social meaning” (Idem: 
182). As Fierke (Idem: 182) epitomises, a state’s identity as a liberal democrat cannot 
be separated from its interest in complying with Human Rights; comparatively, an 
identity as a capitalist cannot be isolated from the interest in generating profit. These 
two examples illustrate how identities and interests are tightly related and, given the 
mutability of social constructions, they may be object of change. 
The concept of power, associated to Realism, has also a different interpretation 
in the Constructivist paradigm: as mentioned repeatedly, Constructivists do not deny the 
materiality of some factors and their influence on international relations, such as natural 
resources, technology and others. But for these theorists, power is constituted by the 
distribution of the actors’ interests; interests are, in turn, constituted by ideas; therefore, 
there is a close connection between material aspects (even power) and ideational 
structures; ultimately are ideas that determine whether a certain distribution of these 
material capacities will end up in a violent conflict or not (Sørensen, 2008: 10), 
depending on how the actors see the others, how they perceive their moves and how 
they respond, in accordance with their identities and interests.  
   
  1.3.1.4. Agency and structure, institutions and norms 
 
 Another (postpositivist) Constructivist ontological assumption shared by all its 
theorists is the co-constitution of agents and structures. This means that both agents and 
structures play an important role in shaping the development of international life – 
structures constrain (or frame) the behaviour of agents and are part of them; but the 
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latter also shape the structures through their interaction, decisions, etc. (Batistella, 2006: 
289; Adler, 2005: 100). As Wendt put it: “as social structures are ontologically 
dependent upon and therefore constituted by the practices and self-understandings of 
agents, the causal powers and interests of those agents, in their own turn, are constituted 
and therefore explained by structures” (Wendt cited in Adler, 2005: 105).  
 The debate around the ontological antecedence of agents or structures is based 
on the question about who influences and limits who; in other words, are agents the 
ones that constrain the options of structures or vice-versa? For Classic Realists, agents 
do; for Structural Realists, structures determine the agents’ actions (Nogueira & 
Messari, 2005: 163). The answer given by Constructivists, as stated above, combines 
these two positions, denying the ontological antecedence to either of them. In fact, this 
denial includes the antecedence in terms of time and capacity to influence the other. 
This approach signifies that there is no determinacy in international relations: agents can 
interfere and shape the structures they are embedded in, and structures are not pre-
determined or unchangeable, having a role to play in the construction of states’ 
identities and interests. Thus, agents have the possibility of choice, which is, 
nonetheless, a limited one, since they “coexist in a social relationship, and their choices 
are partially dependent on the response of the other. The space for choice can thus be 
said to be mutually constituted” (Fierke, 2010: 182). 
 According to Onuf (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 172), between the agents and 
structures are rules or norms, which is a central concept in the Constructivist theory – 
“norms are standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Barnett, 
2008: 169).  They provide the agents with the possible choices and, at the same time, 
guide their behaviour. In case they are not respected, consequences are expected 
(Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 173). At a certain extent, rationalists agree with the idea 
that norms change the actors’ behaviour, but their perception is different in the sense 
that they believe it is the result of the coercive material power and the change is forced 
(Herrmann, 2005: 128). On the contrary, Constructivists subscribe to the premise that 
norms are actually capable of influencing an actor’s behaviour by changing its 
motivations and beliefs; they do not only determine the consequences of its violation, 
but they also (and mainly) set the appropriate behaviour (Idem: 128). Another important 
function of norms, according to Kratochwill (cited in Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 171), 
is to make actions and decisions possible and acceptable or not.   
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This leads to the different approach that theorists support to justify the states’ 
compliance with norms: are individuals like a “homo economicus” that carefully 
evaluate the costs of the decisions and rationally chooses the most efficient option, 
following a “logic of consequences” or are they rule followers that consider how a 
person or a state in their position should act under those circumstances, pursuing a 
“logic of appropriateness”? (Fearon & Wendt, 2005: 60). These two logics of action are 
not incompatible (Barnett, 2008: 163); depending on the context, agents may calculate 
the consequences of their actions and be, at the same time, constrained by the norms and 
roles they are attached to (Fearon & Wendt, 2005: 60).  
 In fact, the reason why individuals follow norms or rules is not linear. As Fearon 
and Wendt (2005: 61) concluded, neither the rationalist nor the constructivist accounts 
are completely correct: human behaviour is not always selfish, but it does not always 
seek for legitimacy either. And more important than standing consistently for one or 
another is to be able to identify which one is at stake in each specific case. Besides, it is 
possible that these two motivations interact with each other in time, originating different 
situations: whether “actors repeatedly comply with a norm, then over time they may 
internalize it to the point of acquiring a preference to comply for the sake of doing right 
or acting appropriate” (Idem: 62) or their “desires to do right may also decay over time 
if there is not enough enforcement against norm violators” (Idem: 62). 
 This is a central question, as compliance with norms is something theorists and 
researchers from diverse fields of the Social Sciences seek to understand. Human minds 
are unattainable through direct means, but human behaviour is an outcome that may 
reflect the actors’ attitudes; carefully analysing that behaviour, its evolution and the 
agents’ explanations and reasoning eases the process of generalisation to reach the 
possible reasons behind their choices. Widening the focus to the international level, in 
the absence of a central and unique authority that ensures the application of its own 
rules to all its citizens, there is only one way international norms are followed and 
respected: through international organisations. For that reason, institutions occupy, 
along with norms, a major place in the Constructivism paradigm. 
  International organisations, as norm diffusers, contribute to the construction of 
the interests of the states that adopt those norms through the integration in a certain 
institution; in that sense, institutions help coordinate and standardise the behaviour, 
establishing new identities, new practices and interests (Adler, 2005: 103, 104). 
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Finnemore & Sikkink (cited in Simmons & Martin, 2005: 198) compare this pressure to 
comply with norms with a “norm cascade”, as international organisations pressure 
“actors to adopt new policies and laws and to ratify treaties and (…) [to monitor] 
compliance with international standards (…). In this way, IOs can be ‘chief socializing 
agents’ pressuring violators to conform” (Idem: 198). It is interesting how 
Constructivists bring to the jargon of IR the concept of “socialisation” used by many 
social sciences, but usually applied to individuals. In this context, however, socialisation 
is applied to states that are, therefore, anthropomorphised – as humans, states are also 
object of the pressure from their peers to converge with them in a common, standardised 
behaviour. This pressure has effects as long as they want to be integrated in the 
community (as individuals want to be part of the society) and to avoid the consequences 
of not being part of it (whether they are sanctions or not fulfilling the others’ 
expectations about them). This pressure, together with the interaction between states, 
promotes the internalisation of norms by states, which, at a certain point in time, do not 
question about those internalised norms, as they already are part of their identity 
(Barnett, 2008: 170). Countries like the United Kingdom and France do not question 
about the centrality of values such as democracy and human rights as an integrated part 
of their own identity.  
 International organisations can also be very helpful in terms of diminishing or 
bypassing the “security dilemma” that rationalists claim to exist among states by 
dealing with the risks and the problems with communication between them (Herrmann, 
2005: 128). They verify the accomplishment of rules, they apply sanctions, etc.; after 
all, institutions are mediators that contribute to the success of more intense exchanges 
between its members. However, as Herrmann (Idem: 128) reminds, international 
organisations not only socialise its member states, but also the ones that seek to join 
them. Both are under the pressure the institution exerts to create a feeling of what they 
should do and how they should behave. The interaction in time within a specific context 
of rules and patterns is a major triggering factor for states to reshape their identities and 
interests (Simmons & Martin, 2005: 198).  
 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002) make an interesting comparison 
between Rationalism and Constructivism in terms of their opposing ontologies 
regarding international institutions in general and enlargement in particular. For the first 
paradigm, institutions occupy a secondary place and do not provide reasons for states’ 
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behaviour – only constraints and incentives for them (Idem: 509); Constructivists, on 
the other hand, underline their role in shaping the agents’ identities and interests and 
their normative commitment (Idem: 509). While for Rationalists, international 
organisations are only instrumental means for states to achieve their national interests, 
for Constructivists, they are not only autonomous and powerful actors, but also the 
“community representatives” that are able to define the standards of legitimacy and 
appropriateness (Idem: 510). Finally, whereas Rationalism only conceives enlargement 
as a mechanisms accepted by countries that see it as a creator of net benefits (greater 
than non-enlargement); Constructivism, for the above mentioned reasons and 
assumptions, believes that what really matters are the ideational factors, embodied by 
concepts like identity, values, culture and beliefs (Idem: 513). 
 Independently from the vision one may be tended to agree with, the complexity 
of the international life is undeniable: individual states, international non-governmental 
organisations, transnational organisations, public opinion, economic, political, cultural 
and social flows, and an enormous variety of other agents, structures and phenomena 
attribute to these interactions a high level of complexity. Anarchy is what usually 
describes international relations, in the sense that there is no single central authority all 
the above mentioned entities are subject to.  
First of all, the existence of an international society is accepted by 
Constructivism because, following the theory’s postulations, “those who speak and act 
in the name of states assume that it does” (Simmons & Martin, 2005: 197). Secondly, 
Constructivists have suggested some forms to organise the study of international 
politics, but what they all have in common is that the theoretical strategy of moving the 
domestic structures to the international level needs to be overcome, as those structures 
are not appropriate for that different context (Adler, 2005: 104).  
Thirdly, and related to anarchy, Constructivist paradigm is quite coherent: if 
every phenomenon is a social construct, anarchy cannot be faced as something different; 
ergo, anarchy is socially constructed and, consequently, it is not something 
predetermined or automatically given. The title of Wendt’s seminal work “Anarchy is 
What States Make of It” is quite revealing in terms of how (at least a part of) 
Constructivists perceive anarchy, or the international system in general. Being anarchic 
is a possibility, but cooperation is also feasible, as long as the units of that system want 
it to be like that (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 167). Processes of interaction between 
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agents and structure (according to Onuf, cited in Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 172) can 
change the anarchic (or better, heteronomous) nature of the international system. That is 
why anarchy is what states want it to be, in the sense that they are able, through their 
intersubjective interference, to modify the system (or the structure) they are embedded 
in. The development of macro-level structures depends on how “others” are 
conceptualised; changes at this level imply a redefinition of the position of the self in 
relation to the other (Kratochwill, 2006: 31). This happens because homogeneity 
diminishes the likelihood of conflict and the acknowledgment that the other is unlikely 
to use force reinforces mutual trust (Idem: 33).  
In the same work cited above, Wendt presents three different cultures of 
anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 179, 180). They 
diverge in the type of culture they are based upon: culture of enmity, rivalry and 
friendship, respectively. Depending on what states are willing to do at the international 
level (permanent competition and self-help; resource and power competition; positive 
predisposition towards the others), the outcome can vary between those three types, 
each of which may entail three levels of internalisation (by force, by interests and by 
legitimacy) (Idem: 180). The key aspect to retain from this theory (as it is not possible 
to deepen it here) is that anarchy is not denied by Constructivists as a reality that 
reflects the state of world politics; however, contrarily to other paradigms, that is not the 
“natural” or unchangeable state of affairs – as a social construction, it can be modified. 
 
1.3.2. Constructivist epistemology 
 
Although the majority of the ontological assumptions of Constructivism are 
shared by almost all of its theorists, in what comes to epistemology, that is no longer the 
case. As mentioned earlier on this chapter, Constructivism in IR emerged as a 
postpositivist critique to the positivist theories or paradigms that dominated the field 
and which became less suitable to a changing (and challenging) international scene. At 
the ontological level, all theorists subscribed to a postpositivist approach, but 
epistemologically speaking, some divisions among Constructivists arose between the 
supporters and the opponents of a positivist approach. 
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The main concern of epistemology and this division is related to two main 
questions Fearon and Wendt (2005: 57) pose: first, “whether knowledge claims about 
social life can be given any warrant other than the discursive power of the putative 
knower” (question of relativism) and; secondly, whether causal explanations are 
appropriate to social research (question of naturalism). The authors concluded that, 
depending on the answers given by the investigators, three epistemological positions 
were born inside Constructivism: the positivist (says ‘yes’ to both questions); the 
postmodernist (says ‘no’ to both questions) and the interpretativist (says ‘yes’ to the 
first and ‘no’ to the second) (Idem: 57). These differences between the epistemological 
perspectives originate significant differences at the level of production of knowledge 
within Social Constructivism in IR. 
For example, Adler (2005: 101), in a chapter devoted to this paradigm in IR, 
wrote that interpretation is an intrinsic part of any Social Science and that it matters 
more how things became what they are, rather than what they are. Additionally, the 
author recognised that in practice, theories are far away from being true images of the 
world. Adler believed these aspects were shared by most Constructivists and that some 
(other) divergences existed. Yet, and having as background the comments of Fearon and 
Wendt, these assumptions made by Adler reveal that the author possibly endorses these 
postulates, which makes him, following the above proposal, a postmodernist – in 
opposition to Wendt himself, who subscribes to a positivist account and who is 
criticised by some Constructivists for preferring causal explanations rather than 
constitutive ones (Idem: 106). 
This leads to the debate about the nature of explanations: causality seeks to 
establish conditions that relate a cause and an effect (more or less mechanically); 
constitutive theorisation attempt to disclose how the objects or events are made of or 
how they are organised – they are, therefore, an effect of the conditions that made them 
possible, but do not exist independently from them (Fearon & Wendt, 2005: 58). Fierke 
(2010: 188-189) wrote that putting the emphasis of the research on causality is another 
inconsistency of Wendt: instead of asking individual reasons for a phenomenon that is 
being studied, the focus should be, according to Fierke, on the social fact that happened 
and how it became possible, highlighting the importance of language and intentionality. 
Another question tightly related to scientific explanations, and that cannot be 
dissociated from it, concerns interpretation or hermeneutics. Constructivism (or at least 
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some constructivists) does not assume the (rationalist) claim to search for an “all-
encompassing truth”; therefore, they create “small-t” [truth] claims, which are partial 
and contingent (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 394), because “for constructivists, 
understanding how things are put together and how they occur is not mere description. 
Understanding the constitution of things is essential in explaining how they behave and 
what causes political outcomes” (Idem: 394). Thus, explanations are permissive and 
probabilistic. 
The same authors believe all Constructivists agree on the need of interpretation 
in research, i.e., that there is “no neutral stance from which they [the researchers] can 
gather objective knowledge about the world” (Idem: 395). The divergence, according to 
them, is in how this interpretation is done: modernists accept the world is always 
interpreted, but some explanations are logically more plausible, empirically more 
persuasive, etc.; on the other hand, postmodernists do not accept to assess the validity of 
analytical and ethical knowledge claims (Idem: 395). 
The generally accepted hermeneutic tradition implies a major epistemological 
assumption: that natural sciences are different from social sciences and that, therefore, 
their approaches and methods need to be different as well. Guzzini (2000: 149) 
reinforces this theory by stating that social sciences “interpret an already interpreted 
world”. Therefore, interpretivism copes with the reflexive character of the social human 
being – the object of study of social sciences. For Guzzini (Idem: 161), human action 
cannot be understood unless it is interpreted, i.e., without understanding the meaning 
individuals attribute to them. The author provides a very illustrative and meaningful 
example: when the traffic light is red, a car stops and a pedestrian crosses the street. 
Under the behaviourist perspective, both in Italy and in Germany, the phenomenon was 
the same – there was a stimulus and then a response. Through a Constructivist “lens”, in 
Germany the car stopped because the traffic rules demanded it; while in Italy, it stopped 
not because of the red sign or the Code, but to avoid overrunning the pedestrian (Idem: 
161). This example shows how the same action, in different contexts, varies. The 
meaning of the action was interpreted in the light of that context and provided a 
different explanation – the comprehensiveness of this theory was only reached thanks to 
what Guzzini (Idem: 162) calls a “double hermeneutics”. The double hermeneutics 
includes the level of action (one interprets the behaviour trying that it makes sense 
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inside the agent’s own world) and the level of observation (not at the individual level, 
but inside the language shared by the community of the observers). 
Constructivism, in general, opts for a holist research strategy – “we need to 
make social wholes and internal relations rather than individuals the primitives in social 
scientific explanation” (Fearon & Wendt, 2005: 58), but that opposes to the 
individualist approach of other paradigms. Holism presupposes that the world is 
“irreducibly social” (Barnett, 2008: 163) and therefore it cannot be decomposed in its 
parts – even though it does not deny the autonomy or the interaction of agents (Idem: 
163). This holistic approach is also reflected by the methodological choices followed by 
Constructivists – as diverse as their epistemological opinions. 
 
1.3.3. Constructivist methodology 
 
Constructivist methodology reflects the diversity within the paradigm. The 
methods used are varied and range from the positivist to the postpositivist approach; 
from the qualitative methods to the quantitative ones. Interpretative methods, such as 
genealogy, ethnography, discourse analysis, narrative analysis and interviews are 
usually chosen by interpretativists; but case studies, process tracing, comparative 
methods and other can be found among the Constructivist research projects. The 
combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods is also possible, as they are 
capable of providing both causal and constitutive inferences through historical 
narratives, for example (Adler, 2005: 101). Kratochwill (cited in Nogueira & Messari, 
2005: 168) considers that methodological choices can be made individually by each 
constructivist, according to his or her preferences and the context of the investigation. 
As Finnemore and Sikkink (2001: 396) put it,  
“there is no single constructivist method or research design. 
Constructivism opens up a set of issues, and scholars choose the 
research tools and methods best suited to their particular question. (…) 
Constructivists, like any other researchers, use the full array of 
available tools”. 
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1.4. Several Constructivisms 
 1.4.1. Divisions among Constructivists 
 
 A theoretical paradigm is, by definition, a unitary corpus of assumptions that 
guide a research. However, like many of the IR theories, and as already noted frequently 
in the previous sections, Constructivism does not have (at least yet) a cohesive body of 
ontological, epistemological and methodological premises – even though epistemology 
is its weakest point and some level of coherency can be found at the other two levels. 
Nogueira and Messari (2005: 184, 185) metaphorically compared Constructivism to a 
refuge to which several IR orphans have gone for being unsatisfied with the traditional 
approaches that depreciate concepts like identity and culture. Consequently, it embraced 
a wide variety of perspectives. 
 Due to these differences, some authors started to create “sub-groups” inside the 
grand group of Constructivism. One proposal has been showed earlier and is presented 
by Fearon and Wendt (2005: 57): according to the understanding on the two 
epistemological questions formulated above, a researcher could fit the group of 
positivists, interpretivists or postmodernists. However, this is not the only proposal. In 
fact, in another major work, Alexander Wendt (1999: 3, 4) labelled the three main 
streams of Constructivist IR theory: modernists (Ruggie and Kratochwill); 
postmodernists (Ashley and Walker) and feminists (Peterson and Tickner). Wendt 
acknowledged that the only commonality between these three lines was the perception 
of Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism as “undersocialised” theories, because, apart from 
that, there were many differences between them. 
 Adler (2005: 97, 98) argues that, due to the varied philosophical and sociological 
approaches several authors opt for, Constructivism can be divided up to five different 
subgroups: modernists (Adler, Barnett, Finnemore, Risse and Wendt); modernist 
linguist (Onuf, Kratochwill, Welds, Carawford), radical constructivists, critical 
constructivists (Linklater, Cox) and pragmatic realists.17 Nogueira and Messari (2005), 
in their analysis, did not divide the whole group into smaller ones, but into some key 
authors and presented their own visions, differences and similarities: Zehfuss is said to 
                                                          
17 Adler explains briefly each of these groups in this chapter, but it does not seem relevant to present it 
here with detail. Through the labels attributed by Adler, it is not difficult to denote the different choices 
made by the groups. 
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be theoretically closer to Onuf and Kratochwill for emphasising the role of language 
and the critical feature of empirical research; Fierke also underlines the need of this 
critical approach, but recognises that it should adapt to the demands of the research (and 
criticises the lack of coherence in Wendt’s mixed positivist/postpositivist proposal); 
Wendt, on the other hand, did not support the linguistic turn and therefore has distanced 
himself from Onuf and Kratochwill; etc. (Idem: 168-185). 
 Fierke (2010: 183) stated that “Constructivism has occupied a ‘middle ground’ 
between rationalist and poststructuralist approaches to IR”. Understandably, when a 
field is in-between two other circles, even though there is an intersection, there may be a 
tendency to bend over one side or the other. In that context, Fierke created two groups: 
the “conventional constructivists” and the “critical or consistent constructivists” (Idem: 
184). The first group, in which Wendt can be fitted, has not rejected the positivist 
epistemology; their opposition to rationalists is merely based on ontological aspects. 
However, Fierke (and the other Constructivists that do not share this vision) wonders to 
what extent it is consistent to combine a postpositivist (constructivist) ontology putting 
the emphasis on the social dimension with a positivist epistemology, accepting the 
empiricist proposal regarding the possibility of construction of objective knowledge 
(Idem: 184). This perspective leads to the subject of the next section. 
 
 1.4.2. Wendt: eclecticism or lack of coherence?  
 
 In his analysis of the two types of Constructivists, Fierke (Idem: 185, 186) noted 
that, when Wendt attempts to create a “Social Theory of International Politics”, not only 
was he mixing Positivism and Postpositivism in the same place, but he was also 
comparing the Constructivist “theory” he built with other substantive theories of IR, 
which is like “comparing apples and oranges” (Idem: 185). On the other hand, 
consistent constructivists do not abdicate of the inseparability of a social ontology and a 
social epistemology (Idem: 186) and maybe therefore Fierke self-entitled group as 
“consistent”. 
 Wendt is undoubtedly one of the most well-known names of Constructivists, 
maybe because he tried to rebuild an entire meta-theory, consolidating it and 
transforming it into a theory of IR – although claiming it was a meta-theory. By doing 
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this, Wendt gathered a lot of supporters, but also a handful of critics that did not share 
his theoretical assumptions. It would not be unfair to state that Wendt’s attempt to 
create an eclectic version of Constructivism ironically deepened the divisions within the 
paradigm.  
 In an article written in co-authorship with Fearon, the authors compare the two 
approaches and are aware of their differences, but do not consider it pragmatic to 
promote a so strong opposition between both, as they can be, according to them, 
combined and used complementarily. For instance, the individualist vs. holist opposition 
was faced as a not useful division, since a researcher can, according to them, develop 
his research without previously thinking about its ontological implications. This would 
imply adopting a pragmatic position and a pluralist ontological perspective (Fearon & 
Wendt, 2005: 53). In general, they do not consider the division (and even the theoretical 
debates) between Rationalism and Constructivism necessary, as “there may be much to 
be gained by using the tools of one to try to answer to other. Such a cross-paradigmatic 
exchange (…) is (…) the most fruitful way to advance” (Idem: 53).  
Throughout the article, the authors enumerate a set of subjects with the intent to 
demystify the incompatibility between the two paradigms. After analysing the question 
of the emphasis on the material or the ideational side, they conclude that after all the 
differences are not that deep (Idem: 59) and when weighing the importance of the logic 
of consequences and of appropriateness, their insight was that there is a comparative 
advantage in both approaches, depending on the circumstances (Idem: 60). These and 
other considerations that tend to make Constructivism closer to the positivist side of the 
theoretical debates have originated, as already mentioned, several criticisms to Wendt’s 
work. 
In the 1992 article on anarchy, Wendt criticised the traditionalist theories and 
proposed a new approach to the subject (as briefly explained in the previous section) 
and, among other things, denied the ontological antecedence to both the agents and the 
structures. However, by giving the state such a central role in international politics in 
relation to the broader structural framework (in that case, anarchy), he ends up 
recognising the major contribution of states – the first criticism is that Wendt’s 
Constructivism is too state-centred (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 176). Secondly, the 
author was also pointed out for having ignored or belittled the linguist turn, as 
mentioned above as well, removing discourse from his analysis (Idem: 177). Zehfuss 
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(2004: 60) critically observes that Wendt does not focus on language but on physical 
action and that, besides, he does not interconnect the domestic and the international 
levels (Idem: 76). 
Kratochwill, a linguist constructivist, reflects upon the question of acquiring 
knowledge in the Social Sciences and reaches the conclusion that it is not possible 
simply to describe things only through purely observational categories or measurement 
procedures, “rather their descriptions must make reference to the shared representations 
underlying the actions of actors” (Kratochwill, 2002: 21, 22). He provides the example 
of a signature, which is different from an autograph because it binds the person to a 
document and, if there was only description, there would be no difference between them 
– physically or at the observational level they are exactly the same, but their shared 
representation implied a different meaning and the subsequent effects. Kratochwill, after 
these thoughts, considered surprisingly that Wendt claims to be a scientific realist and 
points out that “Social Theory” relies on problematic foundationalist notions (Idem: 23).  
Moreover, Wendt recognises the difference between social and natural objects, 
but defends the application of the same methods, which is, for Kratochwill (Idem: 34), 
non sequitur. This reminds Wendt’s lack of coherence in terms of the postpositivist 
ontology and the positivist epistemology mentioned above. In fact, Kratochwill argues 
that his ontology of social life is consistent with Scientific Realism (Idem: 35), which 
leaves Wendt with no attachments to Constructivism – following this reasoning. 
Besides, his rationalist models are considered to simplify the premises concerning 
identity and interests, enabling some issues (such as interest-formation, roles and 
identities) to be neglected (Idem: 34). 
The same author wonders in his article whether Wendt’s version of Realism is 
compatible with Constructivism, and provides some arguments towards a negative 
answer to that question, namely that there are differences among realists and there is no 
defined notion of a realist philosophy; secondly, Scientific Realism ignores the social 
dimension of the phenomena on which Wendt relies; thirdly, Wendt aims to found the 
Social Theory, but that endeavour is old-fashioned and out of synchrony with recent 
developments in Social Sciences; fourthly, realists accept truths and whether Wendt 
accepts them, which makes him incoherent with Constructivism, or he does not, and 
then he goes against a realist premise (Idem: 36, 37). Contrarily to Wendt’s arguments 
(that things exist independently from their descriptions), Constructivism postulates that 
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descriptions are necessary (even mandatory) to talk about things; however, these 
descriptions are not neutral and it is difficult to say what an object “is” unless we 
understand their uses and roles in our practices (Idem: 42) – “in short, what is at stake is 
not the existence of the ‘thing’ in itself, but its recognition as ‘something’ which can 
only be established by bringing it under a description” (Idem: 42). 
Copeland (2006: 11) enlarges the list of weaknesses of Wendt’s theory and adds 
that the theorist assumes that states know much about what the others are doing and 
thinking, but that is empirically unsupported and ignores the question of deception, 
present in social relations. Behnke (2006: 49) draws even tougher criticisms to Wendt’s 
work and states that  
“as an attempt to offer an authoritative disciplinary guidebook to IR, 
STIP [Social Theory of International Politics] is a failure. Its 
conceptualizations and definitions are confusing and contradictory, its 
basic assumptions about international politics misguided, its meta-
theoretical discussion misleading and contradictory, its ambition old-
fashioned and out of sync with recent developments, and the 
theoretical and substantial questions it raises perhaps simply 
irrelevant”. 
The author develops his arguments and explains his position throughout the 
chapter, concluding with three major considerations: Wendt cannot reconcile 
Constructivist with science, his framework does not constitute a neutral ground for his 
objective of being a meta-theoretical arbiter, and he does not contribute much to 
understand current world politics issues (Idem: 55, 56).  At the philosophical level, 
criticisms go even further and are related to Wendt’s attempt to join or bring together 
two sides that seem, for most authors, to be irreconcilable: “very simply put, his 
contention in this respect is that, like neo-realists and neo-liberals, he is on the side of 
science, but that, unlike them, he is not an individualist” (Suganami, 2006: 60). 
Nevertheless, Wendt does not subscribe to radical holism either, opting for a moderate 
holism that Suganami (Idem: 70) calls instead a “moderate individualism”. Hence, as 
his opposition to Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism is also based on individualism, 
Wendt’s concessions to individualism weaken his stance (Idem: 71).   
 Thus, although Alexander Wendt is seen as one of the most prominent 
Constructivists, there are several criticisms that target his attempts to make 
Constructivism more “scientific” through the concession of several rationalist 
assumptions. Creating a middle-ground, however, has not been seen by many 
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Constructivists as a positive development for the paradigm, since it promotes an 
incoherent approach that is not in line with Constructivism’s main tenets – such as 
assuming a postpositivist ontology based on the social dimension and simultaneously a 
positivist epistemology that weakens some of the central aspects of the theory. Yet, 
Wendt’s contribution cannot be demeaned, as his efforts to reinforce the boundaries and 
the content of Constructivism also inspired the work of many researchers. This dilemma 
reveals the internal divisions of the (meta-)theory, but if one considers the development 
of such an incipient approach over the last two decades, its improvements and capacity 
of affirmation among IR theories, it is possible to believe that its further consolidation 
may be achieved through the fruitful debates that have been occurring around this 
theme. 
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2. Bringing theory and research together 
 
 In the previous chapter, a brief reflection upon the theories of IR was made, 
especially upon Constructivism and its epistemological, ontological and methodological 
proposals, as well as its internal divisions. For being outside of the scope of this thesis, a 
deeper theoretical debate is not possible, but this chapter aims to establish a closer link 
between the mentioned premises and the content and development of this thesis. Thus, 
first, Constructivism will be linked with the more specific issue of European integration; 
then, (Neo-)Institutionalism will be introduced as a substantive theory that may be used 
to support constructivist more abstract considerations; and finally, Constructivism will 
be associated with other aspects of the thesis, as a continuation of first section, but no 
longer limited to the field of European integration. 
 
2.1. Constructivism and European integration 
  
 Thomas Risse (2005: 159) wrote that the study of European integration under 
the Constructivist perspective was very recent and that sometimes it had been used as a 
substantive theory, comparable to Intergovernmentalism or Neo-functionalism. 
However, and contrarily to Andreas Adler’s opinion (mentioned earlier), Risse insists 
that Constructivism is a meta-theory that occupies an “ontological middleground 
between individualism and structuralism” (Idem: 161) and should not be treated like a 
substantive theory.  
As such, and given its ontological assumptions explained earlier, Constructivism 
avoids the emphasis studies of European integration usually put on material dimensions 
(economic, mostly), underscoring instead its societal aspects (Idem: 161). In fact, if one 
considers the Constructivists propositions and seeks to import them into the European 
studies, the stress put on societal and ideational aspects come to the surface very 
quickly, meaning that the material dimensions that often dominate the debates (the 
economic benefits of joining the Union, for example) are put aside. On the other hand, 
the impacts on, and the changes of, the identities and interests of the countries somehow 
involved with the EU are more carefully analysed and taken into account. As Risse 
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(Idem: 162) concluded, Constructivism seeks to understand European integration as 
something that shapes collective identities.  
Moreover, under the logic of appropriateness and the principles of the co-
constitution of agents and structures, institutions like the EU are not seen by this 
perspective as external or exogenous to actors, as these are “deeply embedded in and 
affected by the social institution in which they act” (Idem: 163). Subotic (2011: 311) 
makes a very pertinent question related to this issue: “why do States Europeanise?”. The 
rationalist account would justify it with the (material) benefits of accession, but that 
does not explain several cases of Europeanisation (such as the different outcomes of 
Croatia and Serbia, as the author mentions). So, the alternative answer is that they 
Europeanise (in the sense that they are willing to institutionalise and internalise EU 
rules, values, etc.) because they regard those rules and procedures as inherently 
appropriate and legitimate (Idem: 311) – “candidate states then adopt EU rules over 
time through socialization, persuasion, or habit” and social variables arise to provide a 
deeper understanding that goes beyond cost and benefit calculations (Idem: 311). 
These thoughts were of much relevance for the selection of Constructivism, as it 
is our belief that materialism’s approach does not provide a fully satisfactory answer to 
the question on the reasons behind accession. Furthermore, the principles of the co-
constitution of agents and structures and the denial of antecedence to both of them were 
also important for that decision, since states do not seem to be merely controlled by the 
institutions they are part of, nor are they only interested in making them their means to 
reach the national interests. The 2004 and 2007 enlargements are illustrative of this 
postulation: all the countries presented an economic performance (and also societal, at 
the level of Human Rights, for example) much lower than the EU average, but they 
acceded nevertheless. Those accessions implied a re-distribution of funds that harmed 
member-states’ interests (as they were reduced), but that did not prevent the twelve 
countries to join the Union, shaking its institutional balances too. 
Concerning the accession process, several Constructivists’ arguments can be 
used to study it. First, Schimmelfennig and Sedelemeier (2002: 503) define enlargement 
as “a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational 
rules and norms”. This definition entails some key aspects that are worth highlighting: 
the concepts ‘process’ and ‘gradual’ reveal that it is a dynamic that takes time, that is 
progressive. Wendt, as seen in the previous chapter, said identities are not “carved into 
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stone”, but they are difficult to change. Hence, aiming to reshape a collective identity 
implies patience and a gradual process. That process comprises a dynamic of 
institutionalisation, which means that actors, through interaction, become “normatively 
patterned” (Idem: 503). This assumption is very close to Constructivism: not only 
because Constructivism argues that it is through interaction that states modify their 
identities and interests, but also because this meta-theory stresses the role of norms and 
how important they are at the international context.  
Secondly, if norms are important, the way they are conveyed should occupy a 
central position as well; in that sense, the study of institutions is encouraged by the 
Constructivist theoretical body, since they are responsible for diffusing the norms that 
regulate states’ behaviour and, ultimately, influencing the international scene. The 
accession process is nothing else but the diffusion of norms through the interaction 
between actors within the scope of an institution. Through socialisation (and other 
mechanisms), actors learn rules of appropriate behaviour and “norms become normal” 
(Risse, 2005: 164). 
Third, the accession process necessarily involves another process – 
Europeanisation. Radaelli’s (2000: 4) definition of this concept18 includes a set of 
typically Constructivist notions, such as ‘construction’, ‘rules’, ‘procedures’, ‘shared 
beliefs and norms’, ‘discourse’ and ‘identities’, which are central to that paradigm, as 
clarified on Chapter 1. This constitutes an important Constructivist insight to a 
fundamental notion of the European studies; Europeanisation is not perceived, at least 
for this author and the many that follow him, just as the cumulative transference of 
legislation from the EU to a Europeanising country – rather, it involves some other 
dimensions as important as (or even more important than) the material, legalistic 
dimension. Being a construction, actors can be involved in that process, as it is not 
something taken from granted or given; identity issues are not ignored here, as well as 
the beliefs that are also transferred. 
This definition leads to the fourth issue Constructivism is able to contribute to 
and that is the emphasis on ideational aspects. The European Union is not only worried 
                                                          
18 Radaelli’s (2000: 4) definition of Europeanisation is widely viewed as one of the most complete and 
coherent proposals and states the following: “Processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization 
of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared 
beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies”. It will 
be further developed and analysed on Chapter 4. 
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about rule adoption, but also about rule implementation – Commission’s Annual 
Reports reflect that concern, as it will be proven later on when dealing with the case 
study. Kohler-Koch (cited in Radaelli, 2000: 9) considered the biggest impact of EU’s 
policies to be cultural. That meets Radaelli’s opinion that the Union is not only able to 
influence formal structures, but also the values, the norms and the discourses (Radaelli, 
2000: 12). Simultaneously, he recognises that the preferences of policy-makers can 
change, causing modifications in the process of integration too. As Radaelli (Idem: 26) 
concludes,  
“Europeanization is a process. It is a process where the cognitive dimension 
of political life matters. Hence the current emphasis on mechanisms and 
variables should not preclude the dimension of evolution, learning and the 
social construction of politics”. 
Fifth, Constructivism perceives international organisations as autonomous, 
powerful actors with constitutive and legitimacy-providing functions (Schimmelfennig 
& Sedelmeier, 2002: 509). Only with this perspective is it possible to study the impact 
of an international organisation on a certain country, for that IO is perceived as being 
“able to impose definitions and purpose upon governments” and to create new interests 
(Idem: 510) – in this specific case, to appeal to values such as democracy and to 
convince Turkey to adopt and internalise them. 
Sixth, as the last point allowed to foresee, the constitutive nature of IOs means, 
more broadly, that “applicants and members ‘construct’ each other and their relationship 
on the basis of the ideas that define the community represented by the international 
organization” (Idem: 523). In other words, this is the application of the principle of the 
co-constitution of agents and structures and the socially constructed nature of the 
phenomena. Besides, the more the state identifies with the community and shares its 
values and norms, the stronger the institutional bonds are and the more willing it will be 
to pursue institutionalisation (Idem: 513). Hence, identity plays a major role in relations 
between institutions and states – between structures and agents. The same authors 
(Idem: 514) elucidate that this identification varies among the external states and the 
community actors: the former have to conciliate their national and international 
identities and the latter are usually tightly related to and influenced by norms. This is 
clearly the case of the European Commission, for example, and the subsequent lack of 
coherence between its discourse and the national leaders’ discourse on Turkish 
 
65 
 
accession.19  
When it comes to define the identity of a state or organisation, there are several 
possibilities. Subotic (2011: 312) enumerates a set of viable definitions of state identity; 
taking into consideration the context of this section, perceiving it as a collective 
understanding of what are appropriate political principles and practices seems to make 
sense. More importantly is that this identity cannot be considered in a vacuum, but 
rather as influenced by both the national and international frameworks (Idem: 312). 
Subotic seeks, therefore, to understand how state identities influence the 
Europeanisation process and, to find the answer to that interrogation, she proposes two 
concepts: identity convergence and identity divergence (Idem: 313). Very superficially 
approaching Subotic’s thesis, it matters to retain that domestic actors pursue their 
objectives through these mechanisms of convergence and divergence; in the first case, 
they underline and promote the shared beliefs and values, avoiding contradictory ones. 
On the other hand, identity divergence is achieved through the promotion of national 
values and norms as opposed to the ones conveyed by the international actor present in 
the country (Idem: 313, 314). In other words, domestic actors, in the context of 
Europeanisation, promote or defy the values that come from abroad.  
This example was provided here to raise the awareness of how important 
identities may be; Subotic’s conclusion was that “state identity provides a fuller 
explanation of Europeanization’s success or failure than does the concept of external 
incentives” (Idem: 314). This is a major finding that supports the Constructivist belief 
that identities matter; besides, if domestic actors can influence its population’s 
inclination towards the acceptance of or the resistance against Europeanisation, it means 
that not only is their involvement essential to strengthen European values and norms 
internally, but also that a change in domestic actors’ opinions would mean more 
pressure on the society towards one side or another – identities and interests are 
mutable; and they are also responsible for defining the boundaries of groups and 
determining who is in and who is out, as it will be developed on Chapter 8. In spite of 
existing a certain degree of normative unity among the members of a group (and the 
acceptance of the values and rules implied in their accession), it does not mean that 
there are no conflicts within the group or organisation. As Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2002: 514) wrote, in that case, “the decision-making process will not be a 
                                                          
19 Cf. Chapter 11. 
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bargaining process but a process of arguing”, which leads us to the next point: 
discourse. 
The seventh and last aspect to be added to this list is discourse. Although it is not 
a widely accepted concept among all Constructivists, discourse occupies a significant 
place within the Constructivist paradigm. Discourse is then one of the differences 
between the interaction of elements within a group and of elements from different 
groups. Presenting arguments, challenging the others’ statements and struggling for 
consensus based on the best argument (Idem: 515) are part of the process of arguing that 
takes place within the organisations and discourse has thus the “potential to modify old, 
or construct new, identities and norms” (Idem: 515). Additionally, as Risse (2005: 164) 
puts forward, it is through discourse that the agents attribute meaning to their world and 
their actions. Applying Habermas’ theory of communicative action, Risse (Idem: 165) 
envisages EU’s institutions as a discourse more than business or bargaining arenas; 
besides, discourse practices can be a means “by which relationships are established and 
maintained” in the sense that discourse is seen as a process of meaning construction.  
In Turkey-EU relations, discourse is an important component. This is why it will 
be taken into consideration when analysing Erdoğan’s 2011 official visit to Europe20 
and in the inclusion of the interviews among the methodological choices of the thesis. It 
is through discourse that agents and structures interact; it is through discourse that 
domestic elites convince (or discourage) the masses to fight for the integration into an 
international organisation and that the latter will seek to make it possible or not. Risse 
(2005: 161) considered that Constructivism could be useful in the study of European 
integration as complementary to (even more than replacing of) other approaches. In that 
sense, and after considering the diverse options available, for fitting the Constructivist 
meta-theory, (Neo-)Institutionalism was chosen as the substantive theory to embody 
these considerations into something more concrete. 
 
2.2. Substantive theories of European integration 
  
 The broader theoretical context used to study not only European integration, but 
also the whole subject under scrutiny has been chosen, and the reasons behind it were 
                                                          
20 Cf. Chapter 11. 
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partially presented in the previous section (some others will be put forward in the next 
one). However, it was lacking a more substantial theory that would concretise the 
abstract considerations of Constructivism. In that sense, Institutionalism seemed to fit 
the spirit of the thesis and to be adaptable to the meta-theory that had been chosen. 
 In fact, Grigoriadis (2009: 7) considers that there are four main theories of 
European integration: Functionalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Historical 
Institutionalism and Constructivism. Interestingly, the author included Constructivism 
in the list together with substantive theories, which contradicts most theorists’ 
understanding of the subject (like Risse, for example). Therefore, Constructivism will 
not be conceived here as comparable to other theories, even though its principles match 
the considerations made by (Neo-) Institutionalism, for instance. Going very quickly 
through the list used by Grigoriadis (2009), it is possible to realise which theories would 
not fit the purposes and the conceptualisation of this thesis.    
 Functionalism emphasises the autonomous power and the energy of society; the 
main subjects in politics are economy, society and the individuals’ determination to 
solve problems. This theory also adopts the concept of “spillover”, according to which 
initial efforts of cooperation increase with internal dynamics and originate further 
integration (Idem: 7); in other words, integration is like a vicious circle, in which the 
dynamics of integration promote more integration. Neo-functionalism introduced the 
political dimension to this spillover, proposing a more politicised version of 
functionalism (Telò, 2009: 95).  As Professor Otto Holman said in a lecture in Turkey 
(September, 2011), European integration is like riding a bike: as long as the biker keeps 
riding it, it will move; if he stops, he would necessarily fall down. Functionalism is 
influenced by and close to Liberalism (Idem: 93). If peace is to be achieved, cooperation 
is required; this cooperation has to be based on economic and social needs and to be 
limited to specific fields (Idem: 94).  However, this theory was criticised, among other 
things, because the developments in the EU were not smooth or cumulative. 
 Liberal Intergovernmentalism regards states as the primary decision-makers and 
is based on three main ideas (brought by Moravcsik): state’s behaviour is rational; it is a 
liberal theory of national preference formation; and interstate negotiations are studied 
under an intergovernmentalist approach (Grigoriadis, 2009: 8). According to this 
perspective, agreements between states are achieved due to asymmetrical 
interdependence and, moreover, the ones responsible for influencing EU politics are not 
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its institutions, but its member states (Idem: 8). This vision denies institutions the 
capacity to interfere in preference formation or identity definition.  
 On the other hand, (Neo-)Institutionalism conceives institutions as “collections 
of standardised structures and operative procedures that define and stand for values, 
norms, interests, identities and beliefs”21 (March & Olsen cited in David, 2012: 12). 
This means that this approach regards institutions as relevant actors in the international 
scene and associates them with the Constructivist idea of being responsible for 
establishing the “appropriate behaviour that is learnt and internalised through 
socialisation and education” (David, 2012: 12). Also similarly to Constructivism, 
Institutionalism is a top-down approach (Grigoriadis, 2009: 9) that sees institutions as 
political vehicles that influence the political structures and policies (Idem: 9).  
Institutionalism, as Constructivism, has been inspired by the English School and 
shares its historical and sociological interpretation of the systems theory, according to 
which the international system involves such a high level of interaction that all states 
need to take into consideration the other states’ behaviour to determine their own 
actions (Telò, 2009: 91). Moreover, Europe is given as an example of a situation of 
anarchy that evolved into a “society of states” since the Treaties of Westphalia in the 
sixteenth century and now it is comprised of “a group of states who, aware of certain 
common interests and values, consider themselves bound by a set of common rules in 
their mutual relations and participate in the proper functioning of common institutions” 
(Idem: 92). Therefore, expectations, preferences, interpretation and other variables are 
included by this theory to understand and explain the actors’ behaviour (David, 2012: 
13).  
In that sense, institutionalisation promotes change at the international level and 
is not limited to the scope of states, but includes other types of actors as well (Idem: 96, 
97). Mario Telò (2009: 98) enumerates a list of the functions of institutions according to 
the institutionalist view, among which one can find: to decrease the uncertainty in 
international life and the security dilemma, to facilitate negotiations, to promote 
socialisation and learning between their members, to diminish the transaction costs and 
to stimulate the construction of collective identities. It is perceptible the importance 
(neo-)institutionalists attribute to organisations and it is also interesting that they share 
Constructivism’s holist approach and regard institutions as whole, different from the 
                                                          
21 Translation made by the author from the Portuguese version presented by David, 2012: 12. 
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simple addition of its parts: “once established, institutions provoke inertial dynamics. 
To a certain degree they take on a life of their own and become political actors in their 
own right” (Idem: 98). What seems to be different from Constructivism, however, is 
this primacy given to structures over agency. Yet, there are still many points of contact 
between the two theories and the way they perceive the world. 
 Nonetheless, inside Institutionalism, there are some nuances that originate the 
existence of several types of Institutionalism. Historical Institutionalism is one of them. 
This version accepts that states are not the only players in international relations and 
prefers to stress the development and historical uniqueness of institutions; besides, it 
recognises the mutability of states’ preferences, but they are criticised for the limited 
applicability of their conclusions, only suitable for a small number of cases  (Idem: 99-
102). Historical institutionalists also believe that, although it is possible that setbacks 
occur, institutional choices succeed in the end, and that they cannot be considered in a 
“vacuum”, but rather within a specific social and historical context (Grigoriadis, 2009: 
10). This emphasis given to history is reflected in the adoption of the path-dependency 
theory, according to which “early decisions provide incentives for actors to perpetuate 
institutional and policy choices inherited from the past, even when the resulting 
outcomes are manifestly inefficient” (Idem: 10, 11). This implies that the costs to 
reverse a path that has already been begun by a certain country are very high and that 
ultimately history is important to understand the evolution of institutions, as well as 
their current options. Their role in international relations is to diffuse norms and 
expectations (even against the wishes of domestic institutions) (Idem: 12, 13) and 
therefore they acknowledge that “the European Union can sometimes become involved 
in domestic politics and have considerable impact on policies and institutions” (Idem: 
13). 
 A second possible type is Rational Choice Institutionalism. Its name already 
reveals the foundations of this version which, contrarily to the previous one, considers 
individual states as utility maximisers that pursue self-interested objectives, act in 
accordance with cost-benefit calculations and regard institutions as means to diminish 
the transaction costs (Jönsson & Tallberg, 2008; Telò, 2009: 99). This perspective 
justifies the existence of institutions only because they fulfil the functions of states and, 
thus, Rational Choice Institutionalism refocuses the general institutionalist assumptions 
on the states’ actions within institutions (Telò, 2009: 99). 
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 Finally, a third type of Institutionalism has three possible denominations, 
according to the authors, who name it differently, but who are clearly talking about the 
same version: for Schimmelfennig and Sedelemeier (2002) it is “Constructivist 
Institutionalism”; for Jönsson and Tallberg (2008), it is “Normative Institutionalism”; 
and for Mario Telò (2009), it is “Sociological Institutionalism”. Independently from the 
name given to this branch, the fact is that the three denominations also reveal that it is 
tightly connected to Constructivist and its assumptions. Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2009: 513) provide a summarised overview about this type of 
Institutionalism that is worth quoting: 
“According to constructivist Institutionalism, enlargement politics will 
generally be shaped by ideational, cultural factors. The most relevant of 
these factors is ‘community’ or ‘cultural match’, that is, the degree to which 
the actors inside an outside the organisation share a collective identity and 
fundamental beliefs”. 
The comparison to the Constructivist assumptions is unavoidable and does not need to 
be explicitly referred to here. However, it is necessary to emphasise a set of issues, such 
as the fact that Constructivist/Normative/Sociological Institutionalism focuses on the 
role of norms and values and on the logic of appropriateness (Jönsson & Tallberg, 
2008); besides, institutions are regarded as “normative cognitive structures: they express 
shared values” (Telò, 2009: 102) and their existence is shaped and constrained by their 
culture, context and functioning in a clear emphasis on the socio-cultural context of 
international institutions (Idem: 102).22 
 As Telò (2009: 104) concludes,  
“the neo-institutionalist schools mark a turning point in the long history of 
realist and neo-realist dominance. It is no longer possible to study twenty-
first century international relations without taking institutional variables into 
account”.  
Thus, taking in Institutionalism to concretise the more abstract considerations given by 
Constructivism was a need that proved to be valuable, as its insights have corroborated, 
to a large extent, the theoretical premises presented in the previous chapter. Next, and 
last, section will wrap up this first abstract contextualisation by presenting more 
thoughts about the connection between the thesis in general and the Constructivist 
proposals. 
                                                          
22 In fact, Telò (2009: 103, 104) still adds another type: Discursive Institutionalism. It was not included in 
this list for two reasons: first, he is one of the few authors that highlight this variant and second, as it is 
connected to discourse, it would be acceptable to include it within the Constructivist Institutionalism 
since discourse is related to it and would only enrich it. 
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2.3. The Constructivist proposal in Turkey-EU relations 
 
 In order to close this chapter on theoretical considerations, some issues still need 
to be addressed. Constructivism revealed to be one of the most adequate (meta-)theory 
of IR to study EU’s impact on the Turkish democratisation process. Previously, several 
aspects of this paradigm have been connected to the subject of European integration and 
it was also even possible to establish close links with the Sociological Institutionalism. 
 Adler (2005: 90) argued that, besides being a meta-theory and a social theory, 
Constructivism also entailed a third level – as a theoretical and empirical perspective of 
IR. This is a valuable insight as most theorists only look at Constructivism as a meta-
theory and, somehow, limit its application to the concrete study of IR phenomena, 
making it harder for a researcher to use it in an actual case study. In that sense, 
Constructivism in this thesis is seen as a theoretical perspective of International 
Relations that provides the investigation with a framework for the analysis of tangible 
phenomena – tangible not in the logic of material phenomena, but rather as any 
phenomenon that is justifiably included within the scope of IR object of study. In the 
specific case of this thesis, and besides the aspects already mentioned, Constructivism is 
present throughout the chapters and usually that connection is briefly and opportunely 
referred to; sometimes it may remain only implicitly.  
 Constructivism asserts that it has not been proved that reality is accessible. Also 
this thesis follows the principle that all knowledge is an attempt to come as close as 
possible to reality, but simultaneously recognising that it is difficult (if not impossible) 
to truly know it and apprehend it. So complex are social phenomena that what a 
researcher can do at most is to seek to understand their constitution through a small part 
of its whole and to contribute to the enlargement of the knowledge on the subject 
through its theoretical representation in the form of hypotheses or statements. This leads 
to another epistemological aspect: all knowledge is mediated by language, as those 
hypotheses and statements need to be formulated somehow and thus complete 
objectivity, despite the attempt to be followed as much as possible to guarantee the most 
serious and reliable results, is an illusion. The choice of a research theme and the 
theoretical approach to deal with it cannot be objective, they are purely subjective in the 
sense that they resulted from the free choice of the researcher depending on his or her 
interests and preferences, aligned with intellectual curiosity – when not constrained by 
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institutional and material limitations, such as budget and other requirements. 
 From these thoughts derive two important considerations. First, the recognition 
that social and natural sciences are different. Different because their objects of study are 
incomparable: a human being contextualised within a larger group, besides his reflexive 
capacity, entails much deeper and more complex dynamics than those represented by a 
bee, an ant or a rock. Furthermore, if social sciences’ object of study is the human social 
being contextualised, it necessarily means that the researcher is himself part of the 
larger group he is studying, which raises obvious problems of impartiality that, for 
being impossible to be completely erased, have to be accepted and recognised in order 
to be bypassed in the most “scientific” way available. 
 Secondly, human beings interact with each other in the social environment 
through language. The importance of language is a Constructivist assumption shared by 
this thesis. Unfortunately, and for several reasons, it was not possible to include 
discourse analysis, but what people think about reality and say about it, their vision and 
perspective were taken into consideration. One example of that are the qualitative 
interviews led to several Turks. They pretended to illustrate the different angles Turks 
may look at the accession process and how they perceive it concerning their own 
country’s efforts to enter the Union or even the Union’s role in promoting democracy in 
Turkey. Paraphrasing a known expression, the accession process is what Turkey and the 
European Union make of it and think about it, so the role domestic actors play within 
this context is fundamental to assess the development of those relations and to envisage 
how they can be improved so that there are benefits (not only material ones, obviously) 
for both parts, making it a win-win situation.  
 In Turkey-EU relations, identity and interests matter. Chapter 8 will take that 
into consideration, as well as other socio-cultural aspects essential to understand the 
background in which those relations operate. If identity and interests were fixed, Turkey 
would be as undemocratic as it used to be in the early phases of its history – which did 
not happen. As a matter of fact, if there is a country whose identity has been being 
constantly adapted to new conditions and contexts, that country is Turkey – the 
historical context made in Part III illustrates that. Additionally, there has been, over the 
last centuries, a certain tendency of Turkey to be more prone to cooperate with the 
West. Naturally, so many centuries of history with relations with Europe imply that 
these have not always been smooth or peaceful, but rather object of the inherent 
 
73 
 
dynamics of history.  
 Individuals, states and the European Union have their own visions and 
interpretations, and this thesis will attempt to prove whether they really matter. When 
Turks feel unpleased with the state of the relations with the EU, one wonders if that may 
have an impact on the accession process, or even in the country’s democratisation that is 
entailed in the former. Also, the Union’s discourse may have an impact on people’s 
perceptions: stating that Turkey is a candidate to full membership, but that other options 
are available, certainly does not create the same feeling than affirming that full 
membership is the only possibility for a country that fulfils its obligations as a 
candidate. The interpretation of accession negotiations interferes with them. Despite the 
difficulty implied, there will be an attempt to realise if these ideational factors really 
matter more than material ones – are money transfers from the EU more persuasive or 
influential than a friendly, understandable and encouraging approach by the Union?  
 Furthermore, Constructivism takes norms and institutions with high regard. In 
this thesis, the European Union is the institution under scrutiny and as March and Olsen 
(cited in David, 2012: 22) wrote, the EU is historically the highest institutionalised 
organisation; democracy is the value that it diffuses through the accession process and 
the acquis communautaire are the norms that have to be imported by Turkey. Buhari 
(2009: 111) reminds that Sociological Institutionalism acknowledges that EU’s effects 
include ideational, normative and cognitive factors, which goes far beyond the mere 
transference of legislation. Therefore, before this scenario, there is an international 
institution that diffuses its values and norms to a country that decided to apply for full 
membership to that institution and was granted the status of candidate. Despite all 
conundrums, it remains in the race to reach the target and its reasons for having begun it 
may be several and are under lively debates: a cost-benefit calculation, prestige to be 
part of the European Union, technical and technological development, cultural 
affirmation, normatively attracted by the organisations’ values (such as democracy), 
continuing the logic of its historical heritage, etc. are among the several possible 
explanations for that. However, after so many years of interaction with the European 
Union, the reasons and the logic for carrying on the process may have varied. 
 Truth is that, despite the ups and downs in the relationship, a high degree of 
interaction has been occurring for various years and the way the Union may spread its 
norms and beliefs can happen through different mechanisms, like coercion, 
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conditionality or socialisation. The latter is a concept related to Constructivism, as it 
integrates social learning and interaction as an effective and enduring manner to modify 
a country’s identity and interests. It is within an environment of close relationship with 
other peers and international institutions that those dynamics may take place. As Buhari 
(2009: 111) reminds, the EU is a model of socialisation and of norm diffusion. Another 
important ontological consideration present throughout this work is the co-constitution 
of agents and structures. The division of Chapter 3 clearly exposes that assumption. The 
European Union is composed by several individual member states, but has acquired, 
during decades of integration and consolidation, a life of its own; at the same time, the 
individual actors that compose it (and that relate to it somehow, like Turkey) have an 
intersubjective influence over it. Therefore, beside the co-constitution, neither agency 
nor structure precedes the other. Turkey-EU relations are the proof that anarchy (or the 
interaction between international actors) depends on what they pretend to build; both 
had several options – isolation, cooperation, conflict, integration – but they chose the 
ones that seemed appropriate according to their own internal contexts and dynamics. 
 Methodologically speaking, this thesis follows the Constructivist suggestion too: 
it embraces a combination of several techniques that range from the quantitative to the 
qualitative analysis. It does neither ignore statistical data nor historical analysis; it 
includes a model with indicators and numerical evaluations of democratic aspects, but it 
also comprises the theoretical, qualitative and fundamental contributions of several 
authors for the definition of the model of democracy. It tried to be methodological 
eclectic; not for the sake of preferring one over the other, but to search for an academic 
theorisation that would be as faithful as possible to the complex reality it proposed to 
deal with.  
 Thus, and to conclude this chapter, it is important to remember that choosing 
both Constructivism and Institutionalism as theoretical frameworks to guide the study of 
Turkey-EU relations and the specific question about the latter’s impact on Turkish 
democratisation does not pretend to be an inflexible or dogmatic approach; on the 
contrary, it simply meant that, given the complexity of the phenomena involved, a 
theoretical background would be valuable to help conduct this endeavour. Several 
lenses could be used to see this problem; those were the chosen ones.  
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PART II – DEMOCRACY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
3. Democracy – conceptual analysis and assessment 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The concept of democracy is known for representing a particularly complex and 
dynamic reality. It is reasonable to consider that it constitutes one of the most 
challenging concepts within the vocabulary of Social Sciences, not only due to the wide 
range of phenomena it encompasses, but also because of the dynamics it represents, as 
well as the different and diverse approaches many researchers have developed to 
comprehend the subject theoretically, creating various divisions among those who 
propose themselves to analyse it. However, it is simultaneously of much relevance to 
many studies, requiring the special attention of researchers and academics when dealing 
with the notion, as it is the case of this thesis, due to its objectives and central argument: 
in order to understand the evolution of a country’s democracy, one needs first to try to 
delimit the boundaries of such a blurred concept, so that it is possible to develop a 
coherent approach to the subject under consideration. 
There is a multitude of different proposals to conceive, understand and 
operationalise the concept of democracy, which makes any attempt to embrace it 
academically a hazardous endeavour. Notwithstanding, it is impossible to regard any 
approach better than other, simply because each of them is based on different choices 
and perspectives, according to the researcher’s beliefs and purposes. As Ross Harrisson 
(1998: 867) explains, democracy is “an essentially contested concept (...) whose 
analysis is unresolvable because different analysts read into it their favoured rules”. 
Based on this premise, the objective of this chapter is to provide a set of thoughts 
regarding the concepts of democracy, transition and consolidation as the theoretical core 
of the thesis, relying on the inputs of different authors, eclectically combined, keeping 
in mind the final objective of assessing the evolution of a specific country’s real 
democracy and hopefully using that final proposal to contribute to a profitable 
discussion around the subject. 
This is not, however, a recent debate. On the contrary, it can be traced back to 
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the Hellenic Era – Athens is considered to have created a system of rule that based the 
classical model of democracy. This first democratic paradigm (the Greek or Aristotelian 
one) was founded on principles of equality before the law and of political equality, in 
which all citizens were entitled to participate. Plato was very pessimistic regarding this 
regime, due to the levelling equality that would harm the society through the instability 
and unpredictability of the popular demands (Hermet, 1997: 15). Aristotle, on the other 
hand, believed the choice of political regime should be pragmatic and take into account 
the circumstances. And, although he rejected the idea of the people’s incompetence, 
sovereignty ought not to be dependent solely on the (unstable) mood of the people’s 
majority, according to Aristotle’s view. Therefore, the ideal system would combine 
popular legitimacy with rulers coming from a minority, chosen for their skills and moral 
qualities, in order to soften the possible consequences of the majority’s volatility (Idem: 
16). 
The second model, the Romanistic-Medieval, continues the development of the 
democratic principles founded in the previous one, namely through the theoretical 
contributions of William of Ockham (ca. 1255-1350) and Marsilius of Padua (ca. 1275-
1342) (Lopes, 1989: 1318). Although these authors are not frequently mentioned, their 
theoretical contributions, when considered within the framework of the Medieval 
period, are avant-garde: William of Ockham, member of the Franciscan Order, was, 
unexpectedly, in favour of church/state separation, arguing that despite the origin in 
God of the religious and civil powers, the latter did not have to submit to the Pope’s 
intervention. This thesis was particularly relevant for strengthening the Empire’s 
laicisation and to weaken the papal authority (Gonçalves, 1989: 961). Marsilius of 
Padua was a follower of Aristotle and proposed a relatively populist conception in terms 
of a rather inclusive political participation, stating that law had to be enforced by the 
population’s approval, which was also a condition for the establishment of a 
government (McGrade, 1998: 112). It should be highlighted how both approaches 
revealed a serious concern for the principle of the rule of law, contributing to the 
improvement and development of the conception of democracy. Furthermore, the 
influence of the Catholic Church that supported the equality of all men and some main 
events during the Middle Ages, such as the Magna Carta (1215) and the first model of 
Parliament in the Kingdom of Léon proposed by King Afonso IX (1188), constitute 
examples of the development of the democratic system, even though there were not, in 
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this period, democracies as they are nowadays understood.  
Finally, the creation of the Modern model of democracy is attributed to Locke 
(1632-1704) and Rousseau (1712-1778), who allowed the concept of democracy to go 
beyond the political domain, including economic, social and cultural dimensions. Locke 
was concerned with natural rights and emphasised the right to life, liberty and property, 
and therefore believed only property owners should be entitled to vote; besides, and in 
order to protect the individuals from the abuse of power, Locke proposed the separation 
of the legislative power from the executive one. On the other side, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau focused on the principles of freedom and of equality (both political and 
economic), and emphasised that the legislative power belonged to the people through 
the Social Contract. Therefore, Rousseau believed democracy was only possible in 
small states, due to his suspicion about the value and feasibility of representation 
(Hermet, 1997: 20-25; Heywood, 2002: 67-84; Lopes, 1989: 1317-18). 
As it can be perceived, progressively, the notion of democracy had been 
reformulated and its meaning and implications deepened. Other authors, such as 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), John Stuart Mill (1806-
1873) and Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), provided with their contributions, as 
well. For example, in 1835 Tocqueville published one of the most notable works on 
democracy; as João Carlos Espada explains in the Preface to the latest Portuguese 
edition of De la Démocratie en Amérique (Tocqueville, 2007: 12), “Tocqueville did not 
provide an accurate definition of the concept of democracy. He gave us more and better: 
instead of defining the word, he described the phenomenon”. Over the centuries, these 
and many other thinkers paid attention to the phenomenon of democracy and to its 
definition too. 
The spread of democracy, along with the studies on democracy, has been a 
reality, mainly since the nineteenth century. Samuel Huntington (1991) divides this 
“democratisation of the world” into three different and widely referenced waves, whose 
analysis permits to realise the increasing number of democratic regimes. Mainly after 
the two World Wars, both triggered by unstable democracies and susceptible social 
situations, democracy started to be perceived as the only regime that seemed to work, 
since both Fascism and Communism failed and the longest established democracies 
showed relatively success in providing their citizens with conditions for them to fulfil 
their needs and wishes. And if in 1974 there were only 40 democracies in the world, this 
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number has progressively risen; the 1990s democratisation processes made this regime a 
“global phenomenon” and currently three fifths of the countries are democratic 
(Diamond, 2003: 2). As Campbell (2008: 7) also concludes, “democracy, after 1980, 
represents the dominant global regime type”.23  
Nevertheless, as Diamond (2003: 10) argued, democracy is global with the 
exception of the Middle East: “Only in the Middle East is democracy virtually absent. 
In fact, among the sixteen Arab countries, there is not a single democracy, and with the 
exception of Lebanon, there never has been”. This fact may be relevant for the study of 
the Turkish case, as the country’s surroundings may exert some type of negative 
influence on the democratic performance of Turkey if one follows the reasoning of this 
author. And even though the Arab Spring may have brought important democratic 
transitions to some neighbour countries, the fact is that Turkey’s surroundings cannot be 
regarded yet a a stable environment capable of inspiring and promotion democracy in 
Turkey. However, it raises another important and broader question: is democracy a 
universal value?  
Cortona (2008: 454) wrote that democracy diffusion is part of a broader process 
of exchange between cultures of models and products of different kinds in a globalised 
world. If it is perceived in this way, then the export of democracy and the choice to 
democratise may be seen as a dynamic comparable to other exchanges, such as soap 
operas or fast food chains. Therefore, if democratisation occurs, it means that it exerts 
some type of appeal that justifies some populations’ fights to achieve, install and 
consolidate democracy in their countries. According to public opinion surveys cited in 
Larry Diamond (2003: 12-13)24, the appreciation of this regime is shared by different 
cultures: for 69% of Africans, democracy is “always preferable” to authoritarianism, as 
well as for 57% of Latin-Americans, and Muslims are as supportive of democracy as 
non-Muslims. Besides, “Amarta Sen [Nobel Laureate in Economics 1998] argues that 
                                                          
23 In fact, one should be cautious when mentioning the success or the numbers of democracies in the 
world, as this counting depends much on the definition and the understanding of the different political 
regimes. For example, Pasquino (2010: 320-21) is not so optimistic in his analysis and despite his 
agreement with the thesis that the number of democratic regimes has been growing in the last decades, 
this author considers that non-democracies are still the majority of the political systems. According to 
Pasquino’s reading of the Freedom House data, in 2007 there were 90 democracies and 192 non-
democratic states. Therefore, it should be recognised that there are different visions on the subject (due to 
different definitions of democracy), despite a general agreement on the increasing number of 
democracies, as a result of a broad movement of democratisation around the world. 
24 The data mentioned by the author was presented by different surveys, such as the Afrobarometer, the 
East Asia Barometer and the New Europe Barometer. For further information, cf. Diamond, 2003. 
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the mark of a universal value is not that it has the consent of everyone, but that ‘people 
anywhere may have reason to see it as valuable’” (Sen, 2001 cited in Diamond, 2003: 
14). “By this measure, there is growing evidence of all kinds that democracy is 
becoming a truly universal value” (Diamond, 2003: 14). Although the notion of 
democracy may vary and, with it, the number of countries considered democratic or not, 
it is noticeable a general tendency to democratise and to consolidate existing 
democracies, even though some may claim that nowadays political and economic crises 
lead to some doubts regarding the value and validity of this regime – whose discussion 
would direct us to another issue that is not of relevance to this work.  
Coming back to the discussion over the tendency to democratise, there are 
various reasons behind this scenario that will be pointed out in due course, but one of 
the dimensions that is explored in this thesis and that will be focused upon is the 
international influence on the democratic experiences of democratising countries, as it is 
the case of Turkey and the European Union.  
 
3.2. The path towards democracy: the transition phase 
 
Democracy can be defined by what it is not: an autocracy25 (Jaggers and Gurr, 
1995: 496). This premise follows a logic that traces a political continuum in which one 
of the extremes is democracy and the other an autocratic regime26. Throughout that line, 
different political systems would be displaced, defined by their democratisation degree. 
Thus, any non-democratic regime could be understood as a form of governance that, 
denying their citizens the possibility of political participation, has as priority the state’s 
interests, exercising the power arbitrarily (Giddens, 2000: 428; Pasquino, 2010: 320). 
Inside this wider group, it is possible to find more specific political systems, such as 
authoritarianisms, totalitarianisms, post-totalitarianisms and the sultanates (Linz & 
Stepan, 1996 cited in Pasquino, 2010: 334).  
 
 
                                                          
25 The noun “autocracy” will be used throughout this thesis to mean, in a general fashion, all non-
democratic regimes.  
26 Figure 7 (below) is a graphic representation of the above mentioned political continuum. 
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If a non-democratic regime is established, same changes have to occur in order 
to modify that situation, so that the country enters in a transition period that might 
eventually lead it to democracy. However, this change is not easy and has to overcome 
the obstacles of the resistance of the previous regimes, such as the economic success, 
the repressive logic or the power of the leaders, for example (Diamond, 2003: 20). 
Sooner or later, nevertheless, some internal and external dynamics begin to come up and 
to promote a favourable context to transition. This movement becomes of utmost 
importance, since the institution and quality of the future democracy depend, to a great 
extent, on the development of this phase. For Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen 
(2003: 2), and to provide an initial definition of the concept that will be dealt with in the 
next pages, ‘democratic transition’ is 
“a stage of regime change commencing at the point when the previous 
totalitarian/authoritarian system begins to collapse, leading to the 
situation when, with a new constitution in place, the democratic 
structures become routinized and the political elites adjust their 
behavior to liberal democratic norms.” 
However, neither is this definition unanimously accepted. The complexity of 
this concept’s definition is reflected, among others, by existing theoretical approaches, 
such as the functionalist and the genetic schools. The latter emphasises the political 
aspects that, in the short term, influence the process of transition – political choices and 
the actors’ strategies, for instance. On the contrary, the functionalist approach prefers a 
broader vision that takes into consideration the socio-economic environment that works 
as preconditions for the regime change in the long term (Idem: 2-3). As Pridham (2003: 
16) put it, one is macro-oriented and structural, whereas the other is micro-oriented and 
conjunctural.  
Despite their differences, both sides can complementarily contribute to a more 
detailed and complete analysis of the process in question, given the fact that 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Jaggers e Gurr, 1995. 
Figure 7: The political regime’s line I 
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functionalist direct their attention towards a timing prior to the concrete transition and 
immediately after its conclusion, whereas the genetic school completes it with the study 
of the period since the collapse of the autocratic regime until the beginning of the new-
born democracy. In that sense, both structural conditions that undermined the 
disintegrating regime and the political choices that constrained the process (political 
choices and decisions that did not achieve the desired results, for example) would be 
comprised in the study of the transition (Idem: 16).  
This discussion, however, is followed by another relevant question to the study 
of democratic transitions related to the limits or boundaries of the process: when do 
transitions end? When do they start? Including the study of the broader context is one of 
the proposals presented above, but it is not certain how further back it is necessary to go 
to get to the roots of the process. Janine Reinhard (2008: 10) recovers the opinion of 
prominent scholars (O’Donnel, Pridham and Merkel) and distinguishes the transition 
period from the prior liberalisation and from the subsequent consolidation. But, 
according to Schmitter and Schneider (2004: 4), these stages overlap in different ways, 
which makes it difficult for any scholar to disentangle all the moments.  
Rustow (1970) postulated that the active and lively character of transition 
processes should be attempted to be incorporated in a more dynamic model. Therefore, 
the author developed a proposal that perceives the whole process as the result of four 
sequential phases (meaning that the process itself was divided into four different 
stages): background, preparatory phase, decision phase and habituation phase. Each of 
them consists of a set of specific dynamics; the latter would then represent the 
internalisation of the democratic norms and values to an extent that the population 
would regard the regime as the only one capable of providing the solutions to the 
problems of the community, with a generalised feeling of trust in democracy and its 
institutions. 
In contrast, Pridham (2003) and Pridham and Vanhanen (2003) claim that 
transition is a rather short period encompassing the moment in which the previous 
regime starts to breakdown until the proclamation of the Constitution or the election of 
a government under the auspices of the new Constitution. Transition would be followed 
by consolidation, a slower, deeper and wider process that implies a progressive 
internalisation of the democratic norms and the complete institutionalisation of the new 
regime. 
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These divisions among the academics regarding the conceptualisation and 
departmentalisation of these phenomena are illustrative of the difficulty to academically 
separate what in real life constitutes a logical and continuous process with the advances 
and retreats characteristic of such complex reality. Nevertheless, and for academic 
purposes, democratisation will be understood henceforth as the conceptual umbrella that 
covers all the moments related to regime change in a country. Thus, democratisation 
includes pre-transition (or liberalisation), transition and consolidation in a logic that 
follows the proposal above presented; regarding Rustow’s conceptualisation, it is 
possible to integrate what this author comprised only in the transition period as parts of 
other phases. In this sense, the background and the preparatory stages match the pre-
transition period; the decision phase overlaps the transition itself and finally what 
Rustow called ‘habituation’ is one of the main features of post-transition, i.e., the 
consolidation period (analysed with more detail ahead). 
Our proposal combines both the functionalist and the genetic approaches, as it 
takes into consideration not only the macro-environment of the broader structural 
background that triggered the change, but also the shorter-term decisions, actions and 
strategies that constitute what is referred to as the transition moment, here understood as 
the gap between the collapse of the previous regime (be it due to a coup d’état, popular 
revolutions, political leaders renouncing, etc.) and the establishment of a democratically 
elected government and the approval of a new (democratic) constitution. Only after 
these formal moments does the society enter a consolidation period, a deeper and slower 
process that implies the internalisation and institutionalisation of the democratic values 
and norms that will be analysed further on. 
 
3.2.1. Conditions behind transitions 
The backgrounds that contextualise the different transitions are various. Once 
again, given the complexity of this reality (not reducible to a mathematical equation), 
academics’ attempt to build an explanatory model with predictive capabilities results in 
a multitude of explanations, definitions and theses – as many as the factors at the 
disposal of theorists. 
Eclectically based on various authors, our proposal of systematisation of the 
conditions that promote democratic transitions consists of dividing them into two main 
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groups that influence each other mutually: agents and structure – following the 
Constructivist premises. 
3.2.1.1. Agency 
Human agency is a relevant variable that, along with structural conditions, 
contributes to explain (or at least to understand better) regime change situations. Both 
elites and mass public tend to play a major role in the democratisation of their societies, 
becoming therefore a sine qua non condition for this phenomenon. 
“Since democratization is so uncertain and can easily be affected by human 
agency within the process or by some combination of those diverse actors, 
many scholars now agree that actors within the transition process are often 
more important than any societal or civil prerequisites” (Whyte, 2009: 66). 
This vision clearly reflects the choice of some authors for the genetic approach, as they 
attribute the antecedence and the biggest importance to actors, belittling the role of the 
structural context.  
 
a) Civil Society 
Civil society is of great relevance in every phase of democratisation: during pre-
transition, it is fundamental that they start to become aware of the existence of other 
alternatives to the autocratic regime that rules them and, consequently, start pushing for 
the disintegration of that same regime. During the transition period, demonstrations and 
revolutions are frequently the symbol of the fall of non-democratic rulers, and during 
the consolidation phase, masses are the ones to internalise the new practices and to 
apply them in their daily actions, so that the democratic regime develops and deepens its 
roots, guaranteeing the success of the new political system. 
Epstein (et. al., 2007: 14) and his team agree with this idea and emphasise how 
important a vibrant civil society is to promote, deepen and consolidate democracy. 
Paxton (2004), using the concept of “social capital”27, adds the relevance of social 
connections (during the transition) to the diffusion of ideas and to dissemination of an 
anti-governmental speech that undermines the institutionalised powers, promoting the 
                                                          
27 “Social capital” is understood by this author as the “notion that social relations can facilitate the 
production of economic or noneconomic goods” (Paxton, 2004: 256). As a matter of fact, the concept of 
“social capital” is originally attributed to Putman, who defines it as “[…] features of social organization, 
such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions” (Putman, 1993 cited by Cierco, 2013). 
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resources needed to lead a large scale action; and the role of an active social capital to 
the maintenance of a healthy democracy through a lively political participation by the 
citizens (Idem: 257-58)28. Finally, Cortona (2008: 436) recognises that, among other 
domestic factors, an “articulated and autonomous” civil society is key to the 
democratisation process. 
 
b) Elites 
However, masses do not act alone: as most of the previously mentioned authors 
also claim, elites play a vital role in democratisation, as well. First, national elites are, in 
this context, perceived as “persons who are able, by virtue of their (...) positions in 
powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national political 
outcomes regularly and substantially” (Higley and Burton, 1989: 18). In fact, elites are 
more or less involved in the maintenance of the regime in power, usually for economic 
or strategic reasons. They help the rulers repress the masses and control them, and, 
therefore, their support to the democratic cause is very paramount. Besides, there are the 
military elites, whose alliance is fundamental for a successful transition. The point is 
that groups with different types of power can facilitate or hamper the intentions of the 
supporters of democracy and, hence, constitute a valuable help to consider when 
planning a regime change. 
Campbell (2008: 6) includes the involvement of elites as a necessary condition 
for transition, just as Diamond (2003: 20) claims too; Haggard and Kaufman (1997: 
265) give emphasis to the role of political elites, considering that the “new institutions 
are bargains among self-interested politicians” and Higley and Burton (1989: 17) point 
out that some authors believe the success or failure of transitions depends on the 
national elites’ choices – the loyalty of the military is of much relevance for the survival 
of the regime and the behaviour, as well as the support, of the economic elites is very 
unpredictable, as they can become opponents of the regime very quickly (Haggard and 
Kaufman, 1997: 268).29 Thus, despite the differences in the stress put in their relative 
importance, there is a widespread agreement that elites play a key role in democratic 
transitions. 
                                                          
28 The author’s argument is that the relationship between social capital and democracy is reciprocal: both 
contribute to each other’s strengthening. 
29 This argument supports the Constructivist premise that interests are mutable, not fixed. 
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There is, nonetheless, a divergence within the academic field: some authors, like 
Huntington, argue that consensus among the elites is essential for the establishment of a 
stable democracy, because this group only cooperates when its members feel it is their 
duty or in their interest. Other academics (like Roeder), on the other hand, postulate that 
fragmentation is preferable, as it would avoid the process to be controlled only by one 
group (Whyte, 2009: 65-66). Higley and Burton (1989: 17) call these situations, 
respectively, a “consensually unified” and a “desunified” national elite and share 
Huntington’s perspective that only a unified elite produces a stable regime that can 
progress towards a modern democracy. 
On the other side of the discussion, there are the authors that believe elites have 
to be helped by the masses to achieve their objectives (Higley and Burton, 1989: 22) 
and that the elites’ role has been “overvalued” by academics (Pridham and Vanhanen, 
2003: 3). For the proponents of this argument, the discussion should focus on the 
interaction between these two groups of actors within the framework of a larger context 
(Idem: 3) – the structure. Following this logic, Emma Whyte (2009: 68) considers 
different methods of democratic transitions, according to the different possible roles 
played by these actors. As Table 2 below schematises, combining the role of elites and 
masses and their approach (more or less unilateral), it is possible to achieve four 
different outcomes: transition by reform (masses/multilateral), revolution 
(masses/unilateral); pacts (elites/multilateral); imposition (elites/unilateral). It is clear 
that the two first results are bottom-up and the other two top-down approaches, and that 
different situations create different degrees of stability of the future regime.  
 
 
 
 
3.2.1.2. Structure 
 But it is not only direct human action that constraints these complex processes of 
democratic transitions. In fact, there is a set of structural conditions that also contribute 
to shape the dynamics of the movement. Even though they are constituted or 
constructed by human beings, their presence above the individuals is a reality and 
 Masses Elites 
Compromise/multilateral Reform Pacts 
Force/unilateral Revolution Imposition 
Source: Author’s elaboration (according to Whyte, 2009: 68) 
Table 2: Methods of democratic transition 
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should be taken into consideration when analysing certain phenomena. 
 
a) Economic development 
 Economic development is regarded by many researchers as one of the most 
important factor triggering the transition from a non-democratic regime: Dahl and 
Huntington (cited in Whyte, 2009: 59) share this view and Campbell (2008: 207-20) 
includes national wealth among his ten domestic conditions for democracy, for 
example. Epstein (et al., 2006: 560) concludes that the “GDP seems to have a 
significant impact on the probability of transition both into and out of democracy” – 
and, therefore, supports the focus and theses of many researchers who, during the 
1990s, privileged the economic dimension of regime change, such as Rustow, Kuznets, 
Chenery, Taylor, and Przeworski’s. Furthermore, Epstein and his team (Idem: 564) 
claim that “the key to consolidation of a new democracy (...) is a strong economy”.  
 This emphasis, however, is not given by all authors and some nuances or even 
oppositions can be found in the work of several academics. Muller (1995) prefers to 
underscore the relevance of income equality for the constitution of a stronger middle-
class, the true pro-democracy group. Therefore, the economic variable here is 
interpreted in a more specific reality, and income inequality is viewed as having a 
“negative impact on the stability of democracy over time” (Idem: 967). Haggard and 
Kaufman (1997: 266-67), on the other side, do not perceive any connection between 
economic crises and regime change; for them, they are neither sufficient nor necessary 
for the withdrawal of a previous non-democratic government. Lipset (cited in Whyte, 
2009: 59) reached the same conclusion, as well as Diamond (2003: 14, 15), who 
believes that if there is any type of correlation between economic development and 
democracy is through an indirect way, such as the subsequent education or stronger 
civil society; economy is not a condition by itself, as the petro-states epitomise – rich 
but not educated and with hybrid regimes. The economic performance, however, can be 
a relevant variable when considering the disintegration of the autocratic regime, since 
its establishment is frequently associated with economic goals; consequently, there is a 
dilemma: if they fail, they lose the justification for ruling; if they reach the goals, they 
can be perceived as not anymore necessary and become “victims of their own success” 
(Idem: 15). 
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 Hence, since autocracies resist thanks to repression, the power of their leaders, 
the lack of education of its population, etc., it would undermine their consistency if the 
citizens were exposed to the rest of the world (Idem: 20-21) that is constantly exporting 
its ideas and values and would, as a result of some cultural change, contribute to the 
strengthening of a “culture of democracy”, which recalls what Emma Whyte (2009: 59) 
thinks about the economic variable: it is necessary but not sufficient.  
 
 
b) Social, civil and psychological pre-requisites 
Thus, there is a set of other variables (such as this “culture of democracy”) that 
can be included within the framework of the “social, civil and psychological pre-
requisites” for democracy (Idem: 59). This expression means that both the masses and 
the elites are framed within a certain broader context that can either encourage or 
dishearten the actors to pursue their democratisation impulses. It is clearly a variable 
that underlines the value of the ideational side of the arguments, among which one can 
find some other contributions to this on-going discussion about the promoting factors 
behind democratic transition. 
 Pamela Paxton (2002) links social capital and democracy, stating that these 
emotional connections between citizens increase their cooperation and reinforce civil 
society through the promotion of democratic values and collective action (although the 
influence of social capital on democracy is reciprocal). Rustow (1970) argues that any 
genetic theory needs to include a two-direction causality flow between political 
conditions, and economic and social ones. However, he is against the idea of creating 
democrats first: “Instead, we should allow for the possibility that circumstances may 
force, trick, lure, or cajole non-democrats into democratic behaviour” (Idem: 344). The 
only condition that seems to matter to Rustow is national unity. 
 ‘National unity’ is regarded by this author as the only background condition that 
should precede any phase of democratisation, because it is fundamental that, despite the 
variation of different governments that come to power and leave it, citizens remain a 
cohesive group (Idem: 350). Cortona (2008: 436), in the same line of reasoning, 
considers the absence of conflicts related to national questions one of the domestic 
conditions necessary for regime change. It is, as a matter of fact, another valuable 
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variable to take into consideration; however, the process of establishing a new 
democracy is frequently very fierce in what comes to social cleavages and instability 
and, although national unity would be a key to avoid a society’s disintegration, several 
times it simply does not exist. This reminds of the stability-democracy dilemma: 
democracy is a prerequisite for stability, but the path towards it (democratisation) very 
often consists of disquieting times. This argument is supported by Mansfield and 
Snyder’s (2002) study that reached the conclusion that during the initial phases of 
democratisation, there is a higher likelihood of a country to involve in a war, meaning 
that transitions can be a tricky phase for the country’s peace. Moreover, if transitions 
fail and create weak institutions, there are higher risks for foreign policy, which leads 
the authors assert that, before allowing free and competitive elections, it is necessary to 
promote the rule of law, an independent judiciary and other democratic principles 
(Idem: 334). 
 There is, then, besides national unity, a wide range of other conditions that are 
believed by many academics to facilitate the transition to democracy. Education appears 
at the top of the list as a factor that strengthens the democratic character of a certain 
society – as the previously mentioned authors argued, to create a democratic 
background is of utmost importance to avoid weak institutions, overpowered elites and 
armed conflicts. Consequently, education, urbanisation, social equality, national unity 
and others constitute a set of broader pre-requisites that, although not sufficient for the 
establishment of a new regime, increases its likelihood.  
 
c) History 
The weight of history and previous experiences gather a wider than the 
economic arguments consensus among academics – even though those are more 
supported by functionalists. Living under the scope of a non-democratic regime leaves 
its marks and different political systems shape the society and their habits differently, 
originating very diverse contexts – it is, therefore, easier to democratise from an 
authoritarianism than from a totalitarianism (Whyte, 2009: 63). Prior failed 
democratisation attempts undermine the population’s confidence; they are responsible 
for leaving a potentially negative legacy, weakening future attempts to democratise 
(Epstein, et al., 2006: 556). As Morlino (cited in Pridham, 2003: 18) wrote: “the 
previous democratic experience affects deeply the new democratic arrangements; it is 
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part of the historical memory of the people preserved, in turn, by the mechanisms of 
political socialisation”.  
 Moreover, history is important to understand the dynamics behind 
democratisation, as it helps the analyst know more deeply that society’s political 
culture, namely, for instance, if there is a tradition of respect for the rule of law, of 
power concentration or even of defined boundaries between the Church and the State 
(Cortona, 2008: 436). No democratic history, ethnic differences and difficult economic 
conditions make it harder to democratise (Epstein, et al., 2007: 15) and, therefore, many 
authors value this approach and criticise (like Pridham and Vanhanen, 2003) when 
historical explanations are ignored, as the roots of democratisation habitually stretch 
back to the past heritage of the country. 
 These two aspects – the legacy of the previous regime and the history of 
attempts to democratise – support Rustow’s (1970: 348) argument, according to which 
it should be pursued a historical-political approach, as well as the constructivist 
conceptions on the socialisation boosted by organisations. In fact, and although Rustow 
does not mention it directly, Cortona (2008: 435) also defends that “democratisation is 
always the result of a combination of internal and external factors”30 and, in that sense, 
international organisations (and the broader international context) should be included in 
this analysis too. 
 
d) International environment 
 Domestic factors play an important role in creating the conditions for transitions, 
but they are not alone: international dynamics are also essential to determine the broader 
framework in which democratisation will occur – and this environment can either be a 
favourable one or it can jeopardise the internal efforts (when they exist). Traditionally, 
the domestic factors used to be emphasised over the international ones; this trend, 
however, due to major changes in the global scene during the last decades and to the 
growing importance and strengthening of the discipline of International Relations, has 
been changing. Despite the criticisms that remain regarding the role of international 
conditions, there are already many theorists who started to recognise the importance of 
                                                          
30 Translated from the Italian by the author. Original version: “Le democratizzazione sono sempre state il 
resultato di una combinazione di fattori interni e di fattori esterni (o internazionali)”. 
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the external conditions to understand more deeply and broadly such complex reality: 
Dimitrova (1996) quotes Schmitter when he admitted, in 1995, that the international 
impact on regime change may have been more significant than he previously (in 1989) 
thought; and Attila Agh, who, in the late 1990s, already considered the external factors 
the prime catalyst behind democratisation (Idem). The debate about the precedence of 
either the domestic or the external conditions seems to be of little relevance (as well as 
outdated) to the development of the study of democracy and democratisation, as it is our 
belief that only the combined action of both sides, difficult to disentangle, allows a 
successful transition and consolidation. However, there is a growing recognition that the 
international side of democratisations should be included in the analyses: Campbell 
(2008), Diamond (2003), Pasquino (2010), Börzel and Risse (2009), Cortona (2008) and 
Fossati (2010) are some examples of relatively recent works of authors that incorporate 
the international dimension of democratisation in their central arguments.  
 It is important to notice that the role of democracy promoter is not only to be 
attributed to the European Union, but also to other very relevant organisations, such as 
the Catholic Church that seeks to promote social justice and human rights among 
different countries, especially in South America or Africa. Besides the EU and the 
Catholic Church, it should not be ignored the role of individual states (USA, Japan, 
Sweden, etc.) and other organisms, such as the United Nations,  the OSCE or NATO, 
that illustrate the willingness of various entities to support and maintain democracy. 
Moreover, there are the changes in norms and international conventions, elements that 
have a significant impact on the regulation of international actors’ behaviour and to the 
constitution of their identity. They have always attempted to progressively highlight 
human rights and democracy, including these in the international discourse, in treaties 
and in collective action, being in part responsible for a “shared normative expectation”, 
according to which all the states that look for international legitimacy have to rule with 
the consent of the governed – a principle that is increasingly more explicit in legal 
documents (Diamond, 2003: 16-17). 
 Although this subject of the role of foreign organisations or the external 
environment will be more profoundly scrutinised in the next chapter, it is to say that, as 
the broad domestic context, the international framework can work either as a supportive 
or debilitating factor (Pasquino, 2010: 364) and, as the same author recognises, despite 
the difficulty to apprehend it theoretically, “the effect seems to be of positive contagion 
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among close countries” (Idem: 365). It is therefore more likely to exist a positive 
domino effect rather than a negative one, according to this perspective, that can be 
explained by the interesting work developed by Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (2009) 
regarding the international diffusion of ideas, norms and values, among which one can 
find democracy, through processes (better explained in the next chapter) of 
socialisation, persuasion and emulation (Idem: 9). As a matter of fact, the proposals to 
frame the different models of international influence on domestic process are various 
and progressively more detailed and encompassing, due to the efforts of a increasing 
number of scholars that dedicate to the issue, such as Whitehead and Schmitter (1995 
cited in Dimitrova, 1996), Cortona (2008), Fossati (2010), McFaul (et al., 2007) and 
Magen and Morlino (2007), for example. 
 Thus, and due to the current state of the world, full of exchanges and 
interdependences supported by impressive networks of communication and transports, 
the international dimension has been gaining weight in the analysis of the 
democratisation processes. Hence, the conclusion that could be drawn by this section 
(and reinforced on chapter 4) is that, despite some disagreement on the relative 
influence of each side, the processes of democratic transition are the result of the 
interaction of domestic and external dynamics and it is in the study of both that lies an 
answer closer to the intricate reality here investigated, in order to enrich the existing 
knowledge on the theme. 
 
3.3. Democracy 
 
 Hopefully, a successful transition process ends up in the establishment of a 
democratic system, abandoning, at least officially, the previous autocratic regime. 
Recalling the line traced to represent the political continuum mentioned in the last 
section, it would mean that a certain country would be moving from the negative to the 
positive side of the scheme. But, once again, the institution of this regime is neither 
linear nor homogeneous: on the contrary, there are nuances that distinguish the different 
types of democracy, since the limits of that line are ideal and hardly achievable, 
allowing different gradations in between. For that reason, it does not exist a consensus 
regarding the number of democracies in the world and their geographical distribution, as 
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already mentioned, simply because there is no common definition that enables a pattern 
in the measurement or assessment of political regimes.  
However, as an academic work, and even despite these difficulties, it is 
important to present a coherent model that clearly explains what democracy is and how 
it can be measured, so that it becomes possible to replicate this study and to verify its 
conclusions or even to apply it to another case study. Therefore, this section aims to 
provide a conceptual analysis of the term ‘democracy’. The idea is to clarify the 
meaning and understanding of all its components through a more precise and accurate 
definition of the related concepts, of democracy’s types, degrees and levels, so that, on 
chapter 5, it is possible to build a model for assessing the evolution of the quality of a 
real democracy. For this initial analysis, the works and contributions of several authors 
will be used and cited, mainly the ones presented by Leonardo Morlino (2002) and 
Marc Bühlmann, Wolfgang Merkel and Bernhard Wessels (2007). The final purpose is 
to reach a more precise and accurate orientation for the case study and to contribute to 
the lively and ongoing discussion on the definition and operationalisation of the concept 
of democracy. 
 
 3.3.1. A confusing concept: types, levels and degrees 
A first concern lies in the type of definition: some authors prefer a procedural 
definition, considering it enough to embrace only technical questions (such as the 
respect for norms and procedures – formal democracy) whereas others believe it is 
insufficient – and hence it would be better to take into consideration the effects that 
result from those procedures for the citizens, such as their well-being. Bühlmann (2007) 
calls them the minimalist, the medium and the maximalist concepts of democracy; 
Kekic (cited in Campbell, 2008) uses the terms “thin” and “thick” concepts; Campbell 
(2008) labels them as “focused democracy” and “comprehensive democracy”. In 
common, these authors have the notion of the different types and possibilities of 
defining democracy. 
Jaggers and Gurr (1995) wrote that, in simple terms, democracy has to be 
regarded as the opposite of autocracy; for Diamond (2003) the democratic regime is 
nothing but (and paraphrasing) a system in which people choose their representatives 
through elections; in the same line of thought, Joseph Schumpeter (cited in Pasquino, 
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2010) sees democracy as a method in which some people gain the power to decide and 
to make political decisions through a competition.  
On the other hand, Leonardo Morlino’s (2002) definition of minimum 
democracy includes, besides the elections, the existence of more than one political party 
and of more than one source of information. Although this “thin” definition is “thicker” 
than the one proposed by the previous authors, for Morlino it is nonetheless a minimum 
definition, given the fact that, from his perspective, to consider a maximum definition, 
would involve assessing the degree of the application of the two main objectives of a 
liberal democracy: freedom and equality. It implies, in this sense, a focus not only on 
the procedures, but also on the content and on the result. Richard Haass (cited in 
Epstein, et al., 2007) shares this view and states that democracy is more than elections 
and includes the diffusion of power among different societal groups, a system of 
“checks and balances”, independent media, trade unions, freedom of expression, etc. 
Sodaro (cited in Campell, 2008) incorporates the limits to the government and its 
accountability in his definition of democracy. Therefore, and even with a blurred limit 
between “thin” and “thick” definitions, there is a first division in the approaches to the 
concept of democracy marked by the inclusion or exclusion of certain attributes to the 
regime – the more the attributes, the thicker the definition, and vice-versa. 
To distinguish the baseline of what is (or is not) a democracy is a second 
relevant task: combining the proposals of different academics devoted to the subject 
(Schedler, 1998; Diamond, 2003; Esptein, et al., 2007; Pasquino, 2010) emerges a 
central division between the two major types of democracy: liberal and electoral. A 
liberal democracy represents a system in which democratic principles are observed, 
such as the respect and affirmation of the citizens’ political and civil rights, pluralism 
and the rule of law, whilst the electoral form of democracy is limited to the existence of 
suffrage without the actual application of the liberal democracy’s principles. Elections 
constitute, thus, the minimal requisite for the consideration of a democratic regime. 
There, notwithstanding, other possible and valid divisions. For example, David Epstein 
and his associates (2006: 555) adopt the division found in Polity IV and work upon the 
division between autocracies, democracies and partial democracies.31 Although the 
                                                          
31 Partial democracies are sometimes called hybrid regimes or semi-democracies. This constitutes an 
intermediary stage for some authors and another typology. O’Donnell and Schmitter (cited by Usul, 2011: 
9) also differentiate between the “dictablandas” and the “democraduras”, two concepts that mix features 
of both democracies and dictatorships that may coexist in the same society. 
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point made by these authors makes sense and the relevance of an intermediary field 
between the two opposites (democracy and autocracy), for this initial and major 
division, the introduction of a third group would only make it harder to categorise 
reality, as the boundaries would again become more blurred. As it is possible to see in 
Figure 8 below, the non-consideration of an intermediary field is the price to pay for the 
attempt to achieve the clearest division possible in terms of the types of democracy. In 
this sense, electoral democracy is guaranteed by the mere existence of free and fair 
elections (a procedural approach), advanced or perfect democracy is the other (ideal) 
extreme in which all the possible democratic principles are respected and applied and, in 
between these two points, one can find liberal democracy.  
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Pasquino, 2010; Epstein, et al., 2007; Diamond, 
2003; Schedler, 1998; Jaggers e Gurr, 1995. 
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It is then clear that the suffrage constitutes the minimum level of any 
democracy, the null in this scale, and that, from that point on, the functions of 
democracy, materialised through specific procedures, will grow until the ideal extreme 
of perfect democracy. The denominations of those intermediate points (that are located, 
nonetheless, within the field of liberal democracy and that represent the degrees of a 
liberal democracy) can be diverse – as diverse are the proposals of different authors. 
Here, the concepts used are the ones presented by Leonardo Morlino (2002: 20): 
effective, responsible, legitimate, free, egalitarian and perfect – graphically represented 
in Figure 9 (above). It is now possible to say that the initial question of determining 
what is democracy and what it is not has already been overcome and now the focus is 
on another (and perhaps even more complex) question: the quality of democracy, that 
leads us to attribute adjectives to the noun, in order to embrace this reality. 
The inevitability of the attributing adjectives to democracy to specify its 
different degrees had been already foreseen by Collier and Levitsky (1997: 430-31), 
who were concerned about the conceptual validity of the term in question and the 
proliferation of the conceptual alternative forms. Evoking Sartori and his “ladder of 
generality”, those academics refer to the going up and down that same ladder as acts 
that interfere with the conceptual differentiation – increasing it means refining it, but 
diminishing the number of applicable cases; decreasing the differentiation causes the 
opposite. Creating “classical sub-types of democracy” augments, in turn, the risk of 
stretching the concept too much (“concept stretching”). David Collier and Steven 
Levitsky, therefore, advise to differentiate between degrees and types of democracy 
(Idem: 435), which was precisely what was attempted to be done above. There are two 
(three if the perfect one is included) types of democracy and one of them, for its 
encompassing and complex character, will be scrutinised using different degrees that 
will be able to provide higher accuracy to that type of democracy, through the study and 
analysis of the basic principles of democracy, as well as the different components and 
indicators they refer to. 
 
3.3.2. Scrutinising the meaning and the content 
For Morlino (2002: 4), a “good” democracy entails “a stable institutional 
structure that realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and 
correct functioning of its institutions and mechanisms”; it means that its quality has to 
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be assessed in terms of its results (to satisfy the citizens), of its content (a certain level 
of freedom and equality) and of its procedures (where the citizens have the actual power 
to evaluate the government’s performance according to the rule of law). Therefore, the 
evaluation of the quality of democracy has to be done in accordance with five 
dimensions, central to the empirical analysis, proposed by the author: rule of law, 
accountability, responsiveness, rights and freedoms, and equality.32  
The degrees of liberal democracy, according to Morlino, depend on the 
dimensions that are respected and exercised in the case under consideration33. If only 
the rule of law is respected, it is an effective democracy; if accountability is also 
present, there is an upgrade to a responsible liberal democracy; and so on and so forth, 
until all the principles are observable at a high degree, revealing a “perfect” democracy. 
It is worth to mention that every dimension is carefully explained and analysed by the 
author in the same work. 
Despite the quality of Morlino’s model, the analysis of the meaning and content 
of democracy (as well as its operationalisation) would be enriched if the contribution of 
Bühlmann, Merkel and Wessels (2007) was added. In that sense, these authors present a 
conceptualisation of democracy developed in different levels.34 The first level of 
analysis encompasses the three fundamental and most abstract principles of democracy: 
equality, freedom and control. Equality is regarded as one of the most important within 
this triad and means the equal treatment of all citizens in the most diverse moments of 
social life. Freedom comes as the value responsible for the protection of each one of 
these individuals against the violations either committed by other individuals or the 
state, since it includes a wide range of rights that became indispensable for any 
democratic regime. At last, and as a balance between the tension that may rise from the 
combination of the two previous principles35, control emerges as a form of vigilance of 
                                                          
32 Although Morlino, together with Magen, published a later work (Magen and Morlino, 2009) in which 
the dimensions that determine what is a “good democracy” were increased to 8, we decided to remain 
with his initial proposal, at least for now, as it eases the systematic presentation of the content of the 
concept of democracy. 
33 Cfr. Table 3, Appendix 3. 
34 Table 4 (Appendix 3), a simplified version of the original, given the detail it was initially created with, 
schematises the whole model and allows a more general overview. The original table still includes a 
column with sub-components and another one with the suggestion of indicators for the operationalisation 
of the concept. 
35 It is worth mentioning that the question of combining freedom and equality originated countless 
philosophical discussions on the importance and relative weight of each of them in the lives of individuals 
and of society in general, given the fact that it is impossible the maximisation of both at the same time 
and the point of equilibrium of their intersection is not consensual among theorists. Hobbes, Locke and 
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the political institutions, warning the decision-makers that their power is limited and 
constrained by the popular will and jurisdiction. Inside each one of these basic 
principles, one can find a set of partial regimes that are responsible, in their interaction, 
for the normative and operational functioning of the complex institutional structures of 
modern democracies (Idem: 14). Due to this chain, the model is conceived based upon a 
notion of "embedded democracy". The idea is that stable democracies are "embedded" 
in two ways: internally (the interdependency between the different regimes that ensure 
the good functioning of the principles) and externally (the embeddness of those regimes 
in more concrete conditions that make democracy possible). 
The democratic principle of equality encompasses, according to Bühlmann's 
model, the partial regime of political rights. It means that these are a necessary 
condition for the observance of equality. Political rights are regarded by many authors36 
as one of the core areas of any democratic regime: "without the presence of the highest 
patterns and of the institutional mechanisms that guarantee the defence of these values, 
it is not possible to assert that one is in the presence of a democratic regime" (Cruz, 
2003: 67). 
The importance attributed to political rights is related to their connection with 
the electoral regime, in the sense that they are the pre-conditions for elections: political 
rights include a set of freedoms without which free and fair elections would not be 
possible, such as the freedom of expression and of the press (Bühlmann, et al., 2007: 
17). These freedoms allow the citizens to formulate and express their preferences, which 
is, for Dahl (1971 cited in Pasquino, 2010: 360), the requisite for the establishment of 
democracies. 
In terms of functions, this partial regime includes participation, responsiveness 
and transparency. The first implies the formal equality of all citizens to participate 
politically; the second is the “capacity to satisfy the governed by executing its policies 
in a way that corresponds to their demands” (Morlino, 2002: 12). The freedom to 
associate and of opinion (the lack of censorship, for example) are essential to create, 
promote and diffuse the citizens’ preferences and opinions, so that the ones in charge 
are aware of what is demanded. Finally, transparency closes this set of functions with a 
reference to the need for an open public sphere with informational openness of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Rousseau, to name a few, postulated different conjugations of these variables.  
36 For this purpose, cf., for example, Bühlmann, et al (2007), Cruz (2003) or Morlino (2002). 
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political process that guarantees the actual evaluation/observance of the prior functions 
(Bühlmann, et al., 2007: 17). 
Moving to the opposite side of the balance of partial regimes, there is freedom, 
whose unique partial regime is civil rights. These are intended to protect the citizen 
against possible abuses from the executive or legislative powers and only when these 
rights are applied it is possible to enjoy political rights (Bühlmann, 2007: 18). Inside 
this partial regime, one can find two functions that permit its concretisation: individual 
freedom and rule of law. The first is self-explaining, as those freedoms (not to be 
subjected to any type of pressure or constraint) aim to safeguard the individuals against 
harmful political decisions.  
On the other hand, rule of law emerges as a vital function of any modern 
democracy. This institution ensures formal equality before the law and limits the power 
of the state, guaranteeing the supremacy of individual rights and of the law above any 
political stakeholder (Cruz, 2003: 71-73). The exercise of power is constrained through 
its division and the “state is bound to the effective law and acts according to clearly 
defined prerogatives” (Bühlmann, et al., 2007: 18). In other words, the rule of law 
forces the authorities to follow and respect the laws. Moreover, it requires a set of 
conditions to be effective, such as the ones presented by Morlino (2002: 7): the 
existence of non-retroactive, universal, stable and non-ambiguous laws, the civilian 
control over the military, an independent judicial system, equal access to justice, fair 
trials, no corruption, efficient police forces, etc. 
The final democratic principle introduced by this model is control. As said 
before, this “third wheel” works as the intermediary field whose aim is to balance the 
other two, avoiding or diminishing the conflicts they frequently arise, due to the 
opposing views each one stands for. 
The electoral regime is one of the clearest instrument for controlling the political 
power (Idem: 73) and its function is to allow the access to power after free and fair 
elections (Bühlmann, et al., 2007: 16). From the competition of different visions 
represented by different political groups or parties, “a necessary evil in democracy” 
(Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 78), emerges the population’s choice, the result of their 
sovereignty. This is what Bühlmann (et al., 2007: 31) calls “vertical accountability”, 
i.e., rulers are accountable to those who elected them and who periodically control them 
in competitive elections. Thus, the vote is a way to punish or reward politicians 
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(Morlino, 2002: 9-10). As Schmitter (2003: 4) puts it: “the more politically accountable 
that rulers are to citizens, the highly will be quality (or better, the qualities) of 
democracy”. Obviously, the functioning of vertical accountability is only possible when 
representation is respected. In other words, both active and passive suffrages have to 
occur fairly and without any types of constraints, so that the results of the elections 
respect and reflect the real preferences of the voters, and hence become the 
manifestation of the popular sovereignty. 
There is, however, another type of accountability: horizontal accountability is 
control’s second partial regime and is based on a more continuous form of supervision 
of the government or other democratic institutions, allowed by a network of 
autonomous and accountable institutions that are meant to control the action of each 
other. This dimension of power enables the different actors to be mutually responsible 
for controlling possible abuses by other institutions. It becomes, for that reason, 
essential the existence of well established structures, such as political parties, 
independent media, civil society associations, autonomous courts (Bühlmann, et al., 
2007: 19; Morlino, 2002: 10-11). 
This system of checks and balances implies, therefore, that a strong opposition, 
an independent judiciary and all the mechanisms that guarantee a healthy rule of law 
contribute to constrain the autonomy of the executive power, because, as Schmitter and 
Karl (1991: 76) admit, what “distinguishes democratic rulers from nondemocratic ones 
are the norms that condition how the former come to power and the practices that hold 
them accountable for their actions”. 
There still is inside the scope of control another (and a final) issue that should be 
taken into consideration. Although the executive has to be constrained in its exercise of 
power by other accountable institutions that protect the law and the citizens above other 
interests, it is also necessary that the executive has got effective power to govern, which 
means that the ones that were chosen to rule are not anyhow constrained or limited by 
extra-constitutional actors not subject to democratic accountability (Bühlmann, et al., 
2007: 20). In fact, the government should be freed from any type of influences, both 
internal and external, in order to ensure full control and autonomy over its own policies.  
Obviously, all these principles, partial regimes and functions are interconnected 
in a way that makes it really hard to disentangle each part or level from the others. 
However, it is precisely that inextricability that should not be disregarded when reading 
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the model. For example, Morlino (2002: 15) proposes a triangle that relates three 
fundamental aspects of any democracy: the rule of law provides the basis for the 
citizens’ demands of accountability; in turn, accountability fosters improvements in the 
legal system and in the respect for law; responsiveness becomes a pre-condition to 
assess accountability and the rule of law an essential premise of responsiveness. 
Democracy is, therefore, a set of mechanisms, institutions and actors whose aim 
is to rule in benefit of the citizens of a certain society. For its nature and 
comprehensiveness, it embodies an extremely difficult and complex reality, analysed 
and studied over and over again by various academics who interpret it according to their 
own mindset and principles. From countless approaches that were available, 
Bühlmann’s (et al., 2007) proposal has been chosen to scrutinise the concept, adding 
some nuances to seek to improve the model, already thinking about its application to the 
case study. The choice was made based on the completeness and comprehensiveness of 
the approach, although it is always a challenging task to schematise and theorise such 
wide and dynamic reality. 
 
3.4. The path afterwards: consolidation 
 
 As discussed above, democratisation constitutes an “umbrella” concept that 
covers a set of different phases, whose blurred boundaries make it difficult to separate 
from each other.37 However, in accordance with our proposal, consolidation would be 
the process that follows the establishment of a democratic regime and that consists of  
“transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms, and contingent 
solutions that have emerged during the uncertain struggles of the transition 
into institutions, i.e. into relationships that are reliably known, regularly 
predicted and normatively accepted” (Schmitter and Schneider, 2004: 5).  
Or, in other words, consolidation can also mean the  
“gradual removal of the uncertainties that invariably surround transition and 
then the full institutionalization of the new democracy, the internalization of 
its rules and procedures and the dissemination of democratic values” 
(Pridham and Vanhanen, 2003: 2). 
From both definitions is possible to infer some of the process’ characteristics. 
                                                          
37 “The processes of liberalization, transition and consolidation tend to overlap in different ways and this 
makes the whole process of regime change much less predictable than the “over-determined” politics of 
countries with stable regimes” (Schmitter and Schneider, 2004: 4). 
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Due to what consolidation is about and what it involves, this phase is slow and 
uncertain (Cierco, 2008: 73). It is also less linear than the previous stage, mainly if 
transition is regarded as a mere regime change. This slowness comes from the wideness 
and deepness of consolidation; and if the list of conditions included in the latter 
definition is taken into consideration, it is not difficult to realise the complexity of 
defining clear boundaries for this process. Furthermore, the possibility of a backward 
movement towards an autocracy must be ruled out at a great extent, at the same time 
citizens start to act according to the new framework they are in, creating (or 
strengthening) a democratic civic culture committed to the maintenance of the new 
regime. Nonetheless, defining or even measuring to what extent does it already happen 
in a certain society is another tricky task for theorists. 
As Ali Usul (2011: 11) explains, “various conceptualizations of consolidation 
are possible, depending on how the concept of democracy is framed”. It is, for example, 
feasible to approach consolidation as a positive or negative process, i.e. as a phase in 
which the efforts are put on strengthening (or consolidating) democratic features or, in 
the second case, as a period in which the main objective is to reduce the likelihood of a 
breakdown, aiming therefore to solve remaining problems and challenges to 
democratisation (Idem: 12-13). 
Moreover, there are authors, such as Linz and Stepan (1996 cited in Usul, 2011: 
13-14), that prefer to analyse and study the consolidation process in terms of the actors’ 
behaviour, the citizens’ attitudes and the country’s constitution. On the other hand, 
Diamond (1999 cited in Usul, 2011: 14) distinguishes the dimensions (norms and 
behaviour) and the levels (elites, intermediate or masses) at which consolidation occurs. 
These different (not always necessarily incompatible) approaches meet with 
Andreas Schedler’s (1998: 92) criticisms, who, in an article dedicated to this subject 
that will be used as a model, argues that the concept has been used indiscriminately to 
mean a wide number of phenomena, distorting it and condemning its study to 
stagnation. Consolidation has been employed as a synonym for popular legitimacy, 
neutralization of anti-system actors, civilian control over the military, etc. Therefore, in 
order to create a pattern in this field, Schedler proposes a structured approach to the 
various possibilities of democratic consolidation. 
First of all, the author borrows Collier and Levitsky’s terminology and 
determines the division between electoral and liberal democracy as the empirical 
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references for all the research on democratic consolidation (Idem: 93). This division 
coincides with what has been previously proposed – consolidation begins after the 
regime change; and means that both a democracy where one can only find free and fair 
elections, and another one where many democratic features are already solid, all of them 
are object of the attention of theorists, as they find themselves in the process of 
maturing their regimes – even though they might be at different levels of development 
and accomplishment. That is the reason why it may take several decades for a country to 
consolidate its democracy and, as Schmitter and Schneider (2004: 3) put it, 
“democracies are not supposed to be fully consolidated – ever”, because being “fully 
consolidated” would mean achieving the level of a perfect democracy in all of its 
dimensions – an utopia. In fact, consolidation does not have to happen simultaneously at 
all levels (Pridham, 2005 cited in Usul, 2011: 14); some fields may be more matured 
than others. 
Thus, with these considerations, it seems reasonable to reinforce our previous 
assumption: since a country formally adopts a democratic system, it is no longer in the 
transition moment, but in the consolidation process, during which it has to struggle not 
to backslide and, simultaneously, to complete and deepen its regime.  
As it is possible to understand by watching Schedler’s scheme (Appendix 3, 
Figure 10), the period of consolidation can evolve in two directions: negative or 
positive. The author’s idea is that the establishment of a democracy is not a guarantee 
for its endless maintenance. In other words, all the actors should focus on holding what 
has been achieved, avoiding a breakdown until guaranteeing enough confidence that 
democracy will resist (Schedler, 1998: 95). This is, in fact, the first line of the scheme. 
“Avoiding a democratic breakdown” is one of the possible movements, during which 
the main fears concentrate, among others, in possible coup d’états, guerrillas or drug 
cartels: “It is basically pre-occupied with keeping democracy alive, with preventing its 
sudden death” (Idem: 96). 
The danger or threat to democracy may not mean a completely visible backslide 
to a non-democratic regime, but rather a “democratic erosion” that ought to be 
prevented, for being considered by Schedler as the real danger for the regime, given the 
less visible (or “less spectacular” in the author’s words) character of the changes, 
capable of causing a slow erosion, different from the more tangible discontinuity of the 
previous situation. This constitutes a “less transparent for[m] of regression” (Idem: 97) 
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that is very likely to end up creating a hybrid regime that swings between a democracy 
and an autocracy. 
Schedler’s model is not only about negative consolidation. On the contrary, a 
country can complete its democracy and deepen it. The first case is, according to the 
author’s explanation, a kind of second transition; however, this time, it is from a 
democratic government to a democratic regime (Idem: 98). This means that the electoral 
nature of the system is complemented with a set of reforms that allow an evolution 
towards the liberal type of democracy. This moment represents the result of the 
adoption and application of democratic reforms that allow the improvement and 
maturation of the regime. 
Furthermore, in the case a country (imaginarily, let us say) fulfils all the 
conditions to become a “perfect democracy”, it is called by Schedler “deepening 
democracy” (Idem: 99) and which is also a positive movement in the line of democratic 
consolidation. 
Finally, the author proposes a third possible reading of democratic 
consolidation; one that is neither positive nor negative – it is a “neutral” consolidation 
and is represented under the concept of “organising democracy”. To organize a 
democracy means, therefore, focusing on more specific aspects of the regime in order to 
strengthen them, to avoid democratic breakdowns and to consolidate the democratic 
achievements. This type of democratic consolidation resembles the process of 
“institution building” (reinforcing the political party system, the legislative entities, the 
judicial system, etc.), “turn[ing] its attention from the procedural minima that define 
democratic regimes to the concrete rules and organizations that define various forms of 
democracy” (Idem: 100). If the focus changed previously from the democratic 
government to the regime, now it moves from the regime to more concrete subsystems 
(or partial regimes). 
Ali Usul (2011: 15) also associates consolidation with institutionalisation and 
considers this process one of the most important components of democracy, because it 
is the one responsible for establishing norms and rules. Within this field, political 
parties play a fundamental role, as they represent civil society and avoid excessive 
concentration of power (Idem: 16) – as long as political parties are institutionalised and 
follow and apply democratic norms. 
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Civil society, in its turn, here understood as a set of “citizens acting collectively 
in a public sphere” (Diamond, 1994 cited in Usul, 2011: 21), influences the success of 
democracy in the sense that it has got the capability of monitoring the state’s power, 
stimulating political participation. (Idem: 22) and also because citizens, remembering 
the initial considerations about consolidation, are, in general, the ones who have to 
intermediate the new values and principles, acting according to the new context they are 
embedded in. Without a really democratic mindset among the citizens, it is not possible 
to talk about a real democracy: “democracy cannot be regarded as consolidated unless 
there exists unconditional mass support for democratic values, culture and institutions” 
(Usul, 2011: 20)38 – this is clearly at the attitudinal level.  
Thus, and in the light of the different contribution from various authors 
mentioned above, the process of democratic consolidation appears as the subsequent 
moment after transition. In that sense, it is believed that a certain country that has 
completed its moment of transition (conceived as the stage reached after the 
empowerment of a democratically elected government) moves automatically to the 
phase of consolidation of its democracy. It does not necessarily mean, however, as 
proved by Andreas Schedler’s model, constant movements forward towards the positive 
extreme of the line initially traced. The process is slow and complex, and implies 
advancements and retreats in the application and execution of the democratic principles. 
Regardless of what is believed to be a truly consolidated democracy, many years 
are necessary for an incipient democratic regime to improve and mature – maybe 
decades, or even a generation, in the opinion of Pridham and Agh (2001: 2). Besides, it 
is difficult to determine which stage a country is at, or what type of movement it is 
developing. This means that concepts like these (democracy, transition and 
consolidation) become extremely challenging (not to say virtually impossible) to 
operationalise.  
This chapter, for its nature and content, is especially paramount. It constitutes 
the theoretical foundations for the following chapters and, ultimately, for the entire 
work. The theoretical and methodological choices presented in the previous pages will 
be crucial for the analysis of the case study and for achieving the answers that triggered 
this study. 
                                                          
38 Nonetheless, this vision is not shared by all academics. Schmitter (1995 cited by Usul, 2011: 21), for 
example, regards democratic culture not as a cause of democracy but as a result of it. 
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The definition and conceptualisation of democracy is still nowadays an ongoing 
debate and a controversial issue, even though this discussion is not new. Due to the 
evolution of time and of reality, the analysis (or even the assessment) of today’s 
democracy cannot be compared to that of a century ago. A set of new or at least 
different phenomena have been occurring and changing the nature and the features of 
that object of study. Globalisation, for example, is one of the most visible changes and 
the access to various means of communication, the new international actors (like a more 
active and aware public opinion) and other factors reshaped the way democracy has 
been regarded and approached. The new achievements and improvements in the quality 
of many democratic regimes, as well as citizens’ participation made it a different reality 
with different characteristics, including other fields within its scope, such as social 
protection. Lately, current international crisis prompted a deeper reflection upon this 
phenomenon and some critical opinions started to be voiced – is it really the best regime 
to cope with every society’s problems? Is it a real universal value that should be 
implemented worldwide?  
To bring as much theoretical clarity as possible, democracy was conceptually 
analysed as an opposite to autocracy. The motives that promote and trigger democratic 
transitions were mentioned, as well as the possibilities behind the consolidation process. 
It became clear that it does not only mean a positive movement without backslides or 
erosions. Furthermore, democracy was divided into three types (electoral, liberal and 
perfect) and different degrees were attributed to liberal democracy, thus respecting 
Sartori’s advice not to mix the types and the degrees of this concept. Many authors were 
cited to formulate the clearest and most inclusive approach possible and, pursuing these 
premises, democracy’s operationalisation will be developed also keeping in mind the 
theoretical considerations and the feasibility of the application of the model to a 
concrete situation. Thus, it is believed that these theoretical foundations will be capable 
of supporting a solid construct when it comes to study the evolution of Turkey’s 
democratic commitment. 
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4. The European Union as a Democracy Promoter 
4.1. International organisations and democracy promotion 
 
The establishment and consolidation of a democratic regime is a compelling 
task. As mentioned in the previous chapter, democratisation is a process achieved by the 
interaction and conjugation of internal and external variables that, combined, push for 
its concretisation, at the same time they seek to neutralise topponent forces. 
Nonetheless, the international dimension was, until very recently, the “forgotten 
variable” (Magen and Morlino, 2009: 11). That may have happened also because 
democracy promotion as a foreign policy priority has only began to be developed a few 
decades ago. Therefore, academics used to put the emphasis on the domestic factors to 
understand domestic democratisations. However, with globalisation, the increase of 
transnational networks and a wider dialogue between different theorists (Magen, 2004: 
4), the international dimension began to gain some weight and importance in the 
explanations. 
The current debate, nevertheless, does not focus anymore on which of the 
dimensions should be emphasised over the other (international or national), but how 
they interact concerning the promotion of a country’s democratisation. Magen and 
Morlino (2009: 11) argue that the knowledge about external-internal linkages of 
democratisation needs to be developed, in order to avoid the separation of the two 
dimensions. Thus, these authors created a model to analyse EU role as a democracy 
promoter based on the concept of “democratic anchoring”39 (Idem: 28). The idea, that 
we subscribe to as well, is that the international influence exists, but it is constrained by 
the framework of the internal conditions: 
“in the contemporary international system nation-state regimes are subject to 
variably dense external (...) linkages, pressures and stimuli influencing 
internal conditions of democracy, yet democracy and processes of 
democratization exist solely within national systems, so that the proper level 
of analysis of democratization processes remain essentially domestic and the 
correct nexus of inquiry ought therefore to focus on identifying empirically 
discernible external-internal agency interaction” (Idem: 28-29). 
This means that a change in the regime is essentially domestic – even in cases of 
external interventions, according to the authors – and, therefore, “it is difficult to view 
                                                          
39 More details on this model can be found in next chapter. 
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international factors as truly independent variables, since democratization processes (...) 
are ultimately always carried through domestic actors, institutions and procedures” 
(Idem: 29). This conception does not mean a setback for international theorists in the 
sense that the domestic context is perceived as the most important variable; on the 
contrary, this approach proves the advantages of different branches of the Social 
Sciences to join forces in order to contribute to a more solid body of knowledge in 
which different spheres or dimensions are taken into consideration when studying the 
phenomenon. As the international influences on national (and even on sub-national) 
realities are a recognised fact, the stage in which these influences operate, as well as in 
which their interpretation and adoption take place is at the domestic level, whose 
dynamics will filter the external contributions in a way that external suggestions or 
impositions can be more or less successfully implemented and, consequently, 
democracy promotion can be more or less supported and reinforced at the internal level. 
Nevertheless, in terms of external impulses, international organisations are 
among the most relevant actors and have assumed a growing importance during the last 
decades. Both governmental (such as the EU, IMF, WTO, African Union, World Bank, 
etc.) and non-governmental (Amnesty International, Reporters Without Borders, various 
churches, etc.) play an outstanding role in today’s world, helping shape the international 
environment, as more or less influent (but always present) actors. Their voices, together 
with the international public opinion, are taken into consideration and, although 
sometimes they are not followed by some states, the fact is that international 
organisations contextualise the states’ behaviour, defining the ones that are acting in 
accordance with the established international society and those that are not. Herrmann 
(2005: 127) believes that the way international organisations promote certain ideas 
affects how states understand the problems and identify their own interests. Besides, 
these organisations are also capable of promoting cooperation among states, as they 
verify the accomplishment of the rules, recognise the deviant behaviours, apply 
sanctions,... At the same time, they may constitute security communities and help the 
actors overcome certain disagreements, as they deal with the risks and problems of 
communication that are embedded in international relations (Idem: 128). 
 This conception implies a prior assumption that identities and interests change. 
For example, the adoption of a democratic regime in many countries over the last 
decades epitomises the fact that those states changed their identities, introducing new 
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features like the respect for the rule of law, civil liberties and human rights. As a 
consequence, their interests and preferences also changed, as well as their behaviour and 
position within the international community. The reasons for this to happen are many 
and depend on the particular context of each country. Nevertheless, norms are an 
important fact for this change – of course if democracy is imposed by (material) force, it 
is not the case anymore. As again Herrmann (Idem: 128) explains, norms influence 
states’ behaviour as they change their motivations and beliefs, shaping a new 
understanding of their interests. International organisations are able to do this due to a 
socialisation process that produces a feeling of how states should act, defining the “rules 
of the game” (Risse, 2005: 163), determining the appropriate behaviour and the 
consequences of its violation. It is important to highlight that accepting a certain set of 
rules and values (sine qua non condition to be admitted into a certain organisation) does 
not mean that states will always respect them – as a matter of fact, when accepting the 
accession to a particular organisation, states are simultaneously subscribing to a specific 
pattern of behaviour and the consequences of eventually having a deviant attitude. 
 But norms are not only useful to regulate behaviour: “they also constitute the 
identity of actors in the sense of defining who ‘we’ are as members of a social 
community” (Idem: 163). This leads us to the initial idea that international organisations 
have the ability to change states’ identities, but there is also another acceptable 
explanation: “identity can refer to the relationship a collective actor assumes vis-à-vis 
other collective actors”, combining both self-image and the other’s image. The question 
that remains to be answered, nonetheless, relates to the reasons behind the willingness 
to join an international organisation, i.e. why do states decide to commit themselves to 
follow the norms and rules, respecting treaties and other agreements they will be bond 
to. There are two distinct, but at a certain degree complementary, logics to explain this 
behaviour: the logics of consequences and appropriateness – both already described on 
Chapter 1.  
 Thus, international organisations constitute a vital element in the diffusion of 
ideas, norms and patterns of behaviour. Among these, democracy and human rights are 
two key-elements that various organisations promote worldwide, as they are believed to 
constitute the best way to respect one’s natural rights and to safeguard human dignity 
through the institutionalisation of those rights, ensuring their application – Council of 
Europe, OSCE, World Bank are a few examples. It is widely accepted that the number 
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of democracies has been growing over the last decades and that phenomenon proves 
that first, there is diffusion of political regimes; second, processes like socialisation 
have effects on this growing number; third, states want to be part of the international 
community and therefore adapt their interests and identity to be accepted; and fourth, 
international organisations have, at least partially, succeeded. 
 The major question at this point is how democracy has been promoted, so that it 
has spread to many non-democratic countries over the last decades. The Italian author 
Pietro Cortona (2008: 435) argues that democratisation is “always the result of a 
combination of internal and external factors”40 and although this might seem like an 
obvious conclusion, it is a relatively recent general assumption. Focusing on the 
external dimension of democratisation, several authors have developed during the last 
decades various approaches and conceptions of the modalities or mechanisms of 
external democratic diffusion. Renowned academics, like Whitehead, Schmitter, 
Pridham, Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier and Morlino & Magen41, present different 
models that pretend to embrace every possible situation of external influences on 
domestic democratisation processes. Despite the unquestionable intellectual interest of 
these works, two models have been chosen for reasons that will become clear after the 
interpretation of both proposals.  
First, Fossati’s model (Fossati, 2010) comprises a division of the mechanisms of 
external diffusion into four categories: inertial emulation (contagion if spontaneous or 
convergence if intentional), control (direct or indirect), political conditionality and 
rewards. Emulation is related to the example provided by certain countries that can be, 
more or less intentionally, followed by the democratising state. In this case, external 
examples undermine non-democratic regimes and supply a model to imitate. On the 
other side, control is connected with imposition, whether by direct military intervention 
(like Iraq in 2003) or indirect with military assistance (as it initially happened in Libya 
during the Arab Spring). One of the advantages of this model is precisely the sub-
categories that help specify the conditions in which these mechanisms may occur. On 
the other hand, however, our concern lies in the distinction between political 
conditionality and rewards, as political conditionality (that will be further developed) 
cannot only be linked with negative sanctions, framing the rewards within another 
                                                          
40 Translated from the Italian by the author. Original version: “Le democratizzazione sono sempre state il 
resultato di una combinazione di fattori interni e di fattori esterni (o internazionali)”. 
41 For further details on this division, see Fossati, 2010. 
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Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Table 6: Mechanisms of external democracy promotion – proposed model 
category. In fact, it is in the balance between sanctions and rewards that one can find the 
leverage power of this mechanism. Therefore, conditionality limited to sanctions would 
not encourage any kind of change because there would be no incentive. For this reason, 
it is believed that Morlino & Magen’s model provides a complementary approach and, 
although it does not encompass as many sub-categories as Fossati’s, it seems to be 
better organised. There are, in this perspective, four main fields as well: military 
control, conditionality, socialisation and emulation. In this context, control implies any 
kind of external coercive imposition usually, but not necessarily, military; conditionality 
includes both sanctions and rewards. Moreover, socialisation is a category that the 
authors considered relevant to include, as this mechanism may start to develop over 
time in a spontaneous form; finally, emulation is the fourth modality and the one in 
which one can find a more intentional acceptance of the democratic example and 
experience from another country by a certain population.42 As the lack of sub-categories 
may be considered the weakness of this model, compensated by the inclusion of 
socialisation, this thesis proposes an eclectic model that pretends to combine the best of 
each author. 
 
 
Thus, the model (Table 6, above) also combines four categories, including two 
possible sub-fields in each of them. Hard power is the field that merges direct and 
indirect interventions. In this case, the willingness of an external actor is imposed, 
implying that a certain degree of coerciveness is applied to a particular democratising 
country, not necessarily with the latter’s internal consent.  
                                                          
42 For a schematic comparison of the two models, cf. Table 5 (Appendix 4). 
Mechanisms of external democracy promotion 
Proposed model 
 Hard power 
 Direct intervention 
 Indirect intervention  
 Conditionality 
 Negative (sanctions) 
 Positive (rewards) 
 Socialisation 
 Elites 
 Civil society 
 Emulation 
 Contagion (spontaneous) 
 Convergence (intentional) 
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The second field joins positive and negative conditionality, which means that it 
encompasses both sanctions and rewards, for the above mentioned reasons. 
Socialisation is the third category of this model and, together with emulation, 
constitutes the opposite situation of hard power; it represents a learning process that, 
based on the active interaction between two societies, allows the exchange of 
experiences, of perceptions, values and patterns of behaviour. At the national level, it is 
possible to distinguish between elites and civil society, as these groups represent 
different factions of the same society and frequently adopt different (if not opposite) 
positions regarding the democratisation of the country. Therefore, both are of utmost 
importance to the process of democratisation, despite their different types of 
contributions. And although elites and civil society can be object of different 
mechanisms of socialisation, certain contexts are able to supply important and 
influential sources that foster a more “democratic mind” or a deeper democratic culture 
among these groups, such as education, the ability to travel and learn from other 
experiences (exchange programmes are very fruitful in this regard) and access to 
information, namely through Internet. 
Finally, emulation is the method of democracy diffusion that can be pointed out 
as the one in which the promoter actors do not need to actively pursue a democracy 
promotion strategy. In other words, democratising countries, when inspired by the 
example of their peers, seek to mimic them in order to be linked to them somehow 
(Magen & Morlino, 2009: 38). Usually, psychological and geographic proximity eases 
the process of “voluntary lesson drawing” that can either be more intentional or more 
spontaneous. Unlike socialisation, emulation is not about learning through interaction, 
but more mimicking observance. Frequently, these types of democracy promotion 
encourage the society to act and undermine non-democratic regimes by weakening its 
popular support and people’s resignation. Indeed, emulation and socialisation are 
categories that, by nature and definition, can overlap – nonetheless, this final 
mechanism is more related to an imitation than to an active process of interaction and 
exchange, as it happens with socialisation43.  
It is nevertheless important to notice that, although these mechanisms are 
presented here as detached from each other, any country object of democracy promotion 
can be influenced by a set of different mechanisms that correlate to each other and 
                                                          
43 Conditionality and socialisation will be more deeply analysed in section 4.2.4. 
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Source: Cortona, 2008: 450 
Table 7: Intentionality of the international actors and consensus of the state 
which creates the particularities of each case. Bearing in mind the Turkish example, it is 
possible to congregate some influences: the EU uses conditionality as a tool to foster 
democracy in the country, but at the same time the intense relationship between the 
Union and Turkey has led to a socialisation process in the country that progressively 
comes closer to the European patterns; furthermore, the example provided by the 
Central and Eastern European Countries44 may constitute an incentive to Turkey in the 
sense of creating the perception of the necessity to make real efforts to join the EU 
(emulation). This brief overlook attests the possibility of co-existence of different 
mechanisms in the same case of democratisation and all of them contribute in a more or 
less direct, active and conscious form to strengthen democracy. 
These four categories are able to be parted into two main groups: hard power 
and conditionality are cases that imply a more direct external presence and pressure in 
the country to democratise, constituting, in different degrees, external impositions that 
create power asymmetries; whereas the other two mechanisms (socialisation and 
emulation) can be perceived as both coming from inside the society, i.e., a more natural, 
progressive and genuine way of interiorising democratic values. In this regards, Cortona 
(2008: 447) explains that external actions have different levels of intentionality, can be 
more or less direct and reach a higher or lower consensus of the state, as it can be seen 
in Table 7 below. 
 
 
 
 
Regarding socialisation, the application of Cortona’s division is not as clear as it 
is concerning the other mechanisms – and although it is able to be fitted somewhere in-
between emulation and promotion, the fact is that socialisation does not compulsorily 
imply an intentional action of the international actors, neither the consensus of the state. 
In fact, socialisation is the result of socio-cultural influences for many years, sometimes 
decades or centuries of mutual interchanges between countries or societies. The power 
                                                          
44 Excluding the example provided by Bulgaria and Romania, as these countries are very likely to cause 
the opposite effect (cf. Matos, 2012). 
 Intentionality of the 
international actors 
Consensus of 
the state 
Emulation No Yes 
Promotion Yes Yes 
Imposition Yes No 
114 
 
of socialisation depends on the deepness of the process within the receptive society and 
is part of a broader process of democracy diffusion that not only includes what was 
mentioned above, but also this exchange and contamination between cultures, political-
institutional models and products of all kinds (Idem: 454). 
The differences in the impact of the international factors (according to Levitsky 
& Way, apud Cortona, 2008: 448) can be explained through the concepts of “Western 
leverage” and “linkage to the West”. The first represents the degree of exposure of a 
particular country to the external pressures and depends on the balance of strengths, 
strategic interests and alternative pressures between the subject and the object states. 
“The linkage to the West” is related to the deepness of the relations that country has 
with Western countries or institutions and that can assume different dimensions – 
economic, geopolitical, social, communicational, etc. As Cortona (Idem: 449) explains, 
the stronger these bonds are, the costlier they are for an authoritarian regime, given the 
fact that if there are strong relations with Western countries, the likelihood of an 
intervention (more or less direct) will be higher, as well as the internal discontent of the 
society that has been autocratically ruled. 
But “in which ways and with which limits can democracy be exported?” 
(Cortona, 2008: 436). This question raised by Cortona is a point of great relevance to 
understand the role of international organisations in regards to democracy promotion: 
basic principles such as national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs 
may be violated when supporting certain social groups (frequently considered terrorists, 
dissidents, rebels,…) against their rulers and, in that case, international organisations are 
themselves breaking the rules they established. Therefore, there are many voices against 
this method of democracy exportation as a clear violation of the UN’s “Declaration on 
the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States” 
(General Assembly of the United Nations, 1981: article no. 1) which asserts that  “No 
State or group of States has the right to intervene or interfere in any form or for any 
reason whatsoever in the internal and external affairs of other States”, just to quote one 
example of an international treaty regarding this subject. In fact, some types of 
democracy promotion can be viewed as violations of such principles, in the sense that 
they may be perceived as an interference in domestic affairs of a third state – the 
American intervention in Iraq in 2003 was pointed out by many of its opponents as an 
illegal action and one of the arguments was precisely this international norm. And, due 
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to this attitude from Western countries, the initially accepted democracy diffusion 
started, at the end of the 1960s, to be perceived as ethnocentric and as an imposition of 
the Western model (Cortona, 2008: 440). The initial problem remains: are the 
international organisations and individual countries entitled to actively promote their 
style of democracy even in places where socio-cultural traditions and contexts differ so 
much from the pattern they try to implement? 
On the other hand, proponents of the international diffusion of the democratic 
regime point at the globalised world to justify the role of some actors in the 
establishment or maturation of democracy abroad. At the same time, they argue that the 
separation of the effective influence of international actors in democratising processes is 
not linear, because, first, they combine both domestic and international factors, making 
a distinction hard to achieve; and second, because the role of the international 
community can be different in quality and intensity (Idem: 445). Moreover, the recent 
“Arab Spring” phenomenon provides an example of how some countries’ populations 
felt unhappy with the political regimes their respective countries used to have, and, the 
cases in which NATO intervened for instance, can this intervention be regarded as an 
international interference on domestic affairs? It is possible, nevertheless, that this 
action has been led due to humanitarian questions against the brutal oppression of the 
people by the regime. In this case, that reason is foreseen in international documents, 
such as the Charter of the United Nations or even the above mentioned Declaration, 
according to which it is the “duty of States to observe, promote and defend all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms within their own national territories and to work on the 
elimination of massive and flagrant violations of the rights of nations and peoples” 
(General Assembly of the United Nations, 1981: article no. 2, III, c). In that sense, the 
international community not only did not disrespect international norms, but also 
contributed to the application of other fundamental principles (included in international 
treaties as well), such as self-determination. Thus, the principle of non-interference in 
internal affairs and the right to be helped by the international community to be freed 
from despotic regimes are two sides of the same coin and democracy is involved in 
both. 
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4.2. The European Union as a democracy promoter 
4.2.1. The origins and developments 
 
The European Union, as the international organisation it is, has got a peculiar 
character: it is neither a common Westphalian sovereign state nor a merely 
intergovernmental organisation. Jan Zielonka, in his book Europe as Empire (2006), 
solves this dilemma by arguing that the enlarged Union constitutes a “neo-medieval 
empire”. It means that this institution presents typical characteristics of the medieval 
system but with post-modern adaptations. The idea of the Empire comes from the fact 
that the EU exports its rules and relates itself very intensively with the rest of the world; 
simultaneously, the Union cannot be seen like a centralised state, as its authority is 
shared and diffuse, and as it embraces cultural and identity diversity (Zielonka, 2006: 
10-13). 
Being an international organisation, the Union is expected to have its own 
identity. This is, however, a much contested idea due to the fact that there are doubts 
concerning the possibility of building an identity with so many individual member 
states and their own individual interests and features (– the diversity Zielonka 
mentioned above).  Although the issue of identity is not to be developed at this stage, it 
is important to underline the fact that European integration has only been possible due 
to a certain degree of shared ideas. Not ignoring the differences that certainly exist 
among the European countries that constitute the organisation, the EU would not make 
sense if there was no common general set of values and principles, among which one 
can find freedom, peace, democracy and human rights.  
From this point of view, the most important factor for the development of this 
phenomenon is Europe’s historical legacy. The history of the countries that today 
compose the European Union overlaps several times and cannot be understood without 
mentioning the events in the rest of the continent. They have shared the territory, and 
this geographical proximity was responsible for alliances, friendships, trade, struggles, 
wars and centuries of mutual interaction and communication. A natural heritage 
emerged from these ideational and material flows and, to a certain extent, a sense of 
belonging and of community matured too. If one focuses on democracy, this regime is 
linked with the foundations of the European political culture and societal identity, as 
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Emerson (2009: 4) explains. Personal freedoms and equality before the law started to be 
developed in Ancient Greece; the freedom of speech came with the Roman Empire; in 
Sweden, in 1018, an assembly established the principle that the power of the king came 
from the people; the English Magna Carta, the Habeas Corpus Act, the Bill of Rights, 
the French Revolution, etc. (Idem: 4-6) are examples that the author provides to show 
how this concept has evolved in Europe and as it is something shared by different 
countries. Both World Wars were struggles directly related to democracy – whether 
prompted by the European fragile Empires of the early twentieth century that did not 
respect nationalities or about the more flagrant Second World War that united 
democracies against totalitarianisms. All these experiences contoured the way the 
European countries, as well as the rest of the world, perceive political regimes, rights 
and freedoms. 
Alternative ideologies failed in Europe; they did not bring the prosperity or 
happiness they promised. In the field, they proved to be less efficient than democracy. 
Moreover, the old continent was also the place of intellectual reflections on political 
ideas. The Enlightenment period and its philosophers are an illustrative example. Kant 
developed the democratic peace theory that was echoed all over Europe and, like him, 
many other philosophers from all the continent spent great effort on this subject, 
developing and improving it. Together with democracy, human rights, human dignity, 
peace, solidarity and other values became part of the European way of thinking. 
Therefore, in order to finish with the past conflicts that so many times opposed 
European countries against each other, they decided to pursue a policy of integration, in 
which the search for the common good would prevail (Soares, 2009: 102). 
The EU started to build its own identity based on this set of shared beliefs that 
actually led to the unification of Europe. The Union seeks to promote a certain image 
whose aim is to reflect its identity45, ensuring some degree of coherence in its action in 
the scope of the most varied policies – commercial, neighbourhood, enlargement, etc. 
As the EU Treaty puts it and the member states subscribed to: “The Union is founded 
on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights (...)” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007, 
article 2). This implies that, despite the unavoidable diversity regarding the constitution 
                                                          
45 The doubts about the existence of a single European identity will not be developed here, as it 
extrapolates the logic of this section. 
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of the organisation with its twenty-eight members, there is some coherence in its action 
eased by the principles all the member states accepted.  
In fact, one of those principles is democracy, whose importance has been 
growing in legal and practical terms during the last decades. As a result, the worldwide 
promotion of democracy arises as one of the most important objectives of the External 
European Policy: 
“The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, 
the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law.” (EUT, article 21) 
Thus, the European Union is worried about democracy not only within its borders, but 
also in its relations with the exterior. For both situations, the EU has a “strong juridical 
basis” (Baracani, 2004: 8) that include the Treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union and other documents that support it.  
In what comes to promote democracy abroad, Elena Baracani (Idem: 8) 
considers the EU “unique in developing the most diverse and advanced set of legal and 
institutional strategies”. Citing Morlino’s work, Baracani argues that there are a set of 
internal and external reasons that led the EU to adopt this responsibility as a democracy 
promoter, such as its willingness to stand for Western-democratic values, its own 
evolution towards a “community of values”, its military weakness that resulted in the 
reinforcement of the economic and trade ties, and its capability to offer attractive 
incentives (Morlino cited in Baracani, 2004: 8). 
As a respected and powerful organisation, the EU plays an important role in the 
international arena: “International institutions define who the players are in a particular 
situation and how they define their roles, and thus place constraints on behaviour.” 
(Simmons & Martin, 2005: 198). They function therefore as a framework for 
international actors, having the capability to change their identities and interests as a 
result of the interaction on time limited by a set of rules and norms. In other words, 
there is a promotion of the adequate behavioural patterns that reminds us of the 
socialisation process, making international organisations part of the states, at the same 
time states can also influence the organisations they are in. 
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 If one really assumes the idea that the European Union constitutes an 
international organisation with its own identity and image, it is then understandable that 
those values, principles and beliefs are worldwide promoted as a fundamental part of 
EU’s external relations. In what comes to democracy, Emerson, et al. (2005: 2) believe 
that the Union started with a “near zero role in foreign policy” and raised its importance 
since the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The same 
authors present some developments in the field of external relations in the three main 
institutions of the organisation: the Commission improved the instruments of economic 
and technical assistance and began to play a more important role in the enlargement 
process; the European Parliament increased its influence and has been a key voice for 
democracy and Human Rights; and finally the Council that created new posts to 
reinforce its position (Idem: 3). 
 Although Jan Zielonka (2006: 52, 53) argues that sometimes the EU gives in to 
parochial pressures and thus its foreign policy is defined by domestic and individual 
agendas, the action of the EU has been considered very important for the spread of 
democracy, which is regarded as a “universal appeal” increasingly accepted by the 
international community as the most effective way to guarantee peace, security and 
stability (Göksel & Çepel, 2006: 2). And although there are many actors that promote 
democracy, the methods they use to achieve this end vary: generally speaking, the great 
divide is between top-down and bottom-up approaches, in which the first targets the 
political sphere and elites, and the second aims to promote a democratic consciousness 
inside de civil society. At the same time, the promotion can be either domestic 
(horizontal) or international (vertical) (Idem: 4, 5). As mentioned earlier, some 
international actors prefer to intervene more directly and take control over the situation, 
whereas others prefer to convince democratising states through their own democratic 
example. 
 The European Union is an example of the later group; as a mainly civilian power 
(the so called “soft power”), it uses civil means to promote its goals and to export its 
own Weltanschauung, rather than imposing the rules internationally (Zielonka, 2006: 
143). This is the reason why Börzel and Risse (2009: 5) consider the European Union 
an “almost ideal laboratory for investigation processes and outcomes of diffusion”. 
Thus, it is possible to affirm that the EU diffuses its image rather than imposes it, and 
maybe it is one of the reasons why it has become so attractive as a partner. In this 
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context, Zielonka (2006: 55) defines the Union as truly imperialist (as the organisation 
seeks to spread its message), but a “voluntary and cooperative” empire, different from 
others in the sense that its diffusion is a more positive one, based on rewards and on the 
improvement of other countries’ democracies, instead of a more coercive action against 
democratising states. 
 One of the most successful ways of effective democracy promotion by the 
European Union, according to many authors, is the offer for membership. It is 
considered one of the strongest leverage mechanisms in the field of democracy 
promotion. Nevertheless, in its external relations, the EU also diffuses its ideas in the 
realm of the neighbourhood policy or through any other kind of relations with third 
countries, whether they are diplomatic, economic or other. In every context, the Union 
demands for change and reforms; the difference, however, lies in the incentives 
(Baracani, 2004: 20): full membership is obviously much more attractive than good 
relations or slight improvements in trade agreements, for instance. 
 These processes are not, nonetheless, exempted from criticism: many authors 
present great amounts of failures on the European side. Jünemann (2007) accuses the 
EU of changing its strategies and instruments according to the country it is dealing with, 
following a low or high profile of democracy promotion. The idea is that the Union opts 
for a “low profile” when member states have tighter relationships with those countries 
(namely trade, economic or historical links), which diminishes the EU’s room for 
manoeuvre, namely when it comes to apply sanctions (Idem: 3). On the other hand, in 
countries that have no impact on the national interests of member states a “high profile” 
promotion is followed and sanctions are more hardly applied (Idem: 3). Richard Youngs 
(2008) also supports this negative vision vis-à-vis the European democratisation 
policies. The author claims that the EU has no effective strategy towards the promotion 
of democracy: the incentives have a limited impact and are not accurately distributed; 
sanctions are often not used in cases of democratic abuses, not being equitably applied; 
and finally democracy assistance in general constitutes a minor part of the development 
cooperation and aims at very soft reforms (Idem: 2). A possible explanation for this lack 
of commitment is given by Jan Zielonka (2006: 52, 53) that points at the EU’s internal 
diversity as the reason beyond the difficulty in creating wide strategic objectives and to 
clearly define them: “This has created (...) an impression that the Union negotiated more 
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with itself than with the applicant countries” (Idem: 53) or with the democratising 
countries, in this case. 
 Notwithstanding, there are many other voices that contradict this perspective, 
arguing that “it is easy to criticize the EU for being incoherent and using double 
standards, but it is not quite as easy to propose better strategies” (Jünemann, 2007: 7). 
What can replace the enlargement policy as a successful leverage tool? How should the 
EU deal with regimes that utterly resist to any reform? These questions are raised by the 
same author and are backed by Jora (2006: 3) that considers the EU “the most 
persistent, articulated and influential” democratising actor in the world. And finally 
Teresa Cierco quotes Attila Agh, who believes the Union is the most important and well 
succeeded external factor for democratic transitions (Cierco, 2008: 72, 73). Thus, 
academia is split up by the assessment of the success of EU’s democratising effort and 
this study intends to contribute to this debate, using the case of Turkey. Emerson and 
Noutcheva (2004) identified Europe as the empirical proof of their “model of 
democratic gravity”, using the case of the Eastern enlargement, for instance, in which 
the democratic example provided by the Union worked as a centre of gravity that gave a 
particular impetus to the Central and Eastern countries’ democratisation. The incentive 
of accession was combined with the example the rest of the continent provided and, so 
far, these democracies seem to be in a good condition46. 
Concerning the EU, democracy promotion has been developed and reinforced 
over the last decades. Europe has, in its own history, “a long tradition of contagion of 
ideas and revolutionary political movements” (Emerson, et al., 2005: 1), whether it was 
the Renaissance, Liberalism or Communism, to name some examples. As the same 
authors emphasise, the maturation of those revolutions took decades and “the regime 
changes were often long and drawn out processes, especially when they were not 
introduced by war (...) and this seems to be true also of the current episode from 1989 
onwards” (Idem: 1). It is precisely in this social and cultural environment that the 
ideational-constructivist approach finds the impulse for democracy diffusion, based on 
the member states pre-disposition to act in a normative way that emerges from their 
identity as a “norm community” (Tafel, 2008: 7). 
                                                          
46 According to the Freedom House 2012 Report (Freedom House, 2012), from all the ten countries of the 
2004 enlargement, only Hungary and Latvia did not score the best punctuation. Nevertheless, both are 
still considered “free countries”. 
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This EU’s pan-European vocation (Idem: 7) is translated into a democracy 
promotion strategy that is based on three pillars, according to Youngs (2008: 1): 
positive incentives to promote changes, careful use of sanctions and diplomatic 
pressure, and funds for democracy programmes. These are able to be used by the 
European Union, most of the times conjugating more than one at the same time, from 
two different perspectives: the top-down approach that aims at the state level and elites 
and a bottom-up approach, whose objective is to strengthen civil society activities 
related to democracy and democratic principles. 
In this context, the EU has developed a set of different policies and instruments 
that vary according to the geographical area and the type of relations with third 
countries. The European Neighbourhood Policy and other policies with countries from 
all over the world can range from simple bilateral trade agreements to deeper relations 
that may include some form of conditionality to ensure the respect for democracy and 
Human Rights. As already argued, the lack of a membership perspective for these cases 
diminishes in a great extent the possible influence of the EU in any field, as the reward 
is not strong enough. On the other hand, enlargement is considered the “most potent and 
unique democracy promotion instrument” (Idem: 2), which proves its capacity to exert 
some considerable degree of influence in terms of democracy promotion. Youngs is, 
however, very critical in regards to other policies beyond enlargement, stating that the 
logic of democratic reward is not implemented and, more seriously than that, most aid is 
given to authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes (Idem: 3). Youngs provides some 
examples and reveals that more money was awarded to Serbia and Montenegro than to 
Croatia that performed better and argues that in Africa, for instance, the demands for 
democratic development are absent from the aid given, agreeing with Emerson, et al. 
(2005: 6) that consider that member states give priority to countries geographically, 
culturally or historically closer to them. This situation can damage the final goal of 
democracy promotion, once incentives and rewards are reversed and the targeted 
countries do not feel necessary to implement reforms to improve their democracies. 
Youngs (2008: 5) wrote that “EU member states do not currently have any considered 
view on the importance they attach to democracy as a condition for aid distribution” and 
that states tend to favour same countries based on their cultural links. 
Notwithstanding, and although the author provides some data regarding his 
point, some efforts should not be belittled and it seems exaggerated to argue that 
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democracy is forgotten when dealing with aid distribution. The “Cotonou Agreement” 
that entered into force in 2003 reveals EU’s intention to foster democracy, Human 
Rights and sustained development in the African, Caribbean and Pacific States. This 
document discloses a concern with these questions and makes them central in the 
relationship the EU has with the ACP countries. It is a fact that membership is not a 
possibility for these countries and that can somehow diminish the Union’s leverage 
power among them, but it does not necessarily mean that these relations ignore those 
values. Some excerpts of the Agreement can prove this point:  
“The Partnership shall actively support the promotion of human rights, 
processes of democratisation, consolidation of the rule of law, and good 
governance.” (Article 9, no. 4) 
“If, despite the political dialogue conducted regularly between the Parties, a 
Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation 
stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule 
of law referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 9, it shall, except in cases of 
special urgency, supply the other Party and the Council of Ministers with the 
relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation 
with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties. To this end, it 
shall invite the other Party to hold consultations that focus on the measures 
taken or to be taken by the party concerned to remedy the situation.” (Article 
96, no. 2a) (Cotonou Agreement, 2000). 
Youngs’ conclusion that “the EU urgently needs to reassess how it can best 
‘incentivise’ democratisation in the current international context (...) [as well as] to 
evaluate the capability for European leverage through other and new types of rewards” 
(Idem: 2) constitutes a wise statement. Indeed, the improvement of the application of 
the criteria and a more coherent action of the whole Union as an international actor are 
questions that need to be tackled and improved. Still, it does not seem reasonable to 
blame the European Union for not regarding values such as democracy, Human Rights 
and sustained development in third countries, even though in these places their 
influence may not be as strong as in the neighbourhood or in the candidates.  
Even though EU’s enlargement policy is regarded as the most powerful tool for 
democratisation, there is no consensus about the effective capacity of the membership 
appeal to achieve changes and reforms. For example, Raik (2004: 568), referring to the 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) enlargement, argues that many studies 
over-evaluated EU’s impact: “In the 1990’s, an average of only 1 percent of the total 
EU aid to the CEEC’s was directed toward democracy” (Idem: 568). On the other hand, 
Schimmelfennig & Scholtz (2008) consider enlargement the most successful EU’s 
external policy and that “in many cases the Union’s external incentives have been 
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instrumental in overcoming domestic obstacles to further democratic reform” (Idem: 
188). Tafel (2008: 2) and Baracani (2004: 9) share the same reasoning and assess EU’s 
action in the CEEC’s as a very well succeeded task.  
 
4.2.2. The Enlargement Process 
Mattli & Plümper (2002: 55) furnish us with a very interesting and valuable 
definition of enlargement: “a process by which the gap in rules and institutional 
arrangements between insiders of a union and outsiders progressively becomes 
narrower”. Thus, enlargement implies diminishing the hiatus between insiders and 
outsiders. In the context of the European Union, this progression occurs (not only, but 
more intensively) during the accession process. In other words, the accession process is 
the period during which the candidates undertake the reforms and changes necessary to 
comply with EU’s demands, in order to reach as quick as possible the final end of full 
membership. If this definition is scrutinised, one will find that it entails many clues to 
the understanding of the accession process.  
First of all, as the name already reveals, it constitutes a process, i.e., a period in 
time during which different phenomena dynamically take place and create changes that 
are supposed to reduce the gap between the applicant country and the organisation. As a 
process, it takes time, effort and patience, since the differences between both entities 
can be quite tangible and difficult to overcome, which is clearly the case of Turkey and 
the European Union. Furthermore, this effort to change can also be costly, in economic, 
political and societal terms – austere economic measures to achieve some financial 
objectives, the political cost for a party to stand for the organisation that is requiring so 
many sacrifices and possible considerable changes that may affect social structures, 
habits and routines are some of the quandaries that may undermine the entire process.   
The cornerstone of the accession process lies precisely on the reforms and 
changes it implies. These changes have to be conceived within the general concept of 
Europeanisation. As it will be further developed, Europeanisation is a very complex 
process tightly linked to accession and a perfect finished example of how the above 
mentioned gap is supposed to be tightened. At the same time, Europeanisation is linked 
to the normative influence of the EU, meaning that more aggressive mechanisms of 
leverage are absent. 
 
125 
 
The third part of the definition includes the compliance with the organisation’s 
demands. In this sense, and in order to achieve the already referred domestic changes, 
the European Union, for example, applies a policy of sanctions and rewards that 
combined are supposed to motivate the country to carry out the required 
transformations, being sanctioned when fail and rewarded when certain aims are 
achieved. 
Finally, the ultimate goal of a candidate country is to reach full membership. 
After years (or decades) of efforts and sacrifices, achieving full membership constitutes 
the greatest trophy – mainly during the process of accession, the sight of membership 
and the prospect of achieving it can successfully work as a key element for real and true 
commitment. On the contrary, blurred or uncertain perspectives of accession can 
hamper the whole process. 
Therefore, so that all this complex mechanism is able to function properly, these 
four parts have to be considered and work effectively – it follows that changes, reforms 
and compliance with the demands do not work with efficacy if the final end is not 
perceived as an almost certain outcome. The idea is that, if the stick is present, the 
perception of the possibility of achieving the “carrot” is essential. In fact, the carrot of 
membership is valuable due to the idea of a rewarded effort, but also due to what being 
a full right member means and implies in a symbolic manner: internationally, being held 
in consideration by the community and finally being able to participate in the decision-
making process raises the country’s self-esteem and reinforce its position within the 
international society, not to mention the financial advantages (accession to funds, for 
example) that also work as an important catalyst.  
The complexity of accession is present in all the three parts that constitute the 
process: in the EU as an organisation that welcomes the country, in the candidate 
country and in the member states. As a result, the process becomes very slow and 
sometimes painful for some or all the parts involved. An enlargement means to the 
Union an adaptation of its institutions, treaties, funds allocation, political balances, 
borders, etc. No matter the benefits of a new membership, different levels or degrees of 
change are always implicit. For member states, their national interests, their position 
within the Union, the vision of Europe and concerns like security, prosperity and their 
domestic public opinion are always at stake when it comes to accept or refuse a new 
enlargement. Not only economic interests and preferences are taken into consideration, 
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but also cultural and historical bonds can promote or erode the support for a new 
country to join the EU – a very illustrative example can be provided by Germany’s 
diverging positions regarding two accession processes: the CEEC’s and Turkey’s. The 
support or lack of it, respectively, is namely based on the above mentioned reasons 
taken together and responsible for shaping the country’s very assertive position. In what 
comes to the candidate country, it was already stated that a candidacy process has, apart 
from all the benefits and advantages that it may entail, its costs and, given its 
complexity, its outcome can be extremely unpredictable.  
The 2002 Eurobarometer showed that, for EU’s population, enlargement 
represented more an opportunity than a problem: 50% were in favour of enlargement 
and only 30% against it (Eurobarometer, 2002: 67). Moreover, although 65% of the 
respondents believed further accessions would make it more difficult to reach decisions, 
63% and 61% of the EU’s citizens considered them important to (respectively) 
strengthen the Union’s position in the world and to culturally enrich the organisation 
(Idem: 88). In 2010, the support for future enlargements dropped to 40% and the 
number of those against them raised to 48% (Eurobarometer, 2010: 221). On the 
population side, the issue of enlargement seems to be quite controversial, but the values 
fluctuate over the years which reveals some lack of consistency and variation in the 
population’s interests and perceptions. 
The Turkish case, as it will become clearer during this work, comprises a 
challenge for all the three parts: the European Union, Turkey and Turks. A 2006 Special 
Eurobarometer revealed that 48% of the EU’s population would oppose to the accession 
of Turkey even if it complied with all the conditions defined by the organisation 
(Eurobarometer, 2006: 70). The European Union fears unbalances and the importation 
of some of the country’s problems. Some member states do not feel culturally, 
economically, socially or politically identified with Turkey and even this candidate 
faces internal problems regarding the accession. Consequently, the Turkish case 
exacerbates all the common inherent difficulties of the process, making it even more 
difficult to develop and apply. 
Jan Zielonka (2006) points out some situations that contribute to that intricacy 
from the side of the EU. First, the author considers it an empire without emperor, 
referring to the lack of a “single centre of government” (Idem: 59), which makes it 
harder to have some important decisions made. And if the European Council is a 
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powerful institution, the veto power of member states, with both ideological and 
material motives for opposing accession, delays the process or freezes it. On the other 
side, the European Commission is a valuable force towards enlargement and counts 
with the support of external actors like the United States (Idem: 61), that understand the 
advantages of the European integration. Nevertheless, there are many fears to 
overcome: the fear of weakening integration, of economic chaos, of the erosion of 
democratic patterns, etc. and “at the centre of these anxieties is the perceived level of 
diversity between the old and new EU members” (Idem: 66), which is, in other words, 
the fear of heterogeneity. Turkey, in this respect, constitutes another conundrum, as the 
country involuntarily raises the notion of the “other”, creating a psychological reaction 
on the European side, as it will be developed. As Zielonka concludes, Europeans are 
afraid of exporting their values and importing the others’ problems (Idem: 65). 
José Ignacio Torreblanca (2003) proposes an eclectic model to better understand 
the accession process and the motives behind member states’ support for it. “The 
dynamic model of negotiated accommodation” has three basic assumptions: first, EU 
member states have two types of preferences: instrumental and normative; second, the 
set of principles and norms that guides their normative preferences is not absolutely 
constant (they change over time), is not precise (it is subject to different interpretations), 
is not coherent (there can be conflicts among principles) and is not strongly 
institutionalised (without central authority); third, the Union’s ‘culture of consensus’ 
complicates the achievement of a final decision (Idem: 32, 33). According to the author:  
“EU member states are simultaneously negotiating how to best advance or 
maximize their particular economic, security and institutional interests and, 
at the same time, negotiating among them how to adapt, further develop, and 
institutionalise the general principles and constitutive norms which they 
share. Therefore, in some cases we may need to hold structures constant and 
look at how agents negotiate or accommodate their interests while, in other 
cases, we need to pay attention to how norms change as a result of the 
negotiations between actors and how they impact on actors’ preferences.” 
(Idem: 34). 
Ignacio Torreblanca’s position fuses both interest-maximisation and principle-
satisfying behaviours. In fact, one should not ignore the material forces that frequently 
drive member states positions regarding accession. At the same time, the principles 
those same countries agreed on when they acceded and that they still share and promote 
worldwide as part of their image are a fundamental piece to understand this jigsaw 
puzzle as well. It is relevant to remind that this position is not contrary to the 
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constructivist assumptions. Indeed, Constructivism accepts the influence of material and 
ideational forces and this is precisely a case in which both have to be considered, 
because if they are not, there will be the risk of not fully understand the problem. 
The path to achieve the inclusion in the EU is a very challenging one. In order to 
join, “the applicant country must adhere to the principles of Article 6(1) TEU which all 
the Member States subscribe to and on which the EU is based: freedom, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law”.47 In a first 
moment, the country applies to the Council that hears the opinion of the Commission 
and of the European Parliament, having to reach afterwards a unanimous decision in the 
case the country is allowed to begin the process of accession. Member states and the 
applicant sign (and have to ratify) the Accession Treaty that includes the conditions for 
accession and adaptation. But it is only after the Copenhagen criteria are met that 
negotiations can be opened; these criteria entail the stability of democratic institutions, 
the rule of law and human rights, a healthy market economy, the capacity to assume the 
membership’s obligations and to adapt the administrative structures. 
The next phase, negotiations, consists of adopting, implementing and applying 
the acquis communautaire – a very long document with 35 chapters on the most diverse 
areas that need to converge with the European practices. The main objective is to 
prepare the country to be a full member of the Union and “negotiations are conducted 
individually, based on the own merits of each applicant country”. This means that, after 
screening the country to evaluate its status, negotiations take place within the context of 
inter-governmental conferences and each chapter is closed when the country fulfils the 
targets defined for each of them. However, it is important to notice that both single 
chapters or negotiations in general can be “suspended in the event of a serious and 
persistent violation of the principles on which the EU is founded” and even if a certain 
chapter is closed, it can be re-opened in case the country no longer satisfies its 
benchmarks. 
The completion of all the chapters marks the end of the accession process and an 
Accession Treaty is signed and ratified by all the member states and the applicant 
country after a unanimous decision at the Council level. This final treaty includes the 
                                                          
47 The information conveyed in this section on the steps of the enlargement process is based on the 
Official Website of the European Union under the following link: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ 
enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/l14536_en.htm [Acceded on 19.03.2012]. 
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accession date, the results of the negotiations, the adaptation of the European 
institutions and legal documents (distribution of votes, number of seats in the 
Parliament, etc.). 
During the entire process, the European Union deploys a set of mechanisms to 
help the candidate comply with all the conditions, as well as tools to assess its 
evolutions: there are the pre-accession strategy, bilateral agreements, political and 
economic dialogues, accession partnerships and national programmes for the adoption 
of the acquis, the participation of the applicant in various agencies and committees, 
annual reports, financial assistance and the project of “Civil Society Dialogue” that aims 
to “increase mutual understanding and knowledge” between the European and the 
candidate’s populations. 
As proven by this brief summary of the accession process, it represents a long 
and time-consuming set of procedures that, therefore, should placate the fears of the 
member states, once the moment of accession is a priori a time in which countries 
should no longer be considered a threat or menace. Portugal, Spain, Greece and, more 
recently, the CEECs are some good examples of how many fears were and are 
groundless, also given the fact that “an application can be interpreted as a very public 
act of commitment to continuing deep institutional reforms that fully align outsiders to 
EU norms and rules” (Mattli & Plümper, 2002: 559). As the countries showed interest 
in joining the Union, they reveal a true commitment to the process and make enormous 
efforts in order to reach that final goal. 
 
4.2.3. Europeanisation and normative power 
 
All these documents and steps towards accession are also part of a wider process 
called Europeanisation. The Copenhagen criteria and the acquis communautaire are 
good examples of guiding documents in which the main principles and values of the 
European Union are officially stated – they base the criteria the countries need to fulfil 
not only to accede, but also to Europeanise. The fulfilment of these conditions requires 
major changes that involve the EU’s presence and massive financial support – as 
mentioned above, the programmes of assistance are diverse and encompass immense 
flows of money. Therefore, the EU ends up having a determinant role to play in the 
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definition of national agendas and Europeanisation is able to, at the same time, 
interconnect two other major processes: transition and integration (Cierco, 2008: 78). 
The latter refers to the fact that these reforms contribute to the inclusion of the country 
in the Union by diminishing the gap between that country and the member states; 
simultaneously, those changes may create or strengthen a process of transition – to a 
better democracy, to a better economy, etc. It should be highlighted that 
Europeanisation does not only include the adoption of formal rules and their tangible 
transposition for national law, but also their internalisation, which is more related to the 
social learning of the new realities and perspectives that are behind the adoption of 
those rules – more than requiring free elections, developing a democratic culture and 
being interested and actively taking part in the democratic process are also fundamental. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (cited in Subotic, 2011: 311) frugally define 
Europeanisation as a “process by which states adopt EU rules”. This definition does not 
certainly pretend to be complete, but, even so, reducing Europeanisation to the mere 
adoption of rules does not seem to be accurate, as it ignores one of the most important 
parts of the process, related to the internalisation of the European values, principles and 
practices. Radaelli (2000: 4) provides a more complete, accurate and widely used 
definition that has been adopted in this work: 
“Processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ 
and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the 
making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.”  
 
Although this is a very commented and analysed definition, some aspects should 
be highlighted to pursue with this study. First, the plural in the beginning of the 
definition emphasises that many “sub-processes” are embedded in the large group of 
Europeanisation. As such, there are many dynamics and movements occurring at the 
same time. Furthermore, the use of words like “construction and diffusion” confirms 
that Europeanisation is more than the simple adoption of rules, because it implies the 
building of something, which is not the same of externally imposing a set of norms. And 
what is, according to the definition, constructed and diffused? Both formal and informal 
rules; both material and ideational aspects. Again, not only procedures, but also beliefs. 
Finally it is remarkable as well the idea of progression implicit in the author’s 
definition: first those changes are defined by the EU, but then they are incorporated 
domestically. From our perspective, this incorporation does not uniquely mean that they 
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are imported without a reflexive and critic attitude, but rather received by the 
population, interpreted and only then internalised, giving some meaning to it and 
borrowing some collective identity to the norms, rules or ideas that came from abroad. 
Utterly, this denotes that, given this vision of Europeanisation, this process (or set of 
processes) encompasses a slow movement of social learning, implying that any attempt 
to simply impose EU’s perspective with no regard for the other side should not be 
considered as Europeanisation, but just an ethnocentric and imperialist way of making 
the European culture prevail. 
Claudio Radaelli seeks to be even more precise with his definition and 
determines, in the same article, what can and what cannot be considered 
Europeanisation. In that sense, the author distinguishes Europeanisation from 
convergence, harmonisation, political integration and EU policy formation (Idem: 6). 
Convergence is, according to Radaelli, a consequence of Europeanisation, in the sense 
that the latter can result in convergence, but can also generate divergence, making the 
two concepts different from each other, although correlated. In the same line, 
Europeanisation is not harmonisation either: the first is capable of improving the state’s 
capacity to deal with problems, but it is still possible that national institutions produce 
different solutions. Regarding political integration, although Europeanisation would not 
exist without integration, it embodies a “post-ontological focus”, meaning that 
Europeanisation is more concerned about what happens once the institutions are 
established and produce effect, rather than the ontological phase in which countries 
share their sovereignty. Finally, Europeanisation cannot be confused with EU policy 
formation, given the fact that they are conceptually different: policy formation is the 
process that leads to the development of a certain policy, whereas Europeanisation 
constitutes a consequence of that policy at the domestic level (Idem: 6). 
Thus, Europeanisation is, from our perspective, a set of processes that promote 
transformations in the recipient countries in order them to be closer to and share the 
European political-economic and socio-cultural patterns. At this point, the question that 
needs to be posed is how that closeness is reached. 
Caporaso, Cowles and Risse (2001) wrote that the major condition for 
Europeanisation to take place is a gap (or misfit) between European and domestic 
patterns. The wider the gap, the higher the pressure for the country to europeanise. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that, in order to europeanise, there must be a lack of 
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compatibility with the European structures, which means a misfit between the two parts 
and, consequently, the pressure that arises is responsible for creating the impetus needed 
to foster domestic change. This idea of promoting internal change is realised, in the case 
of the European Union, through the conjugation of two mechanisms.  
As Emerson and Noutcheva (2004: 4) postulate, socialisation and conditionality 
contribute to the interaction of the three dynamics that help achieve the final aim of 
Europeanisation48 and which are a) legal norms usually associated with the political and 
economic realms and sine qua non conditions for the accession; b) objective changes 
both in the economic structures and in the individuals’ interests that resulted from the 
growing integration; c) and finally, subjective changes that are related to the 
individuals’ beliefs, expectations and identity at the societal level (Idem: 4). As 
discussed above, these dynamics combine material and immaterial changes, respecting 
therefore Radaelli’s definition and our own understanding of this phenomenon. Besides, 
Emerson and Noutcheva (Idem: 5) recognise that this process is interactive, which 
means that member states begin and shape the process at the same time they are 
themselves influenced and affected by it. Again, the constructivist conception of the co-
constitution of agency and structure.  
As an expert committed to this subject, Claudio Radaelli (2000) proposes a more 
complex and complete model of the mechanisms of Europeanisation49. Although it will 
not be object of a deep analysis, it is worth mentioning that there are three main 
mechanisms in this model: presence of a European model; absence of a European model 
and soft framing mechanisms. These three large groups encompass the means to reach 
that specific type of integration: for example, the presence of an European model 
constitutes a “positive integration”, but the EU’s suggestion of a model implies whether 
some degree of coercion so that the country adopts it or “mimetism”, if a country is 
allowed to choose whether to follow the model or not. In the two cases, there is a 
subsequent adaptation pressure towards the Europeanising country.  
This model is in accordance with what was mentioned above related to the idea 
that not only rules and norms are able to help Europeanise a country – ideational factors 
constitute a relevant side of this question. Subotic (2011) wrote an article based on a 
comparison between Croatia and Serbia, according to which the final aim of accession 
                                                          
48 Morlino and Magen (2009), from the 4 mechanisms of external democracy promotion, also chose 
socialisation and conditionality to apply to the European case. 
49 A reproduction of Radaelli’s “mechanisms of Europeanisation” can be found in Figure 11 (Appendix 
4). 
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is not enough to determine the success of Europeanisation. Although both countries 
were on the run towards accession and had to go through the same procedures, Croats 
“were willingly to adopt rules they disagreed with because the feeling of belonging to a 
shared European family trumped other concerns they had with the Europeanisation 
process” (Idem: 311). On the other hand, and despite the importance of accession in 
Serbia, its post-Yugoslav “uncertain and transitional identity, the contested meaning of 
Europe, and the presence of alternative domestic identity claims (...) can best explain 
cases of stalled Europeanisation” (Idem: 312). Therefore, the success of 
Europeanisation as a set of processes that include the participation of the EU and 
country’s elites and civil society depends on all the parts involved and not only on the 
European side as some authors assert. Identity is, according to Subotic and to our own 
position, a key element to understand this phenomenon and what can in fact distinguish 
an easier and quicker Europeanisation process from a more difficult and slower one.   
As it was already mentioned, identity is mutable and, although many academics 
believe that Europeanising is something natural and desired by all countries, the fact is 
that some collective identities do not perceive the EU as owning a set of principles and 
norms that fit the country’s features and characteristics. Serbia was the example 
provided by the author, but Turkey is another case to consider: although the Turks have 
historically wanted to join the Union, most of them do not regard European’s identity as 
superior to their own identity and therefore do not consider relevant or necessary to 
change or alter it. Moreover, there is a widespread dilemma that opposes Turks’ 
willingness to enter the EU and their fear of losing part of their identity once they 
believe they are assumed to adopt a different identity. Being aware of this dilemma that 
concerns Turks’ minds, elites seek to convey their message, according to their interests, 
promoting whether identity convergence or identity divergence mechanisms.50 Thus, if 
some pro-Europeans sponsor an identity convergence dynamic, emphasising the 
similarities between both parts and omitting some differences, Euro-sceptics would 
highlight the Turkish identity in contrast with the European values, trying to convey 
their message of incompatibility between them and Europe.  
The previous pages referred to Europeanisation at very different levels – the 
adoption of formal rules and identity issues were brought within the scope of the same 
“umbrella” concept. Diez (et al., 2005) noted that and, after concluding that 
                                                          
50 These concept were used by Subotic (2011) and have already been explained. 
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Europeanisation is a complex concept that embraces different realities or dynamics, 
attributed four different meanings to it, differentiating between policy, political, 
discursive and societal Europeanisation (Idem: 2). According to the authors, these 
dimensions should be clearly identified when studying a Europeanisation case, as they 
are “different ways in which Europe becomes a common reference point increasingly 
referred to in domestic debates, or to the alignment of policies, political processes or 
social identities within Europe” (Idem: 2). 
This process, however, is also not consensual in terms of academics’ 
assessment. Didem Buhari (2009), for example, adopted a critical stance regarding 
Europeanisation studies. According to the author, there is an ambiguous approach to the 
term, blurred boundaries with other concepts and even different perceptions that classify 
it whether as a process or an outcome. (Idem: 100). Besides, there is a tendency to face 
the phenomenon as top-down, ignoring the bottom-up sub-processes that also compose 
it, as well as the interactivity of the relationship (Idem: 103). Therefore, a set of 
variables should be taken into consideration, as they too may help explain some 
variations in the success of the application of Europeanisation, such as: EU’s stimuli 
(hard/soft law), type of integration (positive or negative) and national structures. The 
latter are fundamental, as the country’s identity and history, political ideology and the 
associated socio-economic costs can create a more positive or negative favourable 
environment to europeanise (Idem: 104, 105). In that sense, and given the complexity 
behind the changes necessary to pursue with Europeanisation (whether they are legal 
and formal or more cognitive and ideational), it is through this process that “EU stimuli 
are received, translated and adopted or rejected” (Idem: 107). This conception of 
Europeanisation presents it as something that is not only received, but also interpreted; 
that is imposed, but that can be rejected. It is a more dynamic and interactive reading of 
the phenomenon that avoids the formality and unidirectionality of some conceptions. 
Related to Europeanisation and the way the European Union promotes its ideals, 
one can very often find the EU’s normative character. Normative action is the opposite 
option of coercive military imposition; the well-known “soft-power” phenomenon. To 
be a normative actor signifies that it “act[s] in a normative way that transcends 
instrumental rationality and projects values as a means of inducing international 
change” (Tafel, 2008: 2). A normative power does not mean basing one’s action on 
discourse and speech, although cognitive aspects really matter, but rather use the 
economic power, institutions, diplomacy and other non-belligerent means to achieve the 
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final goal of diffusing a certain idea or value as well. There is an impact anyway, but the 
focus is on the ideational side of the question, which avoids an objective and sometimes 
violent material imposition, because as Manners (2002: 238) wrote: “Cold war (...) 
ended with the internal collapse of regimes (...) – by the collapse of norms rather than 
the power of force”. There are other examples all over the world that epitomise this 
idea, given the fact that some of the external military-driven impositions of democracy 
ended up creating some fragile regimes based on formal democratic institutions without 
the public democratic support needed behind them – Iraq is an example of this kind of 
situation.    
Making use of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and other conditions 
(Idem: 242), the European Union diffuses its norms and tries to convince the others that 
they can be regarded as “normal”, as a “pattern” for the other members of the 
international community –  
“not only is the EU constructed in a normative basis, but importantly that 
this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. It is built on 
the crucial, and usually overlooked observation that the most important 
factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it 
says, but what it is” (Idem: 252). 
Democracy is one of the fields in which Europeanisation operates and 
constitutes one of the values that EU tries to promote worldwide through a normative 
way. And more than just another field of Europeanisation, it is one of the most complex 
examples: first, democracy is a wide-ranging concept that includes quite diverse 
realities from the civil-military relations to the learning of the democratic culture; from 
free and fair elections to the trust in political elites. Secondly, there is no single model 
of democracy in the European Union; in fact, there are many differences among the 
European countries, namely regarding dichotomies like Parliamentarianism/Presidential 
system, more or less centralised, more or less intervenient state, etc. And finally the EU 
is itself object of strong criticisms regarding the lack of democratic practices in its 
institutions and how poorly representative they are. As a result, it becomes quite 
difficult for the Union to constitute a credible and coherent example. 
Although “normative power” is different from the common classic version of 
“hard power”, the true is that only powerful international actors have the capability to 
shape or determine what can be considered normal and that constitutes, therefore, a type 
of power as well: “norms become agents and expressions of state power” (Seppo & 
Tyrväinen, 2008: 10). According to Tocci (cited in Seppo e Tyrväinen, 2008: 10), an 
actual normative power is the one that fights for normative objectives, uses normative 
136 
 
means and possibly reaches a normative impact. Thus, it is our strong belief that it is 
fundamental that the EU acts coherently in terms of promoting values, such as 
democracy. Only when the Union is perceived as a true role-model that implements and 
practices the highest standards of the democratic regime within its own borders and 
institutions, will it be possible to exercise the normative pressure on third countries and, 
therefore, to promote democracy across the world namely through serving as an 
example of good democratic practices with positive results, such as peace, economic 
stability and popular satisfaction. In this context, the EU can convince others of the 
validity and genuineness of its action as a democracy normative diffuser, enabling its 
Europeanisation practices to be more effective and successful. 
 
4.2.4. Conditionality and Socialisation 
 
The proposed definition of accession includes a reference to the candidate’s 
compliance with the organisation’s demands. The European Union, as the recipient of 
those candidates, establishes the goals they need to achieve in order to be considered in 
conditions to accede. Accession, in its turn, is only possible when the gap between the 
applicant and the organisation is diminished; in the case of the EU, the Europeanisation 
process seeks to decrease that difference through two main mechanisms: conditionality 
and socialisation. Although the first may be easier to recognise and quantify, the latter is 
also very important for the process because Europeanisation (and diminishing the gap) 
is not only about adopting formal rules51, but also internalising them. 
The EU employs conditionality as the mechanism responsible for controlling the 
steps taken by the countries, using it more widely and systematically to assess their 
evolution, namely through the European Commission Annual Progress Reports, and 
reward their efforts or punish a possible retrocession. Conditionality is considered one 
of the most successful policies of the Union in the context of its foreign policy, and 
more precisely of accession, given the fact that the final reward, full membership, is 
very appealing and maybe the only one that is worth struggling for, despite the costs of 
the process. 
                                                          
51 In fact, as it will be explained in Chapter 5, Magen and Morlino (2009) differentiate between rule 
adoption, implementation and internalisation. 
 
137 
 
Conditionality is the name of the mechanism behind the “carrot and stick” 
policy. In other words, and bringing together definitions of diverse authors, the Union 
provides appealing benefits to countries it deals with (not only in the scope of accession, 
but in every type of relation) if those countries fulfil the accorded conditions, usually 
focusing on the development or improving of human rights and democracy. This 
strategy of reinforcement seeks to promote changes and stabilisation in the recipient 
countries, granting them benefits that range from financial aid, technical assistance, full 
membership, etc (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008: 190; Smith, 1997: 1; Sunay, 2008: 
2).  
In case the conditions are not accomplished by the country involved, there is the 
possibility of applying sanctions. Nevertheless, this situation is very exceptional on 
what comes to the EU and very rarely sanctions are applied (Youngs, 2010: 3). Altering 
the assistance programmes, postponing payments and other aids, imposing embargos, 
suspensions, etc are examples of measures included within negative conditionality 
(Smith, 1997: 17), which frequently do not work in the expected manner. As a matter of 
fact, negative conditionality is very controversial and authors believe that it is very 
likely not to directly target the causes of the violations of the conditions and usually 
even worsen the situation of the population (Idem: 17). Positive conditionality, on the 
other hand, emphasises the rewards when certain aims are successfully achieved by the 
countries and is usually considered more productive. And although the “denial of an 
expected reward is not always seen as qualitatively different from the removal of an 
existing preference” (Youngs, 2010: 7), there is a more optimistic approach implied, 
which promotes further efforts on the countries’ side.  
One of the problems this distinction may raise, and which constitutes a first 
criticism, is pointed out by Richard Youngs, who wrote that  
“However, what is presented as incentives-based political conditionality 
often crosses the line into largely unconditional engagement: rewards are 
invariably granted on the basis of no more than the vaguest of promises of 
future reforms” (Idem: 7). 
The previous assumption that human rights are universal values that every country 
should follow is another question raised by some authors, as well as the fact that 
judging other countries may be somehow unfair and very subjective – a pattern to assess 
all the countries could probably grant more objectivity, but on the other hand applying it 
to all countries would also ignore their intrinsic and specific features (Smith, 1997: 5). 
In this sense, Usul (2011: 64) argues that meritocracy and consistency are fundamental 
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to an effective process of conditionality and, therefore, “double standards” are 
responsible for weakening the process and EU’s image as a serious and committed actor 
as long as “high-politics or geopolitical considerations, along with individual member 
state pressures, are sometimes prioritized over a merit-based accession process” (Idem: 
64). This was the case of Bulgaria and Romania’s accession when compared to the 
procedure towards Turkey.52 
 In fact, this “double standard” comes from other problems of conditionality, 
which are power asymmetry and uncertainty. The relationship between the Union and 
the candidate is not even: the EU sets the rules and conditions without consulting the 
candidate, at the same time the vagueness of those same rules makes it even harder for 
the countries to know how to behave. They are object of a “ex ante conditionality”, 
being accepted only after fulfilling all the imprecise conditions. Uncertainty comes from 
this environment of lack of coherence on the EU’s side and can easily undermine all the 
process and the country’s commitment (Sunay, 2008: 4,5; Usul, 2011: 65). Thus, 
“candidates’ domestic actors are likely to challenge conditionality (in one way or 
another) if the process is uncertain and asymmetrically structured” (Sunay, 2008: 3).  
 These problems contribute to a negative image of the European Union. The lack 
of consistency and of a systematic approach, power asymmetry, uncertainty regarding 
the observance of the promise of accession, etc. cause a credibility deficit in the Union 
that is aggravated by the democratic deficit of its own institutions, as well as some 
faults of its own members. Furthermore, adopting the EU rules and measures does not 
guarantee that the population truly internalise them and apply them in their lives. If the 
first situation only encompasses the institutional level and is easy to assess, the 
individual or societal adoption of those norms is not so simple. As Teresa Cierco (2011: 
145) explains, “The EU as an external actor can demand to establish the legal 
framework for the protection of human rights, but its real implementation and respect 
on a daily basis lies beyond the scope of governmental influence”. Therefore, despite 
the government intentions, the real application and internalisation of the reforms and 
changes the elites pursue in order to get closer to the Union are not easy to assess nor to 
achieve by the mere adoption and imposition, as these changes on a societal level 
require much time and systematic contact with the new frameworks that are not rooted 
                                                          
52 The study’s results proved that the 2007 enlargement has negatively impacted on Turkish democratic 
performance, possibly also due to the frustration created by the perception of unfairness and of double 
standards vis-à-vis the EU’s treatment towards different countries (Matos, 2012). 
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in people’s habits and mindsets – “a change of mentality and culture cannot be reached 
by a state-centred top-down approach as conditionality” (Idem: 146).    
  
Nevertheless, EU’s conditionality process has not only faults, but also some 
strengths that allow it to be followed as a good example of leverage power by other 
countries or regional organisations. Seppo and Tyrväinen (2008: 5) believe this strategy 
constituted an essential tool to reach peace, stability and economic prosperity all over 
the continent, assuming that it helped countries facing important transitions. 
Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008: 207) concluded that conditionality is an effective 
process that, although in need for some reassessment, “even when the membership 
incentives lacked credibility, i.e. when the membership promise was uncertain and 
accession was distant, the impact of EU political conditionality was statistically strong 
and robust”. Indeed, as an incentive mechanism with a very appealing reward, 
conditionality has to be credited for some accomplishments, namely in the CEEC’s 
enlargement and it cannot be ignored its contribution to various reforms and changes, 
because they were, in the context of accession, the only possible way to reach the so 
desired full membership. 
 EU’s conditionality did not always work the same way. As any other policy, it 
has undergone through many changes and improvements, in order to adapt to the new 
realities the European Union itself has to deal with. An incipient form of conditionality 
was firstly presented in the Birkelbach Report in 1962, a document written by a 
European Parliament committee that considered democratic regimes sine qua non 
conditions for candidacy. From that moment onwards, the EU started to take 
conditionality into account, using it as a means to strengthen democracy across Europe 
(and the world), providing help in transition and consolidation processes. In the early 
times, namely in the enlargements to Portugal, Spain and Greece, conditionality was 
rather informal, with no monitoring and a limited conception of democracy was applied 
in a mainly political process in which states prioritised their national interests over the 
organisation’s (Usul, 2011: 45, 46). With time, this mechanism starts to take the shape 
of a more systematised and less political tool, with regular monitoring and a stronger 
presence of EU’s institutions in the development of the whole process. In the 1990’s the 
then EEC accepted to establish association agreements in case the countries would 
satisfy a set of prior conditions: rule of law, human rights and multi-party system 
figured among them (Smith, 1997: 9). It was in this same decade that the Copenhagen 
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criteria were established and the Maastricht Treaty included this concern with human 
rights in the Community’s external policy (Idem: 11). Nevertheless, since the 2004 
enlargement, conditionality became stricter: the possible enlargement fatigue and the 
efforts implied in the membership of ten new countries at once were certainly behind 
this new approach –  
“the increasing Euro-fatigue in the post-enlargement period led to the 
emergence of a non-friendly environment for new enlargements. Together 
with this new European environment, EU decision-makers have started to 
apply more stringent conditionality for new candidates and potential 
candidates” (Usul, 2011: 59). 
 
In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, that acceded three years later, a special safeguard 
clause was introduced with the aim of extending the Commission’s influence over a 
longer period of time; in that sense, the Union opened the possibility of postponing up 
to one year the accession date (Jora, 2006: 12). Both political and economic costs of this 
delay are not tempting at all and, together with the post-accession clauses valid for three 
years after the accession moment and mentioned in the Accession Treaties, European 
institutions extend their leverage power in time and ensuring their demands are 
accomplished.  
 Besides those tools the EU has at its disposal on the brink of the moment of 
truth, others are used to operationalise political conditionality. Usul (2011: 59) 
perceives the European Union as an “active democratic hub” that improved over time its 
leverage capacity due to the establishment of a more comprehensive and systematic 
strategy to support democratisation among candidates. The same author (Idem: 60-62) 
lists a set of instruments that are employed in the scope of conditionality. They consist 
of demarches, opinions, progress reports, accession partnership and national 
programmes, and screening and negotiations. Demarches were the first tool to be 
developed by the EU and included diplomatic notes and official protests; the Opinions 
describe and assess the country in accordance with the conditions involved; the Progress 
Reports evaluate the evolutions of the country within the context of its path towards 
accession, i.e., they praise the improvements and call the country’s attention to the areas 
that need to be more carefully addressed or solved, always having the Copenhagen 
criteria as background; the Accession Partnership states EU’s demands in the short and 
medium term, which are included in the National Programmes designed by the 
candidates; finally, the screening process critically scrutinises the acquis in order to 
prepare the accession negotiations during which the candidate is monitored and helped 
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to implement the acquis so that it fulfils all the conditions (included in the many 
chapters that compose it) to accede when it is ready (Idem: 60-62). 
 
 Democratic socialisation, more specifically, is a mechanism of democracy 
diffusion. Unlike democratic conditionality, socialisation operates more at the societal 
and cognitive levels, as it is the result of the interaction with other actors. According to 
Magen and Morlino (2009: 34), it is “a process of inducting individuals and states into 
the democratic norms and rules of a given regional, international or transnational 
community”. The above-mentioned interaction can occur at different levels and through 
different channels: economic connections, geopolitical relations, social linkages, means 
of communication and transnational civil society (Idem: 34). The idea is that, through 
interaction, individuals and groups acquire or internalise a set of principles and norms 
that are in force among the members of the groups they are dealing with. It is not mere 
mimicking the others’ actions; it is being inspired by them and absorbing some of their 
characteristics. Obviously, there is behind this conception the Constructivist principle of 
the “logic of appropriateness” and the assumption that “domestic decision-makers are 
themselves cognitive-social actors that respond, at least in part, to [this] logic (...)” 
(Idem: 37). Moreover, if the entity that is inspiring the other community is seen as a 
legitimate actor in the field it is promoting, interactions are eased (Idem: 37) and 
internalisation too. 
 It is important to notice, though, that these interactions can take place at different 
levels: both elites and civil society can be part of programmes of exchanges, networks 
and learning processes, for instance. Therefore, and if this mechanism is effectively 
promoted and applied, the top-down and unidirectional approach of conditionality can 
find in socialisation the other side of the coin – a softer, interactive and bottom-up 
approach. It does not mean, however, that this mechanism, academically speaking, is 
easier to identify and assess; on the contrary, the deepness, slowness, symbolic and 
subjective character of this social learning make it truly difficult to evaluate – it is only 
perceptible in the longer-term mentality changes, revealed in modified behaviour. 
 Thus, the real promotion and application of both mechanisms combined – 
democracy conditionality and socialisation – seem to be, at least theoretically, the best 
approach, as both together embrace different sides and aspects of external democracy 
diffusion and if formal rule adoption is induced, the not least important rule 
internalisation is also taken into account and completes the process that, in this scenario, 
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comprises both formal/legal and cognitive/individual domains. Besides, the critiques 
against conditionality are softened with the application of socialisation and the less 
strict and systematic approach of the latter is compensated by conditionality’s organised 
application and assessment. The rigorous application of these mechanisms within the 
broader context of Europeanisation would guarantee the European Union a more 
coherent and powerful action at the global scale. 
 
4.2.5. The ultimate aim: full membership 
 
Any process of accession takes many years or even decades of efforts and 
sacrifices. Making the average of all enlargements, since the moment a country is 
officially considered a candidate, it takes nine years until membership. Turkey is a 
candidate since 1999, which means about 14 years of waiting and reforming, not to 
mention the pre-accession period. Nevertheless, there is no clear perspective of full 
membership yet. 
Sacrifices only make sense if the compensation is achievable or, using a 
common metaphor, it is only worth it to be under the constant threat of the stick if the 
carrot is able to be reached at some point in time. Therefore, the trophy of accession is 
of utmost importance in the framework of all the accession process. Turkey is a very 
peculiar case, as this work pretends to prove – as a result, a higher complexity was and 
still is expected in this particular enlargement. Notwithstanding, not even the final 
accession is something clear in the Turks’ minds: the European Commission embodies a 
position of rewarding reforms and opening the door of the Union, but some member 
states publicly declared their opposition to this membership, making it unclear or 
doubtful to the eyes of Turks.  
Once conditionality entails financial, political and social costs, “the prospect of 
membership lies at the heart of this incentive” (Sunay, 2008: 2). Thus, coherence and 
clear perspectives of accession play a fundamental role in the dynamics of 
conditionality in particular and in the accession process in general. Political questions 
should not be so limitative as the country has already been considered an official 
candidate and at this point only technical questions of accomplishing the chapters of the 
acquis should be under consideration.  
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Romania, one of the newest countries of the EU and whose development is 
comparable to Turkey’s, constituted an example that, according to the researcher Silviu 
Jora (2006: 14),  
“EU conditionality has maximum efficiency after an accession date 
has been on the visible horizon (...). When a candidate state receives a 
possible accession date, the “carrot” is shining there, within touchable 
distance, and the candidate will do anything to complete the leap.” 
In the Turkish case, determining an accession date would raise many concerns 
due to the country’s recent performance in many chapters and therefore it would be 
wiser to analyse the question very carefully before that move. However, the certainty of 
accede in case Turkey fulfils all the conditions should be unambiguous, as otherwise the 
conditionality process may cause reform fatigue and the discredit of the population 
towards the EU, creating a lack of interest in the accession, given the fact that nowadays 
Turkey may have other possibilities of consolidating its position in the world, namely 
through the Middle East and the Arab world. 
 
The European Union seeks to promote democracy in its foreign relations, 
whether in the scope of accession or of any other policy. Using a normative approach 
that tries to convince the others of the value of its positions, namely in what concerns 
democracy and human rights, the EU employs some mechanisms when dealing with 
third countries, as it is the case of socialisation and, more formally and systematically, 
political conditionality. Despite some problems in this last policy, the Union has proved 
to be a valuable external anchor and capable of exerting influence on the domestic 
processes of democratisation and on other realms, namely in the Central and Eastern 
European countries that generally improved their performance. Turkey, a more complex 
case, has gone through many changes under the scope of conditionality and other 
diffusion mechanisms, but the uncertainty of its actual accession may jeopardise the 
achieved results and improvements, and change the country’s interests and perceptions 
towards other possible fronts of its foreign policy after discrediting the Western choice. 
Although the aim of this work is not to analyse deeply the prospects of 
accession, their existence is an important variable that may help justify Turkey’s 
commitment to democratise – or the lack of it. Thus, it becomes fundamental that this 
and other variables are taken into consideration when analysing the stimuli given by the 
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Union, and Turkey’s responses to understand how influent EU can be on Turkey’s 
democratisation. 
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5. Creating a model: democracy assessment and EU’s impact 
5.1. Operationalising democracy  
 
Any attempt to transform into numbers a subjective reality entails a high risk. 
Nonetheless, taking the risk of quantifying the concept of democracy had several 
reasons. First, to contribute to the ongoing debate; second, to avoid using only non-
quantified data, usually associated by positivists with a less objective and less serious 
analysis of reality; and third, to conjugate both quantitative and qualitative approaches 
to enrich the final results. The latter argument constitutes the strongest reason for 
combining both types of methodology; it is what Michael Bamberger (2012) calls 
“Mixed Methods in Impact Evaluation” that inspired this choice. On this paper, 
Bamberger presents the advantages and disadvantages of both qualitative and 
quantitative designs and reaches the conclusion that, when combined, they complement 
each other in the sense that they mutually help each other overcome their shortcomings.  
While a quantitative approach ignores contextual factors and reduces everything 
to numbers (possibly causing the non-consideration of underlying causes), qualitative 
methods are more flexible, holistic and allow the understanding of more complex 
situations. However, on the other side, quantitative designs are able to generalise their 
findings, to be replicated and compared, whilst qualitative approaches present subjective 
conclusions whose validity is difficult to assess and whose findings are also difficult to 
generalise, often lacking a consensus due to the various perspectives brought up (Idem: 
4). Therefore, Bamberger concludes that bringing both designs together and converging 
their strengths increase the credibility of the research conclusions, extend the 
comprehensiveness of the findings, generate new insights and highlight diversity (Idem: 
4-5), which is precisely what it is sought to be achieved with this work. Mixed Methods 
is, therefore, helpful to “captur[e] complex processes of organizational and behavioural 
change, (...) taking into account how programs change in response to how they are 
perceived and used by different sectors of the target population” (Idem: 7). 
The team that edited the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance’s Practical Guide (Beetham, et al., 2008) also believed this mixture of 
approaches to “provide as rich and robust a portrait of the democratic experience as 
possible within the resources constraints of any one assessment project”. This question 
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of resources constraints is also fundamental, as sometimes the use of certain indicators 
or sets of data is limited by the sources at disposal, the number of years provided, etc. 
Yet, the use of qualitative methodologies in this work will be further explained and 
justified. In terms of the quantitative approach, the challenge will be taken into parts and 
explained with detail and as accurately as possible. 
David Campbell, in 2008, assessed a set of initiatives to measure democracy 
worldwide: Freedom House, Polity IV, Vanhanen’s Democracy Index and The 
Economist’s Democracy Index. These were scrutinised by Campbell and his 
conclusions, as well as his suggestions, will be mentioned and taken into consideration 
later on when the question on the choice of the indicators arises. However, Campbell’s 
list is not exhaustive. Many other organisations, institutions and academics tried to give 
their contributions to the discussion, creating a proliferation of methods, rankings and 
approaches. For example, Gerardo Munck (2009) wrote a book entitled “Measuring 
Democracy” in which he reflected upon this subject. A couple of ideas are worth 
sharing to help the construction of our own model. 
 
With the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion began to be perceived as a 
major concern for international actors and “measuring democracy has ceased to be 
solely an academic matter” (Munck, 2009: 1), receiving a growing attention by political 
actors with countless objectives, such as assessing the impact of a programme or to 
supervise its conformity regarding certain aims (Idem: 5-7). However, as the author 
recognises, data has also been misused, allowing the critics to point the finger to the 
existence of hidden political interests behind this measurement. The list of misuses of 
data in democracy promotion includes, among others, the employment of techniques to 
disguise the inclusion of ideological bias, the non-application of rigorous and tested 
scientific methodologies, as well as the lack of transparency in what comes to open and 
public data (Idem: 8-11). 
In the same book, Munck (Idem: 120) asserts that “the measurement of 
democracy is inextricably linked with the definition of the concept of democracy” and 
compares Robert Dahl’s and Joseph Schumpeter’s widely cited definitions to exemplify 
how the initial conceptions may influence or even determine the choices regarding 
measurement. Furthermore, Munck recognises that a minimalist (Schumpeterian) 
definition is better for analytical clarity (Idem: 13), although later in the book he 
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reckons that an “analysis of democracy calls for measures that capture the full meaning 
of democracy” (Idem: 134) and that is only achievable when one goes beyond the 
electoral type of democracy. In addition, Munck postulates that one of the disadvantages 
of a minimum definition is to include in the group of democracies countries that are not 
democratic (Idem: 131), but which gained the status thanks to the coarse filter of the 
definition. 
Thus, the researcher seems to prefer theory-driven measures over a data-driven 
approach and advises that the unit of analysis should be the country, as it still is the 
clearest unit at our disposal (Idem: 136). In this regard, Munck proposes a three step 
process for analysing data: “conceptualisation” (which means to identify the 
components of the concept53), “measurement” (selection of indicators) and 
“aggregation” (to determine the levels and rules of aggregation) (Idem: 14-31). As it 
will become clearer further on in this work, the first step has already been begun in the 
previous sections and will be schematised soon; the second step will be applied when 
choosing the variables for the model developed and the aggregation phase will include 
the construction of indices, as well as the final statistical analysis. 
The whole process requires that the attributes capture the meaning of the concept 
and that the measurement mirrors the content of the concept (Idem: 138), so that this 
quantitative approach becomes a reliable contribution for the study of democracy, and 
since the “human element cannot be removed from the measurement process” (Idem: 
142), in order to overcome it, the researcher has to be explicit about his methodological 
choices and their theoretical justification, keeping in mind that “measurement is a 
precise but not a perfect science” (Idem: 143). 
When a researcher is planning his methodological approach to develop a model 
to assess the evolution of a real democracy, it is vital that the limitations of the research 
are taken into consideration. As in the case of this thesis, if one wants to evaluate the 
democratic performance of Turkey, one has to rely on the data sources that are available 
to fulfil and concretise that same model. Therefore, and in order to make the project 
feasible, Bühlmann’s model had to be adapted and conjugated with other contributions, 
as well as with our own input.  
                                                          
53 Munck (2009: 21) uses the metaphor of a tree: the concept is the tree, the attributes represent the 
branches and the leaves are the components of the attributes. 
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In that sense, Bühlmann’s (et al., 2007) model turned out to be particularly 
complex to operationalise. In fact, despite the various indicators the team proposed, the 
difficulty lied in the possibility to collect that type of data. Besides, as this evaluation 
pretends to cover a ten-year period (1999-2009), this wide-ranging gap makes things 
even more difficult. Therefore, the choice was to combine different proposals, as 
mentioned above.54 The presented model aims to assess the evolution of any democracy 
based on the evaluation several sources provide and its development has been object to 
various transformations – a first attempt created an extremely complex set of concepts 
with many levels of dimensions and sub-dimensions; the second try was too simplistic 
only with democracy’s three main key areas. This final version seeks to avoid those 
extremes and, gathering the options of many authors, it encompasses the main concept 
and three further levels. Applying Munck’s (2009) tree metaphor, democracy is the tree, 
the three principles are the branches, the eight dimensions are the leaves and 13 
attributes concretise the preceding level. Notwithstanding the inclusion of this last 
echelon, data will be aggregated around the previous level. In other words, although 
there are three levels, the last one aims only to specify the previous concepts and to help 
choose the appropriate indicators, but when it comes to gather and present the data, it 
will be aggregated at the level of the dimensions and not of the attributes.  
Figure 12 below schematises our proposal in terms of conceptualisation of the 
notion of “democracy”. It represents our understanding of the concept based on 
different authors’ contributions; it is an eclectic version of reorganised levels of 
conceptualisation. 
Thus, the three main democratic principles were maintained as the most abstract 
democratic fields – equality, freedom and control. The attributes to these principles are 
eight and were inspired by different authors55, such as Bühlmann (et al, 2007), Morlino 
(2002), Cruz (2003), as well as by the suggestions made in the Democracy Barometer 
website56. There are, in fact, some differences between our model and the one provided 
                                                          
54 Notice that the fact that Bühlmann’s model was not chosen as the only possibility for operationalising 
the concept does not mean that the conceptual analysis previously made should be changed. On the 
contrary, it is a valuable contribution to scrutinise the concept and its different dimensions, and the 
addition of further visions to its operationalisation can only enrich the whole model and process. 
55 Cf. Table 8 (Appendix 5). 
56 DemocracyBarometer.org is the website of a project that brings together a set of experts in democracy 
studies (renowned names such as Wolfgang Merkel, Marc Bühlmann, Bernhard Wessels and Daniel 
Bochsler compose the team) from different research institutions and funded by the Swiss National 
Science Foundation. This project aims to analyse the concept, proposes its own approach and assesses 
several democracies over the years, based on their own model. More details can be found here: 
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Democracy
Equality
Political Rights
Participation
Representation
Social Rights Social protection
Freedom
Rule of law
Transparency and corruption
Quality of judicial system
Civil Rights Individual freedoms
Economic Rights Economic freedoms
Control
Horizontal 
Accountability
Checks and balances
Constraints to executive autonomy
Vertical 
Accountability
Free and fair elections
Other forms of popular control
Responsiveness
Citizens' trust
Effective power to govern
by other authors individually57. Comparing it to Bühlman, Merkel and Weßels’ (2007) 
proposal, right in the first dimension – Equality –, political rights entail a set of other 
sub-dimensions that do not correspond to our view to operationalise the concept, in the 
sense that responsiveness seems to fit better in the category of control, as it works as a 
constraint to the exercise of power. This dimension has been divided into two further 
attributes: participation and representation – both related to the desired equality of 
opportunities to be part of the political process, to apply for political positions and to be 
equally represented by the elected peers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political rights are accompanied by social rights in an attempt to overcome what 
can be considered a shortcoming of the above-cited model: we perceived the lack of a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://democracybarometer.org/index.html. Henceforth, this team’s work will be cited as Bühlmann (et al, 
2012), as this publication clarifies in detail most choices regarding the model and explains it. 
57 Cf. Table 8 (Appendix 5). 
Figure 12: Concept’s operationalisation in 3 levels: principles, dimensions and attributes 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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differentiation between formal and substantive equality. While political rights only 
ensure formal equality, the inclusion of social rights in the table means widening the 
focus towards substantive equality. Morlino (2002: 17-18) makes that distinction, 
explaining that the latter type of equality is the only that can ensure that economic and 
social differences are softened, in order to allow “the full development of the human 
person and the effective participation of all workers in the political, economic and social 
organization of a country” (Italian Constitution cited in Morlino, 2002: 18). Therefore, 
the inclusion of social rights in the realm of equality seems to be of much relevance, 
since substantive equality constitutes an important component of the more general 
principle of equality, and only when guaranteeing a certain level of economic and social 
levelling, it becomes possible to achieve (or at least to promote) a higher degree of 
political participation that would be otherwise replaced by more urgent needs with the 
danger of subjecting the people to the will of wealthier and more powerful individuals 
that would, subsequently, impoverish and harm the quality of democracy. 
Despite the difficulty and the costs of pursuing these objectives, they are the best 
way to diminish inequality, which is another democratic ideal. Social rights should thus 
promote physical and mental well-being, assistance, human dignity, the right to work, to 
study, to have a home, etc. (Morlino, 2002: 17; Cruz, 2003: 88). Cruz (2003: 85) 
reinforces that “without minimal economic and social conditions a democracy cannot 
exist” and Campbell (2008: 5-6) considers that economic democracy is one of the 
components of every democracy. Therefore, and to reach a balance with other 
democratic principles, not only economic freedom is important, but also some social 
concerns with the possible negative impact of economic freedom on wealth distribution 
that would create a section in society that would be incapable of exercising the rights 
they were entitled to enjoy (Idem: 86). 
Having that said, a new partial regime has been introduced in the model, “social 
rights”, that embed the function of social protection that, in turn, includes a set of 
fundamental rights present in most European constitutions, such as the rights to 
education, health, work and social assistance in the name of key values European 
countries have been standing for, namely human dignity and the possibility every single 
human being should have to prompt and develop his skills and potentialities. 
In the scope of freedom, the original model only foresaw civil rights as partial 
regime, but, following the reasoning of the previous paragraphs, another one was added 
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– economic rights. Besides civil rights, economic rights are also included within the 
principle of freedom, as it encompasses a set of liberties that are supposed to foster an 
economic environment that allows the usufruct of political, individual and electoral 
freedoms, usually believed to be better developed within a market economy (Cruz, 
2003: 85-86) that, nonetheless, has to be frequently intermediated by democratic 
mechanisms to protect other fundamental democratic principles, as mentioned above. 
Furthermore, and following the logic of Magen and Morlino (2009), the rule of law was 
removed from inside the wider field of civil rights and, in our model, figures among 
economic and civil rights. The reason behind this choice is related to the importance of 
this component for any democracy, that led these authors to name it the “prima inter 
pares”, which justifies occupying its own dimension. Therefore, and according to this 
division, freedom is ensured when economic rights are applied and everyone is entitled 
to act without this type of constraints; when civil rights protect the citizens against the 
abuses by the executive or other bodies; and when the rule of law is applied, which 
means that corruption is controlled and the judicial system reveals the necessary quality 
to ensure the stability of the law and equality before the law both in its accession and 
treatment. 
Finally, control encompasses both horizontal and vertical accountabilities, which 
means that both forms of limiting the exercise of power – through elections or other 
forms of popular control (petitions, manifestations,...) and the action of other 
constitutional bodies that constrain an arbitrary ruling through an equilibrium allowed 
by  a system of checks and balances – are equally important and at the same level. It 
includes as well the dimension of responsiveness (originally found within the scope of 
equality); in this case, however, responsiveness is viewed as a way of exerting pressure 
over the rulers to make them comply with their promises and to meet the population’s 
demands; having to respond before the electorate means, at the same time, that the 
government cannot be under the influence of extra-constitutional entities to ensure its 
effective power to govern. 
Subsequently, to each dimension is given a set of indicators that contribute to a 
higher concretisation of each level of the hierarchy and that, in principle, will allow a 
better understanding of the main (and more abstract) concept under study – democracy. 
Having this model as a guide, a set of sources were selected to provide it with the data 
needed to fulfil each of the items created by the indicators chosen for each attribute. The 
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major concerns behind each choice were to include a) only scientific evaluations; b) 
sources based on geographically distributed organisations (this was intended to avoid 
geographic concentration and to allow more diversified approaches); c) different 
sources for the same indicator to strengthen the results; d) sources that offered 
quantitative data; and e) sources that provided at least a set of years within the period 
under analysis to assess the evolution of the indicator in time58. 
The first criterion was related to the scientific character of the sources; indeed, 
all the organisations selected are recognised by their assessments of different 
democratic assets. The Democracy Barometer project is led by recognised scholars, 
experts on the field of democracy assessment; Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights 
Dataset (CIRI) aims to provide quantitative information on government respect for 
Human Rights in 195 since 1981 and claims to have a reliability of 0,944, basing their 
evaluation both on the US Department of State’s Country Annual Reports on Human 
Rights Practices and Amnesty International’s Annual Reports. In fact, the major 
criticism that these institutions may face is related to their links with certain countries’ 
governments, which is the case of Freedom House and the US’ Foreign Policy.59 
However, the inclusion of Freedom House, despite this widely known criticism, was 
intentional, as its presence is balanced by other institutions not so tightly linked to the 
USA, such as the European organisations. Figure 12 (above) reveals the concern of 
widening the origin of the sources, as stated in the second criterion. Furthermore, 
Campbell (2008: 16-17) criticises the lack of sensitiveness of Freedom House’s 7 point-
scale. That shortcoming is overcome by the consideration of other sources for the same 
indicator or other indicators that may help specify the first. For example, recognising 
that Freedom House’s “political rights” score is somehow dubious, it is only one among 
eleven or twelve other indicators from various sources that are able to specify and 
concretise more deeply the former one, such as “women’s political rights”, “political 
terror”, “freedom of association and assembly”, etc. This meets the requirement of the 
fourth criterion. 
Besides, all the sources used provided quantitative information – and that is the 
                                                          
58 In Appendix 6, a set of figures and tables can be found to help justify the choice and, simultaneously, 
assess the validity of the indicators included in the model: Table 9 shows all the indicators selected 
according to their source, their geographical origin, the scale they use, the number of years provided and 
some explanations regarding their methodology; Table 10 assembles the indicators and their distribution 
across the different dimensions; and finally Figures 13 and 14 schematise the sources’ geographic and 
institutional distribution. 
59 This is one of the criticisms Campbell (2008: 16) makes regarding Freedom House. 
 
153 
 
reason for the exclusion of other sources (at this point of the evaluation), like the 
Human Rights Watch and the Bartelsmann Stiftung, for example. Finally, the amount of 
years with data available also weighed in the choice of the sources. Vanhanen’s 
Demcoracy Index, as well as The Economist Democracy Index were left aside due to 
the very limited time scope. There is, however, one exception: the World Economic 
Forum. This source only offered a set of 4 years (between 1999 and 2009) when 
compared to the majority of the other organisations that counted on more than 6 years 
for an 11-year-period, but some of the indicators that were considered relevant have 
been included, as it is the case of the “global competitiveness index”, the 
“macroeconomic environment”, the “public trust in politicians”, the “reliability of 
police services” and the “quality of education”. Due to their importance to the 
respective dimensions, they were included even despite the small number of years 
provided. 
The allocation of indicators or even sets of data to the categories created for the 
model is not an easy task. The necessary compartmentalisation of such a complex 
concept often creates some grey areas that may overlap. However, more important than 
being stuck by those deadlocks is to reflect upon them and make decisions coherent 
with the project and clear to the reader or the researcher for future reproduction of the 
study – although these decisions, despite being supported by literature, may not be 
consensual, as they result from the interpretation of very abstract and general theoretical 
principles. Political rights encompass participation and competition, and, as they are 
embedded in the principle of equality, they are related to the need for equal access of 
citizens to the electoral process and to compete for political posts. Also, they imply an 
equal (fair) representation of the citizens in the elected bodies. In that sense, the 
freedoms that guarantee that people can truly engage in the political process and 
compete for a political career were included in this section, such as the freedom of 
assembly or of association, women’s political rights or other rules related to political 
parties, women’s representation, etc. As these indicators embody fundamental 
freedoms, it would be possible to include them in the principle of freedom, namely in 
civil liberties. However, we found particularly relevant for the equality in the accession 
to the political competition that these freedoms would be guaranteed, without which a 
fair contest would not exist. 
In terms of social rights, this field encompasses indicators related to social 
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protection (expenditure on health and education, for example), workers’ and women’s 
rights, trade unions and general development. Economic rights were operationalised 
through a set of indicators that illustrate the general macroeconomic environment to 
create wealth and to have the freedom to invest and succeed at this level – GDP, 
(un)employment, competitiveness, investment, property rights, etc. 
Civil rights include a wide range of indicators, such as torture, imprisonment, 
politically motivated disappearances and persecution, freedom of religion and of the 
press – all necessary conditions to ensure citizens are protected against arbitrary ruling; 
that they are free in their movements, in the access to knowledge and information, from 
persecutions, etc. Again, the rights associated with the press and with speech overlap 
with the scope of responsiveness, for example: if the government needs to meet the 
demands and wishes of its citizens, the latter have to be free to publicly express their 
views and to criticise the rulers, based on accurate, serious and reliable sources of 
information, because, otherwise, responsiveness would only be a façade. Nevertheless, 
this set of freedoms was moved to the more general dimension of civil rights; and, if 
responsiveness is perceived as the need for the elected to be aware of the real demands 
of their population in order to judge the convergence or divergence of their policies, the 
best indicators for this dimension are the electors’ opinions regarding the trust in those 
institutions. If they do trust in them, it means their needs and wishes have been met. 
Besides, for a government to answer to their citizens and to be able to make real 
decisions, it needs both stability and an effective capacity of implementing those 
decisions (two further indicators). 
Rule of law is a very broad field; in order to operationalise it, it was divided into 
two attributes: transparency and corruption, and the quality of the judicial system. Both 
attributes are fundamental for the concretisation of the rule of law and for binding the 
politicians and all the political institutions to the law in force; transparent institutions 
and corruption-free decision-making processes, together with an effective legal system 
that warrants independent and accessible courts are sine qua non conditions for this 
dimension. Separation of powers is traditionally linked to the rule of law, as well, but it 
was rather included in the horizontal accountability dimension, as the process of checks 
and balances allowed by that separation is a form of mutual control of the democratic 
institutions. In that sense, any interference in politics of extra-constitutional actors (the 
military, religion) that may harm the executive’s autonomy was included here.  
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Finally, vertical accountability is a field that somehow overlaps political rights, 
as both are tightly related to the more general concept of “electoral regime/rights”. 
However, the main distinction lies in the principles each of these dimensions is 
embedded in: political rights in equality and vertical accountability in control. This 
means that, while the former are more concerned with the equal conditions to accede to 
the electoral process in terms of being capable of competing for political positions, the 
latter focuses on the electoral act per se, i.e., if electoral participation entails main 
obstacles, if women are represented in the elected institutions and, more broadly 
speaking, if people can participate in demonstrations and petitions to exert some type of 
influence over the elected. 
In fact, these options may not be shared by everyone, as they imply an 
interpretation that can vary. However, it is crucial to find a compromise in order to 
achieve this challenging task of operationalising the concept. Thus, we have created this 
model to assess the evolution of democracy and the first two steps proposed by Munk 
(2009) are already complete: democracy was conceptualised and, based on that 
conceptualisation, its measurement was proposed having in mind a set of criteria to 
guarantee the geographic variety and the scientific quality such assessment should 
entail. The third and last stage is aggregation. As already mentioned, all the values 
provided by the about 80 indicators selected will be allocated at the dimensions’ level 
and not at the attribute’s, in order to simplify the reading of the results. It means that the 
unit of analysis is each of the eight dimensions attributed to the three main principles. It 
is likely, nevertheless, that the results may be aggregated at the principles’ level, but it 
will depend on the clearness of the final results and the possible need to make their 
reading more general to understand the bigger picture. 
Another important aspect to take into consideration is related to the 
transformation of the values; as each source opted for its own scale, and different scales 
are not able to be directly compared, those values will be converted in a 100 index in 
which 0 represents the lowest and worst scenario or quality or performance and, on the 
other side, 100 is the best score regarding that particular indicator. This may seem quite 
obvious, but there are indirectly proportional scales in which the opposite is true and 
that would make all the findings erroneous.  
This is just, however, the evaluation of a particular democracy – the one that 
will be applied to the Turkish case to assess its performance over the years. The next 
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fundamental step is to connect this evaluation with the influence or impact of an 
external actor whose aim is to give impetus to that performance in order to improve it. 
That will be task for next section. 
 
5.2. Assessing the EU as a democracy promoter 
 
 Analysing the influence of an international organisation on a domestic process 
involves taking into consideration the interaction of two different spheres that may seem 
to be evidently defined by more or less physical barriers. However, their influences and 
mutual interactions make it difficult to distinguish one from the other clearly. This 
endeavour of assessing to what extent a particular international organisation has an 
impact on a country’s democratic performance has been pursued and sought by several 
academics. These studies lack a systematic and somehow holist approach.  
 Before even proceeding with the possible ways of evaluating the external 
impact, it is worth making a break to reflect upon the concept of impact itself and to 
justify its employment. Ali Usul (2011: 69) describes its meaning as the “EU’s effect on 
a candidate sate’s domestic political regime as a result of the EU’s transformative effect 
or influence”. According to this view, impact is the “mirror image of compliance”. 
However, the utilisation of the word ‘impact’ in the context of this work is slightly 
different. In fact, it is closer to a maximalist understanding, as it includes the cultural 
shifts and the changes in mentalities and does not perceive this dynamic as 
unidirectional (Idem: 70). The author wisely writes that these cultural shifts take 
decades to be measures and that, therefore, only rule adoption and implementation are 
the indicators that allow the evaluation. Nonetheless, and despite the recognition of the 
length of mind-related changes, as it will be explained later, this work also constitutes 
an attempt to comprise this ideational side, in order to enrich the final conclusions.  
Contrary to Usul, the European Union and the pressure it exerts to promote 
democracy abroad is not only regarded as a mere external imposition, but also as a flow 
of suggestions, interchanges and mutual interactions that are frequently adopted by the 
recipient country after interpreting them and adapting then to their own context. In that 
sense, impact is not seen as an external imposition to which correspond a set of passive 
domestic changes; on the contrary, as sugar that is poured into water, not only the water 
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becomes sweeter, but, after the necessary time to solute and to be incorporated in the 
new context, the sugar is itself object of a transformation. 
 One of the most methodical models to assess that influence (or impact) is the 
one proposed by Magen and Morlino (2009), several times cited in this thesis. The 
EUCLIDA model recognises the primacy of the domestic sphere, but wants to 
understand the degree of influence of the European Union. For that purpose, it defines a 
set of three layers of impact, intermediate variables and attempts to isolate the influence 
of other international actors. In terms of research design, the creators of the model argue 
they pretended to develop a “qualitative empirical analysis, using structured, focused 
comparison of case studies” (Idem: 18). The strategy includes a first moment in which a 
detailed report is constructed for each country with economic, historical and political 
contexts, shorter-term indicators and international connections of the country; and a 
second step that is constituted by an exhaustive questionnaire, whose answers are 
required to be supported by reliable data. With these two steps, the idea is to ensure the 
same pattern is applied to every country that is object of this study. Understandably, the 
levels of impact, the rule of law dimensions and all the conceptualisation developed by 
Magen and Morlino are the framework that constrains all the study (Idem: 18-ff). 
Düzgit and Çarkoğlu (2009) apply the EUCLIDA model to study the EU’s influence on 
Turkey’s rule of law. This is a pretty complete model whose strength lies in its 
capability of being applied to different countries and of allowing the comparison 
between the different countries that are object to this study. Their conclusions will be 
compared to the results of our model at the end of the thesis. 
 Other authors, such as Müftüler-Baç (2005), opt for correlating domestic 
formal/legal changes with the EU’s criticisms or suggestions – although they ignore 
their implementation or internalisation. Açikmese (2010) and Usul (2011) choose a 
historical approach that analyses the evolution of Turkey-EU relations, its ups and 
downs, and subsequent transformations at the domestic level; this methodology usually 
divides broader time periods into smaller units and labels them according to the mood 
of the relations. Still, both of them prefer a focus on conditionality and the logic of 
consequences. Another possible approach focuses on specific issues – like Magen’s 
(2004) study: death penalty was selected as the case study to evaluate the EU’s 
influence. This choice was justified by the author due to the visibility of the subject 
(changing legal rules regarding the death penalty is easily observable) and because it 
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excludes one of the international influences Turkey usually counts on – the United 
States (that do not promote abolition, hence eliminating it as a potential external source 
of pressure).  
 Our proposal follows some of the previous examples, captures some of their 
suggestions and introduces some different options and is developed as follows. 
 The European Union is an international actor concerned with the spread of, 
transition to and consolidation of democracy among third countries – be them 
candidates, neighbours or simply partners. This concern is embedded in the wider 
concept of Europeanisation – already reflected upon on last chapter. As seen, to 
Europeanise means to embrace a set of principles, norms, ideas and structures typically 
European and, after their interpretation and adaptation, to internalise them in the 
domestic formal, legal, societal and cognitive structures. Among the several 
mechanisms that are used to make this engine work, and as already mentioned on 
Chapter 4, conditionality and socialisation are the ones that gather the widest support to 
be studied as the ones used by the Union to promote democracy abroad – besides, 
socialisation is far less complex to study academically when compared to emulation, for 
example. When covering up these two mechanisms, several dimensions or aspects of 
democracy promotion are included in the approach: conditionality incorporates the more 
formal, legal, material changes and interaction; whereas socialisation, despite more 
difficult to spot than the previous mechanism, widens the study to less formal, cognitive 
and ideational transformations. 
 Thus, any study about the European Union’s presence on a domestic 
environment needs to focus on these two mechanisms that require, therefore, to be 
operationalised. When dealing with conditionality, some specific phenomena have to be 
observed more carefully, such as money transfers, domestic legal reforms and relevant 
landmarks in the development of the relations with the democratising country (declaring 
the candidacy status or the opening of negotiations); whilst, when dealing with 
socialisation, the focus highlights more concrete and bottom-up projects that involve the 
population and promotes, at that level, the internalisation of the modifications 
introduced by the formal reforms. Furthermore, choosing these two mechanisms as the 
cornerstone of the external promotion of democracy implies the recognition of the 
impact at three different levels: macro, meso and micro. Conditionality and its formal 
changes operate at the state’s level (macro), while socialisation influences the meso-
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level of smaller units like specific communities, social segments or the society in 
general (meso). The both combined are able to set in motion alterations at the individual 
cognitive level that, due to their action, face changes in mentalities, opinions and 
identities (micro) – although truly difficult to be assessed, this latter level is the ultimate 
proof of democratic principles acceptance, internalisation and consolidation in a 
sustained way.  
 The dynamics that occur within each of these levels, as well as between them, 
are complex and, in some cases, particularly complicated to identify and evaluate. 
Nevertheless, our model associates the macro level with money transfers, legal reforms 
and rewards – the first two studied through a quantitative analysis and the latter through 
the interpretation of historical events. At the meso level, the number and strength of 
societal projects and programmes funded by the EU may constitute a valuable indicator 
of assessment, couple with the results and improvements that stem from them. Finally, 
the micro-level can only be perceived through the comparison of opinion surveys from 
different years, which include their statistical analysis and the interpretation of the 
meaning of the observed changes, achieved through an inductive approach; besides, all 
the interviews conducted in Turkey will reveal helpful to achieve some comprehension 
at this level. 
 
5.3. The model 
 
 Although, as mentioned previously, the task of operationalising democracy is 
not an easy one, assessing an external influence on a domestic set of variables is even 
more challenging, mainly because it implies correlating those two sets of 
conceptualisations and operationalisations. Besides, isolating the impact of an external 
actor in a globalised era in which countless transnational flows occur incessantly seems 
to be an impossible mission. Therefore, and to sum up the preceding sections, our model 
aims to bring a fresh, or at least a slightly different, approach to this not new problem, 
based on the contribution of several authors who devoted their efforts and knowledge to 
the issue, but also conveying new inputs and thoughts that seek to construct a systematic 
and replicable approach that points out the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
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European approach, as well as the current Turkish reception model, in order to improve 
both. 
 In fact, this is a very sensitive and prolific area of Europeanisation, within which 
the main objective is to find if there is a correlation between a set of independent and 
dependent variables. The dependent variable is the development (hopefully the 
improvement) of a candidate country’s democracy – in this case, Turkey’s democracy. 
The independent variables were selected in accordance with the two main mechanisms 
believed to be used by the European Union to influence a third country’s democratic 
performance (conditionality and socialisation). These two mechanisms, due to their 
major differences, operate at the three possible levels: macro (state), meso (society) and 
micro (individual). It is only in the conjugation of these echelons that one can truly 
assess the influence on the evolution of a democratisation process, since this involves a 
truly complex phenomenon – not only formal and visible changes are necessary, but 
also their implementation and internalisation by the population. 
 That assessment congregates two types of methodology (quantitative and 
qualitative) to follow up and be capable of embracing the comprehensiveness of the 
phenomenon. In that sense, the EU allocation of funds to Turkey (especially the ones 
directed to democracy), the reforms undertaken in the country, the positive and negative 
evolutions of the relations between the two, as well as the rewards and punishments that 
complete the process will be analysed. Furthermore, projects at the societal level and 
changes in opinions, perceptions and identities will be used to complete the whole 
approach and get the big picture. Simultaneously, other international and national actors 
have to be under our consideration, as they may (and certainly do) interfere in the whole 
process – contact with Turks, their experiences and perceptions are a valuable tool to 
isolate these variables, as well as keeping record of the donations the country receive 
from external entities to promote its democracy. 
 Nonetheless, this presence (as the independent variable) only matters if the 
outcome variable is also considered; thus, the above-mentioned indicators will be 
compared to and, possibly, correlated with the evolution of Turkey’s democracy in 
terms of its quality. This evaluation will be based on the reports and findings of several 
organisations that devote their efforts to accompany the ups and downs of 
democratising states, as presented in the first section of this chapter. Besides, all the 
quantitative data gathered from them will be analysed taking into consideration the 
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perspective of some other (qualitative) sources – and that means including progress 
reports, official documents, experts’ opinions and analysis, stakeholders’ positions 
regarding the theme, etc. The idea is to bring together in a time lime all the changes, 
reforms, programmes, money and historical events that marked the period between 1999 
and 2009 and, establishing a timeline, is possible to compare the democracy’s evolution 
with the other variables under study. 
 It is our true belief that only following all these steps and conjugating these 
variables through a serious and informed interpretation of the results and the findings 
will bring results that are closer to reality, in order to provide valuable conclusions. 
When does Turkey commit more efforts to improve its democracy? Is EU’s contribution 
fundamental, important or merely secondary? Does a more visible presence and 
pressure from Europe mean a more dedicated pursue of the democratic achievements? 
Does more money mean more legal changes? Are other international actors as essential 
as the EU in Turkey? Or is full membership the only goal that is worth pursuing? Or not 
that much anymore? These are some of the questions that inundate our mind when 
thinking about these phenomena and hopefully some of the ones that will have an 
answer after this thesis is completed. 
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PART III – THE CASE STUDY: TURKEY 
 
Part III has been divided into three chapters. However, Chapters 6 and 7 may 
seem redudant due to the overlapping time periods they encompass. Notwithstanding, 
the difference between both lies in the focus that is given in each chapter: Chapter 6 
adopts a domestic perspective to analyse the development of the construction of the 
country since the Ottoman Empire, whereas Chapter 7 emphasises Turkey’s dynamics 
in the light of its relationship with the West. Finally, Chapter 8 bypasses this historical 
analysis to provide the thesis with a socio-cultural profile, underlining concepts like 
identity and culture and their importance to a deeper understanding of the realities under 
study. 
 
6. The construction of Modern Turkey 
6.1. The Ottoman Empire 
 
 Turks were first recognised as a group of nomads among the tribe in Northeast 
China in the sixth century AD. However, the history of Turkey only begins with their 
migration from Mongolia and Central Asia to the Anatolian Peninsula some centuries 
later (around the tenth and eleventh centuries) (Mango, 2004: 15; Mango, 2005: 15; 
Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 15). Attracted by the wealth of the territory, this group of 
nomads settled in the Northwest of Anatolia and starts populating the peninsula 
(Mango, 2005: 15). Their spread, however, was constrained by the presence of the 
Byzantine Empire that used to control, in its apogee, all the Middle East (except Iran) 
(Quataert, 2000: 37). 
 During this migration movement, Turks have been influenced by various 
contacts they made, mainly with the Muslim world, getting in touch with Islam through 
Persian and Arab merchants and preachers. Their conversion triggered a new sense of 
expansion, headed to the West and encouraged by the fight against a Christian domain60 
(Mango, 2004: 16). In this context, an army led by the Seljuk ruler Alp Aslan defeated 
the Byzantine emperor Romanos IV Diogenes in 1071 and that “date marks the 
                                                          
60 It is important to remind that “Turks were originally animists” (Mango, 2004: 16). 
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beginning of the history of Turkey”, according to Andrew Mango (2004: 17). From this 
moment onwards, the movement of conquest progressively developed, in order to 
occupy the territory (Idem: 17). 
 When the warlord Osman declared independence from the Byzantine Empire, he 
was establishing the foundations of the new empire and attributed his own name to the 
new dynasty (Osmanlı). Osman was able to enlarge and expand through conquest 
(Mango, 2005: 15) and the 1435 fall of Constantinople at the hands of his descendant, 
Mehmet II, marked the extinction of an empire, the end of the Middle Ages and the 
birth of a new powerful empire in a new era. Thus, the expansion initiated in the 
thirteenth century was successful and able to reach three continents in its peak: South-
Eastern Europe, Asia and North Africa (Fernandes, 2005: 34, 35). As Quataert (2000: 
38) noted, “Byzantine Christian Anatolia, where Greek was the predominant language, 
transformed profound and inexorably, eventually becoming Muslim and adopting the 
Turkish language. 
 It is already possible to perceive how this empire was marked by the intersection 
of three different continents and their dissimilar civilisations. It combined a very diverse 
set of nationalities, ethnicities and creeds: “this civilisation was not only transnational; it 
was also trans-religious” (Kitsikis, 1985: 15). More interestingly, the Empire was 
inhabited by as many Christians as Muslims and the possible clash that may have arisen 
was mitigated by the creation of a synthesis that originated a neither Muslim nor 
Christian society, but essentially an Ottoman major group or identity (Idem: 15). 
Kitsikis (Idem: 18, 19) provides an example of this synthesis: in the 1839 Ottoman 
territory, there was no official language; besides, the Sultans recruited officers and 
ministers among the minorities of the empire (Albanians, Macedonians, Armenians, 
Greeks and Jews) (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 16, 17). The millet system also granted that 
minorities were not forced to convert; on the contrary, they enjoyed a certain degree of 
autonomy in terms of worship, legal and educational systems, etc. Greek and Orthodox, 
Armenians, Jews and Latin Christian were the four recognised millets (besides the 
Muslim majority), but several others have been included in the list during the nineteenth 
century (Idem: 18). 
 It is worth emphasising two aspects from this brief outline of the birth and 
development of the Ottoman Empire: first, its belligerent character. The establishment 
and survival of the empire was directly related to its capacity to defend itself from, and 
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to conquer the hostile neighbours. In fact, this perception of continuous external threat 
remained in the following centuries and the trust in the military to protect the country 
from foreign threats is a recollection of the unstable neighbourhood, but also of this 
heritage. Secondly, and despite this character marked by force, the co-habitation of 
several nations, ethnicities and religions has not been repressed in the sense of 
abolishing internal differences; on the contrary, the millet system recognised an 
important set of rights to each minority living in the empire. 
 What the elites have attempted to do, in a very clever way, was to unite all the 
different groups under a “supranational” identity, as Ottomans. This attempt worked at a 
certain extent, but in the unstable period of rising nationalisms it was not enough as it is 
going be explained further on. Nonetheless, in an era of clashes of civilisations and 
struggles between religions, the respect for minorities that could undermine the stability 
and cohesion of the empire was an exception: “for centuries, the minorities of the 
empire enjoyed more rights and legal protection than their congeners under the domain 
of the French King, for example” (Quataert, 2000: 202) – that is why the author 
considers inter-group relations in the Ottoman Empire fairly good in comparison to the 
patterns practiced at that time. 
In the nineteenth century, however, the Ottoman Empire was struggling to 
survive to the threats of Frenchs, Russians and Austrians. According to some authors, 
like Faucompret and Konings (2008: 1) and Mario Losano (2009: 11), the Ottomans’ 
awareness of the difficulties to survive to the pressure led them to believe that importing 
the European model would help improve their situation, as they considered the key of 
the European success and supremacy to lay on its military and economic models. Paul 
Dumont (1992: 459) stated that the reforms the empire undertook to get closer to the 
European patterns were an attempt to answer the question Sultans had been posing for 
very long: “how can we save the empire?”. Kitsikis (1985: 116), on the other hand, 
explains this approximation to Europe with the pressure the United Kingdom and 
France were exercising for the empire to create a constitutional regime. Burdy and 
Marcou (2008: 9) prefer to look at “that will to modernise [as] a form of obsession of 
the Ottoman ruling class”.  
Regardless of the reasons behind it, the truth is that the Ottoman Empire made a 
big effort to modernise having Europe as a model. Losano (2009: 11) wrote that the 
empire eruopeanised, using a concept that would be applied to Turkey only several 
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decades later. These changes were based on a couple of central ideas: administrative 
centralisation, modernisation of the state apparatus, westernisation of the society and 
secularisation (Dumont, 1992: 459). The reforms began with the Sultan Selim III 
around 1792, who copied the European military structures and who brought to the 
empire schools to teach the European science and techniques. This policy was 
interrupted by Mustafa IV (1807-1808) and resumed by his brother, Mahmud II (1808-
1839), who initiated the second phase of the process (Kitsikis, 1985: 112-ff). The 
reforms led by these Sultans were not as systematic and intense as the ones taken by his 
successors: Abdülmecid I (1839-1861) and Abdülaziz (1861-1876) ruled in the 
Tanzimat period (1839-1876), which constituted a structured and intensive attempt to 
modernise the Ottoman institutions and practices, aligning them with the European 
standards. The reforms aimed at the Armed Forces, central bureaucracy, taxes, 
education, judicial system, etc. (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 1) and were responsible 
for creating the first structures of a secular state, promoting a very unusual separation 
between politics and religion in Muslim countries (Fernandes, 2005: 36). 
Among the specific measures triggered by the Tanzimat edict, one can find the 
foundation of the Superior Council of Justice (1838) to prepare legislative texts and 
ensure their application, a new criminal code (inspired in the French model, 1848), the 
inauguration of schools for civil servants (1859), the abolition of censorship (1864), the 
institution of the Supreme Court of Justice (1868), a new Civil Code (also inspired by 
the French), the reorganisation of the military and of the judicial system (mainly 
guaranteeing equality before the Law), the creation of several ministries (in 1870, 
among others, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, of the Interior, Justice and Finances 
have been created), the secularisation of education, the reorganisation of provincial 
administration, etc. (Losano, 2009: 13, 14; Dumont, 1992: 473-484). 
All these changes and many others culminated in the proclamation of the first 
Ottoman Constitution in 1876 that, although only in force for two years, constituted an 
important mark in the westernisation and secularisation of the Ottoman state. At a 
certain extent, it also meant the first signals of an incipient democracy. As written on 
Chapter 3, in order to move from an autocratic to a democratic regime, some changes 
need to be made and the obstacles that hampered democratisation have to be removed. 
This is an example of how there has been an attempt to modernise the regime as an 
incipient and early form of transition.  
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At the end of the nineteenth century, the reforms have approximated the 
Ottoman Empire to the European states, and the real power had been, after the process, 
transferred from some specific social groups, like the military elite, the uleman, the 
mufti or the sheiks to a secular state bureaucracy (Fernandes, 2005: 37). This author, 
however, is very critical regarding the results of Tanzimat, as he concludes that, 
although ruling elites had become closer to the European patterns, the Muslim 
population, in general, remained attached to its past, creating a kind of time gap – they 
were still in the pre-Modern era (Idem: 37). Mario Losano (2009: 12) adopts a more 
optimistic stance and considers that these reforms launched the foundations for the 
reforms taken during the Republic. Nevertheless, he recognises that these “reforms are 
presented as a compromise with tradition and not as a rupture with it. Their architecture 
and their hesitant execution led the empire to ruin” (Idem: 12). Thus, and combining 
both reflections, one may conclude that the empire’s intention to be Europeanised 
succeeded in the sense that it accommodated several new institutions and laws, 
important to modernise the state. Moreover, as Losano (2009: 12) and Burdy and 
Marcou (2008: 21) add, these reforms were also key for future modernisation phases, 
namely under the Young Turks movement61 or Mustafa Kemal’s reconstruction of the 
Turkish identity. In terms of saving the empire from collapse, nonetheless, they did not 
succeed, as it only lasted for less than half a century. 
The decline of the Ottoman Empire is the result, as in any other complex 
phenomenon, of a set of reasons and contexts. Although it may have been considered 
“one of the most powerful [empire] of the globe” in the fifteenth century (Quataert, 
2000: 100), three hundred years later, it was the “sick man of Europe” (Idem: 100). In 
1878, the Congress of Berlin resulted in the reduction of the European territories of the 
Ottoman Empire; besides, the social agitation and the economic crisis of the epoch led 
the Sultan to be on constant alert for fearing coup attempts. In that context, Abulhamid 
II (1876-1909) increased his absolutist position, strengthened censorship and repression, 
namely against the Armenians (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 21). This undemocratic move 
also included the dissolution of the Parliament, justified by the Sultan as due to the 
threat of Christian Ottomans’ nationalist ideologies (Mango, 2005: 16). In fact, and 
despite (or maybe because of) the empire’s openness in terms of nationalities, they 
ended up being one of the reasons behind its collapse. The nineteenth century faced a 
                                                          
61 Further details can be found below. 
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considerable degree of instability, cause by internal upheavals and the violence between 
different communities – not to mention the territorial losses and the external threats 
(Quataert, 2000: 77-82). Burdy and Marcou (2008: 18) also point out the nationalist 
claims of non-Muslim minorities – encouraged and supported by European powers – as 
one of the reasons for the empire’s decline. The lack of a strong army also made iti 
difficult to control this unstable context (Idem: 17). The millet system revealed to have 
harmed the empire’s unity, because the citizens were, according to the same authors, 
more tightly linked, in identity terms, to their communities rather than to the Sultan and 
the Ottoman Empire (Idem: 18). In the century of raising nationalists, that was fatal. 
Furthermore, the attacks against the Ottoman Armenians “were unparalleled” 
(Quataert, 2000: 214). Several massacres during the last years of the nineteenth century 
and the beginning of the following one originated the deportation to Syrian deserts and 
the killing of thousands of Armenians (Idem: 215) – still today a very sensitive issue in 
turkey. Also due to this violent approach, Europeans reinforced their negative 
perceptions on the Ottomans as the “barbarians” (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 17). 
However, a small group within the Ottoman elite started to voice their discontent 
regarding the authoritative character of the Tanzimat reforms, as well as their opposition 
to the Sultan’s despotism. Those were the above mentioned Young Turks, who, basing 
their ideology and action on the Comtean Positivsm, the European nationalisms and 
presenting a programme very close to the French Revolution’s outline, claimed for the 
return of the Constitution and to the democratisation of the perishing empire (Idem: 22; 
Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 1; Kitsikis, 1985: 118; Losano, 2009: 14). Even though 
within the Young Turks’ movement was possible to find some divergences, namely 
between a more pro-Western and a pro-Islamic wings, they started to attack the Sultan 
using leaflets and newspapers and, in 1908, they surprised the regime with a revolution 
that replaced the Sultan by his brother – this was known as the “French Revolution of 
the East” (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 23). This example illustrates some of the theoretical 
considerations made on Chapter 3 concerning the importance of elites (and civil society) 
for promoting transition. Besides, the broader context in which the Ottoman Empir was 
embedded in also empitomises that the structural environment is an important variable 
to take into consideration when studying democratic transitions. 
This revolution brought several transformations, such as the freedom of reunion 
and an increase in the number of parties and associations, not without the opposition of 
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the more conservative sectors of society, which were defeated by the military (Losano, 
2009: 16). The installed regime pursued a modernisation and westernisation agenda, 
recovering what had been the first steps in this direction, in terms of schooling, 
secularism, etc.  “The Young Turks prepared thus the terrain for several of the further 
Kemalist reforms. But the internal tensions and the ongoing territorial losses quickly put 
an end to the period of freedom” (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 24), originating a phase of 
quasi-dictatorship. In 1913, the military intervened and led a coup that seized the real 
power from the Sultan, handling it to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, 
İttihat ve Terakki Cemiveti, Young Turks’ party) (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 2). As 
Losano (2009: 16) wrote, the Sultan lived in a type of internal exile, as the one in 
charged was a military – Şevket – and this event is considered by the same author as the 
beginning of the military tendency to act as guardians of the Constitution, even though 
this coup and the exercise of power were everything but constitutional. However, still in 
the same year, Şevket is murdered and freedoms are affected, namely through the 
prohibition of parties and associations. Yet, reforms continued; the power of madrassas 
was diminished and Arab and Persian words were replaced by Turkish, as the prior 
came from the Islamic law and the military were decided to continue the incipient 
process of secularism (Idem: 16). 
The following year brings the First World War. The Ottoman Empire aligned 
with the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy in the hop of revenging 
the territorial losses and the diplomatic humiliations it had undergone in the decades 
before the war (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 25; Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 2). For the 
Ottomans, the conflict also entailed a religious connotation of a jihad as the enemies 
were accused of oppressing Muslims (Losano, 2009: 17). Nevertheless, they could not 
avoid the defeat and its consequences: further territorial losses, the birth of the 
Armenian state, Greece’s territorial expansion, President Wilson’s willingness to 
attribute the autonomy to Kurds, the demand for the proportional representation of the 
minorities and a strong setback in the empire’s sovereignty. Besides, as the German and 
Austrian advisors were expelled, it also meant increasing the distance from Europe 
(Losano, 2009: 17, 18; Fernandes, 2005: 41). These (and other) provisions figured in the 
Sèvres Treaty, which now gives name to the syndrome some authors (like Kubicek, 
2007: 371) attribute to Turks: the Sèvres syndrome is basically the fear of 
dismemberment of the country, as it happened with the empire. 
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Notwithstanding, in the post-war, the Allies could not agree on the division of 
the territory among them and Greece invaded Turkey, which ironically may be seen as a 
first step towards the construction of modern Turkey, if one takes into consideration that 
the Greek defeat paves the way for new treaties, new conditions and for a fresh and 
enthusiastic population, grateful to one of the most important persons for this revenge: 
Mustafa Kemal. 
 
6.2. The birth of Modern Turkey 
 6.2.1. Kemal and Kemalism 
 
The War of Independence, as it is known in Turkish historiography, began in 
1919 and lasted for three years with the military operations being led by Kemal. But it 
was not only the military operations that mattered for the success in the conflict; 
Mustafa Kemal also played a very wise diplomatic game with the Greece’s allies: he 
signed in 1921 friendship or peace treaties with Russia, France, Italy and the UK. Being 
aware of the Italian discontent with the Sèvres Treaty, of the English lack of public 
support for another armed conflict or even the French lack of interest in the territories in 
dispute, he was able to isolate Greece and succeed (Fernandes, 2005: 42-43). 
This conflict was of major importance for Turkey, as it was, at the same time, a 
way to become independent from the European powers, a jihad against Greeks and 
Armenians and also a civil war between several remaining Ottoman factions (Idem: 42-
45). The war created a certain degree of national unity (getting together Turks and 
Kurds, for example) and it meant the transition from a multi-nationalist empire to a 
Muslim nation-state (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 30), due to the population exchange that 
occurred between Turkey and Greece: 500 000 Muslim Turks were exchanged for 1,5 
million Greek Orthodox and the rate of Muslims in Anatolia increased from 80 to 98% 
(Idem: 30). This exchange was one of the provisions of the new Lausanne Treaty that 
replaced the out-dated Sèvres Treaty, signed in 1923. 
As mentioned above, Mustafa Kemal played a very important role in several 
fronts of this conflict. First, he was in charge of the military operations; second, he used 
the Allies’ division in his favour and played a clever diplomatic game. As Mango 
(2005: 17) explains,  
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“he persuaded the Allies to evacuate Istanbul, the Straits and Turkish 
Eastern Thrace without a fight, and after arduous negotiations he 
secured the international recognition of a fully independent Turkish 
state within the borders still held by the Ottoman troops when the First 
World War ended in November 1918”. 
Psychologically and socially speaking, Mustafa Kemal was also capable of 
channelling the Turkish anger against the European powers in general and the Sèvres 
Treaty in particular against the Greeks when they tried to occupy Izmir (Faucompret & 
Konings, 2008: 3). Fourth, the Turkish leader was responsible for shaping the new 
identity of Turks and the features of this newly established regime, as soon as he 
entered in its political life. 
 
In the 29th of October 1923 the Republic of Turkey is proclaimed by the Grand 
National Assembly, but this institution was not born in this moment. In fact, its 
existence dates back to the beginning of the 1920s. When Turkey and Greece begin the 
war, the situation of the empire was truly difficult and Mustafa Kemal convenes a 
national congress in which he declares that if the government was not able to maintain 
national unity, then it should be replaced by a revolutionary one. In response, the sultan 
leads some changes, but these are perceived as insufficient, and the signature of the 
Sèvres Treaty worsens the situation. In this scenario, is created the Grand National 
Assembly (April, 1920) in Ankara, the new capital of the state, in defiance of the 
sultan’s authority. This institution declared itself as the only representative of the 
Turkish people and of national sovereignty and nominates Kemal as its President. The 
sultan sends loyal troops to Ankara, but this brief civil war is won by Kemal’s military 
body, strengthening this new establishment with more legitimacy. Nevertheless, until 
the international successes of the new regime and the new Treaty, the Turkish state lives 
in a dual system in terms of power – the sultan in Istanbul and Kemal in Ankara 
(Losano, 2009: 24-25). It is interesting that the new political centre chooses this city as 
the new capital; Burdy and Marcou (2008: 39) believe this is due to the centrality of its 
geographical location, as well as the lack of mixed cultural and other influences, in 
opposition to what happened (and still happens) in Istanbul. Mango (2004: 21) adds the 
geostrategic position of Ankara as a safe place, protected from the Allies’ warships. 
Kemal’s actions towards the establishment of a Republic can be considered another 
attempt to democratisat the regime, even though his means cannot be considered 
democratic. This situation reminds some theoretical aspects discussed on Chapter 3, 
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namely (again) the relevance of the role played by elites, the type of previous regimes 
and how difficult it was to shift mentalities towards a more democratic mindset. It also 
reveals that there was lacking a democratic culture among Turkish citizens and that the 
weak levels of education were also hampering the process. 
The young Republic, with new institutions, a new capital and possibly with a 
new ideology, was however still a “Third World country with a First World elite of 
administrators inherited from the Ottoman Empire” (Mango, 2005: 18), a very poor and 
illiterate country that needed to be rebuilt from its deepest foundations. In order to 
accomplish that, Turkey’s first President, Mustafa Kemal, established a “rational 
government” (Idem: 17) based on a new political party – the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP, Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi) –, whose premise was that only one civilisation 
represents the material and moral progress of humanity (Idem: 18) and that was the 
Western civilisation. Inspired in the French Revolution, the technical-scientific 
European rationality and in rupture with the Ottoman heritage in all the fields62 
(Fernandes, 2005: 48), the doctrine developed by Kemal – the Kemalism – oriented the 
action of the party and all his followers. The doctrine is based on six main pillars: 
reformism, secularism, republicanism, nationalism, populism and statism (Idem: 48); as 
it is visible, democracy did not figure among these core values of Kemalism and it 
allows to foresee how democratic values were supplanted in the name of the other 
principles. Thus, several changes needed to occur so that the country Kemal found when 
he came to power would become the one he had dreamt of.  
A new constitution was adopted in 1924 and several reforms were already 
introduced in that document inspired in the Western models. New civil and penal codes 
were approved (1926), also following the European examples – the Swiss and the 
Italian, respectively. Women’s rights were improved, for instance, and in 1930 they 
were allowed to vote in local elections.  Secularism was one of the pillars of Kemalism 
and one of the areas of more intensive changes – although José Teixeira Fernandes 
(2005: 39) believes that Kemal was more inspired by the French laicism with some 
secularist nuances63. In that respect, several measures were taken: the caliphate was 
abolished (1924), religious courts were closed (1924), all Muslim institutions became 
                                                          
62 Burdy and Marcou (2008: 33) argue that it was also inspired by the USSR and Italian fascism. 
63 For further details on the differences between secularism and laicism, Cf, for example, Fernandes, 
2005: 39. In this work, as the Kemalist doctrine chose “secularism” for one of its pillars, that is the word 
that will be used for meaning the separation between politics and religion or the primacy of politics over 
religion. 
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subject to the state’s control (1924), the reference to Islam was removed from the 
constitution and the call to prayer was mandatorily in Turkish (1932). Besides, citizens 
were dissuaded to wear headscarves; on the contrary, they were encouraged to wear 
Western-type clothing. In fact, long beards were forbidden in public buildings for being 
considered religious manifestations. In line with the European practices, the adoption of 
surnames became mandatory (1934) and that is when Mustafa Kemal is attributed the 
surname of Atatürk (meaning the Father of the Turks).  
In the cultural and scientific fields, and in line with the identity changes the 
Turkish President pursued, the Latin alphabet was introduced (1928), the Society of 
Turkish History was created to write (or re-write) the national history and the Society of 
Turkish Language was established with the aim of purifying the language from Persian 
or Arab influences that derived from Islamic Law64. Learning Arab and Persian at the 
university level was forbidden, following the same line of reasoning. Furthermore, the 
first census of the population occurred in 1927 and concluded that there were 14 million 
Turkish citizens; the European calendar was introduced (1925), polygamy was 
forbidden and women became entitled to ask for the divorce.65  
These are just some of the many examples of measures and reforms undertaken 
by the Parliament. However, as it is easily deduced, such changes must not have been 
straightforwardly introduced or imposed in the citizens’ lives; they were achieved 
because of a set of conditions that created the ideal momentum for them, such as 
Atatürk’s internal and external prestige (Fernandes, 2005: 49). And as it was not 
enough, the opposition was suppressed and the Grand Assembly enjoyed a very high 
degree of power, naturally controlled by the President (Mango, 2005: 19). Besides, 
pseudo-scientific studies allied with the idealisation and mythologizing of Turkish 
history, for example, worked as a strong propaganda tool to shape the Turks’ 
consciousness and a feeling of Turkishness, supported and reinforced by a “Father 
state”, populist and threatening. As Fernandes (2005: 50) analyses, legitimating the 
Turkish identity was a very difficult task; even legitimating historically the Republic in 
the Anatolian territory was not easy. Turkish identity, that was intended to be purified 
                                                          
64 Professor Losano noticed that this linguistic depuration was juridically relevant as it tried to find 
Turkish words that express the new juridical institutions imported from Europe through the replacement 
of Arabic. 
65 The changes and reforms presented in the previous chapters were assembled from different authors:  
Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 39-44; Fernandes, 2005: 48-49; Losano, 2009: 26-28; Mango, 2004: 21-22; 
Mango, 2005: 18. 
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(as with the language), was the result of a varied set of influences and could not be 
based on language or religion or the territory, as all of these criteria would raise other 
questions. Therefore, some historical discoveries were “incorporated and developed by 
Kemalist historiography, anxious to inculcate a Turkish national identity in its 
population” (Idem: 53).  
These efforts aimed to replace the Ottoman multinational feature and, for that 
reason, there was even a pecuniary penalty to those who used any other language but 
Turkish. In addition, European teachers were hired to accelerate Europeanisation 
(Losano, 2009: 22) – therefore, these endeavours to create a new identity (and a new 
Turkey, after all) were also aligned with and following a strong aspiration to approach it 
with the European models and standards. Ironically, this process was being developed 
with no regard what so ever for the European democratic practices. Burdy and Marcou 
(2008: 34-35) assess these modernisation efforts as follows: 
“Kemalism (...) is a form of enlightened despotism in the classic 
meaning of the expression: modernisation is carried out proactively 
and authoritatively. The Republic is not synonymous with liberal 
democracy. (...) Kemal is too authoritarian to tolerate a true political 
opposition within a democratic system.”  
On the other hand, Mario Losano (2009: 26) adopts a less critical position 
regarding the efforts of Atatürk, as, according to this author, the Turkish leader “cannot 
be placed at the side of the tyrants that devastated Europe in the twentieth century” if 
the political tradition of Turkey is taken into consideration and the fact that he was “an 
autocrat, but not a tyrant: because his power was not illegitimate or violent; because he 
was more of a ‘sui generis prince’ than an ‘anti-prince’” (Idem: 26). 
On the whole, this first phase of modern Turkey was a truly important period in 
Turkey’s history – not only in formal aspects and legal changes, but also as it meant a 
tangible twist in the development of the state. And although it is not possible it to talk 
about a political culture in the country, some of its seeds may be believed to be thrown 
at this moment. As a matter of fact, in terms of democratic achievements, one cannot 
claim that Turkey has developed a lot during these first years: it was a top-down 
approach, the Constitution did not foresee institutional balances and the country looked 
more like a single-party system; but, on the other hand, it is not possible to ignore the 
improvements in terms of the citizens’ real lives: the introduction of the Western 
clothing style meant the end of the visibility of social differences and Turkey was a 
 
175 
 
completely transformed country by the time Atatürk died, in 1938, and is replaced by 
İsmet İnönü. 
The conclusions about this process that lasted for more than a decade are 
controversial. For example, Burdy and Marcou (2008: 33) distinguish Kemalism from a 
“revolutionary rupture”, as it was, according to the authors, the continuation of the 
willingness to modernise began with the Ottoman elites. Rupture with the past or not, 
the truth is that “between 1925 and 1935, the Turkish society was transformed from its 
roots. And it was transformed in the European sense” Losano (2009: 26). However, 
these transformations could not be achieved within a democratic framework –  
“as they [Turks] waited for democracy, the Turkish people benefited 
from rational government (...). Atatürk’s policy brought peace to 
Turkey and laid the foundations of progress (...). It is hard to imagine 
them [the reforms] winning approval in a popular referendum” 
(Mango, 2004: 22).  
Interestingly, this poses another problem concerning the democratic validity of 
the reforms. The paradox lies in this confusing relation between the non-democratic 
imposition of norms, rules and practices in order to approach the democratic standards 
of (Western) modern societies. It raises doubts about the deepness and solidity of the 
measures in the citizens’ practices and, mainly, minds. The consequences of this strange 
relationship flourish in the following decades – aspiring to reach the Western standards 
of democracy with non-conventional (and non-democratic) tools or mechanisms. This 
paradox began with the establishment of a Republic with a single-party system (only 
interrupted very briefly by an authorised opposition that was very quickly eliminated) 
and will continue in the country’s history for several decades – and the military 
interventions in the second half of the twentieth century illustrate that very well, as it 
will be further explained.  
 “It was within this firm framework of a hierarchical state which was an 
amalgam of French republicanism and Ottoman authoritarianism that the Muslim 
inhabitants of Turkey were moulded into a Turkish nation made up of citizens equal 
before the law, but manifestly unequal in wealth, educational attainment, lifestyle and 
access to power” (Idem: 26). 
However, one may wonder whether there was an alternative: Turkey was the 
sick man of the Bosphorus and  
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“Kemal Atatürk’s therapy gave [him] back some health (...) and 
accompanied him in the early stages of recovery. That therapy 
consisted of an autocratic government with some of the seeds for 
democracy in the future, which developed not without difficulty. It 
could not be otherwise, because five centuries of theocratic despotism 
could not be replaced overnight by a European-type of democracy. (...) 
it was necessary a gradual transition from a ‘dictadura’ to a 
‘dictablanda’” (Idem: 26, 67). 
History and time will judge the alternatives that could have been used, but it 
seems rather certain that not even the seeds of democracy would have been thrown 
unless these “revolution/continuation” policies were not applied in a perishing Turkish 
state. 
 
6.2.2. The Second World War 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk dies in 1938 and is replaced by İsmet İnönü. Despite the 
set of reforms initiated by his predecessor, İnönü did not find the most appropriate 
environment when he came to power to pursue with such an intensive pace of reforms 
due to the Second World War and the subsequent unstable post-war period. President 
İnönü used to be Kemal’s military subordinate, his Prime-Minister and, despite his 
dismissal, a man upon whom Atatürk relied. Known abroad as “Mr. No”, İsmet İnönü’s 
top priority was to maintain the achievements of his predecessor (Mango, 2004: 27). 
Concerning the world conflict, İnönü adopted a neutral position (Faucompret & 
Konings, 2008: 6) – at least in the beginning of the conflict – despite the United 
Kingdom’s and Germany’s requests for aligning with each of them. Between 1939 and 
1941, Turkey signed a set of trade and non-aggression agreements with Britain, France, 
USRR and Germany (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 87). Besides, the earthquake of the late 
1930s and its human and physical destruction, together with serious economic problems 
(Mango, 2004: 30-31), were major reasons for making İnönü less prone to enter the war. 
Nevertheless, keeping neutrality was almost impossible in a disputed world mainly after 
the Soviets cancel the Soviet-Turkish alliance of 1929, so that they could recover some 
former territories now under the Turkish control. The recent republic had no alternative 
but to turn itself towards the USA (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 88-89). 
In this context, Turkey declares war to Germany and Japan in 1945, “in order to 
be able to participate in the Conference of San Francisco, founder of the United 
Nations” (Idem: 89). Furthermore, it begins a period marked by the membership of 
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several Western institutions, such as the World Bank (1947), the International Monetary 
Fund (1947), the Council of Europe (1949), NATO (1952) and the OECD (1961). Also 
very important for determining Turkey’s next steps was the acceptance of the support 
provided by the Truman Doctrine to contain Communism (Idem: 89; Mango, 2004: 38).  
Despite de success of İnönü’s external policy – “[he] had lost nothing through 
his policy in the world war”, on the contrary he gained the Western support and 
independence, his country was not destroyed by war, etc. (Mango, 2004: 38) – the 
assessment of his domestic policies are not so consensual. In 1932, a law limited the 
foreigners’ freedom to exercise several professions; in 1942, a ten-time higher tax was 
applied to non-Muslim businessmen and those unable to pay it were sent to labour 
camps. Consequently, half of the Jewish population in the country had emigrated to 
Israel by 1948 (Idem: 33). On the other hand, it was also İnönü who promoted the 
establishment of an institution to translate and publish classics of world literature, as 
well as he created institutes to train young people to spread skills in rural areas (Idem: 
35). In terms of democratic advancement in the country, the President was responsible 
for allowing the creation of political parties and implementing the multi-party system in 
1946 (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 89).  
Isabel David (2012: 140-145) brings other important aspects of İnönü’s domestic 
policies. For example, in spite of the President’s personal beliefs and religiously 
devoted practices, he kept faithful to the secularist principle of the Kemalist doctrine. 
Nevertheless, there was a wider openness to religious aspects, such as it is perceived by 
the introduction of optional religious education. This and other similar measures were 
criticised by Republican intellectuals who saw it as a violation of Kemalist principles 
and, in fact, the religious feeling re-emerged in the country, which translated into a 
wider spread religious education and the establishment of more religious orders and 
parties, to name a few. In what comes to democratising efforts, the author still 
highlights the less severe censorship, the increasing of the autonomy of universities, 
paid holidays, advantages or protection in motherhood, the permission for trade unions 
to be created, changes in legislation to make it more difficult for the executive to close 
newspapers, etc. (Idem: 143-145). 
Thus, İsmet İnönü was a controversial ruler whose decisions did not please all 
the sectors of the Turkish society. He weakened the ethnic and cultural diversity of the 
country with discriminatory measures at the same time he reinforced the Muslim 
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mercantile class. Besides, his religious policies revealed his personal preferences and re-
introduced in the country the feeling of belonging to the wider community of Islam, 
despite his attempt to respect and maintain the legacy of his secularist predecessor. On 
the other hand, however, İnönü accomplished some important changes in the democratic 
landscape of Turkey – something Atatürk was not able to: to allow political opposition, 
to diminish the strength of censorship and to permit the existence of trade unions and 
more rights to the workers. The seeds of democracy seemed to be starting to grow, 
slowly. 
Yet, the context in which the second President of Turkey operated was not a 
particularly easy one, as he followed a very charismatic and popular leader, the founder 
of the Republic, and, at the same time, as he had to protect the country’s autonomy, 
safety and interests in a very unstable world, with hostile neighbours and enemies in an 
extremely violent conflict. And when this conflict ends, the following period of the 
Cold War will shape very strongly the country’s relations with the rest of the world and 
its own future. 
 
6.3. Turkey in the Post World War II 
 6.3.1. The Cold War 
After the Second World War, Turkey has good economic indicators (balanced 
budget, surplus in the foreign trade, etc.), but its citizens lived in very bad conditions 
with the subsequent discontent, which was controlled by the single party of the country, 
very rigid with strikes and demonstrations – that were simply forbidden (Mango, 2004: 
39).  
The introduction of the multi-party system in 1946 was an important step 
towards the improvement and europeanisation of Turkish democracy. It is also a signal 
of democratic transition since, until then, it would be difficult to talk about a democratic 
regime (cf. Chapter 3). Nonetheless, it also meant an open door to nationalist and 
Islamic non-democratic parties (Losano, 2009: 40) that wanted to reach powerful 
positions in an “attempt to deconstruct secularism” (Fernandes, 2005: 59). The elections 
held in that same confronted the party in power, the CHP, and a recently created centre-
right party, the Democratic Party (DP). According to Isabel David (2012: 147, 148), the 
differences between the two political parties were not very significant; both wanted a 
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modern Turkey. The difference lied in the way to achieve it: for Democrats, Kemalism 
was seen as a flexible ideology and should be interpreted according to the 
circumstances, for example, replacing statism by free enterprise. The DP also demanded 
more democratic practices in the Turkish political life.  
In the 1946 elections, there were accusations of fraud due to the secret counting 
of the votes – allegedly, the Republicans won 400 seats and DP conquered 40 seats in 
the Assembly (Idem: 43). As Mango (Idem: 43) wrote, “civilizes politics had been 
short-lived”: İnönü was re-elected, despite the DP’s attempt to contest the results. 
However, the already not good economic situation of the country started to worsen. It is 
in this framework that Turkey accepts the Marshall plan’s help and becomes an OECD 
member, having received, by 1950, around 200 million dollars in American aid (Idem: 
44).  
Bowing to internal and external pressures, the electoral law was amended and 
the vote counting became open to public scrutiny.  The 1950 elections were the first 
really democratic suffrage in the country and brought a volte-face in the distribution of 
seats in the Parliament: Democrats won 408 seats and the Republicans only 69 (Idem: 
45).66 This change meant not only a new political distribution, but also the first time the 
democratic character of the Republicans, as well as, their role as an opposition party 
was put to test. Moreover, it also implied a modification of the social profile of 
Turkey’s rulers – they were not a bureaucratic elite anymore, but from other social 
groups and included lawyers and businessmen, for example, seen as closer to the 
common citizens and their needs (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 48). These results were 
perceived in the rest of the world as “a sign of the soundness of the foundations laid by 
Atatürk and a proof of Turkey’s maturity” (Mango, 2004: 45). Whether that democratic 
maturity was real or not, the truth is that Turks finally were allowed to freely express 
their wishes in terms of political choice that was actually respected. 
Fernandes (2005: 60) wrote that this new political era began a “counter-
revolution” led by the Democratic Party since 1950. In fact, some symbolic measures 
were rapidly taken by the new government led by the Prime-Minister Adnan Menderes: 
they re-introduced Arab in the call to prayer, public schools provided religious teaching, 
                                                          
66 Andrew Mango (2004: 45) tells an interesting short story about this victory: “It is said that when the 
results came in, a leading general came to İnönü and asked him whether the army should intervene to 
prevent a change of government, and that İnönü refused”. 
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banks were re-privatised, among others (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 49). Moreover, as the 
power was concentrated in the Grand National Assembly since the 1924 Constitution 
and given the absolute majority won by the DP, Menderes ruled in a dictatorship of the 
majority (Mango, 2005: 19-20), disregarding the role of the opposition party – even 
though they had previously, as the opposition party, claimed for more democracy. 
With ruinous policies in the economic field that worsened an already difficult 
situation in four years, the government, in order to ensure its re-election, starts to adopt 
a set of undemocratic and populist measures: they limit the opposition’s rights, diminish 
the freedom of the press and the independence of the judiciary, appeal to religious 
feelings and were able, in this fashion, to win the 1954 and the 1958 elections – the first 
with an absolute majority, but the second with a relative majority only. Both suffrages 
concerned the international observers for alleged frauds. And they may have been 
achieved because the government hid the gravity of the economic situation through an 
inflationary public spending (Idem: 20; Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 49-50; Faucompret & 
Konings, 2008: 8; Mango, 2004: 51). Burdy and Marcou (2008: 50) synthesise:  
“the errors of the ‘democratic decade’ (1950-1960) bring to light the 
difficulty of the Turkish political system to accept the mutual respect 
and the moderation necessary to the functioning of a pluralist regime 
that assumes alternation. The Democratic Party gradually began to 
behave like a single party, applying to the opposition and the press the 
treatment itself experienced before it came to power”. 
Thus, as the Turkish context at the end of the 1950s was so critical in several 
domains, elites and students were becoming increasingly unsatisfied. The students’ lack 
satisfaction reflected in manifestations that were suppressed by the military under the 
orders of the government. This action against the demonstrators and the general 
repressive environment, coupled with military’s discontent with the erosion of the 
founding principles of the Turkish Republic (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 8), led to 
the first military coup d’état in modern Turkey in May, 1960. This intervention, 
although aiming to safeguard democracy and end corruption, was rather violent and 
ended up with the death penalty of the dismissed Prime-Minister and two of his 
ministers after an eleven-month trial that also included over 400 long imprisonment 
sentences (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 50; Mango, 2004: 53). 
After Mustafa Kemal’s death, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) reinforced their 
perception as guardians of the Turkish Republic and the Kemalist principles; and they 
used this argument to legitimise their political involvement, although Atatürk had 
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proclaimed that “…all officers wishing to remain in the Party must resign from the 
Army. We must adopt a law forbidding all future officers having political affiliations” 
(Atatürk cited in Brown, 1987: 235). Despite this wish of their ideological leader, a 
decade of abuses against the Kemalist doctrine spoke louder and originated the 
intervention. Adopting a new more liberal Constitution and founding the II Republic 
were among the military’s objectives and they achieved it. Menderes was removed from 
power, a new (and liberal) Constitution that reduced the excessive authority of the 
Assembly was approved in the next year and this involvement of the military was 
supported by the majority of the educated public opinion (Mango, 2005: 20). Not only 
at home, but also from abroad, the military rule was not disputed (Mango, 2004: 57) 
and, since that moment, the TAF realised how powerful they were.  
The 1961 Constitution, despite being a military’s project, was approved in 
referendum by 61,7% of the voters. In the one that was considered the most liberal 
Turkish Constitution, article 2 stated that the country should be ruled based on its 
nationalist, democratic and secular features, in accordance with the principle of rule of 
law and human rights. It also determined Turkish as the official language; it foresaw 
every citizen’s equality before the law and forbade the use of religion for political 
purposes. Moreover, the right to strike, to collective negotiations, as well as the 
proportional representation at the Grand National Assembly were introduced in this new 
document that approached Turkey to its Western European counterparts. The idea was 
to avoid another situation of abuse of power and it revealed some concerns regarding a 
social state (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 8-10; Mango, 2004: 58). 
Nevertheless, the approval of the Constitution had at least one unexpected 
consequence: it was followed by a set of weak coalitions whose action was rather 
limited by the new establishment. The first elections held after the military give the 
power back to civilians, in 1973, were an example. Ecevit’s CHP granted only 37% of 
the votes, which did not enable the party to rule alone, but in a coalition with Erbakan’s 
Islamist party, the MSP (Millî Selâmet Partisi, National Salvation Party) (Burdy & 
Marcou, 2008: 52; Mango, 2004: 59). There was a new party structure that tended to 
reflect more accurately the population’s claims, but which caused a high degree of 
political fragmentation (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 51). The new Justice Party (AP, Adalet 
Partisi) succeeded the DP and its leader, Süleyman Demirel, was a very popular 
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politician who was able to win the 1965 and the 1969 elections – the first with an 
absolute majority (Mango, 2004: 64-66). 
In the social and economic fields, the 1960s were a very prolific decade. 
Economic growth and urbanisation promoted several social reforms and improvements, 
but there was also domestic instability caused by leftist movements inspired in the 
Soviets. In 1968, the Turkish students imported the radicalism that was occurring in 
Western Europe and caused some disturbance in their manifestations and quest for the 
answers to the capitalism/socialism debate (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 11; Mango, 
2004: 67; Mango, 2005: 21). All this instability and the imminence of violence started 
to concern the military that issued a memorandum to President Sunay demanding a 
strong government. This constituted an attempt to make Demirel resign, what actually 
happened; afterwards, the Armed Forces install a technocratic government more or less 
visibly controlled by them and dissolve two parties (an Islamic and a communist), 
beginning in 1971 a 29-month period of martial law to ensure the normalisation of the 
country in terms of stability (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 51-52; Faucompret & Konings, 
2008: 11). 
During the military ruling, in response to the unexpected consequences of a 
more liberal Constitution, the ones responsible for the first version introduced some 
changes in the document that became more restrictive to ensure national unity, the 
National Security Council became more powerful, universities lost part of their 
autonomy, civil liberties were curtailed and the military’s influence was reinforced 
(Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 12; Mango, 2005: 21). 
The following decade was not as quiet as the military would like it to be. At the 
international level, two events would contribute to that unsteadiness: the oil crises and 
Cyprus invasion67. The first worsened the already existing economic crises in the 
country, unemployment and inflation were high and the citizens were discontent. The 
second originated nationalist feelings and developed (or reinforced) the perception of 
we-Muslims against they-Christan Greeks. Coupled with this international environment, 
Turkey was also facing a considerable polarisation in terms of secular vs. Islamist 
education. This was a symptom of a broader struggle between the two factions in an 
epoch of the growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism and political violence. Religion 
recovers some place in the stage of politics and social life; Erbakan, MSP’s leader, saw 
                                                          
67 For more details on the Cyprus question, Cf. Fernandes (2008). 
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the support for his party increasing during the decade and he became a necessary partner 
for coalitions. He believed that the return to Islam was fundamental to achieve the 
stability Turkey needed so much and that was lacking in the country for decades – his 
religious agenda was not even a secret. Islam was still used as a political tool to unite 
the country against the Soviet threat. Furthermore, the creation of the separatist 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) and beginning of their 
armed struggle against the state contributed to the very unstable 1980s too (Faucompret 
& Konings, 2008: 13; Fernandes, 2005: 70-71). 
In this context, the military, who perceived themselves as the only cohesive and 
incorrupt elite (Dagi, 1996: 125), believed it was time to involve in politics again and 
stage another coup: 
“The country had been riven by ideological conflict. The military 
decided that the remedy lay in confining politics to the inner councils 
of a few, preferably only two, political parties, just as religion had 
been confined to the interior of mosques under state control. Society 
was to be depoliticized” (Mango, 2004: 81). 
Turkey was then ruled by the military during the first three years of the 1980s. In 
this period, the Turkish Armed Forces established the foundations of a new order 
through “draconian means” (Idem: 81). In the name of the reasons the military claimed 
to be behind their intervention – to preserve the country’s integrity, avoid a civil war 
and safeguard democracy – all political activities were banned, martial law was 
extended to all country, press was monitored and several newspapers were closed, the 
legislative power was transferred to the National Security Council, strikes and became 
illegal, the leaders of the four biggest parties were imprisoned, as well as other 
politicians and journalists, academics were fired,... By the end of the regime, 48 
executions were carried out and over 60 000 people were considered suspect of terrorist 
or illegal political activities and were detained (Dagi, 1996: 125-126; Faucompret & 
Konings, 2008: 13,14). As Dagi (1996: 126) explains, “all these aimed first to suppress 
the domestic opposition against the military intervention and then to re-form the whole 
political structure”. Nevertheless, as other authors put it, there was no real opposition to 
this coup, even after a very politically prolific epoch, because Turks were tired of the 
instability and violence (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 53). 
At this time, however, the Constitution was not amended; there was a brand new 
Constitution that resulted from the intervention and was approved by the population in 
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1982. This new document was much less liberal than the previous one; it attempted to 
avoid allowing the same problems the latter had created: Presidential powers increased, 
freedom of association was limited, trade unions were not authorised to involve in 
politics, a bicameral system was introduced, the military reinforced their roles and 
positions in the political landscape of the country and the Constitution became a 
security-oriented document. It was also introduced a 10% threshold under which no 
party could be able to be represented in the Grand Assembly (Faucompret & Konings, 
2008: 13-14). 
Contrary to the previous military coups, the international reactions were much 
less enthusiastic and showed serious concerns about the development and maturation of 
the Turkish democracy. Dagi (1996: 126-128) assembles the position of several 
Western countries: both France and the United Kingdom were worried about democracy 
and human rights, and used their diplomacy to mitigate the effects of the coup; the 
Scandinavian countries severely condemned and criticised the intervention and brought 
it to the agenda in the European institutions; West Germany was an important economic 
and military partner and the regime did not want to deteriorate these relations, but 
Germans hosted several political refugees and blocked some help to Turkey; finally, the 
United States, despite showing their concern for the development of the democracy, 
expressed their trust in the Turkish Armed Forces. There were obviously strategic 
interests behind this support and the country lobbied before the Council of Europe to 
avoid Turkey’s expulsion.  In fact, the American economic support increased during the 
military ruling. 
“In short, democracy and human rights issues were repeatedly 
expressed publicly and privately by the West European states in their 
bilateral relations with Turkey. At the beginning they showed a rather 
mild reaction, but as time passed, without much progress, and as the 
generals took harsh policy decisions they became tougher. (...) 
Turkey’s relations with Europe were tense and sometimes strained, and 
even deteriorating, while Turkish-American relations developed along 
a perfect line” (Idem: 127). 
It is interesting to notice in this practical example how the foreign policies of 
different Western countries reacted to the same event in Turkey. The concerns over 
democratic issues or mere strategic interests made a difference in the diplomatic 
response. The European Commission was also paying attention to the respect of human 
rights and democracy, but the European Parliament was more vocal when it came to 
reveal its opposition and reminded Turkey that those were essential conditions for any 
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possible candidate to the Community. In general, however, it was a policy of “wait and 
see” (Idem: 129) with some pressure for the military to give the power back to civilians, 
in order to restore order and the natural distribution of power. 
Apart from this not so positive reaction mainly from the European counterparts 
(contrary to what have happened in the previous interventions), the Armed Forces’ 
attempt to reorganise the political arena of Turkey had a set of unintended 
consequences: first, the electoral system they adopted was not changed by the civilian 
governments that followed the coup, as it favoured the winning parties with far more 
seats than the proportional system would allow them to have. In that sense, the 
distribution of seats in Turkey’s Grand National Assembly did not respect (or reflected) 
in proportional terms the citizens’ choices; secondly, unstable coalitions continued to 
form the successive government; and, finally, the 10% threshold was not able to 
diminish the number of small parties that originated the much contested political 
fragmentation that characterised Turkey’s politics in the previous decades: in 1987 there 
were seven parties running for elections, in 1991 they were six and in 1999 the number 
rose to twenty (Evin, 2005: 33). 
When the military decided to return the power back to the civilians, another 
attempt to influence on the political future of the country (and another objective they 
could not achieve) was to allow only the competition, in 1983, of three parties being 
two of them directly and clearly supported by them. Therefore, the three parties that ran 
for the elections were the MDP (Nationalist Democracy Party, Milliyetci Demokrat 
Partisi), a centre-right party led by a retired general; the Populist Party (HP, Halkaçi 
Parti), a centre-left party led by a retired senior civil servant; and finally the liberal 
Motherland Party (ANAP, Anavatan Partisi) which was coordinated by Turgut Özal 
and allowed by the military, although not supported by them. Özal enjoyed foreign 
creditors’ support and the success of his stabilisation programme during the military 
rule (he resigned in 1982 to be able to build his party and run for the elections) 
guaranteed him this opportunity (Mango, 2004: 82). This time, Turkish citizens did not 
follow the military’s advice and elected the only party that was not supported by them; 
maybe they were already tired of their very aggressive ruling and wanted them not to 
interfere in politics. The 91% of popular support in the Constitutional referendum may 
have had the same justification, as its rejection would mean the continuation of the 
military rule (Idem: 83). 
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Özal was a very popular and successful Prime-Minister in Turkey, mainly in the 
economic field. During his two terms in the office (1983-87; 1987-89), his policies had 
very positive results in reducing the deficit, more than tripling the exports in seven 
years, increasing tourism, building or updating energy and communication 
infrastructures and, therefore, the economy grew in average 7% per year (Idem: 85). 
According to Faucompret and Konings (2008: 14), these measures were made through a 
bottom-up revolution that involved people in the country’s modernisation. He was also 
a big supporter of EU’s accession and developed the cooperation with the Balkans. 
Moreover, his actions increased the public understanding about the concepts and 
practices of civil society and pluralism – previously seen as something that would not fit 
Turkey’s unity (Evin, 2005: 36). 
However, some authors (like Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 15) claim Özal was 
not capable of controlling the growth and enthusiasm he began; therefore, the high 
degrees of consumption led to a great increase of inflation, incomes decreased and the 
accusations of corruption and nepotism started to abound. To worsen the situation, the 
gap between secularists and Islamists widened again. In a private conversation with an 
academic, Mango (2004: 86) quotes him when he declares: “I blame Özal for taking 
ethics out of Turkish society by idealizing money”. This statement is certainly related to 
what Evin (2005: 34) wrote: the Prime-Minister helped Turkey prepare for entering the 
global markets, but he did not care much about rules and laws and would easily 
overcome them if needed to. This action also meant a rupture with the Ottoman 
tradition; now the emphasis was on the economic activity itself and he moved away 
from statism and the culture of dependency on the state (Idem: 35). 
Unfortunately, these changes and improvements did not last very long, because 
the “deeply rooted characteristics of Turkish political culture” (Idem: 36), such as 
clientelism in politics and the lack of tolerance for political opposition, re-emerged and 
undermined the results of Özal’s policies. Besides, when General Evren’s term as 
President ended in 1989 and Özal was a candidate to the post, the opposition accused 
him to want to “escape before the bubble burst” (Mango, 2004: 88), as he had left a 
country in a difficult economic situation, mainly due the high levels of inflation. That 
was not, however, an obstacle for his election and he became de second civilian 
President of the Republic of Turkey. In this new position, Turgut Özal focused his 
efforts on foreign policy: he applied for membership to the European Community 
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(which was refused), he sought to convince the West of the importance of Turkey after 
the end of the cold War and in 1990 allowed NATO to use the base against Iraq, despite 
wide criticisms and the resignation of two Foreign Ministers for his interference (Idem: 
89-90). 
After the 1983 elections and the withdrawal of the military, several parties were 
created or reformulated. Demirel renamed his party as “True/Right Path Party” (DYP, 
Dogru Yol Partisi) with some religious influences but not supported by the most 
religious voters who preferred Erbakan’s Welfare Party (RP, Refah Partisi); in the 
centre-left spectrum, Inönü created the Social Democracy Party (SODEP, Sosyal 
Demokrasi Partisi) that took in the Populist Party and was challenged by another leftist 
party, the new Democratic Left Party (DSP, Demokratik Sol Parti) founded by Mrs. 
Ecevit (Ecevit’s wife) (Idem: 84). Therefore, during the 1980s, this was the main 
political scenario in Turkey; two centre-right parties (DYP and RP) and two centre-left 
(SODEP and DSP). However,  
“the policies of all these parties resembled each other in their vague 
formulation. The divisions among there were not ideological, but 
personal. The parties were mutual protection societies among which 
the voters made a choice on the basis of affinity and in the hope of 
personal benefit” (Idem: 84).  
 
This statement actually agrees with the previous assumption that, despite the 
Özal’s changes, the democratic maturity of the country remained rather incipient and 
that it is particularly difficult to change the political culture of a nation overnight. Even 
if one looks at the evolution of the Turkish constitutions since the birth of the Republic, 
it is noticeable a rapid pace of change – but it is very likely to occur only on paper and 
its internalisation in the citizens’ minds and practices remains another problem. The 
1924 Constitution was amended right in 1928 and in 1937; in 1961 it was adopted a 
completely new document after the coup, revised ten years later and replaced by another 
one in the following decade, during the military rule (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 58-59). 
Yet, the 1990s do not show signs to be quieter or more stable than the previous phase. 
This instability, when contrasted to the theoretical aspects proposed on Chapter 3, prove 
that a country’s democratic consolidation may be a difficult, hazardous and uncertain 
process which is able to entail backslides.  
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 6.3.2. The Post-Cold War Era 
 
Turkey was a strategic fundamental partner for the Western countries during the 
Cold War against the Soviet Union. That role granted the country a widespread 
international prestige and support. However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
implosion of the USSR, major changes occurred in the international system and Turkey 
needed to find its place in the new concert if it wanted to keep playing a relevant role in 
the new distribution of power among the nations of the world. It seemed that, when the 
waters of the pond looked like they were calming down, another stone is thrown against 
it and Turkey needed to redefine its dynamics, interests and even its identity to cope 
with these new turbulent times. Kazancigil (cited in Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 13) 
calls the 1990s the “lost decade” – economy, society, politics,... – nothing had had 
enough time to consolidate and this new era threatened their fragile stability.  
When, in 1989, Özal became President, the opposition was right: he left the 
country in a very difficult situation, in spite of his initial successes. Mesut Yılmaz 
replaced him, but had to abandon the post after losing the 1991 elections, won by a 
coalition led by Süleyman Demirel (Mango, 2004: 92). Unexpectedly, however, Özal 
dies in 1993 and Demirel replaces him in the Presidency in the same year. Tanşu Ciller 
fills the vacant position as Prime-Minister. This “attractive, US-trained woman 
economist (...) saw herself as a Turkish Mrs. Thatcher” (Idem: 94), but, on the contrary 
to the English counterpart, Çiller continued to overspend, rapidly increasing Turkey’s 
foreign debt in a time creditors were not inclined to lend more money to the country. 
With the decrease in the interest rates, markets panicked, capital fled out and the IMF 
was asked to help. Its assistance had the price it usually has: Turkey needed to begin a 
policy of devaluation and retrenchment. As a consequence, the GNP shrank by 8% and 
prices grew 106%: “It was seen as the gravest economy crisis in the history of the 
republic” (Idem: 94) and they could already count a couple of them, despite the short 
life of the regime. Regardless of these setbacks, Tanşu Çiller achieved one major 
success during her legislature, which was the signature of the Customs Union with the 
European Union that entered into effect in 1996. Besides, she was able to fight the 
Kurdish insurgency, with the popular support, giving the military green light to suppress 
it (Idem: 95).  
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Still, they were not enough for the party to remain in the power and the Welfare 
Party won the 1995 elections. Erbakan was the first openly Islamic Prime-Minister and, 
therefore, his agenda to gather the support of Muslim countries, as well as to reinforce 
the role of religion, namely in education, was not hidden or disguised. Being aware of 
this context, the military were on alert and began a campaign to demand the 
government’s resignation. Simultaneously, they gave the Prime-Minister a list with their 
demands, so that the executive would not forget that Turkey was a secular state based 
on a set of principles foreseen by the Constitution. In spite of his promises, Erbakan did 
not alter his path and pursued with his measures (Idem: 97). Isabel David (2012: 189) 
provides several examples of how Erbakan’s attitudes may have upset the Armed 
Forces, when, for example, he visited Iran (defying the United States), when religious 
leaders were invited for the meal that breaks Ramadan fast in his official residence and 
went wearing religious clothing or even the plans to build a mosque in Taksim Square. 
These are a few examples of how the tension between the two sides was growing almost 
immediately since the Welfare Party was empowered.   
In February 1997, the military decided to intervene; this time, it was in a more 
subtle way. After realising their warnings had not been listened to, the Army sent tanks 
“ostensibly on exercise”, but in reality they wanted to “readjust the balance delicately” 
(Idem: 97). The process of 28 February, as it is now known, constituted therefore in a 
“campaign to eradicate Political Islam form education, business and other activities” 
(Idem: 97) and was supported by the majority of the intellectual elite. Wilkens (cited in 
Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 16) called it the “bloodless coup”, but it also labelled as 
the first “post-modern coup” (Mango, 2004: 97), as this symbolic pressure from 
different society sects, coupled with the imminence of an actual coup, ended up in 
Erbakan’s resignation in June. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court banned the 
Welfare Party – later replaced by the Virtue Party (FP, Fazilet Partisi) – and the Mayor 
of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was imprisoned for ten months for reciting a poem 
by a nationalist poet.68  
In the 1999 elections, and after the arrest of the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, 
which caused massive patriotic feelings, a coalition began to rule the country. It was 
composed of the three parties led by Yılmaz, Bahçeli and Ecevit. Despite the good 
                                                          
68 “The mosques are our barracks, their minarets our bayonets, their domes our shields” (by Ziya Gokalp) 
(Mango, 2004: 98). 
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beginning of this period, which also ensured the status of candidate to the EU, the 1999 
earthquake started a less happy moment with the devastation of Izmir and the death of 
17 000 people. This natural disaster revealed several weaknesses in Turkey: first, the 
late reaction of national rescue team (in opposition to the prompt response of the foreign 
teams) and second the realisation that urbanisation planning and building regulations 
had not been respected due to bribes that violated the law (Idem: 99).69  
In fact, the 1990s were an extremely difficult decade for Turks. Economy 
stagnated (not to say worse), one big financial crisis was not completely solved, 
immigration movements from the Southeast overpopulated cities and raised social 
tension, nationalist Kurds and radical Islamists were become more violent with an also 
very unstable neighbourhood, old political parties changed their names, but remained in 
politics, weak governments were frequently not capable to take the necessary decisions 
to develop the country in the right direction (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 13). Thus, 
reforms were urgent and people knew it, but they were not expecting that a new strong 
economic crisis hit the country again and would change its landscape – one more time. 
 
 6.3.3. The 2000s 
 
Despite the disquieting moments of the first years of the first millennium, the 
2000s meant to Turkey a major about-turn in all the field of the country’s life – from 
politics to the economy; from culture in general to religion in particular. It also due to 
the dynamics of this new era that 1999 was set as the beginning period of study of this 
thesis. For example, Düzgit and Keyman (2007: 69) argue that there are two different 
images of Turkey: 1995-2000 and since 2000 – and this year marks, according to them, 
the turning point. In the first phase, Turkey is a very state-centric, security-oriented and 
crisis-ridden country whose political elite is seen as corrupt and whose conflicting 
identities create a great deal of instability. On the other hand, and from 2000 onwards, 
Turkey is a changing country, mainly in the democratic field, but also in its economy 
and external policy. Two general dynamics are responsible for triggering these changes, 
                                                          
69 The only “positive” side of this disaster was the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece. The Greek 
availability to help created a new environment of dialogue and cooperation, which began to be known as 
the “earthquake diplomacy” (Mango, 2004: 99).  
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although one cannot forget all the way the country has gone through in the previous 
decades. 
In 2000, the IMF’s aid was achieving the first positive results (the economy 
grew 6%). However, a weak banking system and the increase in the imports made it 
difficult again to control inflation and private banks began to fail (Idem: 100). 
In the political domain, a public disagreement between the newly elected 
President Necdet Sezer and the Prime-Minister, Ecevet, during a National Security 
Meeting agitated the markets and the Turkish lira halved in value. The Prime-Minister, 
to calm down the situation asked the vice-President of the World Bank, Derviş, to be in 
charge of the country’s economy and to negotiate with the IMF new credits. 2,5 million 
jobs were lost, the state expenditure diminished and the situation slightly improved, but 
the confidence on the coalition was still low (Idem: 101). Therefore, and also because 
the DSP and the MHP were not able to find a compromise regarding EU reform 
packages, Ecevit calls for early elections, scheduled for November 2002 (David, 2012: 
255). As Düzgit and Kayman (2007: 70) wrote, this context created the perception 
among Turks that the macroeconomic stability and a democratic, efficient political 
power were tightly linked. 
In the 2002 elections, none of the parties of the coalition were able to overcome 
the 10% threshold to be represented in the Assembly. To everyone’s surprise, only two 
parties accomplished that condition: the AKP and the CHP. These results, as well as the 
events of the previous years, may reveal a more positive phase of the country’s 
democratic consolidation, as they imply that citizens were likely to act within the 
framework of the democratic regime and theur attitudes and behaviour have been 
democratised too – which is an important part of consolidation, as mentioned on 
Chapter 3. 
The AKP (Justice and Development Party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) won 362 
ou 3 seats in a 550-seat National Assembly, which meant a share of 66% of all seats, 
when the party has only won 34% of the votes. This discrepancy is justified by the 
Turkish electoral system and the 10% threshold that benefits the bigger parties. It was 
the first time since 1987 that a party achieved a majority (Idem: 103). This very recent 
party presented itself with a pro-Islamic tradition (that also influenced the Welfare Party 
or the Democratic Party some years before) and gathered its support mainly from 
Central Anatolia (more conservative and traditional area), but also some from Istanbul, 
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Ankara and Bursa (Fernandes, 2005: 120); its typical voter is young and religious, 
comes from poor neighbours of big cities and is reluctant to support Turkey’s European 
bid70. Isabel David (2012: 259) quotes a survey that reveals some interesting data: 90% 
of the AKP’s electorate prays at least once per day, 99% do the fastening in Ramadan, 
81% see themselves first as Muslims and only then as Turks, and 60% prioritise 
religious values over national ones, democracy, secularism or even human rights. 
On the other side, the opposition party, the CHP (Republican People’s Party, 
Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi), has gathered its support among a not so young electorate, 
with a more leftist, secularist and pro-EUU viewer. Usually with higher levels of 
education, CHP’s voters include teachers, independent workers, lawyers, engineers, 
medical doctors, etc. (Idem: 259; Fernandes, 2005: 120). 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan only became Prime-Minister in 2003, because he had 
been banned from any political activity until then (Mango, 2005: 25). A former disciple 
of Erbakan, from whom he separated in the 1997 coup, the new Prime-Minister has had 
a difficult relationship with the military since the beginning of his legislature 
(Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 17) and, therefore, some divergences with the secularist 
opposition party. Nevertheless, and mainly in the first years of this new epoch, both 
countries were capable of negotiating, discussing and approaching several measures and 
reforms driven by the EU. Actually, the EU used to be for the AKP one of its top 
priorities (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 97), which was something sceptics usually do not 
believe in, as they  
“question whether the reforms were primarily driven with the 
objective of subordinating the state elite, particularly the 
military, to the political leadership, and then revert to AKP’s 
hidden anti-secularist agenda. After all, it was Mr Erdoğan who 
had described democracy in 1993 as a ‘vehicle which you ride as 
far as you want to go and then get off’” (Evin, 2005: 39). 
Although these are worrying statements to be pronounced by an individual with 
political responsibilities (even though he was not in charge yet), this may remind that, 
despite the AKP’s interest in the relations with the Union, it pursues a realist foreign 
policy that does not ignore history nor geography and which, therefore, focus on 
Turkophone Central Asia, the Muslim Middle East and the United Sates as well (David, 
2012: 262). Besides, and according to Isabel David, this party recognise and are 
                                                          
70 In fact, the AKP always showed itself as a EU supporter, so this feature of its voter seems to be at odds 
with that position.  
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enthusiastic about the elaboration of a new Constitution for the country, one that 
pretends to have a “bottom-up approach that would reflect the popular demands in 
accordance with democratic patterns” (Idem: 265). 
In addition, the AKP perceives itself as a conservative party that seeks a gradual 
transformation of the society and that follows the example of Christian Democrat 
parties in Europe or the Republicans in the USA; this implies that the AKP does not 
want to be seen as a religious party per se, but as a political institution inspired by a 
Muslim matrix. Therefore, Kemalist secularism is a principle that needs to be 
reinterpreted in the sense that it has to be conceived, following this logic, as providing 
the conditions for everyone to be entitled to freely practice and express his own religion 
(Idem: 265-66). 
During his first term in office, the AKP, together with the cooperation of the 
CHP, has approved several harmonisation and reform packages, as well as 
constitutional amendments, that aimed to promote the convergence between national 
law and the EU’s demands. Although these legislative changes will be analysed with 
more detail in Part IV, it is worth emphasising that the first term was prolific in terms of 
democratic measures. However, after the elections held in 2007, the reform pace is 
slower and the government begins to be criticised for the first time by the EU for not 
being committed to the accession process.  
AKP’s first term in office,  
“[have] revealed the fact that the possibility of political and economic 
stability (as well as internal and external security) in Turkey lies in 
democracy and its consolidation in state-society/individual relations” 
(Düzgit & Keyman, 2007: 70).  
It may be, therefore, considered one of the greatest achievements of the 
beginning of the twenty-first century for Turkish citizens in terms of learning or 
internalising a different political (democratic) culture. In fact, and as Evin (2005: 42) 
states, since Özal there has been a “dynamic tension between continuity and change” 
that has resulted in a “slow but far-reaching” transformation of the country. According 
to the author, this is mainly due to four factors: the arrest of Öcalan, the 2001 crisis (that 
led to reforms), demographic changes – with a younger generation more willing to 
compete and debate within the political and democratic framework – and “the fourth, 
and the central one, is the prospect of membership of the European Union, which helps 
to reinforce and consolidate political reforms” (Idem: 43).  
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It is precisely this relationship between the internal and the external domains that 
the present thesis aims to reflect upon – for that purpose, this chapter very briefly 
outlined the domestic dynamics of the country, since its Ottoman origins, in order to 
provide a broader and more complete comprehension about its nature and 
characteristics, essential to a more accurate acknowledgment and understanding of the 
its broader relations with the Europe in the light of the development or improvement of 
the Turkish democracy. 
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7. When Turkey met the West 
7.1. Following the European model 
7.1.1. The very beginning: the Ottoman Empire 
 
Despite the topicality of the problem this thesis proposes to embrace, its deepest 
roots can be found back in the Middle Ages. In fact, European political units (empires, 
kingdoms, princedoms, etc.) had had relations with the Ottomans since their expansion; 
these relations may have been peaceful sometimes and warlike in other times, but the 
interchanges between both have existed for centuries and it would be limiting not to 
acknowledge how the two parts (Europe and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey) have 
influencing each other way longer than under the scope of the institutionalised relations 
since the 1959 request. 
If one recalls the events narrated in the previous chapter, it is not difficult to 
perceive that the Ottoman Empire established its domains at the costs of the Byzantine 
Empire. In other words, its expansion meant diminishing what had been perceived as 
the European territory, right since the moment when, in the fourteenth century, “the 
Ottoman Turks crossed the Dardanelles and stepped on to the European continent” 
(Yurdusev, 2010: 277). However, this idea of confrontation between the two rival 
civilisations constitutes the result of a retrospective interpretation, because, as Yurdusev 
(Idem: 278) wisely reminds, there was no such thing as a European identity; only in the 
twenty-first century Europe began to be linked with Christianity. Even more 
interestingly,  
“the term ‘European’ is said to have been used for the first time in 
connection with Turks. Pope Pius II in his letter to Mehmed II in 1458 
used the ‘European’ interchangeably with the ‘Christian’. From then 
on, it is said, the words European and Europe began to be used in 
connection with or in contrast to, the Turk” (Idem: 278). 
This explanation for the beginning of the utilisation of the concept is tightly 
related to the construction of an identity dichotomy between the Europeans and the 
Ottomans/Turks, very relevant to consider at this point, although approached with more 
detail in the next chapter. The definition of the boundaries of what was Europe was then 
achieved through the opposition of the two societies. Understandably, they used to see 
themselves as enemies and most literature points out the confrontation side of their 
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relationship: the expansion of the Ottoman Empire was feared by the Europeans as a 
dangerous threat to their territory and safety (Idem: 278). It is worth to highlight in this 
regard that the Ottoman Empire until the Treaty of Carlowitz (in 1699) is very different 
from the Ottoman Empire after the treaty in terms of its own identity and self-perceived 
image, as well as in the relations with others, namely with Europe, as it will be 
explained later on. And sometimes authors focus on the Ottoman Empire that undertook 
a set of reforms to westernalise but they do forget about the previous period in which 
the Ottomans felt as the superior civilisation. 
Still in this first period (somewhere between 1400s and the end of the 1600s), 
although some animosity was common and frequent, cooperation was also present 
between the two entities. When, in the fifteenth century, in Europe began to emerge a 
state system, the Ottoman Empire has influenced its shape: they  
“actively and intensively engaged in European affairs (...) the Empire 
played a major part in the formation and working of the European state 
system and this shows that a process of mutual dependence operated 
between the two systems, despite the historical prejudices of the 
Europeans towards the Turks and the pretensions of self-sufficiency on 
the part of the Ottomans” (Idem: 279). 
In this context, the Ottoman Empire was allied with France against the 
Habsburgs, and with the England against Spain in the mid-fifteenth century (Mango, 
2005: 15). In the Westphalian order, the anti-hegemonial nature of the European state 
system was also possible thanks to the Ottoman pressure on the Habsburgs (Watson 
cited in Yurdusev, 2010: 282), given the fact they constituted a counter-weight to 
possible unifying tendencies of some European states, reinforcing the freedom of 
smaller states (Yurdusev, 2010: 282), as one should not forget that at that time, the 
Ottoman Empire was “one of the most powerful of the globe, maybe only supplanted by 
China”, according to the historian Quataert (2000: 100). Moreover, it was present in the 
history of the Italian reunification (Losano, 2009: 5), as Italians asked for the Sultan’s 
help against France and gave the Sultan’s Ambassador a place as an observer during the 
signing ceremony (Yurdusev, 2010: 282). During the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, Constantinople made several alliances, supporting the English, the Dutch, 
Protestants and Calvinists, etc. Simultaneously, the Ottomans were also an important 
hub between Europe and India – therefore, if they fought against European monarchies, 
they also negotiated silk and spices with them as well (Losano, 2009: 5). As Stivachtis 
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(2008: 23) put it, there were war and trade interactions, despite no common interests or 
values. 
Thus, and despite those divergences, authors agree that the Ottoman Empire was 
a European power and part of the European state system as well (Idem: 23; Faucompret 
& Konings, 2008: 1; Losano, 2009: 5). As seen, the interactions between the two parts 
were very frequent at the political, diplomatic, warfare and trade levels. Yet, there was a 
clear opposition whose traces may be said to still remain in today’s relations, as if the 
events of a several century-long process were still imprinted in the collective memory of 
both peoples. Yurdusev (2010: 283-284) claims very assertively that the Ottoman 
Empire “was considered in Europe but not of Europe (...) because, despite the intensive 
engagement in the process of making the modern European identity (...) the Turk was 
‘otherised’”. This is true, but it is not all the truth about this so complex subject. 
As a matter of fact, during the Renaissance there was an anti-Ottoman rhetoric in 
Europe (Stivachtis, 2008: 25). For example, several Popes used to claim for the 
Europeans’ action against the Ottomans; Pope Nicholas is said to have called the Sultan 
“the cruellest persecutor of Christ’s Church, (...) the son of Satan”, wanting them to be 
out of Europe (cited in Frazee, 1983 cited in Stivachtis, 2008: 21). Besides, it is also 
true that those who constantly attacked the European territory and who actually made it 
to the gates of Vienna were seen as the “‘perfect barbarian’ for the Europeans in order 
to readily affirm the civilised nature of Europe” (Yurdusev, 2010: 285), as Turks 
revealed a very strong connection to a religion perceived as an heresy in Europe, as they 
constituted the most feared threat against the European civilisation  (Idem: 284) and, 
therefore, using the Ottomans as the group that delimited the European boundaries in 
terms of civilisation (culture, religion and territory) was an fundamental tool to achieve 
a reinforcement of the European identity in construction. As Stivachtis (2008: 23) 
synthesises: 
“the dominant ‘Other’ in the history of the European society of states 
has been ‘the Turk’. The military might and physical proximity of the 
Ottoman Empire, combined with the strength of its religious tradition, 
made it a particularly relevant ‘other’ and instrumental in the process 
of the rise and evolution of European identity”. 
However, and recovering Yurdusev’s thoughts about the Ottomans that were not 
of Europe due to being “otherised” by the Europeans, it is key to add that the they, until 
the end of the seventeenth century, considered their civilisation superior than any other 
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(Quataert, 2000: 100) – including the European one. They even did not accept the 
European practices and norms (Stivachtis, 2008: 24). A sign of that can be found in the 
diplomatic exchange: although the European courts had already sent diplomatic 
representations to Constantinople since the 1500s, the Ottomans only sent their 
diplomats to Europe at the end of the eighteenth century (Idem: 104; Yurdusev, 101: 
279). Therefore, the opposition or some animosity between the two sides is pretty much 
due to the use of the concept of the Ottoman/Turk to build or strengthen the European 
identity by giving the Europeans a common enemy, but it is also due to the superiority 
complex of the Ottomans who did not even consider treaties as bilateral agreements, but 
as unilateral ones that they concede to the inferior monarchies of Europe. 
 
The volte-face happens in 1683. That year marked the beginning of a century of 
defeats that ends with the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 (Quartaet, 2000: 60). 
1699 is also a fundamental year: the second failed siege of Vienna meant the end of the 
Ottoman expansion in Europe (Mango, 2005: 15) and the following Carlowitz Treaty 
constitutes a turning-point for Europe-Ottoman Empire relations. As they lose their 
military superiority and they have to retreat from Central Europe, the Ottomans’ 
perception about the new balances starts to change at the same time they have to 
recognise the European’s influence in their own territory (Losano, 2009: 10). As 
Quataert (2000: 60) alerts, the territorial losses that resulted from the consecutive 
defeats could have been even worse, but as the Europeans were rival between each 
other, they did not want that other peers from the continent would increase their power 
considerably by Appendixing Ottoman domains, what ended up by benefiting the 
sultan’s territories.  
In the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was, therefore, the “sick man of 
Europe” and the elites began to think how it was possible to solve its problems and to 
avoid the ruin of the empire. They envisaged the solution: if Europe was succeeding (in 
military, economic and cultural terms), then it would be profitable if the empire 
followed the European example. Thus, from that moment onwards, the “Ottoman 
Empire chose to be bound by the rules of the European state system” (Stivachtis, 2008: 
27) – and it is precisely because of this new condition and the Ottomans’ self-awareness 
of that, that the end of the seventeenth century means a rupture with the traditional 
posture of the Sublime Door. The idea of civilisational superiority is left aside and 
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Europe is looked upon as the model from which to import new ideas and new ways of 
doing things. Interestingly enough, however, is that the lower the Ottoman self-esteem, 
the more Europe felt a sense of superiority that reinforced its unity (Stivachtis, 2008: 
27).  
Here one can find the first steps the Ottomans took towards their approximation 
to the European patterns – one can actually say that this stage marked the first attempts 
to europeanise, as a set of measures and reforms began to be undertaken by the Sultans 
in order to achieve that aim. However, as Isabel David (2012: 76) emphasises, this 
implied an “imposition of reforms to the society in a top-down process, demanding a 
great effort that originated deep gaps in the Ottoman society”. 
The period of reforms that began in the eighteenth century was already 
scrutinised in the previous chapter – the reforms began with Sultan Selim III (who ruled 
between 1789 and 1807) and were pursued by his successors (with the exception of 
some breaks in-between) until the Tanzimat period begins in 1839. This period is of 
special relevance for what happened in this phase (described on chapter 6) constituted a 
reorganisation (literally, the meaning of the Ottoman name of the period) in the 
European sense, i.e., following the European model and standards: the army, the penal 
code, science, technology, state bureaucracy, etc. were objects of more or less deep 
reforms that aimed to trigger the development of the Empire and, ultimately, to 
safeguard it from extinction. The first Constitution and the first Parliament were created 
at this time and, therefore, one can retrospectively picture very incipient forms of both 
westernisation/modernisation/europeanisation and, more specifically, democratisation. 
Turkey (or the Ottoman Empire) met the West at this phase in a different way it had met 
it in the previous centuries; the technical, cultural or other exchanges (although they 
were not reciprocal) were different from the political or trade cooperation or 
confrontation that marked the period before the seventeenth century. Values and 
principles were imported – methods and technologies, equality between all men, etc. 
(Quataert, 2000: 86-89) –, but even the Western life-style was copied by the Ottoman 
elites who initiated a phase of a real enthusiasm (or even obsession, as it was quoted in 
the previous chapter) namely “reflected in the importation of goods that represented the 
Western life-style, such as sofas and chairs that replaced traditional furniture, trousers 
and dresses, the artists” (David, 2012: 84-85), and so on and so forth.  
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These “profound changes reflected something more than the 
willingness to avoid the decline of the Empire. Instead, they revealed 
the bureaucratic elite’s fascination for the Western culture, in a 
fundamental change of mentality, based upon the recognition of the 
Ottoman’s inferiority that did not happen, however, among the masses, 
separated from the elites by high rates of illiteracy and by the distance 
from the big cultural centres, sticking to tradition” (Idem: 102). 
At a more political level, the ideals of Liberalism and democracy were imported 
from the French Revolution and although sultans and grand-viziers were very keen on 
importing European knowledge and technology, they were, understandably, reluctant to 
the liberal and democratic ideas. However, when importing the Western education, they 
were unexpectedly seeding the dissemination of Western ideas, including Liberalism 
and democracy (Dodd, 1992: 17). In that context, in 1839, an important advisory 
council started to work with free speech and majority vote, in 1868 was created a State 
Council very similar to the French model and in 1876 a limited in power but with very 
lively debates Parliament takes place and starts to operate under an also new 
Constitution (Idem: 17). These were small but important steps towards a democratic 
regime, as they may have started to develop some awareness about this regime, even 
though it was not shared at a great extent by the masses. Yet, and due to the decrease in 
the Ottomans’ self-confidence, the importation of these (and other) structures meant that 
“during the first half of the nineteenth century, the impact of Europe on the Ottoman 
Empire was profound and overwhelming” (Stivachtis, 2008: 29). 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Sultan closes the Parliament in an 
attempt to control the dissemination of nationalist ideology that had been being spread 
in the empire by the Christian Ottomans (Mango, 2005: 10). This was a real problem the 
empire had to deal with – and, ironically, a problem imported from Europe, as well. 
From Europe had also come in 1856 an effort to avoid the disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire through its inclusion in the Concert of Europe71, because already at that time 
there had been several internal upheavals and independence movements (many of them 
supported by European states) (Quataert, 2000: 78-80). However, to be included in the 
Concert, the empire was asked to make some internal reforms, which is a demand that 
reminds the conditionality policy of the European Union, if one tries to make a 
                                                          
71 “While being admitted into the European Concert, the Ottoman Empire did not achieve equal legal 
status until 1923, when the Treaty of Lausanne abolished the unequal treaties that the Europeans had 
imposed on the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, the European states demanded changes to conform further 
to European standards. The result was a serious of long-run reforms that enabled the Ottoman state to 
modernize and attain the standards set by the European powers” (Stivachtis, 2008: 29). 
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parallelism between both situations – and this comparison seems unavoidable. The Paris 
Agreement recognised the importance of those reforms and ensured the integrity of the 
empire (Stivachtis, 2008: 29), but was perceived as a foreign imposition (the parallelism 
could be extended here) and led to a failed attempt to overthrow the sultan. Europeans 
were, in fact, afraid of Russia’s intention to dismember the empire; in that case, the 
possible gain of the Russians led the Europeans to provide help and to contribute to the 
Ottomans’ integrity. 
The modernisation efforts mentioned earlier were not welcomed equally by all 
the elite’s groups. Young Ottomans, for example, wanted it, but as long as traditional 
Islamic values were also respected and applied. The 1908 revolution (“the French 
Revolution of the East”) revealed some more open dynamics and its perpetrators 
constituted a nationalist, secularist and modernist generation (Losano, 2009: 15), i.e., a 
generation really close to its European equivalents, who also stood  for these values. 
The Parliament reopens four decades after it had been closed by the Sultan and it was 
composed of 288 deputies that represented the structure of the Ottoman society: 147 
Turks, 16 Greeks, 60 Arabs, 14 Armenians, 27 Albanians and 4 Hebrews (Idem: 16). It 
is interesting to notice how there was an attempt to follow the democratic principle of 
representativeness and its meaning for the several ethnicities or nationalities that 
inhabited the empire back then.  Yet, the Young Turks’ liberalisation efforts, due to 
internal reasons, had to be abandoned and the Empire entered a period of quasi-
dictatorship (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 24). These and other internal dynamics and the 
defeat in the First World War triggered the end of the Ottoman Empire, as written on 
chapter 6.  
All the centuries covered very briefly on the last pages constitute a set of events, 
changes, reforms and volt-faces that marked the evolution of the Ottoman Empire since 
its beginning. As it was hopefully proved, the contacts between Turkey and the West, 
more precisely Europe, have not begun in the twentieth century when the country is 
established as the modern Republic as it is known today; Turkey, through its imperial 
past, met the West and had with it very diverse, complex and more or less friendly 
dynamics, creating important flows that would mark the history and development of 
Europe, but mainly of Turkey – both negatively (the prejudices and the negative images 
of an identity built from the ‘othernisation’ of the Turk) and positively (thanks to the 
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imports of technology and knowledge and improved the empire and the country’s socio-
economic, as well as political, standards. 
 
7.1.2. Turkish Republic: since the foundation to the 1950s 
 
The leading figure of the creation and first developments of the Turkish Modern 
Republic is indisputably Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; maybe nobody else in Turkey’s 
history does embody so well the spirit of the country’s transformation. As explained in 
the previous chapter, Kemal was inspired by the European values and the French 
revolution, the nationalist wave of the nineteenth century and by the European progress 
at the technical and scientific levels. In order to apply this ideology to his own country, 
he had to break with the past, that is, Mustafa Kemal had to eliminate the Ottoman 
influences and hence one of his doctrine’s principles was reformism. This reformism 
would be achieved through the implementation of Western-inspired measures to change 
and adapt the country’s political, cultural and economic structures. 
These constituted important steps towards Turkey’s modernisation in the 
European/ Western sense even though several authors frame this phase as a continuation 
of the Westernisation efforts that already came from the Tanzimat period: Burdy and 
Marcou (2008: 33) consider that Kemalism is not a “revolutionary rupture” but the 
“continuation of a century of the Ottoman elites willingness to democratise”. Dodd 
(1992: 17) also agrees that Atatürk inherited the Ottoman tradition of modernisation, but 
enlightens that that tradition was “insufficiently radical for him”, as he preferred a faster 
rate of reforms, without the religious participation in the state institutions and a liberal 
democratic system (Idem: 17). 
The abolition of the caliphate and the sultanate, the gathering of the National 
Assembly, the introduction of the Latin alphabet, the wide set of secularist reforms, the 
Codes inspired in the European models, etc. were several measures already quoted on 
chapter 6 and that marked the beginning and the following development of this phase 
that led to a more or less genuine transformation of the society during the first half of 
the twentieth century. It is important to emphasise, nevertheless, two main fields in 
which these changes are particularly controversial. The first is religion. One of the 
central principles of the Kemalist doctrine was secularism, but even Atatürk realised 
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how crucial religion was to unite Turks; in such a multi-ethnic country, religion was the 
key to many problems, the so-called “social cement” of the country. Therefore, religion 
was tried to be apart from the state, but Islam was introduced as part of what was 
considered being a Turk, which originated an innovative approach to the religion, the 
“Turkish-Islamic synthesis”. 
The second field is democracy. In this period, Turkey met the West through the 
hands and action of Mustafa Kemal. However,  
“Atatürk wanted radical change first, and democracy only after Turks 
had come to realize, through his party’s leadership and education, their 
true role as patriotic citizens. Atatürk’s idea of democracy was 
essentially idealist, and required acceptance of the need revolution 
first” (Idem: 18). 
Thus, in the mind of the Turkish President, in order to implement the changes necessary 
to approach the civilisation Kemal was inspired by (which included democracy), he had 
to adopt (or at least he opted for adopting) a dictatorial style. This question is not 
consensual, as one may wonder whether he had to because it would be impossible to 
modernise otherwise or, if it had to be imposed, it would mean the population was not 
ready or did not want to change. In this latter case, it would imply that this constituted a 
top-down imposition only successfully achieved at the formal level and not truly 
internalised by the population, just forced by the elites.72 It is possible to affirm that 
Mustafa Kemal, considering his democratic intentions were authentic, used 
undemocratic tools to achieve a democratic end, which raises several ethical and 
political questions.73 
 In this context, it is not difficult to realise that, despite the attempts to modernise 
and europeanise, democracy was not a concern at the beginning of the Republic: the 
inexistence of political parties and opposition, the single-party system, a high 
concentration of powers by the executive, some control of the press and other signals 
showed how deficient this regime was in terms of democratic standards. It seems that 
the price to pay for achieving the civilisational standards of the Western communities 
was this lack of democratic quality. The first Constitution (1924) was pretty 
authoritarian and did not foresee the necessary institutional balances for a healthy and 
                                                          
72 For example, in 6.2.1. Kemal and Kemalism, it is already stated the opposition between the opinions of 
Losano (2009: 26) and Marc & Burdy (2008: 35) regarding this subject. 
73 The military, during their political interventions, also played this type of paradoxical game. Cf Chapter 
8. 
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balanced democracy. As Burdy and Marcou (2009: 35) write, “the Republic was not 
synonymous with liberal democracy”. 
 Both aspects (religion and democracy) reveal that there is an opposition between 
what the Kemalist regime claims to be theoretically and what it really is – being a 
secular state but using Islam to unify its citizens and aiming to achieve democracy while 
using undemocratic means. In fact, this reveals that the importation of Western 
institutions and practices, such as secularism, human rights and democracy, did not take 
into account that those concepts are embedded in a broader context that includes the 
meanings and perceptions attributed to them by the population that has built them over 
the centuries, resulting in the creation of a regime with fragile foundations (David, 
2012: 138). Yet, Mario Losano (2009: 28) believes that several measures meant more 
than just their formal adoption, comprising some deepness in terms of infiltration or 
dissemination at the societal level. 
 Ironically, with the death of Atatürk and his replacement by İsmet İnönü, the 
country takes a really important step towards democratisation when the new President 
introduced the multi-party system, enabling the creation of political parties and of truly 
democratic elections that take the Democratic Party to power for the whole decade of 
1950s. This change in the political scenario brought a different style of governing and 
naturally some policies’ changes, namely and mainly in the realm of religion, 
introducing some revivalism and a great amount of populist measures, in part 
responsible for the military intervention of 1960. 
 
 After the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the policy of 
Westernisation or Europeanisation reflected into a set of measures and reforms that 
aimed to promote the rapprochement of the country with Europe and to modernise it. 
However, it was not until the end of the 1950s that Turkey really started to embrace this 
approach to Europe in a more systematic, or at least more formal, way: in 1959, Turkey 
asks for associate membership to the then European Economic Community.  
 
 
 
 
205 
 
7.2. Institutionalised relations: Turkey and the EU (1959-1999) 
 
 In a seminal work published in 2009, Atila Eralp (2009) analysed Turkey-EU 
relations through the introduction of two not often used factors: temporality and 
interaction. The author considered these variables important to explicate the “cyclical 
nature” (Idem: 150) of those relations. In this context, he divided them into four periods. 
The first, named “harmony in the relationship”, encompassed the phase between 1959 
and 1970 and represented a positive moment, marked by Turkey’s alliance with the 
West and by the elites’ support who envisaged this approach in a “broader civilizational 
context”. Besides, at this point, nobody would question the country’s cultural and 
religious differences (Idem: 151-152). 
 According to Burdy and Marcou (2008: 93), even before the 1957 Rome Treaty 
did Turkey want to participate in the creation of the European Economic Community 
(EEC). Therefore, in 1959 Turkey applied for associate membership of the EEC. 
However, the following year brought the military coup which was, nevertheless, not 
responsible for worsening the relations between the two parts, as in 1961 a new (and 
more liberal and democratic) Constitution is approved and the power returns to the 
hands of civilians. Possibly, this democratic improvement may have influenced the next 
step: the signature of the Association Agreement (also known as the Ankara 
Agreement) in 1963, as well as the first Financial Protocol. The first document foresaw 
the constitution of a customs union and full EEC membership.  
 After a positive decade, the end of the 1960s raises some difficulties to Turkey-
EEC relations. Despite the 1970 approval of an Additional Protocol and the second 
Financial Protocol, the Turkish government was not satisfied yet (Faucompret & 
Konings, 2008: 27). In the same year happens another military intervention that began 
to worry the European Community (EC) due to the political instability of the country. 
This is one of the reasons why Atila Eralp called this new period (1970-1999), the 
“emergent discord” (Eralp, 2009: 153), as both domestic and international contexts were 
not favourable to the positive development of the relations. The military coup was one 
of the events, but not the only; problems in international economic relations (oil crises), 
the EC’s growing divergences with the USA regarding political and economic issues 
and the lack of consensus on Turkey’s European vocation fostered a less enthusiastic 
environment (Idem: 153). At the internal level, economic problems, Cyprus invasion in 
206 
 
1974 and new political tendencies against Turkey’s relations with the West completed 
the darker picture. A pro-Islamic party, the MSP, claimed the EC was a Christian Club 
and proposed an “Islamic Community”; at the same time, Turkey interpreted the 
European insistence on democracy and Human Rights’ issues as interference in internal 
affairs and the rest of the century was marked by a growing distance between Turkey 
and Europe (Idem: 154-156). 
 The 1980s were still problematic – the third military coup in a thirty-year period 
worsened the European perception towards the country’s political instability and lack of 
democratic maturity. Therefore, relations were frozen until the mid-1980s. The 
European Commission and the European Parliament were worried about democracy and 
Human Rights; and the member-states’ Ministers for Foreign Affairs also voiced their 
concerns, but were convinced that democracy would be established soon and, therefore, 
did not suspend the Association Agreement nor the Fourth Financial Protocol (Dagi, 
1996: 129). As Dagi wrote,  
“the EC’s mild initial attitude can be attributed to uncertainties about 
the policies of the new regime in Ankara. Thus, the Community 
adopted a policy of wait and see. They also did not want to alienate the 
new regime immediately after the coup and push it away from the 
sphere of influence of the European Community” (Idem: 129). 
This opinion reveals a very important fact: the EC already in the 1980s was trying to 
maintain the country under its leverage power, namely in terms of promoting or helping 
improving its democracy. 
 However, in 1981 a first more serious warning came from the European 
Parliament which adopted a resolution, demanding the restoration of democracy within 
two months and threatening with consequences. Even harsher was the position of the 
Socialists who asked for the suspension of the Association Agreement (Idem: 129), but 
which did not come to happen. In May 1981, the EC and Turkey agreed on a draft of the 
fourth financial protocol and the Turkish Ambassador declared the government was 
ready to accelerate the internal changes to become a candidate as soon as democracy 
was re-established. In June, the Protocol was prepared and increased in 94% the help for 
Turkey; nonetheless, this contribution would only be given according to the democratic 
developments in the country (Idem: 130). This promise was kept and, after criticising 
the lack of advancements in Turkey and the still very tough measures adopted by the 
military regime, the Commission decided not to resume the discussions for the 
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application of the fourth Protocol. Turkey became more and more politically isolated in 
Europe (Idem: 131). 
 In 1982 came an attempt of rapprochement. The 10 Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
decided to send a mission to Turkey, mainly to discuss the subjects of democracy and 
Human Rights. The country’s authorities ensure the EC they would return to democracy 
within two years. Moreover, a new Constitution was approved in a referendum and 
general elections were scheduled for November 1983. Yet, the request to give green 
light to the fourth Protocol did not succeed among the European institutions, which 
believed their interference in domestic politics was legitimate, since Turkey was 
applying for full membership of the Community  (Idem: 131-132). In April 1981, the 
President of the European Parliament visited Turkey and his report concluded that it 
was not necessary remove the country’s status as candidate to accession, but that the 
discussions and negotiations needed to continue. Some other diplomatic movements 
made both parts impatient regarding the whole process and there had been an increasing 
pressure on Turkey to improve its democratic and Human Rights’ standards – that 
pressure came from the European Community, but also from other major international 
organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the Amnesty International (Idem: 133-
137). 
 As Dagi concluded, Turkey was not capable of escaping this pressure which had 
its effects. General Evren appeared to be pretty anxious not to seem submissive to the 
EC’s influence, but  
“this oversensitivity is also a sign that European pressure was there 
and influencing his decisions, or at least that he had the European 
response in mind when he made decisions. (...) The argument, 
therefore, is that in the absence of any significant popular demand for a 
speedy return to civilian rule at the home front, a very important factor 
was the international-European environment and pressures from it. (...) 
the present danger of losing the gains and the accumulations of two 
hundred years constituted a long-term thinking that was behind the 
Generals’ decision to return to democracy” (Idem: 140-141). 
 It is interesting to observe, thus, that the European presence was already felt in 
Turkey at the end of the twentieth century and even more revealing is Dagi’s last 
conclusion regarding the role of a European Community whose leverage capacity over 
Turkey was rather limited due to the lack of mechanisms of conditionality and other 
tools it had, in the meanwhile, developed.  
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 Even despite all these conundrums, Turgut Özal decided to apply for full 
membership in 1987. The answer came two years and a half later and brought a “non 
courtois” (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 94), blaming the country’s economic and political 
situation for its unpreparedness and the subsequent refusal. Besides, there were also 
other issues that concerned some European countries, such as the access of Turkish 
labour force to the European market, the Cypriot problem and the fresh enlargement of 
the Mediterranean countries (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 31). This European stance 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union that ended a strategically important Cold War for 
Turkey created a new international context in which the EC began to be more focused 
on the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) that had just come from the 
Communist influence rather than on the Turkish application. The opinions on Turks’ 
reaction to this response are divided: Eralp (2009: 157) wrote that it originated a feeling 
of resentment; on the other hand, Ali Usul (2011: 77) the Commission’s report seemed, 
in a vague way, to accept the country’s eligibility for membership of it would undergo 
further reforms, creating an “overwhelming optimistic reaction to the report”. 
Nevertheless, according to Özal’s speech in September 1989, Turkey was ready to 
implement the reforms needed to improve its conditions (Usul, 2011: 76). 
 Whether Turks in general were optimistic or not, the fact is that the 1990s did 
not show sound developments in Turkey-EU relations. In June 1990, the European 
Commission proposed a package of economic and political measures to be implemented 
by Turkey in order to overcome the stalled situation of Turkey-EU relations, but it was 
rejected by the Greek veto and it could not come into effect (Faucompret & Konings, 
2008: 31). In spite of this obstacle, the negotiations for the Customs Union were being 
developed; they were, however, very slow: the EU demanded several changes to 
Turkey’s legislation (and Turkey asked for more money to concretise them) and there 
were political problems (like the detention of Kurdish deputies) that the EU wanted to 
be solved. In that context, the Turkish Parliament adopted a set of Constitutional 
amendments (namely the mandatory amendment of the Article 8 on the Anti-Terror 
Law, that was a sensitive issue, but a sine qua non condition for the European 
Parliament’s ratification) that convinced the European institutions.74 The Customs 
Union was finally reached, coming into force in 1996 (Idem: 35-36; Usul, 2011: 80). 
                                                          
74 The Greek blockage was overcome by the guarantee that Cyprus would be offered full membership 
(Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 36). 
 
209 
 
 This was a fundamental step for Turkey to come closer to the European Union. 
However, the following years were full of setbacks that shook the relations between the 
two: in 1997, from a meeting of EU foreign ministers came a consensus decision that 
shocked Turks: “Turkey is not a candidate to become a member of the European Union, 
short term or long” (cited in Usul, 2011: 81) for civilisational reasons. The weight of 
this communication should not be undervalued, as important individuals took part in 
this meeting (Kohl, Aznar and Prodi) and also because it re-agitated the waters of the 
“clash of civilisations” – the Christian club that would not allow a Muslim country to 
join. Some months later, EU President, Jacque Poos, declared in Ankara that accession 
would depend on solving one of the most sensitive problems in the country – the 
Kurdish issue (Idem: 81-82). Furthermore, and according to the Agenda 2000, adopted 
in 1997 as well, Turkey was not ready yet due to political and socio-economic problems 
that the document listed and among which one could find the macroeconomic 
instability, taxation system, state of agriculture and social security, the lack of freed of 
expression, conflicts Greece and Cyprus, civil-military relations, etc. (Faucompret & 
Konings, 2008: 36). And finally, at the end of that same year, the Luxembourg Summit 
did not include Turkey in the group of countries to accede in the next round of 
enlargements and that would not happen in the foreseeable future. In the following day, 
the Turkish government freezes the political relations with the Union and 1998 revealed 
to be a particularly difficult year for Turkey’s relations not only with the Union, but also 
with several individual countries (Idem: 37; Usul, 2011: 82-83). 
 The same summit had decided to write annual progress reports on Turkey and 
the first document of this type divulged a set of problems that needed to be tackled by 
the country if it really wanted to join the Union, namely: lack of fair trials, slowness of 
the judicial process, judges’ impartiality, the role of the National Security Council, 
problems with the freedom of expression, women’s status in the Civil Code, 
discrimination of non-Sunnis, the non-recognition of Kurds as a minority, Cyprus 
question, economy, corruption, clientelism, etc. (David, 2012: 195-196). Thus, Turkey 
had ahead a very long path to go through in order to meet all these (and other) demands 
and expectations on the Turkish side were rather low concerning their successful 
adoption and implementation and even lower when thinking about the final aim of 
membership. 
210 
 
 Nonetheless, the country approved in 1999 the fourth Constitutional Amendment 
Package with several important reforms and the 1999 Helsinki Summit reached a not 
expected decision, accepting Turkey as a candidate country, since the country was 
regarded as having fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria. Faucompret and Konings (2008: 
38) establish another causal link to justify this twist in the European position; according 
to these authors, the enlargement to the CEECs implied its acceptance as NATO 
members, which would be very naturally blocked by Turkey – already a member. 
Therefore, if the European Union wanted to have its candidates as NATO members, it 
had to convince Turkey to allow their accession. In return, Germany, Austria and 
Greece would give up their blockage and Turkey would become a candidate to full 
membership, what actually happened in 1999. This new status granted Turkey a set of 
new tools and mechanisms to help its development, such as a Pre-Accession 
Partnership, enhanced political dialogue, the country’s participation in European 
programmes and agencies, etc. (Idem: 39). 
 Thus, it seemed that the difficult decades that ended the twentieth century saw a 
meaningful U-turn in Turkey-EU relations and in the country’s approximation to 
Europe. As a matter of fact, the “emergent discord” phase terminates here and gives its 
place to a brand new era of a “positive turn”, using the same time division proposed 
above (Eralp, 2009: 157). As this new phase coincides with the beginning of the period 
this work aims to study more carefully, the dynamics since 1999 will be thoroughly 
analysed in the fourth and last part of the thesis. Yet, it seems relevant to mention Ali 
Usul (2011: 89-92) considerations regarding the influence of the European Union on 
Turkey in the pre-Helsinki period. According to the author, the European pressure had 
little success, as Turkey had, before that, a very vague and confusing condition and it is 
membership (or the perception of achieving it in the future) that constitutes an effective 
triggering factor for political transformation. Besides, there were no monitoring 
mechanisms, EU’s criticisms were “sporadic and non-systematic” and the country’s 
legal reforms were “insubstantial and not enough” (Idem: 90). As the same author 
concludes,  
“the EU (...) did not become an anchor for Turkey’s democratization 
during this period [before the Helsinki summit]. Turkey’s aspiration 
for EU membership did not receive a clear response from the 
Community. Its position vis-à-vis Turkey’s application for 
membership remained vague. (...) [However,] providing a full 
membership perspective to Turkey represented a paradigmatic change 
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in relations and thus the EU really began to function as a leverage to 
promote democracy in Turkey” (Idem: 98-99). 
 It is precisely this premise that the current work seeks to study and assess. Since 
1999, Turkey became an official candidate for membership and this incentive is 
supposed to have encouraged further reforms in the country to approximate it to the 
European patterns. This hypothesis will be under scrutiny in Part IV. For now, Turkey 
will continue to be the object of the attention of this thesis as a case study. 
 
7.3. A long learning process 
 
 The relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey until 1999 were, 
one can say, ad hoc. It was only when the Ottoman Empire perceived to be under the 
threat of disintegration that it decided to come closer to the block of countries that were 
better succeed. Following that logic, the Ottoman elite started to import and imitate the 
technologies, the knowledge and the life-style of a wealthy Europe. When the empire 
collapsed, the establishment of modern Turkey by Mustafa Kemal was based on a set of 
principles whose application aimed to develop the country, having as background the 
Western/European civilisation model. And then, Turkey progressively became closer to 
Europe and even started to engage in its organisations and institutions. The application 
for association membership and even for full membership reveal the country’s intention 
to formalise these relations, to make them more systematic and, after all, to be part of 
Europe.  
 This thesis aims to understand, among other objectives, to what extent the 
European Union influenced the Turkish democratisation process between 1999 and 
2009. However, it would be rather reductionist to limit the relations between the two, as 
they date back to the formation of the Empire Ottoman itself. It is in this intersection of 
conflict and cooperation that a synthesis of the relations can be found, even though they 
were not formalised or institutionalised – it is true that the request for membership is a 
form of institutionalisation of the relations, and the European Union had been present at 
that times, as well, but it is also undeniable that its leverage power and the intensity of 
those interactions are much higher in the post-Helsinki era, as, from that moment, the 
EU presents a strategy for the country with mechanisms and tools to accompany 
Turkey’s development both in terms of funding and of monitoring. 
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 It is, therefore, possible to envisage an evolution in the interactions between 
Europe and Turkey since the expansion of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, one can 
postulate that Turks began to want to be part of the European international system and 
then developed towards integrating in the European international society. This is a 
conceptual distinction made by Hedley Bull that fits this case study; according to the 
author, an international system consists of “two or more state [that] have sufficient 
contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause 
them to behave as parts of a whole” (Bull cited in Stivachtis, 2008: 18); on the other 
hand, an international society implies other requisites: “when a group of states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense 
that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations 
within one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Idem: 18). As 
Stivachtis (2008: 19) infers, the European Union represents a homogenous international 
society within a broader heterogeneous European international system. Therefore, the 
enlargement process means transforming the heterogeneous system “into a more 
homogeneous regional European international society” (Idem: 19). When it comes to 
Turkey, and since its European nature is not questioned, it is not difficult to perceive 
this evolution in the history presented on the last pages. In fact, after belonging to this 
international system, Turkey has been making the necessary changes to align with the 
European principles and values and, in that way, to share a common set of rules and 
institutions. 
 As it happens with individuals that need to learn the rules of the society they are 
embedded in through a process of socialisation, states, in this situation, also undergo 
through that same process. Interacting with other states in joint programmes or 
exchanges in the most varied fields promote closer links between the parts involved and 
help shape the countries’ identities and preferences in the sense that, although 
frequently the learning process is not conscious, they are object of the action of other 
peers. As it is written on chapter 4, socialisation results from the more or less long and 
intense interaction between different societies, fostering the absorption of models, 
values, institutions, principles, lifestyles, etc. Usually, this mechanism takes place when 
there are concrete projects that unite the two societies and Turkey’s history narrated 
earlier provides several examples of that, such as the European experts that went to 
Istanbul to help modernise the army, the state bureaucracy and education, and the 
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diplomats and other Ottomans who went to Europe to study and learn foreign languages 
and the Western scientific developments. In fact, besides the migratory movements, 
namely from the Balkans to Istanbul, the Ottoman Empire and Turkey also hosted 
several refugees and exiles. Two examples of how Europeans shaped the empire or the 
country with their presence, at the same time they were also influenced by Ottomans or 
Turks, are the Jews who fled from the Iberian Peninsula around 1942 because of the 
Catholic Reconquista and the over thousand Jews and non-Jews that sought for asylum 
in Turkey to flee from Nazi Germany. The latter were responsible for the development 
of several universities and several of them – philosophers, jurists, scientists, 
economists,... – received the Turkish nationality (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 139). 
 As the same authors explain, the more recent Turkish emigration to Europe has a 
two-side impact: besides the sometimes negative perception about Turks it creates at the 
hosting country and the also very visible remittances, the “come-and-goes between the 
European Union and the motherland promote the diffusion of reference norms or of the 
behaviours of the host country. These migration movements are, therefore, an element 
of social and cultural change in Turkey” (Idem: 142-143). These flows of people and, 
coupled with them, of ideas and renewed perceptions are of utmost importance for the 
socialisation process of an entire group or nation, as they start to be spread by some of 
their members and, possibly, reach the rest of the society. More interestingly, a study 
conducted in thirty-two Muslim communities around the world about their position 
regarding democracy concluded that  
“in almost all cases Muslims who lived in a democratic country for a 
year or more were supportive of both democratic institutions and 
democratic norms than were Muslims who had never enjoyed this 
experience. This result indicates that travel and living in a democracy 
are among the most, if not the most, influential agents of democratic 
socialization” (Fattah, 2006: 52). 
 These moments and flows, that began in the Ottoman period and continued over 
the centuries more or less intensively, can be described as incipient forms of 
europeanisation – in the cases they are related to interchanges with the European 
continent, naturally. Recalling Radaelli’s (2000: 4) definition, what was described 
above were  
“processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal 
and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of 
doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are (...) incorporated 
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in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and 
public policies”. 
Obviously, it is only since 1959 (and even more systematically since 1999) that one 
may refer to the role of the EEC/EC/EU as a source of formal directives to be adopted 
by Turkey; however, if europeanisation is here understood in its lato sensu, one cannot 
disagree that the diffusion and domestic incorporation of European values, procedures, 
knowledge, etc. have been happening for centuries.  
Europe has been working for Turkey as its “norm entrepreneur” (Börzel & 
Soyaltin, 2012: 9) that socialises the domestic actor through persuasion and learning 
mechanisms that take time. Besides, there are several conditions that facilitate or 
hamper domestic change; one of them, according to the same authors (Idem: 11-13) are 
power asymmetries – if the country has much to gain, the institution’s influence will be 
higher, for example. In the case of Turkey, belonging to the Concert of Europe, 
avoiding the disintegration of the empire, creating a secular Republic and achieving the 
international recognition as a full member of the European Union are gains that, over 
time, triggered the reforms. In the last part, it will be assessed how powerful the 
incentives are these days and if they are powerful enough to induce change and improve 
the country’s recent democracy. 
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8. A socio-cultural profile 
 
After having analysed the construction of Modern Turkey and the role the West 
played in those internal dynamics, a broad overview of the twenty-first century Turkey 
is needed to complete this approach to the case study, in order to proceed to the 
following and last part, in which all the knowledge gathered so far will be applied to 
find the answers to the initial questions. This chapter aims to provide the general 
landscape of current Turkey in its social and cultural dimensions mostly; given the 
wideness and complexity of the subject, as well as the distribution and weight of the 
chapters, this will be an analysis that will only touch upon the main issues according to 
the literature, to the opinions of the interviewees and to the scope of this thesis. 
Besides, and also due to the importance attributed to the ideational factors by 
Social Constructivism, it seemed appropriate to highlight those aspects to better 
understand this reality. In fact, the perceptions and perspectives offered by the Turkish 
interviewees constitute a very relevant contribution to the study of the country’s internal 
dynamics. Recalling the debate on the internal/external dimensions of the sources of 
democratisation, and as the conclusions pointed towards a process whose external 
influences are contextualised internally, deepening the knowledge on those internal 
phenomena comes out as a natural consequence. Furthermore, only when that internal 
side is acknowledged, is it more feasible to isolate, as much as these interconnected 
dimensions allow, the domestic and international dynamics from each other. And as 
Campbell (2010: 216) recognises, the politics of identity is fundamental to understand 
global affairs. 
Samuel Huntington’s (2002) thesis of the Clash of Civilizations75 is worldwide 
known and cited as a theoretical model to comprehend international events. According 
to this work, “culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization 
identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-
Cold War world” (Idem: 20). Therefore, and in line with this statement, culture and 
identity emerge as two of the key concepts of global politics after the Cold War. For 
Huntington (Idem: 21), the most important distinctions between peoples are not 
                                                          
75 As the author explains, this book resulted as the development of an initial thesis constructed in a 
Foreign Affairs’ 1999 article.  
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political, ideological or economic anymore, but rather based on culture and, therefore, 
they tend to group with (and struggle against) each other in terms of civilisation76: 
“A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the 
broadest level of cultural identity people have (...). It is defined by 
common objective elements such as language, history, customs, 
institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people” (Idem: 
43). 
Having this definition in mind, the current chapter will somehow follow its 
components and apply them to the study of Turkey: language, history (and also 
territory), religion, customs, institutions and self-identification will be therefore 
included in the structure of this chapter and more or less deeply developed on the 
following pages. 
 
8.1. Culture and identity  
 
 Democratic consolidation is not only about adopting formal rules and 
institutions. It is also, as written on Chapter 3, about democratic values being 
internalised by the citizens’ mind-sets and practices, so that this society is committed to 
maintain the new regime.  
 Culture, in very broad terms, can be defined as everything produced by human 
action; in that sense, it is the opposite of nature. Woodward (2002: 31) gives the 
example of food: nature provides men77 with food, but its consumption varies according 
to the cultural context someone is embedded in. The way food is prepared and eaten 
depends on that specific society’s gastronomic traditions and the social status, for 
example. Therefore, according to the author, cooking is a way of transforming nature 
into culture. 
 Thus, and as culture embraces all kinds of human production, several 
assumptions can be deduced: first, through culture, men organise reality; second, it 
takes us to the Constructivist conception that “materiality always signifies something 
                                                          
76 In fact, although the value of Huntington’s thesis is recognised and the importance the author attributes 
to culture and identity to analyse international events, we tend to disagree with the way he develops his 
arguments and the conclusions drawn from them, according to which the division of this multi-
civilisational world in cultural lines leads to a clash between those entities.  
77 The word “men” is, in this context, used as a synonym with human being, including both male and 
female genders. 
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that goes beyond itself” (Santos, 2007: 112) – an object is a physical material differently 
perceived and used by different communities. In other words, the material world is more 
than its tangibility. A certain reality or phenomenon (for example, the role of the Armed 
Forces in Turkish democracy) is perceived differently depending on the person who is 
judging it, because the tools they were given to interpret the world make them 
understand it in a way or another. But this perception and the relation I-world are not 
unchangeable, according to this perspective. On the contrary, it is a continuous, 
dynamic and complex process that is developed in the interaction with the others. In a 
more systematic and deeper form, during the socialisation process, the individual 
acquires a symbolic code that will frame his vision of the world (his Weltanschauung) 
from the above mentioned interaction with the society he is embedded in. As Dubar 
(1997: 31) explains, this process is interactive and encompasses permanent 
renegotiations and adaptations, as the individual progressively develops his 
representation of the world: socialisation constitutes the “gradual and slow construction 
of a symbolic code that (...) constitutes (...) a system of reference and assessment of the 
real that allows [the individual] to behave in a certain manner in a given situation”. In 
principle, the group’s attitudes are assumed as one’s attitudes and will tend to guide 
one’s behaviour more or less consciously. Third, culture becomes fundamental to 
produce meaning and reproduce social relations, embodying therefore the role as 
responsible for the maintenance of social order (Woodward, 2002: 31, 33; Santos, 2007: 
112). 
 Paula Santos (2007: 113-115) selected a set of attributes to culture: territory, 
language and blood. In that sense, she linked these three realities with the distinction 
character of each culture. Territory is the variable that links the individual with the 
place; usually this relation entails a feeling of belonging and possession. In the case of 
Turkey, the appeal of Mustafa Kemal for recovering the sovereignty over the territory 
they had lost triggered a nationalist response against the occupiers, for example. 
Language is obviously related to the specificity of the communication between the 
members of the group and one of the strongest markers of identity as it implies a 
socialisation process in which these symbols are shared. Finally, blood represents the 
human body and the symbolic cultural value of a biological object. 
 Given all these attributes and the strength of culture in the post-Cold War era, 
Huntington chose the broadest cultural units – civilisations – to understand global 
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politics and his arguments are really strong in that realm, as he states that “cultural 
identity is what is most meaningful to most people” (Huntington, 2002: 20) and 
therefore global affairs are constrained by these divisions of a multi-civilisational world. 
Civilisation and culture are a people’s way of life and includes their values, norms, 
institutions and so on (Idem: 42). Besides, what is also interesting in this approach is 
that the author recognises that cultural identities can be redefined and the composition 
of civilisations changes over time, as well as the fact that they are not political entities 
(Idem: 43, 44). 
 The West has been one of the most powerful civilisations for the last centuries; it 
was able to develop and modernise, mainly since the eighteenth century, and to become 
a powerful organisation ever since. But, in addition to its modernisation (in terms of 
education, wealth, technology, etc.), the West kept its core values and principles that 
existed way before the modernisation: the classical legacy, Catholicism and 
Protestantism, the separation of spiritual and temporal authorities, the rule of law, 
individualism, social pluralism and representativeness (Idem: 68-71). In fact, this 
distinction is important to highlight that the modernisation and westernisation of non-
Western societies due to the expansion of the West are two separate things. 
Subsequently, it is possible to find three reactions to the Western impact, according to 
Huntington (Idem: 72-76): refusing both modernisation and westernisation 
(rejectionism); accepting both (Kemalism); and embracing modernisation but not 
westernisation (reformism). These three dynamics are truly relevant for understanding a 
wide range of phenomena in international relations. 
 Obviously, Turkey (and the name attributed to the dimension is quite revealing) 
epitomises the Kemalist approach: the country, under the rule of Atatürk, sought to 
modernise and westernise. However, that strategy, for Huntington, failed and originated 
a torn country: “a society which was Muslim in its religion, heritage, customs, and 
institutions but with a ruling elite determined to make it a modern, Western (...) 
[through] the difficult and traumatic task of destroying a culture that has existed for 
centuries” (Idem: 74). 
 It is evident that Huntington does not believe in the success of the Turkish 
movement from one civilisation (the Islamic) to another (the Western). He presents, 
before explaining the Turkish case, the three requirements for this dynamic to occur 
successfully: the support of the elites, the support (or at least the acquiescence) of the 
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citizens and the willingness of the host civilisation to accept the new comers (Idem: 
139). In Huntington’s view, Atatürk’s attempt to modernise and westernise Turkish 
society – and subsequently to avoid all the Ottoman and Muslim roots – was criticised 
by Muslim and Arab countries, and also not truthfully welcomed by the hosts. The latter 
were the weakness of the whole process, since the “elites of the recipient, Western 
civilization were not receptive” (Idem: 148-149), despite the internal support both from 
the elites and the general citizens. 
“Turkish leaders regularly described their country as a ‘bridge’ 
between cultures. (...) A bridge, however, is an artificial creation 
connecting to solid entities but is part of neither. When Turkey’s 
leaders term their country as a bridge, they euphemistically confirm 
that it is torn” (Idem: 149). 
 From this hard comment on that so-used metaphor, it remains implicit that the 
artificial linkage is religion. Turkey, as belonging to the Muslim civilisation, is 
incompatible with the West and will never belong to that other group, according to this 
view. However, as Büthe and Gençer (2009: 12) stress, this does not have to be an 
obstacle, for Bulgaria, Greece and Cyprus belong to another civilisation (the Orthodox, 
in Huntington’s division) and they are still part of the European Union. Moreover, 
Greece’s religion was used as well in the 1970s to impede its integration and these days 
nobody notices that difference. Therefore, this division or even the artificiality of the 
Turkish bridge is not so linear and straightforward and it is here that the theory of the 
clash of civilisations may fail: the integration of a Muslim country in a Western 
organisation can only prove that cooperation is a feasible reality between different 
civilisations and that a closer relationship would improve the quantity and quality of the 
interactions between the two peoples, providing a sounding example to other countries 
and to the perspective of the inter-civilisation dialogue.  
 Yet, there is a phenomenon that needs to be taken into consideration and that 
may aggravate an already fragile balance between Turkey and the EU – or even the 
Islamic and the Western civilisations in general – and that is the resurgence of national 
identities. In fact, Kemalism began to be challenged in Turkey within the scope of a 
broader dynamic that was affecting the whole post-Cold War World. New nationalisms 
emerged as a natural consequence of globalisation, as a reaction to it (Juergensmeyer, 
2002: 4); some groups sought to reinforce ethnic and religious identities usually using 
transnational means and strategies (Idem: 4). They took advantage from that nation-state 
crisis, the general loss of trust in secularism and in the perverse side of modernisation 
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(Idem: 5-6) – exploitation, unemployment, urbanisation... –, so that traditional values 
and practices would replace the “savagery” caused by years of modernisation under the 
influence of the Western powers: “[the post-colonial generation] wanted to complete the 
process of decolonization by asserting the legitimacy of their countries’ own traditional 
values in the public sphere and constructing a national identity based on indigenous 
culture” (Idem: 7). 
 Samuel Huntington shares this view on the resurgence of anti-Western 
movements and calls it “indigenization” (Huntington, 2002: 91); in fact, it is a 
movement of using the Western decay to reinforce their position in the world scene. As 
the author wisely asserts (Idem: 92), “as Western power declines, the ability of the West 
to impose Western concept of human rights, Liberalism, and democracy on other 
civilizations also declines and so does the attractiveness of those values to other 
civilizations”. Furthermore, this originates an interesting paradox, as non-Western 
societies use Western-imported (democratic) institutions to have access to power and 
thus pursue their anti-Western agendas (Idem: 94). In the same line, the failure of 
modernisation is attributed by them to the separation from God, leading to a re-
evangelisation movement – the aim is “no longer to modernize Islam but to ‘Islamize 
modernity’” (Idem: 96). Religions in general and Islam in particular provide a source of 
identity and of comfort for people whose roots were lost in their pursuit for 
modernisation and better life conditions: “Re-Islamization ‘from below’ is first and 
foremost a way of rebuilding an identity in a world that has lost its meaning and become 
amorphous and alienating” (Lewis cited in Huntington, 2002: 98). Religions, thus, try to 
provide solutions for social problems; modern emptiness is filled up with religious 
precepts, fostering a feeling of relief and satisfaction for those who believe to be 
returning to their original, traditional identity and customs. Moreover, in most Muslim 
countries, there are no real, credible political alternatives for the well-organised and 
promising Islamic parties.  
It is in this context that Huntington develops his major theory: “In this new 
world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of 
civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations” 
(Idem: 28). In this regard, he sees the inevitability of conflicts between different 
civilisations – not recognising therefore that “anarchy [or the relations between the 
civilisations] is what states [and other actors] make of it”, recalling Wendt’s expression, 
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and that differences in identities do not necessarily lead to conflicts; peaceful co-
habitation is possible. 
Nonetheless, each culture embeds a particular identity (or set of similar 
identities) and the practices and identity of a specific culture are delimited by the 
boundaries of other cultural groups, through what Woodward (2002: 33) names a binary 
opposition between insiders and outsiders. Identity comes therefore as another 
fundamental concept in this study. 
 
Identity is a concept used in diverse Social Sciences and Humanities, such as 
Psychology, Sociology and Anthropology. International Relations also borrow this 
concept and use this variable in order to supply a fresh perspective to its problematic. 
However, identity, both as a concept and a social construction, has to be contextualised. 
It is not something given or completely frozen and, as a mutable variable, Science has to 
take that into consideration when analysing it. On the contrary, identity results from a 
process of construction that is never finished or complete. An individual’s identity is 
therefore developed within the context of his own culture; what surrounds him shapes 
the way he perceives the world and the meaning he attributes to certain phenomena and 
realities. 
As identity develops interacting with the others in the context of a larger group 
and as there are many groups, it is not possible that the individual only possesses a 
single identity, but rather many coexisting identities. Despite the co-existing identities, 
belonging to one group often implies the exclusion from another one. This dynamic 
allows the above mentioned dichotomies and others, such as “us”/ “them” and “self”/ 
“other”. These oppositions set boundaries and establish who belongs to “our” group and 
who does not: “identities are forged through the making of difference” (Woodward, 
2002: 29). Paradoxically, knowing who “we” are not is the way of providing a feeling 
of belonging and knowing who “we” are. Each group has its own way of classifying the 
world, i.e., it is its culture that differentiates it from other groups and thus makes the 
individual distinct from a member of other cluster.  
 In fact, these oppositions set frontiers, determining who is in and who is out, and 
this differentiation can be regarded more positively, accepting the other, or more 
negatively, emphasising the lack of identification with the other and thus marginalising 
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the outsiders78. The feeling of alterity develops being the antonym of the “self” (Ferréol 
& Jucquois, 2004: 4) and implies the following reasoning: there are the others and I am 
not their similar; the other is the “non-moi” whom I am not linked to (Idem: 4). Thus, 
collective identities are developed so that the group is clearly defined in relation to its 
“alters” or others. Once a set of people believes they share the same values, attitudes 
and perceptions, they establish their identity and try to maintain it, as there is always “a 
basic fear about the mortality of the collective institution” (Robins, 1996: 61), that is 
what frequently happens, for instance, when citizens like the Turks or any other 
European people are afraid of losing their identity through being absorbed or integrated 
in a wider group like the European Union. 
 From an individual standpoint, to change an institutionalised identity can only be 
explained by a motivation that makes him believe that “the benefits of taking on the 
new identity must be expected to be greater than the likely costs of sticking with the 
old” (Zehfuss, 2004: 56) – these costs are not only material ones, but mainly ideational: 
feeling of identification with other group that provides a stronger sense of security and 
belonging, realisation and accomplishment. As a result of a set of social interactions 
(and learning) emerges a consciousness of “soi” that promotes the cognitive process of 
identification in the moment the individual perceives the similarities with the group 
(Ferréol & Jucquois, 2004: 20; Woodward, 2004: 14). It is in this context that collective 
identities emerge. As mentioned above, the existence of many groups means the 
existence of multiple identities and therefore it is inaccurate to attribute a single identity 
to each individual. Thomas Risse (2005: 168) proposes three ways in which different 
identities are able to relate to each other: a) “nested” identities are pictured as concentric 
circles, according to which identity A is within identity B, which in turn is embedded in 
identity C and so forth; b) “cross-cutting” identities refer to some members of one group 
that are simultaneously members of another group79; c) the “marble cake” is a metaphor 
that resembles the fact that different elements of an individual’s identity are inter-related 
and cannot be clearly separated from each other, as they are blended. 
Thus, from this perspective raising a European identity does not automatically 
mean a decrease in the involvement with the national identity, which is one of the 
                                                          
78 Hence, the clash of civilisations is not a fatality. 
79 In order to clarify this second conceptualisation, the author quotes the following example: “Some 
women might feel a strong gender identity, but only a subgroup of them might also identify with Europe, 
while the latter group also encompasses women without a strong sense of gender identity” (Risse, 2005: 
168). 
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nationalists’ fears. As well as each individual has multiple sub-national identities, a 
supranational identity can be added to this set of multiple identities. In a globalised 
world with blurred boundaries, so the feelings of attachment may also be blurred due to 
communication technologies and travelling possibilities. Nevertheless, globalisation 
also meant the reinforcement and re-strengthening of national identities, given the fact 
that it was (and still is) perceived as a threat to national identities that reacted coming 
back to origins and traditions. Frequently, these reactions may lead to the development 
of imagined communities, that are, according to Woodward (2002: 18), the outcome of 
the wish for restoring a unity that never existed as such. In that sense, they are imagined 
and not real. 
Poststructuralism also provides an interpretation of the role of identity, arguing 
that human experience is structured by dualisms (interior/exterior; domestic/foreign; 
East/West; etc.) and that the outside is central to the constitution of the inside 
(Campbell, 2010: 225). In that sense, identity is, also for this theory, “culturally 
constructed through a series of exclusions” (Idem: 225) – again the idea that the ‘other’ 
establishes the boundary. As Constructivism postulates, identity is a construct that 
comes from that interaction. As long as the groups are formed, positive or negative 
identification with other groups (or states in IR, for example) makes the group more or 
less willingly to engage with others (Zehfuss, 2004: 40). It is through repeated 
interaction that identities and interests are created and maintained, giving origin to 
certain social structures that constrain choices and guide actors’ behaviour. These 
structures become objective social facts and are only capable of changing through social 
learning and with conscious efforts to change it (Idem: 43-46). 
Hence, it is not difficult to understand that identity constitutes a valuable 
variable for the study of world politics: it provides a relevant input regarding a not so 
common approach that values culture, ideas and the contributions of Social Psychology 
as a way of understanding the purpose of an actor’s action. Therefore, events are more 
deeply scrutinised and a more superficial approach is overcome, so that the actor’s 
behaviour is more comprehensively understood, making it easier to realise its position 
within the international system, as well as to predict possible future behaviour, 
according to that actor’s images, perceptions, values, etc. – its mindset. The use of this 
variable and this broader cultural approach, on the other hand, helps understand “when, 
how, to what degree and why the cultural norms, standards and values play a significant 
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role in foreign policy and international relations” (Bugrova, 2000: 254) – alliances 
emerge from shared beliefs and values, i.e. similar identities, and clashes come from 
perceived threats, meaning that the way the countries or other actors perceive each other 
is very influential on how they relate to each of other members of the international 
system. As a result, identity constitutes an added value and an additional approach to 
study international relations. 
 
 8.1.1. Being “a Turk” 
 
Being “a Turk” is something not clearly defined nor widely accepted – “is a 
puzzling phenomenon” (Cagaptay, 2006: 1). This uncertain identity constitutes a socio-
cultural synthesis that was constructed and re-constructed over time. As Yavuz (cited in 
Waxman, 2000: 3) wrote, “few countries in the modern period have had their identity 
contested as bitterly and interpreted as variously as the Republic of Turkey”. It can be 
added that not only in the Modern period has Turkish identity been contested, but since 
the creation and affirmation of the Ottoman Empire, where multiple influences reached 
from both sides of the Empire, shaping the way Ottomans used to see the world and 
themselves. In terms of Turkishness, all Muslims are considered Turks, but non-
Muslims, even if they do speak Turkish, are not seen as “real” Turks (Cagaptay, 2006: 
1). It follows that other religious groups are discriminated against in this perception of 
Turkishness and also that religion is a central aspect of the definition of this identity. 
It is interesting to notice the evolution of Turks’ self-perception of their “main” 
identity. To the question “Would you primarily describe yourself as...?” (Figure 15, 
below), 44.6% answered they are first Muslims; on the other hand, 29.9% see 
themselves as citizens of the Turkish Republic and 19.4% as Turks (Çarkoğlu & 
Toprak, 2007: 44)80. The first conclusion that can be drawn is that religion plays an 
outstandingly important role in the definition of who is a Turk (and, simultaneously, 
who is not). Islam is still able to be used as a useful social unifying drive and cannot be 
disregarded in this function by political decision-makers. However, even more 
                                                          
80 These values come from the published results of a survey led in Turkey during 2006 to about 1 500 
individuals in face-to-face interviews. They also compare the 2006 results with the ones of the 1999 
survey. More details on this survey and its methodologies can be found in Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2007. 
 
 
225 
 
Source: Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 44 
Figure 15: Turks’ primary identity 
important is the comparison with the results of the 1999 survey: in this short period of 7 
years, the two options of the national identities (as a citizen or as a Turkish) decreased 
their representation 4.2% and 1.4% respectively. In contrast, the three options that stood 
for ethnic-religious identities – as a Muslim, as a Kurd or as an Alevi – increased their 
supporters (8.9%, 1.5% and 0.2% respectively) (Idem). These results sustain 
Huntington’s theory that post-Cold War era has been facing an “indigenisation” process 
with the reinforcement of local identities in a reaction to more globalised flows. 
Contrarily to this tendency, and when analysed the education level of the respondents, 
the higher the education level, the lower the first identity is linked to Islam and the more 
they see themselves as citizens of the Turkish republic: 76.8% of the illiterate define 
themselves first as Muslim whereas only 24% of the graduates do it; conversely, only 
8% of illiterates think of themselves as citizens of Turkey, while the value raises to 
44.3% among the graduates (Idem: 46). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These constructions and re-constructions depended both on the actors involved 
in the process and on the dynamics and emphasis that were privileged. This means two 
things: first, identities are mutable and this example epitomises that premise; second, 
there is a lack of stability regarding the meaning of being a Turk. These two phenomena 
combined are of utmost importance to understand the Turks’ difficulties in dealing with 
others: should they emphasise their Islamic side and consequently improve their 
relations with the Arab counterparts or should Turks highlight their Westernised 
character and therefore widen their relations with the USA and Europe? 
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Any collective identity embraces a long and extremely complex process of 
formation, development, internalisation, sometimes contestation and continuous 
redefinitions. As it was previously stated, identities have to be contextualised within a 
broader framework that contributes to a better understanding of this social construct. 
From the reading of the previous chapters, it is not difficult to realise how especially 
complex the Turkish case is, given the multiple and frequently contradictory 
contributions to the construction of its current identity(ies).  
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire (and even during its existence), Turkey 
tried to modernise. This effort of modernisation was inspired in the Western model. At 
the same time, the country had to cope with its own peculiarities, mainly its Islamist-
oriented culture. On the European side, values such as democracy and Human Rights, as 
well as the concept of modernism, are part of an entrenched and anciently rooted 
identity with a strong Jewish-Christian background and a product of centuries of 
maturation and development that led the continent to the stage it nowadays occupies 
(apart from any moral judgement of that state of development). Understandably, trying 
to follow a certain model, to adopt and adapt it to a different reality results in a bigger 
effort, as there is the danger of merely imitating and not comprehensively internalising 
it. Besides, there is the natural tension and opposition on the side of the population to 
change their deep-rooted habits. Almost a century has passed since Kemal’s first efforts 
of modernisation and some other centuries have also gone since the Ottomans decided 
to “Europeanise”; and a reflection needs to be made. 
Nowadays, Turkish society constitutes a very special case where many different 
influences are melted and mixed to form what it is today. José Teixeira Fernandes 
considers that Turkish cultural-national identity is fragmented. In order to prove his 
point, Fernandes mentions some of Turkey’s social key problems: the division between 
the majority of Sunnis and the Alevi minority; the separatist problem with the Kurds 
and the denial of the Armenian’s genocide (Fernandes, 2005: 79-97). Indeed, these 
problems reflect a certain degree of lack of identification of some minorities with the 
major definition of Turkishness, at the same time the majority of the population does 
not include in their definition of collective identity other sub-groups that could be 
embedded in their sense of being a Turk. Kentel (2011: 52) argues that Turks’ 
uncertainty of belonging leads to the use of two solid references: the secular 
Turkishness and Islam. The apparent incompatibility between both visions seems not to 
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affect that feeling of belonging, as they consider it possible to combine both. Turkish 
nationalism should be regarded as a synthesis of all these (and other) influences. 
Although this may seem a socially fragmented society, which is actually the case to a 
certain extent, the inclusion of these groups is certainly part of a learning process the 
Turkish society is undergoing at the moment of its candidacy to the European Union. 
Thus, Turkish identity and nationalism, despite being still in a consolidation and 
readjustment process, is likely to change towards a more inclusive definition if the 
country, again, truly commits to the European standards defined in the Copenhagen 
criteria and present throughout the process of integration. In the meanwhile, once more, 
Turkey faces another moment of redefining who Turks believe they are. How they 
perceive themselves will influence their relations with other international actors and 
subsequently their position in the world. Some of those dimensions will be briefly 
covered in the following sections. 
 
8.2. Lifestyle, women and human rights 
 
 People’s attitudes and behaviour are also object of democratising drives, in the 
sense that they are supposed to adopt a certain set of values and practices that reinforce 
the country’s democratic regime (as written on Chapter 3). The continuous shaping and 
re-shaping of Turkey’s collective identity, and even of its narrative, creates a certain 
degree of instability regarding the endeavour to know who Turks are. They have been 
modernised at the time of the foundation of the new Republic, but then, as noticed in the 
previous section, Islamic, ethnic and traditionalist movements’ resurgence nuanced the 
results of that modernisation: polygamy was only forbidden since the adoption of a 
Swiss-inspired Civil Code by Atatürk, but Andrew Mango (2004: 119) reveals that in 
Turkey’s countryside there are still some cases happening. On the other hand, however, 
divorce has become progressively more common in the country, as well as the social 
acceptance of the co-habitation of unmarried couples (Idem: 120). At the same time, in 
the countryside, “honour killings” continue to be a way to show the social discontent 
with some situations and, even more shocking, minors are used to perpetrate them in 
order to reduce the risk and the length of the imprisonment. Again, on the other hand, 
brothels are licensed and inspected (Idem: 120-121). These facts are paradoxical; they 
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reveal a Turkey with several gaps in terms of the coherence of its positions. As a 
Turkish academic (Interview, 2013e) stated when talking about these issues,  
“I do not think that a Turkey like this would have a place in European 
society. It is so far, so conservative. (...) three years ago, two guys 
killed 44 members of another neighbourhood. 44 members in a 
wedding ceremony inside their house for black feud. They were 
relatives. 44 members with Kalashnikovs. It happened in Turkey three 
years ago. (...) How can you explain it to a citizen in Porto? In 
Copenhagen?”. 
These thoughts reveal some important issues that still need to be addressed in Turkey. 
Besides, there is also another question regarding Turkey’s lifestyle which should be 
reflected upon and that the same interviewee focused on (Idem): “Istanbul, Ankara and 
Izmir are the most developed three cities in Turkey, but if you go outside Ankara, that is 
not the EU, actually, and it is most of the country”. This comment points out the 
regional differences and the state of development of less urbanised or developed areas 
which, in fact, seem to be a considerable part of the country. 
 Nonetheless, even in more developed cities, conservatism appears to be rising 
again. Two interviewees (one academic (Interview, 2013e) and one women’s rights’ 
activist (Interview, 2013g)) recognised that pattern, but highlighted that it is a different 
type of conservatism:  
“Culturally, Turkey is not improving; it’s getting more conservative in 
a way. But this is a different kind of conservatism; this came with the 
post-modern age, the conservatism of a global world. You see more 
women with headscarves, but with more iPhones, with more SUVs. 
This is a different kind of conservatism; it’s more materialised” 
(Interview, 2013e). 
 In the same survey quoted above, in a question about marriage, it is interesting 
to notice that still around 22% of the respondents considered a better option (“more 
appropriate” is the designation of the question) if the family arranges the marriage 
(Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 72). Yet, if one looks closer to the distribution of these 
options, 28% of these respondents came from rural areas and almost 19% were from 
urban areas. The same pattern can be found in the literacy variable (the more educated, 
the less prone they were to support arranged marriages) and in the left-right political 
spectrum (the more to the right, the higher the agreement with them) (Idem: 73). These 
values reveal a considerable degree of conservatism and some social fractures regarding 
issues of this kind. These results may be one of the reasons why the same interviewee 
explained that, in the last six years, her organisation has been committed to “early and 
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forced marriages” (Interview, 2013g). There have been a set of initiatives to bring the 
subject to public debate and to the general awareness in coordination with a platform of 
64 other NGOs called “Say No to Child Marriages”; internationally, they also have a 
project entitled “Girls not Brides” which allows exchanges and interactions at a broader 
level to tackle to problem.  
 Concerning the same issue of marriages, Çarkoğlu and Toprak’s (2007) survey 
divulged that 50,5% of the surveyed would oppose their children to marry a Muslim 
from another sect and this value almost achieves the 70% when it comes to oppose their 
daughters to marry a non-Muslim. In what comes to marriage, a Turkish academic 
(Interview, 2013e) highlighted the fact that still today there are girls forced to marry and 
that in the same day of the interview some news were reporting the murder of a 
nineteen-year-old girl who refused to marry the man she was supposed to as his third 
wife in Southeast Turkey. Besides, he alerted, “look at the rate of women killed by their 
husbands in Turkey; this is so widespread” (Idem). Women are also object of several 
restrictions, mostly in less developed areas – “young girls cannot go out in the evening 
in many parts of this country” (Idem). In fact, this opinion is supported by the data: in a 
poor working district of Istanbul, Ümraniye, 44% of women need a man’s permission to 
leave home in daytime and that value increases to 96% in the evenings (Mango, 2004: 
118). There is not, therefore, gender equality in Turkey, except in a very particular 
section of the society, the urban middle-class, in which these cases are not so common 
(Idem). Still, girls study in average two years less than boys (Idem: 117), justifying why 
Flying Broom and other organisations develop such a serious work all over the country 
to overcome these issues (Interview, 2013g). Not only at school, but also in politics, for 
example, are women unevenly represented: only 2 out of 81 mayors in Turkey are 
women and only 14% of the Parliament is composed by female deputies and “nobody 
speaks about this” (Idem). Despite the efforts of the NGOs and the important 
achievements in the adoption of legislation in line with the European standards, that  
“brought really really good on rights to women (...), we are a country 
where all looks good on the paper (...), but when you look at the de 
facto equality, we are at the bottom. (...) [The gap] is so big because 
the hardest thing is to change the attitude. You can change the laws, 
but if you don’t implement them, it does not work at all” (Idem).  
Therefore, one of the main issues regarding women’s rights in Turkey is the 
implementation of the already adopted measures and their internalisation by the 
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population, as the lack of a tradition of respect for women and for their equal treatment 
is a very time consuming task. 
 Human rights in general suffer from the same problem. This is a major issue in 
Turkey and in its relations with the European Union, which considers it one of the 
country’s biggest weaknesses (Cf. Chapter 9). Minority rights are another field Turkey 
is usually much criticised about – the difference between their recognition in theory and 
practice is one of the problems (Fernandes, 2005: 18). According to this author, the 
other’s identity is frequently subject to distortions that may bring harming or even 
aggressive behaviour towards the other. In that sense, a real and effective rule of law is 
mandatory to protect the minorities from these situations, also granting them more 
political, religious and linguistic freedoms (Idem: 18). Turkey’s uneasiness with 
minority rights has an important historical background; for decades, human rights in the 
European language only meant for Turks granting more freedoms to Kurds (Interview, 
2013e), which is a very sensitive subject among them. Understandably, they used to 
look at requests to improve minority’s rights suspiciously, afraid of the Kurds’ 
separatist line. According to the same academic, this is not the case anymore. 
 Yet, another relevant factor for this stance lies in the country’s security-centred 
perspective. Being surrounded by an unstable neighbourhood and also with internal 
enemies, Turks had to adapt to a constant alert position, aggravated by the military’s 
coups and the subsequent state-centred and security-centred Constitutions (Interview, 
2013h). Security concerns were prioritised over individuals’ interests and the freedoms 
of organisation and expression, for instance, were limited in the sake of the state’s 
security (Idem). Citizens used to be afraid of the police – the Ministry for EU Affairs’ 
official conveyed the generalised feeling during the time of the military’s rule when a 
friend was arrested for wearing a scarf in his neck due to a sore throat, which was 
interpreted as a political symbol81; people were afraid of the police (Interview, 2013i), 
as cases of abuse of power and mistreatment were not rare. Even much later, in the early 
2000s, Andrew Mango (2004: 124) reveals that between January 2000 and April 2001 
from the 1 500 policemen prosecuted for mistreating prisoners, only 113 were convicted 
and only 26 out of the 160 accused of torture were formally convicted. And although 
these numbers are low, coupled with the instruction security forces have been receiving 
on human rights, they have an impact on police behaviour.  
                                                          
81 Again, the importance of interpretation and perception in social relations. 
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 Freedom of expression is another particularly sensitive issue in Turkey: a 
Turkish academic recognised that the European criticisms on that area were “quite fair” 
because the country had problems at that level (Interview, 2013h); another academic 
was harder on his comments and argued that “journalists cannot publish the news freely 
because they can be fired”: in fact, several journalists from Hizmet, Taraf and Sözcü82 
have lost their jobs like that (Interview, 2013b). The interviewed editor of a Turkish 
newspaper asserted that the issue of imprisoned journalists needs to be seriously 
addressed but that Turkey’s special context of the military coups, which cannot be 
ignored yet, that scenario is still possible, justifies the carefulness towards the military 
(Interview, 2013c) – it can be assumed for this statement that, from his point of view, 
some media control is necessary for security reasons. On the other hand, when talking 
about the freedom of expression, the official from the Ministry for EU Affairs recalled 
the case of Fazil Say83 and the Prime-Minister’s reaction who, despite disagreeing with 
the pianist, stated that there “should be freedom also for bullshitting” (Interview, 2013i), 
in a reference to the healthy environment of the freedom of expression in Turkey. 
Besides, as the interviewee highlighted, Fazil Say was sentenced to ten-month 
imprisonment, but he did not go to jail literally; the sentence was postponed for five 
years “just supposing he misbehaves” (Idem). If the “misbehaviour” the official referred 
to was related to the pianist’s comments, then Turkey should address this issue more 
carefully as an imprisonment sentence sounds like an overreaction to the statement. This 
position regarding freedom of expression can be reinforced by some other statements by 
the official: “So, there are some general values, but, especially for freedom of 
expression and everything, people might feel irritated through some reading materials” 
(Idem). 
                                                          
82 Hizmet is a newspaper linked to the Gülen Movement; Taraf is a liberal newspaper, the one that 
revealed the Ergenekon case and Sözcü belongs to the radical left wings, close to the CHP and the 
Worker’s Party, with the support of secularists and nationalists. 
83 “In April 2012, Say posted controversial tweets asking whether heaven in Islamic tradition is like a 
brothel or a pub because the Quran says there are rivers of wine and huris (very beautiful women) in the 
afterlife for those who commit good deeds while on Earth. Say also tweeted about a muezzin who recited 
the evening call to prayer in 22 seconds, wondering whether he was in a rush to reunite with his lover or 
go to a rakı table. Say explained his controversial tweets as verses from a poem by Omar Khayyam, a 
Persian poet. The prosecutor's office has found that Say's statements run contrary to the first and third 
points of Article 216 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK). These points concern the offenses of “inciting 
hatred and enmity among the public” and “insulting religious values.” (Today’s Zaman, 16/04/2013, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-312831-erdogan-refuses-to-comment-on-pianist-says-sentence.html ) 
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 Thus, human rights in Turkey, one of the most severely criticised domains by the 
European Union in its reports, need to be dealt with in a particularly thorough fashion, 
given their current state in the country – the assessment by different international 
organisations may be observed in the next part of the thesis. Freedoms of expression, 
association, torture and ill-treatment, as well as minorities, constitute a set of fields 
Turkey apparently needs to invest on. Again, as the women NGO representative said, 
the de facto application of the laws is still the major problem behind human rights 
(Interview, 2013g). 
 
8.3. Kurds, Cypriots and Armenians 
 
 A democratically consolidated democracy entails the recognition of democratic 
practices both inside and outside its borders. Once committed to democratic principles, 
they have to be applied, among others, in the country’s foreign policy, accepting and 
complying with the institutionalised international law (cf. Chapter 3). These are three 
issues that also help understand much of Turkey’s choices in terms of internal and 
external policies. Although the subjects under consideration in this section may seem 
unrelated, the truth is that all of them have a direct impact on the country’s European 
integration, as well as all of them somehow result from the Turkish difficulty to deal 
with the other, in the sense that the solution of all these problems would imply 
accepting the other’s point of view, concede and compromise in several fields and deal 
with the other’s peculiarities and differences in relation to the Turkish identity and 
perception. 
 Kurds are a minority indeed, but a significant one. The numbers vary; however, 
Bahcheli and Noel (2011: 101) point to a total of 15% of the whole population. 
Interestingly, Kurdish sources raise it to 25% and Turkish ones lower it to 10% (Idem: 
118). Kurds are of Iranian origin and this issue goes back to the establishment of the 
Republic in 1923. The Sèvres Treaty foresaw some degree of autonomy (and even the 
independence), but Mustafa Kemal always revealed to be against any type of self-
determination. As a consequence, the Lausanne Treaty was not so bold in terms of 
granting rights to Kurds, who were not even considered a minority, as they were 
included in the group of the Muslim majority (Fernandes, 2005: 84-85). The fear was 
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that the newly established Republic suffered the same problem that contributed to the 
decay and fall of the Ottoman Empire – opening a precedent for other nationalist 
movements, such as the Bulgarians, Arabs or Greeks. 
 At the end of the Second World War, Kurds organised themselves politically and 
established the PKK (in 1974 – the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party) (Idem: 85-87). In the 1980s, the PKK began a guerrilla war as a reply 
to the state’s prohibition of the Kurdish New Year’s celebrations (Idem: 88), beginning 
an era of bloody conflicts between the two factions and the declaration of state 
emergency in ten provinces in the Southeast of Turkey (Usul, 2011: 153). In 1999, the 
party’s leader, Öcalan, is captured and the conflict smoothes with this psychological 
defeat, although its violence has never completely disappeared, being particularly 
intensive again during the 2000s. As Yeğen (2011: 67) summarises,  
“The Turkish Republic has, since its establishment in the early 
1920s, wrestled with the Kurdish question, which has assumed 
many forms since then, including armed resistance, massive 
political discontent, lack of cultural integration and acute 
poverty”. 
The same author divides the development of the Kurdish issue into three phases: the 
pre-denial phase, in the years before 1923 and some willingness to recognise the 
minority; the denial period, until the 1990s, when cultural and political rights were 
refused to Kurds, as well as their ethnic status; and finally the post-denial stage, since 
the 1990s with some efforts to recognise the Kurdish question and to deal with it (Idem: 
67). 
 Kurds are, for Usul (2011: 151) one of the reasons why Turkey performed so 
poorly in terms of human rights and democracy in general in the 1980s and 1990s: 
torture, extra-judicial killings, evacuation of villages, arbitrary detentions, etc. Besides, 
their identity was rejected by the state itself and the Turkish elites perceived it as a 
“product of the Great Powers abroad” (Idem: 151). So, the Kurdish issue was not only a 
matter of internal security, but also a reason for the country to be suspicious about the 
Western involvement – hence all the European attempts to talk about human rights used 
to be seen with some discomfort, as written earlier. 
 The strategies used by successive governments have failed, since the problem 
still exists, maybe because they constituted an “amalgam of old and new, blending 
assimilation and oppression with discrimination and recognition” (Yeğen, 2011: 67). 
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Solving this issue is not uncomplicated; in fact, on the other side of a peaceful 
compromising solution, there are “proposals proved too contentious and politically 
unrewarding to be adopted” (Bahcheli & Noel, 2011: 101). The violent response by the 
state to the demands of the Kurdish people has brought nothing but more violence and 
tension between the two parts. Nevertheless, the willingness of several political leaders 
to find an end to this struggle only led “their efforts [to arise] more suspicion and 
hostility than support” (Idem: 102) and the political costs of decisions of this kind is 
always well balanced before their adoption: nationalists, the Constitutional Court 
(usually close to the Kemalist line), the consensus with other political parties to achieve 
a Constitutional amendment, voters from all factions and Kurds are several variables 
that jeopardise the solution of this conundrum. The official from the Ministry for EU 
Affairs recognised the weight of this subject on the domestic affairs:  
“The Kurdish issue has always been a part of the Turkish democratic 
problem starting from the 1980s (...) because, as the famous saying, 
violence breeds violence. (...) And if you think that the average age in 
Turkey is 29 right now – and the PKK is actually 29 years –, so we 
grew up with this and it has become part of the Turkish population 
daily life” (Interview, 2013i).  
Similarly, for a Turkish academic, the Kurdish issue and minority rights, coupled with 
the need for a new Constitution, are “the major issues in terms of the Turkish 
democracy” (Interview, 2013h). 
 Another important issue for Turkish democracy and its accession process, as it 
involves a conflict with a member-state of the organisation, is Cyprus. This small island 
in the Mediterranean always attracted foreign powers for its strategic location that 
allows the control of the Eastern side of the sea. In 1914, it was transformed by the 
United Kingdom in a type of colony. Cypriots, however, were discontent with this 
situation; they did not want independency, rather they preferred to unite with Greece 
whom they had become independent from a century before. Greek-Cypriots still felt 
Greece as their homeland, in opposition to the Turkish-Cypriots who chose the division 
of the island in two different states (Losano, 2009: 43). Mario Losano (Idem: 43) wrote 
that the unification of the island was hard due to the tension between the two parts 
caused by their socio-economic, linguistic and religious differences, by the legacy of 
their respective “homeland” (Turkey and Greece) and finally by the Turkish-Cypriots’ 
“historically reasoned” fear of being oppressed by the Greek-Cypriots.  
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Despite the apparently jubilant moment of the formal independence of the 
country in 1960, the truth is that the lack of a foreign power to keep the country’s unity 
in its dualism led to a growing manifestation of those cultural differences (Idem: 44). 
Losano explains the situation: “At the roots of the tension is probably the fact that there 
is not a true and actual Cypriot nationality, but rather the two communities of the island 
that felt part of a different nation due to their language, religion and culture” (Idem: 45). 
From 1964 to 1974 the Greek-Cypriot community dominated the political and economic 
life of the island and the tension between the two peoples grew during that decade. In 
1974 the Greek military dictatorship planned to Appendix the whole island, but in July 
the Turkish troops occupied the Northern part of Cyprus. From that moment onwards a 
Turkish-Cypriot community rules the Northern part of the territory, never recognised by 
the Greek-Cypriot government. Still, in 1983, within the scope of the international 
principle of self-determination, they proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (Idem: 46-49), only internationally recognised as such by Turkey. 
This brief outlook of the history of the island and its division is important to 
frame the question84. As known, in 2004, Greek-Cypriot side of the island entered the 
European Union, creating a serious obstacle to the Turkish accession process and its 
natural final outcome of full membership. It is relevant, however, to emphasise that the 
EU was in favour of a resolution with the unification of the island and that there was an 
international plan for this crisis sponsored by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, the Annan Plan, which was actually supported by both the EU and the United 
Sates (Mango, 2005: 26). This plan was subject to a referendum to all the citizens of 
Cyprus in April 24, 2004 and despite the Northern support and formal approval, the 
Greek community refused it, making unviable its application and the settlement of the 
dispute. 
Cyprus is then a serious obstacle to the Turkish accession and when asked about 
the possible double standard approach of the EU towards Turkey in several issues, the 
interviewee from the Ministry for EU Affairs chose Cyprus to prove that point: “they 
[the EU] use a small island, a semi-state according to the Constitution” to create 
problems to Turkey – namely blocking chapters – and  
“Merkel and Chirac used the Cyprus issue as a scapegoat (...) You 
don’t do that, because the Turkish community voted yes for the Anna 
                                                          
84 For further details on this issue, for example, cf.Fernandes, 2008. 
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Plan. The other community voted no for that. And the EU backed the 
Annan Plan and so double standards started from there” (Interview, 
2013i). 
 Turkey has also quandaries with other neighbours: Armenians. After the First 
World War, almost all the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire disappeared 
(Fernandes, 2005: 90). They comprised approximately 10% of the inhabitants of 
Anatolia and were since the nineteenth century targets of the Muslim hostility against 
the Christians. In the hope to become an independent state, Armenians joined the 
Russian Army in the First World War fleeing the Ottoman Army; the Ottomans reacted 
to this “betrayal” through deciding to extradite all the Armenian population from the 
war zone to Zor, at the centre of the Syrian Desert. As a consequence, between 1915-17 
a considerably high number of Armenians died (Idem: 91-91). The controversy begins 
right here in the number of deaths among this community. Still today the Turkish 
government does not recognise this collective murder as genocide, despite Armenia’s 
attempts to force the authorities to publicly accept it. In fact, when other countries (and 
that happened with the United Sates, the United Kingdom and France more recently) 
have tried to recognise the Armenian genocide, the Turkish state reacted negatively 
raising some diplomatic tension and lobbying for that official recognition not to happen.  
In spite of the controversy surrounding the number of deaths (and if it was a 
deliberate plan or not), it is interesting to notice this social phenomenon in which 
Turkey in general and Turks in particular seem not to deal naturally with its less bright 
past. Teixeira Fernandes (2005: 95) wrote that the explanation for this fact may lie on 
the Islamic ethics which “favour honour and shame over truth”. This position is 
seconded by some groups within the Turkish society, mainly secularists, who would 
prefer their state to recognise the genocide, similarly to what the Catholic Church has 
done with Inquisition, France with colonialism, the USA with native Amerindians and 
Africans (Idem: 96-97) or even Germany with the Nazi period. 
Thus, and in terms of good relations with its neighbours and minorities within its 
own borders, Turkey has some issues to solve or at least to show enough maturity to 
deal with in a democratic way, through dialogue and diplomatic and political means. 
Dealing with these sensitive and key situations would help the country overcome most 
of its ghosts and strengthen its position in the world scene – as well as improving its 
image before the European Union. 
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8.4. A polarised society: Secularists vs. Islamists 
 
The polarisation of Turkish society between secularists and Islamists constitutes 
a fundamental axis when seeking to understand the internal and external phenomena of 
the country. That can be perceived through academic literature, news and even some 
interviewees’ comments. Islam, as already written, has been the main religion of the 
then Ottoman Empire since its own foundation, and this tradition has continued so far 
without signs of fading away. One of the most (when not the most) systematic attempts 
to deconstruct this long-established tight relationship between religion and state affairs 
was made by Mustafa Kemal in the 1920s. Nonetheless, even in that period, religion 
was used as a strong social unifying force to bring the Turkish population together. The 
Islamic tradition among Turks always made it a key element concerning Turkish 
democracy and often one of the reasons that split up Turks and Europeans. 
As Waxman (2000: 8) reminds, Islam was supposed to be put aside by 
Kemalism, but Mustafa Kemal was aware of the importance of religion in Turkey and 
of the fact that he would not be capable of creating a feeling of togetherness without this 
component. Therefore, a “Turkified Islam” (Idem: 9) was developed in order to 
strengthen national identity. Two examples can be provided to prove it: first, the 
population exchange with Greece following the establishment of the Turkish Third 
Republic and secondly the Capital Tax regulation that set religion and ethnicity as the 
criteria to determine the amount to pay to the state, according to which non-Muslims 
had to contribute ten times more than Muslims (Idem: 10, 11). 
Thus, even with Kemal’s attempt to secularise the country, this feature was not 
(and is not yet) disregarded as a fundamental element of Turkishness and ultimately 
what distinguishes between a ‘Turk’ and a ‘Turkish citizen’ – “Turk designates an 
ethno-religious characteristic of the political community, an attribute” (Idem: 14). Since 
there is this distinction, a subsequent discrimination is to be expected. Again two further 
examples can prove this point: Turgut Özal’s 1989 statement and Turkish Armed 
Forces’ measures during their ruling period. Özal stated that “Everybody who lives in 
this land (...) is a first class citizen (...) with no distinction (...) but what holds our nation 
together [and] what serves in a most powerful way our national cohesiveness (...) is 
Islam.” (cited in Waxman, 2000: 17), revealing how important religion was. On the 
other side, the historical defendants of secularism, the Turkish military, included 
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compulsory religious education in the 1982 Constitution, so that an “official” version of 
Islam was conveyed, instead of a more fundamentalist one and, therefore, enabling it to 
be used as a tool by the government. 
Nevertheless, the secularisation attempt by Atatürk is still nowadays widely 
criticised; the new Turkey he wanted to be born disregarded its Ottoman heritage and 
ended up promoting “no less than the annihilation of the past” and the emergence of a 
state without history, as Robins (1996: 68) put it. According to this author, the 
Republican elite ignored the positive aspects of the Ottoman Empire for the sake of the 
implementation of a new society. In that sense, the new state retrogressed in terms of 
the previously allowed pluralism of identities and, when regarding Islam as a threat to 
modernisation, its replacement for secularism was an “empty substitution” in which 
nothing equally symbolic was put in its place (Idem: 69). To these two examples Robins 
provided, he added a third one related to democracy: for the author, repression was 
applied in the name of democracy and it has been installed a paternalistic and 
authoritarian regime where there was no place for social or political differences (Idem: 
70).  
Waxman (2000: 6-7), on the other hand, assumes that, although Turkish 
modernisation was not a process, but a top-down, state-led, elitist project that led to the 
creation of a too synthetic and too superficial “Republican Turkish identity” (Idem: 7), 
elites had had into consideration the population’s characteristics and that the 
authoritarian drive was in the name of the future democracy. Therefore, according to 
Waxman, “the Turkish national identity is an outcome of these accommodations, a 
product of the perpetual negotiations between the state and society” (Idem: 8). This is 
an open debate and what is most relevant to underscore in the present context is the 
whole framework the Turkish identity has developed within and that, as the author 
argued, it is the result of multiple influences, moments, bargains, processes and projects. 
More precisely, it is not about whether Islam is part of Turkishness or not, but how 
important it is; consequently, it is a “question of emphasis” (Idem: 22) rather than one 
of a zero-sum situation, which has important political consequences. 
In actual fact, and despite the considerable number of Turkish flags with the 
image of Atatürk all over Turkey, Kemalism started to be challenged still in the 
twentieth century, giving origin to a long period of the already mentioned secularist-
Islamist debate. Recalling Huntington, in the first half of that century, modernisation 
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achieved a retrocession in terms of attachment to religions worldwide; but, when 
modernisation begins to be perceived as having failed, the fault was attributed to the 
separation from God (Huntington, 2002: 95-96). Thus, in reaction to secularism and 
relativism, religions re-emerged to reaffirm their values in an unstable world – as “the 
vitamin of the weak” (Debray cited in Huntington, 2002: 101); Huntington borrows the 
concept from Gilles Kepel for this phenomenon: La revanche de Dieu (Idem: 95). For 
this reason, the author realises that, in the re-Islamised societies of the second half of the 
twentieth century and onwards, “among Muslims, the young are religious, their parents 
secular” (Idem: 101). Robins applies this indigenisation dynamic to the Turkish case 
and explains that, since the mid-1980s one assists to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, 
and an increased recognition of the country’s ethnic heterogeneity and of the references 
to the Ottoman legacy, what the scholar calls the “return of the repressed” – religion, 
ethnic diversity and Ottoman past (Robins, 1996: 72-73). 
Islamists were against Turkey’s European integration: Europe was the Islamists’ 
Other and they rejected its type of civilisation, for considering it materialistic, 
destructive and morally decadent (Duran, 2004: 126). In that sense, their discourse was 
anti-Europe and in favour of the return to old values and practices. It was part of what 
Huntington labelled the Islamic “declaration of cultural independence from the West” 
(Huntington, 2002: 101). This declaration meant the rejection of the West, but not of 
modernisation; it was the rejection of the “Westoxification” emanated from Europe and 
the USA (Idem). The Islamists’ discourse was truly anti-European regarding Turkey’s 
integration; it “rests upon the premise that Islamic civilization is ontologically and 
epistemologically different from the West” (Duran, 2004: 127). Besides, for them, 
integration equalled the country’s assimilation and its maintenance in “the periphery 
[to] control it” (Idem). 
The discourse was hard on the West and was able to capitalise the national and 
international contexts (namely the consequences of the oil crises, severe internal 
political and economic crises or the state of Turkey-EU relations) to gather broad 
popular support. Democracy was frequently the pathway Islamists used to reach to 
power – legally and within the Western-like political structures. The Welfare Party (RP, 
Refah Partisi), for example, was banned in 1998 for being considered anti-secular by 
the Constitutional Court (Duran, 2004: 128). Its successor, the Virtue Party (FP, Fazilet 
Partisi) changed its rhetoric and voices its support for EU membership, 
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democratisation, human rights and personal liberties (Idem). And even though the party 
had to face the obstacles left by the Kemalist heritage and its guardians (the military and 
the Constitutional Court, to name two), they looked forward to being supported by the 
European Union in the sense that this institution would force the country to increase the 
individuals’ freedoms and curtail the limitations of the high degree of secularisation 
Turkey was living. 
Despite these efforts, the FP was also banned in 2001 and two other political 
parties were constituted from its heritage: the Felicity Party (SP) and the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP). The traditionalist members of the FP composed the first, 
whereas the latter included its reformist section and was led by the former Mayor of 
Istanbul, Erdoğan (Idem: 133). Although they have their differences, the support for 
Turkey’s European integration was a policy common to both. Definitely, the Islamist 
discourse had changed in order to take advantage of the framework they were embedded 
in; otherwise, they would have had many difficulties in trying to achieve their 
objectives in terms of political power. 
Based on an extremely large survey to over 31 000 Muslims of 32 countries, 
Moataz Fattah (2006) wrote a book entitled “Democratic Values in the Muslim World”, 
in which the author seeks to comprehend whether “the values and attitudes of Muslims 
obstruct or decelerate the democratization process in Muslim countries” (Fattah, 2006: 
2). As this scholar recognises in the beginning of his book, Muslim countries are 
“disproportionately autocratic” (Idem: 1) and there is not in the world any Muslim 
country with a consolidated democracy these days. One very interesting result of the 
survey is that Muslims are “highly influenced by opinion leaders who present ready-
made intellectual meals for consumption” (Idem: 7). In other words, opinion makers in 
Muslim countries enjoy a wide prestige among their audience and high levels of 
influence over them. This is particularly important when one considers the effect of 
discourse and speech on the population’s opinions and consequently on their interests 
and choices. Therefore, the author’s conclusion is that opinion leaders (or makers) are 
“agents of political socialisation” (Idem) – hence the media plays a major role in these 
questions as well, and also maybe because of that are they so frequently subject to the 
control or limitation of autocratic regimes. 
A second important finding of this study comes with the three patterns of 
Muslim attitudes towards Islam and democracy. According to this division, a Muslim’s 
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attitude can be framed within one of the following patterns: traditional Islamists, 
modern Islamists and secularists (Idem: 9). For traditionalist Islamists, democracy is 
seen as “a replacement of the will of Allah with the will of people” (Idem: 12); as they 
interpret the holy texts literally and regard themselves the guardians of their religious 
traditions, the adoption of democracy constitutes a betrayal and a sin since it is 
forbidden to imitate non-Muslims. Traditionalists can opt for a violent or a pacifist 
approach to stand for their beliefs (Idem: 12-14). Modernist Islamists, on the other 
hand, are willing to take on non-Muslim concepts, as long as they do not contradict 
Islam’s precepts. In that sense, for them, democracy can be applied if it is Islamised 
(Idem: 17-18).  
Secularists occupy the other extreme of these perceptions in the sense that they 
recognise that Islam does not provide governance suggestions. In fact, as Sharia does 
not include political issues, it means Allah allows humans to work those fields and that 
“Muslims need to follow the paths of the most successful societies in order to outdo 
them” (Idem: 20), which is exactly what the West had done by learning from ancient 
cultures. There are two types of secularists: the ones that would rather support a strong 
government to defend the state’s unity. This does not imply a democratic government 
though, since they are afraid of democracy because of the Islamists’ threat to mobilise 
and manipulate electors and because of their unpreparedness for this regime – they are 
illiterate, prone to apathy, nostalgia, tribalism, etc. –; these are the statist secularists 
(Idem: 19-22). On the other side, pluralist secularists do not share the previous 
assumptions, as they believe there are “Muslims who are politically closest to the 
Western concept of liberal democracy” (Idem: 24). Therefore, modernist Islamists 
should be involved in the democratisation process of their own countries (Idem: 24, 25) 
to contribute with their perspectives and inputs.  
In what comes to Turkey, its first position in the democratisation potential 
ranking is revealing (Idem: 29). Among the 32 countries surveyed, Turkey occupies the 
first place with a high degree of potential, due to the distribution of its population 
among the four mentalities: traditionalists – 1% (the lowest value of all countries); 
statists – 5%; modernists – 31%; pluralists – 63% (the highest value of all countries). 
Thus, if one adds the proportion of traditionalists and modernists to find the total 
percentage of Islamists, the number reaches the 32% (the lowest value of all countries); 
on the other hand, if modernists and pluralists (both with a high potential to promote 
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democracy and tolerance and not to adopt extremists stances on the two directions) are 
united, Turkey achieves an impressive value of 94% of the surveyed population who 
can be truly regarded as democrats – again the highest value of all the countries that 
participated in the study (Idem: 29). 
This study deepens these perceptions regarding democracy and analyses the 
correlation of side variables, such as age, gender, education, previous political 
participation, religiosity, etc. As it is not possible to go through these results thoroughly, 
Fattah (Idem: 64) presents a symbolic conclusion of the medium, typical profile of a 
pro-democratic Muslim:  
“a female who is affluent and better educated (...) [who is] likely to 
have experienced democracy through previous voting and/or living in 
a democratic country (...) to believe that democracy is an extension or 
application of (...) Shura, and to have a negative attitude toward 
undemocratically elected Muslim rulers”. 
Obviously, this figure is the stereotype of the results of the study, but it helps realise 
how important several factors are for the shaping of a pro-democratic Muslim or, 
otherwise, for an anti-democratic Muslim. These variables are to be taken into account 
when one seeks to realise how democracy should be promoted among Muslims. 
Furthermore, and regarding Turkey, this study revealed a key factor: Turks are the most 
meaningful democratic tendency among Muslim people in the entire world, suggesting 
that, as a Turkish academic stated, “if democratisation works here, it does not 
necessarily mean that it will work automatically in other societies. But if it fails here, 
then we will have a problem” (Interview, 2013e). 
When analysing more specifically Turkish Islamists and their stance regarding 
European integration, Duran (2004: 136) divides them into three main positions: the 
ones that support it, the ones that deny it and the ones who hesitate. The elements from 
the first group, such as Gürdogan and Koru, stress the democratic importance for 
Turkey to be linked with Europe and argue that it would mean the strengthening of its 
identity and not the opposite (Idem: 136). Opponents to integration see it as an external 
imposition, a retreat from spirituality, a clash of civilisations whose cultural differences 
are not possible to be overcome, a decline of the Islamic culture and compare the 
Copenhagen criteria to a second Sèvres Treaty (Idem: 137-139). The latter group is 
afraid of the country’s assimilation into the European culture, but accepts that the 
accomplishment of the criteria would only benefit Turkey (Idem: 139). 
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When Turks were asked to place themselves between the Islamist and Secularist 
sides, the results partially support the theory of the polarisation of the society: 48,5% 
included themselves within the interval 6 to 10 (where 10 is Islamist); 20,3% placed 
themselves between the values of the scale 0 to 4 (where 0 is Secularist), and 23,4% 
opted for the middle-ground, level 5, do not revealing a clear tendency towards any of 
the two options under consideration (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 42). Not surprisingly, 
Turks who feel more connected to the Secularist are more educated, more leftist, 
younger and richer. CHP sympathisers are also much more prone to support this side. 
Following the same reasoning, AKP supporters are more inclined to the Islamist side 
and reveal the opposite profile (less educated, more rightist, older and less wealthy) 
(Idem: 43). In one of the interviews, a Turkish academic drew a general draft of today’s 
Turkey stating that there is “a polarisation between the AKP voters and the non-AKP 
voters” (Interview, 2013b); according to him, the latter are seen as “supporters of the 
military and not trustful” (Idem).  
It is perceptible, therefore, that groups are formed in Turkey and opinions are 
divided on several issues, like the use of turban, the EU process or even religious 
education, to name a few. In the early 2000s the situation was not like that – the AKP 
was able to join several sects of this divided society through a moderate speech which 
used to please both conservatives (it was a Muslim party, after all) and secularists 
(excited in the support the party revealed in terms of the EU accession process).  
However, and after an initial phase of enthusiasm with the positive economic and 
political results, the party’s more secularist supporters started to become increasingly 
concerned with the development or the direction of some measures: “the AKP 
government publicly denounced the online ultimatum in 2007, and former military 
officers have been prosecuted by civilian courts for conspiracy against the government, 
both of these being a first in the country’s history” (Somer, 2011: 28). It is true that the 
military frequent interferences in the Turkish political life did not improve its 
democratic quality at all; however, the military were also, besides a tremendously 
respected social group among Turks, the guardians of the secularist sect; the ones 
people were relying on to avoid the country to backslide into a more religious type of 
state.  
In that context, “the pro-secular actors turned suspicious of the reforms led by 
the government, while the government lost its reformist zeal and seemed resort to 
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‘illiberal’ means in order to pacify the opposition and consolidate its power” (Idem: 29). 
In 2007 the AKP began a campaign to amend the Constitution to lift the ban on the use 
of headscarves at Turkish universities, but the CHP took recourse to the Constitutional 
Court that decided to declare the amendment unconstitutional for violating the secularist 
principle (Idem: 30). In fact, the AKP also survived an attempt to be banned, which was 
not accepted by the same Court, even though it recognised some members’ activities 
were suspicious and warned and fined the party (Idem: 30). Several other events could 
be added to this list: Prime-minister’s calls to boycott a media group, a scandal with a 
charity organisation and its links with the AKP, the opposition warnings about a “deep-
state” within the country, etc. (Idem: 31). This opposition between the two factions has 
several effects and, as Somer (Idem) wrote, “a sure sign that democratization is the 
victim of the religious/secular confrontation is the deterioration in the level of media 
freedom” whose scores and position rankings when compared to the rest of the world 
have been decreasing. In one year (2007 to 2008), the number of prosecuted for 
“thought-related ‘crimes’ doubled from 254 (...) to 435” (Idem), which is quite 
revealing of the general environment of freedoms of expression in the country. Among 
them, of course, one can find journalists, politicians and writers.  
In the same chapter, Murat Somer proposes a solution for Turkey: using 
Stepan’s concept of “twin tolerations”, the author concludes that a consolidated 
democracy demands both the state’s autonomy from religion, but also freedom of 
religion and of conscience (Idem: 35). Therefore,  
“the key question for the success of Turkey’s continued 
democratization is whether or not it can produce the emergence of twin 
tolerations between state and religion on the one hand, and between the 
pro-secular and religious-conservative social-political actors on the 
other hand. (...) This, in turn, requires normative adjustments of the 
dominant narratives of both types of actors, in addition to strong 
institutional and political checks and balances” (Idem: 36, 42).  
 
In fact, both are European Union’s requirements; however, Turkey, with an apparently 
growing centralised power is making it hard for that to happen. Yet, it has to do with the 
country’s political culture and not only with its religious and secularist debate. 
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8.5. Turkish political culture 
  
 On Chapter 3, it has been written that, for some scholars, the development of a 
country’s political culture is essential for its successful democratisation; others, on the 
other hand, believed this would only develop with a real democratic experience and 
that, therefore, political culture was not a sine qua non condition for democratisation. In 
either cases, this variable should take into account when studying the process of 
democratisation. 
 The existence of a political culture in a certain country implies that its citizens 
have already learnt (considering it is possible to have learnt such dynamic and abstract 
reality rather than following its continuous and changing nature) how to cope or deal 
with the political process, usually the norms and practices of the democratic regime, in 
the sense that they are able to play the rules of the game and to act accordingly. This 
learning process, as any other social phenomenon, is achieved through a broader 
socialisation process. Socialisation entails the internalisation of a symbolic code through 
individual-society exchanges in an interactive and multidirectional process that allows 
the person to develop a representation of the world he or she lives in (Dubar, 1997: 30, 
31). Under the influence of several socialisation agents, this interaction permits that the 
individual builds structures of identification with several groups, builds his or her own 
identity and develops bonding relationships with others (Idem: 31).  
In the same way, political culture is also learnt and it is built over the years with 
different experiences depending on the context one is embedded in. Percheron (cited in 
Dubar, 1997: 31) defines socialisation as “personally assuming the group’s attitudes so 
that, without realising it, it leads our behaviour”. Although it is also true that individuals 
contribute to the development and reshaping of the groups they belong to as well – 
recalling the Constructivist thought –, it is relevant to stress that these groups constitute 
an important major structure in which the individual fits and which provides his or her 
major patterns of behaviour. Political socialisation, more specifically, conveyed through 
political representations and choices, is not a one-time phenomenon, but it is built  
“as if they were periodic rearrangements resulting simultaneously from 
the new assimilations (...) and from the adjustments to the evolutions 
(...) which allows to reorganise sufficiently coherently the elements 
(...) of a system of political representations progressively more 
246 
 
internalised and constitutive of the social identity (...)” (Percheron 
cited in Dubar, 1997: 33). 
Turkey is not, as Dodd (1992: 16) put it, a newcomer to Liberalism and 
democracy; since the Ottoman Empire they imported indirectly these Western concepts 
and Atatürk inherited this tradition of modernising and westernising the country. Maybe 
because of that democracy is Turkey’s twelfth most significant problem in the eyes of 
Turks (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 48). Only 0,8% of the respondents were worried 
about democracy in the country and 0,6% with the lack of opposition, for example. The 
top concerns were whether related to economy (unemployment: 38%; inflation: 12%) or 
to security (terrorism: 11%). This may be a good sign in the sense that the state of 
Turkish democracy is satisfactory for its inhabitants. Moreover, when asked about the 
democratic system, almost 79% of respondents agreed that democracy, despite its 
problems, is still much better than any other regime. 7,4% disagreed and 13% didn’t 
decide (Idem: 55). These numbers match Fattah’s findings regarding the high level of 
democratisation potential in Turkey.  
Turgut Özal is one of the examples of a Turkish leader that reconfigured the 
country’s political culture (obviously not to mention Mustafa Kemal). Isabel David 
(2012: 179) wrote that his term in office brought a political and economic restructuring 
to the country. Özal embodied a break with the Ottoman tradition of the state as the 
biggest consumer and of the culture of the people’s dependency on the state (Evin, 
2005: 34). Therefore, the 1980s marked a shift away from etatism and an emphasis on 
the economic activity and entrepreneurship. Moreover, he was able to raise the citizens’ 
perception and understanding of the civil society and pluralism (Idem: 36). Nonetheless, 
this legacy did not remain for long, as political clientelism and intolerance towards 
political opposition, two “deeply rooted characteristics of Turkish political culture” 
(Idem: 36) were not able to be overcome and jeopardised the previous efforts. Özal 
prepared Turkey for international economic competition, but he would not mind to 
ignore the law if he needed to (Idem: 34). And besides his strong religious character, a 
novelty in modern Turkey, he regarded democratic transition as a detail, which led to a 
petition signed by prominent Turks who asked for the prohibition of laws against 
democracy (David, 2012: 180). 
Another important aspect of Turkish political culture is the country’s 
Constitutional tradition – the first dates back to the Ottoman Empire in 1876, as Ali 
Usul recalls (2011: 155). Then, there were the 1924, the 1961 and the 1982 
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Constitutions, none of which were prepared by a Constituent Assembly though, granting 
them a very “weak political legitimacy” (Idem: 156). Despite the undemocratic nature 
of the last one, for example, as it was produced by a military regime after the coup, 
several amendments in the meanwhile have progressively democratised: from 2001 to 
2004, there were 43 amendments which equalled changes in over 170 laws, most of 
which were due to the European Union’s pressure (Idem: 156). And although Ali Usul 
(Idem: 156) believes that these improvements do not necessarily mean the regime’s 
democratic consolidation, the truth is that the existence of these procedures per se. are 
already important benchmarks to consolidate Turkey’s political culture, since those 
political decisions implied democratic debates, bargaining and compromise between 
political parties and the society within the democratic structures and institutions. When 
conveyed to the public, these democratic moments also constitute key moments of 
socialisation, given the fact that the population realises how their political 
representatives work within the system trying to solve the country’s problems. 
The agents of socialisation in this field are political parties. In Turkey, they 
resemble the European peers, but, as Fernandes (2004: 111) reminds, the country’s 
Islamic character and Atatürk’s legacy introduce influential idiosyncrasies in the 
Turkish partisan system, which is responsible, from the perspective of Usul (2011: 157), 
for the weakening of institutionalisation due to its increasing volatility and ideological 
polarisation. Moreover, the same author argues that a signal of the lack of a strong 
political culture in the country is the electorate’s volatility, as 20% of the electors vote 
in different parties at each election (Idem: 157). Teixeira Fernandes’ (2004: 74) 
concern, on the other hand, is not about the electorate, but rather about whether the 
Islamic parties achieved the level of democratic maturity required to integrate the 
partisan system accepting its rules and practices. In fact, this is a pertinent question, but 
at least during the first decade of the twenty-first century, generally speaking, the AKP, 
as an Islamic party, has played the democratic game, even though some less democratic 
tendencies have emerged from time to time. 
Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007: 81) asked in their survey whether “political parties 
that base their policies on religion should be a part of the Turkish political party 
system”, and in 1999 only 24,6% agreed with that; however, the 2006 numbers changed 
and 41,4% agreed. Conversely, the opponents to the participation of religious parties 
decreased from 60,6% to 53,6%. Although these numbers may signify a retrocession in 
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terms of the popular willingness to involve religion in politics, they are coherent with 
the rest of the survey and with the Islamic resurgence worldwide in the last decades. 
Figure 16 below shows another major issue concerning political Islam, which is the 
existence of a regime based on Sharia. As these numbers clarify, the majority of the 
population, and in a growing number over the years, do not want a Sharia-based state in 
their country. That increase has been steady since 1998, even though the other answers 
show a different behaviour and are more volatile.  
 
Thus, the consolidation of Turkey’s political culture is, as in any other country, a 
very long and complex process. The war against the PKK, for example, fosters a 
“negative atmosphere for democratic political culture” (Usul, 2011: 154) as it frequently 
implies ignoring fundamental rights protected by the democratic regime. As the official 
from the Ministry for EU Affairs stated, “our political culture is a bit prone to clashes, 
especially form the 1970s onwards” (Interview, 2013i) and when asked if it was caused 
by a lack of political tradition in Turkey, the interviewee answered positively (Idem).  
One of the Human Rights Turkey has been performing poorly is related to 
freedom of expression. According to the same study, 80% of the surveyed agreed with 
the statement according to which “the freedom of people to express themselves freely 
should not be limited by any means” and only 7,3% disagreed with it (Çarkoğlu & 
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Toprak, 2007: 55). This is an impressive number, mainly if one compares it to the 
results of another question in the same survey: “Do you think that the repeated 
publication of the cartoons of Prophet Mohammad by a Danish newspaper, despite 
strong opposition from the Islamic world, is an inevitable consequence of democracy 
and the freedom of thought?” (Idem: 54). 73% of the respondents opted for the option 
“Such publications must be prevented”, against the mere 15% who considered that a 
result of the freedoms granted by democracy. Therefore, these results are paradoxical; in 
actual fact, it seems that Turks theoretically believe that there should be freedom of 
expression, but then when that freedom is exercised by someone who does not share 
their beliefs, i.e. who satirised their prophet, their decision is to prevent those 
publications, curtailing someone’s freedom of expression. Moreover, if one scrutinises 
these results, it is possible to notice that those 73% can reach and overcome the 
threshold of the 80% in some particular sections of the Turkish society: AKP 
supporters, literates without a diploma, rightists, Islamists and women who wear a 
çarşaf. They overcome the 90% of the respondents from Aegean, Black Sea, Eastern 
and South-eastern regions and even the 100% of the ones who stated that they would 
want their wives to wear a çarşaf (Idem: 55). 
 A Turkish academic commented in one of the interviews on the Islamists’ 
difficulties to embrace the democratic principles: 
 “Turkish Islamists did not have an idea of democracy in their political 
culture and through EU instrumentality and conditionality. With the 
support and promotion of the Turkish liberal circles (intellectuals and 
big business), they tried to make up or convert the former not very 
democratic (I wouldn’t say undemocratic) Islamist into democratising 
agents. This is obviously not an easy process to achieve in anyway, in 
any country, in any social context. They tried to create a democratic 
culture from a non-democratic political movement, which used to be 
very hierarchical, very leader-oriented and democracy is something 
Western, of course. It was not very easy for the Turkish Islamists to 
embrace the principles, the idea and practices of democracy” 
(Interview, 2013e). 
Still linked to the religious component of Turkish democracy and its political 
culture, it is important to highlight the role of religious brotherhoods, which are 
frequently pointed out as part of the “deep state” in Turkey. One example is the Gülen 
Movement or the Fethullacılar, considered by many as the “Islamic modernisers” 
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(Mango, 2004: 130) and led by Fethullah Gülen.85 This group “seeks to convert 
contemporary society by the example of its good works” (Idem: 130). Hence, they 
support a wide number of schools, universities, dormitories, hospitals, media groups and 
other social facilities; they are funded by donations and contributions (mostly from 
businessmen) and claim not to be a political movement. The representative of the 
“Journalists and Writers Foundation” talked about the Hizmet movement (Hizmet means 
The Service, another name to the Gülen movement) during the interview and presented 
it as a civic moment that was born in the context of the 1970s instability (Interview, 
2013d). As this foundation is one of the branches of the Fethullacılar (another possible 
designation), he introduced some of the main ideas behind the project, namely that it 
opted for a more traditional approach, accepting, nevertheless, modern ideas and tools 
in a “love-oriented, not normative, interpretation of Islam” (Idem). As an organisation, 
they are not hierarchical and compose a very loose network – so loose, that the number 
of members or followers is not even estimated, according to him. With the slogan 
“peace through education”, the Gülen movement has two main binding rules: to serve 
all human beings in the world (and hence all the international projects on the most 
varied fields) and not to have political ambitions (Idem). 
 Yet, although they claim not to be politically involved, as long as they 
emphasise the Turkish nationalism and reject the Kemalist doctrine, underlining the 
Ottoman heritage and the religious component of the country’s identity (David, 2012: 
268), it is natural that “most secularists fear them” (Mango, 2004: 130). In fact, in an 
anonymous and off the record interview (not included in the references for its 
anonymous character), a Turkish secularist drew very hard criticisms on the Gülen 
movement. According to him,  
“the Gülen movement is one of the biggest threats to democracy in 
Turkey. (...) the Gülen movement scares me. They are not open (...), 
they can tap your telephone conversations, they can follow your e-
mails, (...) they control the police department intelligence (...). So, this 
is a hidden power which tries to dominate and there is also an internal 
fight between the government and the Gülen movement. (...) Of course 
this is a political movement. They talk about dialogue, they talk about 
tolerance, so why do you want to control the intelligence service of the 
police department? (...)They tell us this is a civil society organisation, 
they are not political, they have no political ambition, etc, but this is 
bullshit. I mean, it has to be... I mean, I am not against people having a 
political agenda. You can pursue a Sharia order – I don’t care. I mean, 
                                                          
85 For more details on the premises of this group and other relevant information on their work and 
development, cf., for example, David, 2012: 268-276. 
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there are people that want to live in a very religious Islamic order, but 
that’s ok. But they [the Gülen] are not open. They say... There 
language is so friendly, but their agenda is so aggressive, so hostile; if 
they target you, they dig on your history. (...)”  
In fact, there are widespread rumours that the Gülen movement has some type of 
involvement in the political and social structures of the country. However, a Turkish 
academic stated that the organisation has a role in democratisation, but its aim is not a 
revolution or political participation: “If he [Fethullah Gülen] wanted to be in power, he 
could already be in 2003 after the crisis. He was powerful and with strong popular 
support. The real aim is to develop a strong civil society in Turkey” (Interview, 2013b). 
In addition, this scholar also answered to Erdoğan’s accusations that the movement was 
part of the deep state, arguing that Gülen has invested in education for 30 years to create 
a better society and that Gülen was an intellectual, not a charismatic politician; besides, 
he said that all the strong political institutions that arose from the 1980 coup are all in 
the hands of Erdoğan (Idem), suggesting it would be difficult to penetrate in such a 
state. 
 
8.5.1. Civil society – a brief context 
 
Civil society has been regarded by some authors (as explained on Chapter 3) as 
a cornerstone of any democratisation process. They are fundamental to promote 
transition and to support consolidation; without its true commitment, it is hard to find a 
real democracy established.  
The Turkish Ambassador to Portugal stated in her interview that “in the 1990s, 
they [civil society and NGOs] were seen as trouble makers” (Interview, 2013a), due to 
the generalised distrust towards them. Besides, Usul (2011: 159, 160) explains, the 
historically strong state tradition in Turkey was responsible for the lack of a vigorous 
and active civil society in the country; for elites, strong NGOs would mean a threat to a 
secular and united state, so their existence and development was not supported by the 
state until very recently – the 2004 Association Law (Idem: 160, 161). Another Turkish 
scholar (Interview, 2013e) agrees with this vision and adds that “civil society has been 
mostly directed and manipulated by the state”. According to him, they play, however, 
an important role in Turkish politics, but only the powerful big business (who force 
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Turkey to attach to the EU) and a more recent conservative Islamist civil society that is 
already linked with the political process and the government itself, revealing an 
ambivalent position towards the EU – when “they realised that there are limits for their 
aspirations or demands to the EU” (Idem). 
The official from the Ministry for EU Affairs, when asked about the lack of a 
strong civil society in Turkey, denied it:  
“I do not really agree with that. (...) Turkish culture is a long-standing 
culture and actually in 1911 the law of associations was more liberal 
than the 1982 law of associations. Now we have a liberal law of 
associations since 2004; (...) but to say that Turkey is lacking a civil 
society culture would not be true” (Interview, 2013i).  
On the contrary, the more recent positive developments on Turkish civil society is 
attributed by the same interviewee to a “success of the European tools” (Idem), given 
the fact that before 2005 or 2006, the state was  
“a bit suspicious about the NGOs receiving grants, but after the new 
law and after having a new department of associations in the Ministry 
of Interior, they understood that this may constitute a threat, but it is 
also an opportunity. (...) So, European dynamics have created a 
momentum of NGOs. So, what I am saying is that there was a civil? 
Yes, but it was broken down to pieces in the 1980s and the 1990s and, 
with the accession process, this NGO moment has also triggered 
bureaucratic movements, so they wanted to respond to the NGOs, they 
wanted to work with the NGOs; but at least if they don’t want to work 
with the NGOs, they want to listen and to control the NGOs. The 
bureaucracy also started to be involved in meetings of NGOs, they go 
there giving speeches. If you check back 10 years, 15 years, you don’t 
see many Ministers going to some small NGO meetings. But today 
every minister, in his everyday programme, has at least one or two 
NGOs’ meeting or some people from NGOs speaking with them” 
(Idem). 
This involvement of the civil society in the political process is corroborated by the 
Turkish Ambassador to Portugal, when she affirms that there are signs of change in 
Turkey and that NGOs and civil society have been included in the creation of the new 
Constitution and have been asked about what they want (Interview, 2013a). 
Additionally, one of the interviewees related to an NGO also recognised that in the last 
ten years there was a positive evolution of the civil society to operate: when the military 
were in power, individuals could not voice their opinions; however, more recently, “the 
quality and size of civil society increased substantially” (Interview, 2013d).  
The women’s rights activist, on the other hand, was not so optimistic. According 
to her, despite the difficulties to raise money for the organisation, there were positive 
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developments “on paper. But the attitude, the thinking... (...) In the last ten years we are 
really feeling the difference in the field. Before, everyone was welcoming us; now, with 
this rising conservatism, they say ‘we do not have any women’s problems here’” 
(Interview, 2013g). Moreover, she discloses that there is not a charity tradition in 
Turkey in what comes to organisations, because Turks, after three military coups, do not 
believe in organisations and look at them as terrorists or anarchists (Idem). 
Therefore, the feedback from the interviews was somehow contradictory, but all 
seem to point to a set of partial conclusions: first, there was not a tradition of a strong 
civil society in Turkey, mainly to the constraints imposed in the military-created 
Constitution of 1982 that limited freedom of association; secondly, the Turkish tradition 
of a strong state was not supportive of that dimension either; third, there have been legal 
improvements during the period under study in the field of freedom of association and 
then NGOs and representatives of the civil society had the possibility to develop and 
improve their status; fourth, despite these developments, Turks’ mentality is still stuck 
in the previous phase of the country, as they are suspicious about the intentions and 
goals of their country’s organisations and, probably, that hampers their willingness to 
cooperate with those organisations; fifth and finally, this whole question is 
contextualised within the broader framework of the Turkey’s political culture, which 
seems not to be as developed as in many other consolidated democracies; yet, one has to 
take into consideration the country’s idiosyncrasies that stem from its history and its 
socio-cultural features, namely religion. As Usul also concludes, tolerance towards 
difference and interpersonal trust in the country are very low (Usul, 2011: 163); besides, 
the same author quotes a 2004 study that concluded “Turkey does not at present possess 
a broad-based democratic culture” (Tessler and Altinoglu cited in Usul, 2011: 163). 
 
8.5.2. Civil-military relations 
 
 Another fundamental field when analysing a population’s political culture are 
civil-military relations. The military have played an influential role in Ottoman/Turkish 
society since the thirteenth century – the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey also 
had a military background. Forming the elite and entrenched in the spirit of Kemalist 
heritage, they have considered themselves the guardians of secularism and democracy in 
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Turkey since the twentieth century. Nevertheless, a particularly ardent pursuit of the 
defence of these principles very often lead them to relatively direct forms of 
intervention in political and civil issues, in complete accordance with the views of the 
general population. In regards to the implications for the European Union, however, this 
situation is not conducive to the consolidation of Turkish democracy and, consequently, 
for the process of accession. In fact, it creates an outcome that is diametrically opposed 
to it, eroding the quality of democracy and perverting this group’s ideology.  
Although the Turkish military were important in the early stages of 
democratisation (as “guardians”), any political involvement at this point would only 
harm the quality of democracy. The historical background of the role of the military has 
been presented in previous chapters and is particularly relevant to understand the current 
state of civil-military relations in the country: their modernisation, their political 
involvement, the military successes, the popular support, among other variables are 
important to be kept in mind when analysing this subject. 
 According to Dagi (1996: 124), there are two conflicting political traditions 
within the Turkish military: one which is marked by an interventionist strategy, less 
trusting in politicians, and assuming the role of “guardians” in a considerably 
authoritative sense; the other political tradition may be termed a “moderniser”, 
highlighting the importance of democracy and being comprised of Western-oriented 
governance. This dilemma derives from the declaration made by the TAF stating that 
they are the “only cohesive and uncorrupted state elite” (Idem: 125), and according to 
most opinion polls, the majority of Turks feel the same way. Sarigil (2009) concludes 
that the military are very popular in Turkey86, not only among common citizens, but 
also within specific professional groups, such as the academics. The answer again lies in 
the popular perception – the Turkish military are seen as “the most egalitarian, non-
politicised, and professional public institution compared with the political class that was 
often unstable, corrupt and unreliable.” (Aydin & Keyman apud Sarigil, 2009: 709). 
 For the author, the dynamics behind this phenomenon are unknown, but the 
prestige the military enjoy is fundamental to their capacity for influencing the political 
process, as their actions can be regarded as legitimised by popular support. So, in order 
to decrease the military’s influence over the population and politics, as well as to 
                                                          
86 61% of the Turks have a “great deal of confidence” in the military, in contrast with the 33% of the 
Americans and the 7% of the Spaniards (Sarigil, 2009: 709,710). 
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enhance the trust in accountable, democratic institutions, it is very important to 
understand why the Turks still feed those perceptions. Geography and security are two 
of the reasons (unstable neighbourhood, PKK terrorism, Aegean disputes, etc. create a 
perception of continual external and internal threat, putting the survival of their State in 
the hands of the military); religion and the polarisation of the society due to the threats 
to the Kemalist principles and secularism in general are another important hint. 
Another reason for the positive light in which the population perceives the Armed 
Forces is rooted in Turkish culture and identity. However, as outlined by 
Constructivism, both facets are changeable and it is therefore possible that these 
traditions which shape the relationship between the military and the populace may be 
altered and replaced by a different kind of relationship. Kuloğlu & Şahin (2006: 89) 
explain that patriotism and ceremonies are a very important part of the Turkish culture: 
values like loyalty, self-sacrifice, courage and strength are esteemed in this society and 
allow further rationalisation of the military’s popular support. Turks also emphasise the 
collective rather than the individual (Konijnenbelt, 2006: 161) and the education system 
itself reinforces ideas such as “all Turkish heroes are warriors” or that “every Turk is 
born a soldier” (Idem). These, and others, are social phenomena that apart from being of 
academic interest, might be an important element in explaining the intimate relationship 
between both parts – the celebration of a son’s departure for and the return from the 
military service or his letter with a photograph in uniform received with joy and pride 
(Varoglu & Bicaksiz, 2005: 585) exemplifying the social importance given to the fact. 
 Finally, the historical and political legacy: the role of the military during the 
Cold War, the alliance with the United Sates and accession to NATO improved the 
TAF’s prestige both worldwide and within the country. Furthermore, the legacy of the 
Ottoman Empire, the Independence War and Kemalism, as well as the lack of a strong 
democratic tradition (Güney & Karatekelioğlu, 2005: 442, 443) reinforce the military’s 
role in the country and its wide acceptance. Regarding this last point, they emerge as an 
alternative to the “petty party politics” (Idem: 442, 443), to corruption, or the civilian’s 
alleged inability to solve crisis. Bringing together this legacy and Demirel’s thesis that 
“the nature of an outgoing authoritarian regime has a significant impact on a new 
democracy” (2005: 246) and that a positive evaluation of a military rule makes it very 
hard to regard democracy “the only game in town” (Idem: 246), logical reasoning brings 
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us to the very complex relationship between the military and democracy, and mainly 
between the common Turk and the democratic system. As Narli wrote:  
“Cultural and institutional factors offer a clear explanation of civil-
military relations in Turkey. (...) This ruling style is the product of 
Turkey’s specific cultural, social and institutional context, featuring a 
stratified society and political culture as well as historic conflicts with 
neighbouring states. Such conditions significantly influence the 
military’s role in the nation.” (Narli apud Güney & Karatekelioğlu, 
2005: 442) 
 Democracy has been central in the discussion regarding civil-military relations, 
an occurrence resulting from the rule of law and its principle of civilian control over the 
military as one of the cornerstones of the democratic regime. The most common theory 
regarding civil-military relations centres around the principle that the military should be 
subordinate to civilians and never encroach on politics. In Turkey, notwithstanding, the 
situation is not as transparent as this basic rule dictates, as it has been realised. Civil-
military relations in Turkey are especially difficult to manage and to categorise, due to 
all those above mentioned specificities. In regards to democratic consolidation, though, 
the TAF’s political participation is a serious impediment, and this area remains very 
problematic, for example, in the European Commission Annual Reports – as it will be 
seen further on. And although authors like Satana (2008: 358) affirm that “absolute 
military disengagement from politics is unrealistic for countries like Turkey”, the 
European Union is not very likely to take that into consideration.  
 
 With the end of the Cold War and the approximation to Europe, Turkish civil-
military relations had to be redefined, as Turkey no longer played the same role as it 
used to play during the struggle between the East and the West; in the words of Satana 
(2008), they needed to shift to a “post-modern military paradigm”. Satana analysed the 
different dimensions of civil-military relations in the country and assessed if it was at 
this advanced level, or still in the “late modern paradigm”. In order to do so, Nil Satana 
used ten indicators and concluded that “the Turkish military is in transformation and is 
following the Western trend slowly but eminently. The armed forces seem to realise the 
changes from modern to postmodern realities and adapts in time.” (Idem: 380).  
 So, if Satan’s reasoning is to be followed, the TAF are transforming, i.e. there 
have been changes and improvements. However, according to the EU, they haven’t 
reached a desirable stage. What has failed, or is still failing? The central point is that, 
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aside from what happened in Greece, the power of the Turkish military after the 1980 
intervention remained considerable, complicating the consolidation process, given the 
fact that the Armed Forces should not keep tutelary powers within the context of a 
healthy consolidated democracy (Gürsoy, 2008: 312). This power has been used over 
the last few decades to allow the TAF to exert some influence on political issues, not 
directly connected with the military institution, namely political Islam. Akay (2010: 6) 
exposes the key problem of the Turkish civil-military relations:  
“Security has been and is a problematic and contentious area in the 
Turkish political system due to both the structural, functional, and 
organizational significance of the security sector within this system 
and to the autonomous and leading role that the security sector plays.” 
Therefore, one of the problems concerning these relations is the 1982 Constitution, 
stemming from the military coup and consisting of a legal system characterised by a 
focus on national security within the society, transforming Turkey into a “state of 
security” (Idem: 8).  
 A second issue, tightly linked with the previous one, concerns the Ministry of 
Defence and the fact that this institution has to act according to the defence policy of the 
Armed Forces and in line with the principles and priorities of the Chief of Staff (Idem: 
9), who, in turn, answers directly to the Prime-Minister and not to the Minister of 
Defence (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 153). This is undoubtedly a question of an 
authority that is diverted from the democratically elected government to a body that not 
only is not directly accountable to the population, but that is also very poorly controlled 
by accountable institutions: “This situation can be described as a textbook case of 
‘distorted authority-accountability relationship’.” (Bayramoğlu apud Akay, 2010: 9). 
 The influence of the National Security Council (NSC) (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu), 
on the other hand, has been decreasing due to EU proposals, but since its creation, this 
body set the perfect example of how the TAF wanted to intervene in politics: essentially 
composed of military staff, its decisions had priority in the Council of Ministers and 
both the Prime-Minister and the Chief of Staff had the same power to set the agenda of 
the NSC. As mentioned above, this situation has changed in recent years; nevertheless, 
Faucompret and Konings (2008: 153) believe this institution is (or at least was) a 
“shadow government through which the generals can impose their will on Parliament 
and the government.”. In actuality, the status of this body detracts from the healthy 
functioning of democracy, again subverting the rule of accountable institutions.  
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In practice, the Internal Service Law, which states in its article 35 that “The role 
of the Armed Forces is to guard and protect the Turkish homeland and the Republic of 
Turkey” (Akay, 2010: 15), is in practice regarded as superior to international 
agreements (Idem). The Internal Service Regulations of the Turkish Armed Forces is 
another legislative document that one can regard as supportive of the military 
interferences (Heper & Güney, 2000: 637), but, although these famous articles are 
quoted to legitimise the interventions, article 43 of the Internal Service Law also forbids 
military staff to enter politics – and there are few who cite it. The concept of the Armed 
Forces as the protectors of the Turkish Republic has, as realised, historical groundings; 
however, that need to protect the state from the profusely mentioned internal and 
external threats no longer makes sense, as the Turkish democracy has matured enough 
to protect itself against those threats, even more so if the country is looked at as a 
European Union candidate. So, the action of the Armed Forces (or their eventual 
opposition to the changes in their institution) generates the result they pretend to avoid, 
damaging the country’s path towards a consolidated democracy. 
Some other issues might be pointed to as clear threats to that consolidation: for 
instance, the parliamentary oversight is problematic (Akay, 2010: 15, 16), obviously 
raising concerns regarding democracy. The range of the Parliament’s action is very 
limited in practice – the Parliament’s commission responsible for the military does not 
possess the authority to deal with the budget or security policy and is only authorised to 
review the drafts of the legislation (Idem: 15, 16); the same happens with investigations 
and inquiries which are very rarely subject to control. The existence of a “military 
judiciary” and blurred boundaries within the civil courts (Idem: 16, 17) are two other 
important factors which should not be disregarded, as well as the military schools that 
are outside the scope of control of the Ministry of Defence. In addition, it is still 
possible to mention the TAF’s monopoly of arms’ production (Idem: 19) and the fact 
that some personnel, despite not being trained, are armed and very often enjoy a high 
degree of impunity (Idem: 20-24). 
These are some of the failures that Akay reported in the quoted document, but 
many others can be located therein. They have a single aspect in common: the TAF’s 
high degree of independence is contrary to the European pattern of civil-military 
relations. That autonomy also means that a body that is not accountable exerts a lot 
more influence than it is supposed to in a democratic society – even though they believe 
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they are protecting that same society. The consolidation of democracy and the path 
towards the European Union are the ones that suffer most from the excessive influence 
of the military. 
Bastiaan Konijnenbelt’s (2006) article, in which the author analyses the public 
statements of the Turkish General Staff (an informal mechanism of public influence) 
and of the government, in seven different fields. The results are meaningful: in contrast 
with the EU practice, the Turkish General Staff adopts positions on national policy 
issues not in accordance with the position of the government, making statements before 
the government cleared its position and on matters outside the scope of defence and 
security, never alluding to the fact that the statement is under the authority of the 
government (Idem: 189). Such an example is very significant, because it shows how the 
military perceive themselves, acting completely independently from the civil 
authorities: the TAF are “acting as an autonomous actor in Turkish politics. Not de iure, 
but de facto” (Idem) and this situation is not in line with the European model. 
 
As a state that was born and developed through bellic means, in Turkey, the 
military have always had a level of prestige attributed to them, garnering the support of 
different social groups, and therefore perceiving themselves as the guardians of a state, 
perpetually in peril, both internally and externally. As an important pillar against 
political Islam and other threats, the TAF have indeed played a vital role in 
safeguarding democracy.  
Nevertheless, in the present context of European candidacy and democratic 
consolidation, the political interference of the military is regarded as negative, because 
their involvement deteriorates basic fundamental features of a Western-like democratic 
country, such as the rule of law. In this sense, the EU, despite the vagueness of its 
orientation, has been very critical of the state of Turkish civil-military relations (as it is 
understood by the reading of the Commission’s progress reports) and has demanded a 
range of changes and reforms – some of which have already been institutionalised, 
while others are to follow, but many are still to be appropriated.  As the Armed Forces’ 
popularity was heavily reliant upon the perception of continual threat, the more peaceful 
environment that is offered by the European Union could only placate this feeling. 
Democracy will only be truly internalised when, among other signals, it is perceived as 
the “only game in town” and when Turkish citizens trust the democratic institutions are 
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able to solve internal or external threats that may emerge – in fact, this perception will 
only strengthen and legitimise democracy.   
Furthermore, the positive evaluation of the military by the population damages 
the ‘habituation phase’ as people will fail to internalise the habits of democracy. This 
perception of the military rule as a success, together with TAF’s self-perception that it is 
part of their duty to safeguard certain principles, make it harder for democracy to be 
truly consolidated. The Greek episode shows that it is possible for the military to remain 
in their barracks, but this is not very likely to occur until their own notion of what 
constitutes a prospective threat is diminished, and the general population as well as the 
elite refuse to support their interventions.  
Nonetheless, Turkey is not starting from zero; as already stated, the Turkish 
government has accepted many European suggestions and made many reforms over 
recent years, even if some of them hoisted opposition to the military. In 2007, the 
diaries of a former Commander of the Navy were published and revealed a military 
conspiracy against the AKP in the years 2003 and 2004: more than 100 people were 
involved (not only military staff, but also journalists and academics) and the trial began 
in 2008. The reasons behind this conspiracy were the reforms led by the AKP 
government to meet the Copenhagen political criteria, which decreased military 
independence, creating their discontent – they believed this was part of the AKP’s 
hidden agenda to weaken the guardians of the secular Republic. The adoption of 
European rhetoric, the recognition of minorities’ rights and the revision of the policy 
regarding Cyprus were other AKP measures that displeased the TAF. But the AKP’s 
strength and the divisions within the Armed Forces led to the abortion of the coup and 
the judicial investigation brought the role of the military to the public arena. 
In relation to the topic of EU membership, the Turkish Armed Forces are in 
favour of the economic benefits, but they will not accept concessions on issues such as 
the Kurds, Cyprus, Armenia or the Aegean Sea. Furthermore, the military believe that 
some of the EU’s requests endanger secular democracy, as they curtail the action of the 
TAF who, completely submitted to the civil forces, would not be able to defend 
secularism. The European Union considers it one of the democratic failures of Turkey, 
which means that Turkish civil-military relations are an impediment to accession and 
also a setback in the country’s democratisation process, as well as an obstacle to the 
maturation of its political culture.  
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8.5.3. A strong state, a strong leader 
 
 Whether one thinks about the Sultanate regime of the Ottoman Empire, the 
vigour of Mustafa Kemal’s policies as Turkey’s leader during the establishment of the 
new Republic or even the charismatic and popular Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it is not 
difficult to conceive the Turkish state as a traditionally strong entity with a high 
emphasis on the image of a strong political leader. Currently, there is even a heated 
debate on the new Constitution and the introduction of a Presidential system, which 
would follow this logic of a relatively high concentrated level of power in a single 
state’s figure. 
 A Turkish scholar asserted that traditional political elites are “too state-centred, 
as they considered the life and security and survival of the state were above all the 
benefits, the well-being and the freedom of each individual” (Interview, 2013e). In fact, 
this situation has not completely changed over the years under analysis (1999-2009); the 
same interviewee pointed it out:  
“the problem in Turkish democracy is not about civil-military-
relations, etc etc etc. (...) The point is this: the government itself and its 
Prim-Minister have a very strong tendency to monopolise power. This 
is the main weakness of Turkish democratisation process; even his 
ministers cannot make autonomous decisions without asking him first. 
(...) His authoritarian tendencies are the weakest point of Turkish 
democratisation efforts today” (Idem).  
In fact, and from the several interviews and informal conversations with Turks during 
the field work, there seems to be a generalised feeling (not among AKP’s most obvious 
supports, of course) that this “authoritarian” tendency has been being revealed over the 
years in a growing way.  
 Erdoğan became a full-time politician in 1983 linked to the Refah Partisi and his 
aim was to change the party’s image. In a speech to party’s members at that time, he 
said:  
“Greet everyone. Don’t forget to greet all your neighbours in the block 
where you live or passers-by in the street. If you say es-selâmü 
aleyküm [Peace Be Upon You – the traditional Muslim greeting] and 
get no response, you must understand that the man you address does 
not like this form of greeting. Then say merhaba [Hello – a word of 
Arabic origin]. If again there’s no sign of understanding, substitute İyi 
günler [Good day – the modern pure Turkish form]. If there is no 
response either, then perhaps you are speaking to George [an English-
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speaking foreigner]. So, greet him [in English] with ‘Hello, good 
morning!’” (Erdoğan cited in Mango, 2004: 110). 
 This excerpt from Erdoğan’s speech is revealing of the kind of politician the 
future prime-minister would become. In a simple way, he enlightened his party 
colleagues how to please everyone; it does not matter who you are dealing with, the 
person in front of you can possibly vote for you and it is not difficult to empathise with 
people – you just tell them what they want to hear: a Muslim greeting, an anti-Kemalist 
greeting, a pro-Kemalist greeting and even a greeting for foreigners. The message is 
clear: if a politician wants to be elected and popular, he or she cannot distinguish people 
based on their political and philosophical affinity, the politician should please everyone 
and respect their origins or choices. This is identity politics. It is not possible to know 
for sure if Erdoğan truly used the advice he had given, but, in case he did, it is a 
successful political strategy, as in 1994 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the mayor of 
Istanbul at the very early age of 40 and, at that moment, he began to shave his long 
beard and to wear suits – although his wife did not give up on her headscarf (Mango, 
2004: 110). Again, voters may identify themselves either with a beard-shaved, neat suit-
wearing man or with his more conservative, head-covered woman. “As a mayor, 
Erdoğan learned to work effectively within the system” (Idem: 110).  
In truth, there was a mistake regarding “working within the system” and that 
was when the then mayor of Istanbul was arrested for quoting Gökalp, a Turkish 
nationalist theorist. But prison “taught him a lesson in prudence” (Idem: 110) and he 
emerged as a more moderate politician – the one who would reach the governance of 
the whole nation right in the beginning of the new millennium. His victory is frequently 
attributed to the unstable country he inherited from his predecessors, since the party was 
fairly recent and for the first time a bipartisan Parliament was able to be built. Both the 
AKP and its opposition party, the CHP, were engaged in Turkey’s modernisation and 
integration and had to face serious quandaries during the legislature: Cyprus issue, 
military’s interferences, Human Rights’ violations and the implementation of minority 
rights (Çarkoğlu, 2004: 20). Yet, they seemed committed to continue their predecessors’ 
work on the way to the European full membership; naturally, economic measures were 
also prioritised given the country’s context. 
The novelty, after several military coups that deposed more or less assumed 
religious parties, was that the AKP, despite not considering itself a religious party, had a 
strong religious tendency – or, as they used to put it, they were to be compared to the 
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“conservative democratic” parties of Europe (Duran, 2004: 134). At that time, they 
rejected the “ideologization of Islam” and did not convey bold Islamic discourses; 
instead, Erdoğan claimed to be for democracy, freedoms, pluralism, secularism and 
tolerance (Idem: 134) – at least, those were the words he used in 2002. In that sense, his 
message was truly appealing to the both sides of a divided society. The party’s foreign 
policy intentions and popular support has already been mentioned in a previous chapter 
and therefore it is not worthy to repeat it here, but it should not be forgotten that both 
the European Union and the approval of a new Constitution were two of the most 
powerful flags of the party in what came to its earlier election campaigns. One of the 
controversial issues of that new document, as written above, is the presidential system. 
As a political scientist noted, Turkey already has a semi-presidential system, “but it has 
no tradition of using those presidential powers” (Interview, 2013b). However, the doubt 
lies in the current Prime Minister’s intention regarding this change. Some theories 
believe that this is part of a plan for Erdoğan to leave the government in order to 
become President in a system in which his powers would be reinforced over the ones of 
the Prime Minister. However, that does not please the current President, who, many 
people conjecture, will run for the executive (Idem).  
An important issue of checks and balances are therefore at stake when talking 
about the new Turkish Constitution. The result of that process will extraordinarily 
influence the quality of the country’s democracy. Nonetheless, the current status of 
Turkish democracy does not thrill many people who are sceptical about the 
government’s intention. According to that line of thought, “since 2006-2007, we do not 
see a government keen on democratising Turkey’s political system, but which tries to 
undermine the democratisation process which itself contributed a lot to” (Interview, 
2013e). The interviewee gives the example of the pressure on the media and summarises 
with the conclusion that “Erdoğan is a powerful leader and, if you want something to 
change in Turkish politics, you have to do it with Erdoğan” (Idem) – reinforcing the 
thesis that the tradition of a strong state, a strong leader is still rooted in current Turkish 
political culture, and which may be harmful for the country’s democratic standards. 
However, this concentration of powers may also be due to the unhealthy working of the 
checks and balances system, given that a Turkish political scientist affirmed that there is 
no real democratic alternative to the AKP  (Interview, 2013b) and that, therefore, its 
self-confidence increases as it is aware of being the only viable option for the electors. 
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Additionally, “internal actors in Turkey do not have confidence in themselves” (Idem), 
strengthening that feeling. 
On the other hand, and that may recall what Usul wrote about the political 
parties in Turkey, the AKP cannot be a strong party, because, as its leader is so strong 
and charismatic, AKP’s MPs have to be “low profile” (Idem), originating a really 
dangerous political situation, mostly when a Turkish political scientist asserts that “our 
democracy is only as strong as Erdoğan wants it to be” (Idem). For that, he has a 
solution: the fundamental role of the European Union as an intermediary actor between 
the polarised internal actors: “the EU is the only alternative that can stop the 
Erdoğanisation of Turkey” (Idem), i.e., the continuation of the ongoing process of 
power concentration in the figure of one single man and the overshadow of also 
accountable and representative democratic structures, such as the political parties, the 
Parliament, the Courts or even the President of the Republic. 
As Isabel David (2012: 292) rightly defended, Kemalism is preserved by three 
guardians: the military, the judicial power and the Presidency of the Republic. However, 
even in these structures, the government was able to introduce its sympathisers, 
reducing the power of the secularists – the Presidency of the Republic and the choice of 
Abdullah Gül almost caused the party to be banned87, but they survived and became 
stronger as a party and with a President close to it. The military have been seen their 
influence on the political process diminishing88 with the Europeanisation of Turkish 
civil-military relations. The judicial power is a more complex structure and, it would not 
be untrue to say, maybe the only resisting bastion of Kemalism in general and 
secularism in particular – even though their presence among its institutions have also 
been weakened.  
On the population’s side, nevertheless, the levels of support for the government 
are still high. Çarkoğlu and Toprak’s (2007: 92) survey results may be slightly different 
at the end of that decade; yet, its figures are unambiguous: 67% against 24% consider 
the AKP government changed for the better the country’s economic conditions; for 66% 
the relations with the EU improved with AKP and for 62% the Turkish politics 
improved as well. Concerning the evaluation of the party on different issues, almost 
54% of the respondents agreed that the AKP is a party committed to democracy and 
                                                          
87 Cf. Isabel David, 2012: 304-ff.  
88 The Ergenekon case, for exemple. 
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over 50% of the surveyed believed the party that supported fundamental rights and 
freedoms the most – the ones who disagreed composed 26% and 31% of the answers 
respectively (Idem: 94).  
Isabel David’s (2012: 377) conclusions are particularly straightforward and 
touch the essential aspects of all this complex debate: 
 “the result has been the maintenance, or even the reinforcement, of the 
authoritarian culture, based on a strong and charismatic leader, which 
means that, without the EU’s condition, there is no longer an incentive 
to the country’s democratisation. (...) AKP’s project of democratisation 
is limited, therefore, to the “tyranny of the majority” (Tocqueville) in 
which all the powers are controlled by the party.” 
Thus, so that Turkey’s political culture matures and achieves the levels of 
consolidated democracies, the country has to overcome several social and political 
obstacles and to enter a new phase in a way people deal with politics and trust each 
other. 
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PART IV - BRINGING EVERYTHING TOGETHER: EU, TURKEY 
AND DEMOCRACY 
 
9. Turkey-EU relations and legislative changes since 1999 
 
The institutional relations between the European Union and Turkey have already 
been approached on Chapter 7 with the aim to contextualise the period under study in 
this thesis. This chapter, not ignoring the knowledge gathered in that part of the work, 
will attempt to list the key moments of those relations since 1999. Its development 
before the application of the model – which will take place in the following chapter – is 
justified by the relevance of the events here presented for a better understanding and 
interpretation of the model. Secondly, constitutional and other legislative reforms that 
happened in this period will be included here as well. They have not been presented on 
Chapter 6 on purpose, since their existence can only be understood in the light of 
Turkey’s relations with the European Union to a great extent, as the timing of their 
adoption discloses. 
The structure of this chapter reflects a division of the larger period into three 
main smaller units: the first encompasses the years between the Helsinki Council and 
the general elections (1999-2002); the second represents the first term in office of the 
newly elected AKP party (2003-2007) and the last one includes the beginning of the 
party’s second term in office until the end of the period under consideration (2007-
2009). This division is merely an attempt to organise all the data and the events that 
occurred in the proposed phases of this eleven-year period. As it may be possible to 
conclude, these different stages meant different types of relations with the EU and 
different levels of reforms and changes at the domestic level. Only further data, 
presented in the next chapter, will prove whether this division makes sense in terms of 
the fluctuations of the institutional relations between the two actors. 
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9.1. From Helsinki to the AKP (1999-2002) 
 
 Since 1998, the European Commission started to issue Annual Progress Reports 
(APR) on Turkey and the first document of this type already identified a set of fields on 
which the country should focus to improve its performance. These included human 
rights, civil-military relations, death penalty, several freedoms and minorities issues 
(Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 83-84). As a response, Turkey adopted some measures 
during 1999, amending some articles of the Penal Code, dealing with the definition of 
controversial concepts like terrorism and abuse of power, increasing freedom of 
expression, etc. (Idem: 84). As a follow-up of this general environment surrounding the 
country’s approach, the European Council in Henlsiki, in December 1999, and after 
Germany, Austria and Greece having given up their opposition (Faucompret & 
Konings, 2008: 38), the EU declared Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and 
allowed the country to move towards the new stage in the accession process: Turkey 
became an official candidate. Thus, after recognising Turkey its new status, the Council 
sought to combine of all types of assistance to the country in a single pre-accession 
framework. Besides, the Council also advised the improvement of the political dialogue 
and the permission for the country to participate in European programmes and agencies 
(Idem). This means that, since 1999, there was a shift in the paradigm of the European 
Union’s approach towards Turkey and also vice-versa. This shift implied that both 
factions would need to cooperate more closely to pursue the path of 
enlargement/accession. This was an important benchmark achieved by Turkey and one 
that would initiate a significant momentum in Turkish democratisation process as well. 
In the 2000 APR, the Commission wrote that several meetings between Turkey 
and the EU had taken place during that year and that the annual allocation to Turkey 
would reach the 177 million Euros in 2000 (European Commission, 2000: 7, 8). 
Moreover, the same document notified that the “compliance with the Copenhagen 
criteria is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations. So far, Turkey has 
not fulfilled these political criteria” (Idem: 7). In fact, there were several criticisms 
regarding the country’s shortcomings in terms of its performance at various levels: the 
Constitution needed to be revised (namely regarding freedom of expression), judicial 
processes were still too long, the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure needed to 
be adopted, the widespread practice of corruption demanded more efforts to be fought 
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against, the civilian control over the military was not aligned with the European 
practices and the National Security Council still interfered in politics, death penalty had 
not been abolished yet, prison conditions were cause of concern, there were many 
problems regarding freedoms of expression and of the media and of association, 
minorities were not treated equally, there were no developments in the fights against 
drugs and fraud, etc. (Idem: 12-64).89 
Nevertheless, on the other hand, some improvements were also praised by the 
Commission, inter alia, the internal coordination on EU matters and the creation of the 
General Secretariat for EU Affairs, the increasing number of judges and prosecutors, 
several programmes to train judges on human rights and the ECHR, human rights 
education was also included in the curricula of police academies, authorities were in the 
process of restructuring the prison system and the legal change that allowed parents to 
choose their children’s name freely (Idem). The document concluded that overall “since 
the last regular report, progress in transposition of legislation in these areas has been 
limited. As a candidate country, Turkey has to start making substantial progress in 
alignment with the acquis” (Idem: 70).  
 In March 2001, the European Council adopted an Accession Partnership for 
Turkey (Council of the European Union, 2001). The document foresaw a set of requests 
for the country to fulfil in the short and medium terms. As Usul (2011: 62) explains, this 
type of documents constitutes a roadmap for the candidate country to guide the process 
of accession. As it can be read in the document, the fields on which the European Union 
insists to be dealt with are related to the judicial system, different freedoms, torture, ill-
treatment and death penalty. These issues were not new for Turkey, but they were 
emphasised in the Accession Partnership as goals in the short-term, i.e., to be tackled 
during that same year (Council of the European Union, 2001). In what comes to the 
medium-term goals, they included broader questions such as border disputes, 
international conventions, cultural rights, the state of emergency in the country’s 
                                                          
89 It is important to highlight that the analysis of the European Commission’s Progress Reports on Turkey 
was made taking into consideration mainly the fields more directly related to the issue of democracy. In 
that sense, the sections on “Democracy and Rule of Law” (which includes the Parliament, the Executive, 
the judicial system, corruption and civil-military relations), on Human Rights and Protection of 
Minorities (including civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and minority rights), 
as well as on the Chapters 23 and 24 of the acquis were the ones chosen to be analysed with closer 
attention to achieve a broader understanding regarding their evolution in time. Table 12 in Appendix 7 
contains a schematic, non-exhaustive, analysis of these fields. Henceforth, any references to the Progress 
Reports can be completed with more details through the reading of that table. 
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Southeast, the National Security Council, etc (Idem). This official document can be seen 
as the first one developed within the scope of the newly acquired status of candidate and 
as a relevant attempt to promote change and reforms in Turkey towards its own 
democratisation. 
 The Council also advised the country to elaborate a national programme for the 
adoption of the acquis in accordance with the Accession Partnership document. That 
request was accomplished in the same year with the government’s approval of the 
Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) (Secretariat 
General for EU Affairs, 2001). Prioritising Constitutional Amendments, the document 
stated that “in 2001, the Turkish Government will speed up the ongoing work on 
political, administrative and judicial reforms and will duly convey its legislative 
proposals to the Turkish Grand National Assembly” (Idem: 5). This statement reveals 
the willingness of the government to pursue with the demanded changes and constituted 
a positive reaction to the previous document. Yet, some authors (like Usul, 2011: 119) 
claim that it fell “behind what the EU requested from Turkey in terms of democracy and 
human rights” and that the lack of precision in the definition of timetables and deadlines 
also harmed the quality of the first NPAA. Nevertheless, still in 2001, the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly took several measures to change the country’s Constitution, 
in what appears to be one of the first and most successful moments of conditionality. 
 The new coalition government built after the 1999 elections created an All-Party 
Accord Committee, which was composed by two members from each political party and 
aimed to develop a common ground for the needed Constitutional amendments 
(Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 49). This committee was able to find a consensus on 37 
out of 51 amendments, later approved by the Turkish Parliament. According to 
Özbudun and Gençkaya (Idem: 49-50), one of the motives behind these changes at the 
Constitutional level was to meet “the economic and political criteria and adopting the 
required legal regulations in the process of full membership in the EU”. In general, the 
reforms included in this package were more focused on diminishing the legal 
constraints to human rights, in order to improve their standards (Faucompret & 
Konings, 2008: 42). 
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 In concrete, and not presenting an exhaustive list90, the 2001 Constitutional 
Amendments included several important steps towards the improvement of the 
country’s democracy: 
- Article 1 was amended to diminish the restrictions on freedom of thought and expression;  
- gender equality was reinforced with a new text for article 41;  
- the number of civilian members of the National Security Council was increased;  
- pre-trial detention period was diminished (article 19);  
- death penalty was abolished except in cases of war (article 38);  
- it was introduced the right to a fair trial (article 36);  
- it was established the principle of proportionality;  
- articles 13 and 14 were reformulated to limit the abuse of fundamental rights and freedoms 
– namely that not only individuals, but also the state could be charged with the 
accusation of not respecting them, in line with ECHR recommendations –;  
- detainees became able to inform their relatives about the detention some guidelines were 
introduced some guidelines for the registration of their custody;  
- the alteration of article 26 removed the phrase “language prohibited by law”, therefore 
improving freedom of expression and minorities’ rights;  
- some parts of article 28 were erased concerning the freedom of the press; article 33 was 
improved to avoid several restrictions on the establishment of civil society associations;  
- article 34 eased the freedom of assembly.  
- the amendment of articles 68 and 69 made it more difficult to forbid or dissolute political 
parties;  
- rights of privacy, of family life and the inviolability of the domicile were also developed 
(articles 5, 20 and 21);  
- the restrictions on meetings and demonstration were reduced (article 34);  
- and the right to petition was modified to guarantee that petitions would be dealt with more 
quickly and allowing foreigners resident in Turkey the same right.  
(Usul, 2011: 124-125; Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 50-62). 
 These constitute some of the articles of the Turkish Constitution that were 
amended in 2001 after the approval of the country’s Grand National Assembly. Düzgit 
and Keyman (2007: 73) assess these reforms as “the first crucial responses to EU 
conditionality”. Nevertheless, and maybe even more important than that, is the fact that, 
to achieve this degree of changes in such a fragmented political scenario, Turkish 
political elites had to overcome some differences and, within the framework of a 
                                                          
90 For an extensive work on these amendments, for example cf. Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009. 
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coalition government and of a not consolidated democratic culture, to be able to join 
forces to accomplish this endeavour. Besides, the beginning of the 2000s was being 
marked by a severe economic crisis. As Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009: 62-63) wrote:  
“The 2001 constitutional amendments were the most extensive 
changes that the 1982 Constitution has undergone so far, involving 34 
articles. While some of them were relatively minor ‘cosmetic’ 
changes, others were important steps in the liberalization and 
democratization process. (...) Also significant is the fact that these 
amendments were the product of intense negotiations and 
compromises (...) and that they were adopted through broad inter-party 
agreements”.  
This also meant, according to Kalaycioğlu (2011: 272), that  
“there has been relatively large-scale support among Turkish political 
elites of almost all ideological backgrounds for the deepening of 
relations between Turkey and the EU. Full membership in the EU is a 
project that transcends partisan politics and carries multi-party 
consensus”.  
 These efforts paid off; the 2001 Progress Report recognised the changes 
achieved through the above-mentioned reforms and, despite still recognising Turkey’s 
weaknesses in various domains (asking for their improvement), the document stated that  
“since the last Regular Report, further alignment has taken place in 
these areas. (...) Turkey gained greater understanding of the acquis and 
the government has started an intensive process of preparation of new 
legislation” (European Commission, 2001: 93, 95).  
This positive evaluation was also shared by the European Council, whose conclusions 
recognised that “good progress has been made in implementing the pre-accession 
strategy”. (Council of the European Union, 2001a: 2). 
 Probably due to the impetus created in the previous year, 2002, which began 
with the entering into force of the new Civil Code (Düzgit & Keyman, 2007: 73), was 
marked by a set of three harmonisation packages (in February, March and August) and 
further Constitutional amendments by the end of the year. The main changes brought 
by the new Civil Code focused on “gender equality, protection of the child and 
vulnerable persons and the freedom of association” (Secretariat General for EU 
Affairs, 2007: 5). The first package included the amendment of seven articles (7, 8, 16, 
107, 128, 159 and 312) that dealt with Laws on the Trial Procedures, the State Security 
Courts or the Anti-Terror Law (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 128). In this sense, the 
penalties for some crimes against the state were reduced, propaganda became 
criminalised only when it is used to encourage terrorism, the pre-trial detention in areas 
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in state of emergency was reduced from seven to four days, it was given the possibility 
for the detainees to contact a relative after their arrest, etc. (Usul, 2011: 126, 127).  
 The second harmonisation package embraced a broader set of 23 articles91 and 
concerned fields such as the Press Law, the Law on Associations, on Civil Servants, on 
Provincial Administration, on Political Parties, on Meetings and Demonstration 
Marches, among others. These amended articles aimed, for instance, to increase the 
civilian role in local administration, to limit the Gendarmerie’s action in some areas, to 
prevent torture and ill-treatment, to narrow the possibility to close or ban a political 
party, to shrink the limitations on the freedoms of association and of expression. 
 The third harmonisation package, adopted in August, was even broader in terms 
of the number of articles it was able to change: 43 articles were modified with the aim 
to approximate the Turkish laws to the European standards. The Press Law, the Law on 
Associations, the Penal Code, the Law on Foundations, on Foreign Language Teaching 
and Education, on Forestry, etc. were amended (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 128, 
129). As a consequence, death penalty was only kept for cases of war and the cases 
which it had been applied to were converted into life imprisonment without parole 
(Usul, 2011: 128). Article 159 was modified so that it would not constitute a crime to 
criticise state institutions or state personalities, including ministers or even the military 
– although a safeguard was maintained for the use of insults; non-Muslim minorities 
recognised in the Lausanne Treaty were granted more rights and freedoms; Kurds were 
allowed to broadcast in their mother tongue and minorities could create language 
courses (Idem: 128-129). 
 These (and other) changes were fundamental in the realm of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. For the first time in modern Turkey, Kurds were recognised as 
a different ethnic group. Besides, both internal and external commentators praised 
these changes. The Human Rights Watch (cited in Usul, 2011: 125) stated that “much 
what passed as reforms since the beginning of Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership 
has been little more than cosmetic gestures; these new reforms are truly significant”. 
 In November 2002, general elections were held and, as already written on 
chapter 6, they were won by the recent AKP. Turkey would enter a new phase in its 
domestic politics. In fact, as soon as the new party was in charge, some Constitutional 
                                                          
91 The number of articles included in each harmonisation package presented here comes from the reading 
of Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009. 
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amendments were made. Nonetheless, these changes to the 1982 Constitution did not 
aim to please the European Union or to improve the country’s accession process; on 
the contrary, they planned to allow Erdoğan to become a deputy and, ultimately, the 
Prime-Minister – since he had been banned from any political activity, as explained 
previously. Amending articles 76 and 78 and replacing “ideological and anarchistic 
actions” with “terror actions” as crimes that would exclude someone from the run to 
political positions, it would be possible to concretise that wish. However, President 
Sezer (2000-2007) vetoed the law in December on the grounds that it was not in 
accordance with the principle of rule of law and that rules should not aim a particular 
individual; they should be objective and general. Still, the AKP passed the 
amendments with no change and they ended up being adopted (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 
2009: 63-64). 
 This first episode with the AKP revealed a tendency that would be confirmed 
later in the party’s action: as they did not need to involve the opposition or other 
political actors in their choices, some measures would be taken even if they were not 
supported by the opposition or even the President of the Republic, almost ignoring the 
system of checks and balances or the symbolic power of the head of the state.  
 Even before this event, the European Council of Seville (Council of the 
European Union, 2002: 7), in June, unveiled the possibility of the good news that were 
to come: in its Conclusions, the Council “encourages and fully supports the efforts 
made by Turkey (...) [and added that] New decisions could be taken in Copenhagen on 
the next stage of Turkey’s candidature”. The 2002 Progress Report (European 
Commission, 2002) was also relatively positive regarding the efforts made by the 
country to pursue with the accomplishment of the Accession Partnership and its path 
towards the EU. The same document listed the changes led by Turkey: 
- State Security Courts improved; 
- training programmes for judges continued 
- anti-corruption measures taken by the government achieved some results; 
- there was a new strategy to promote transparency and good governance; 
- National Security Council became formally an advisory institution; 
- several Conventions were signed and ratified; 
- death penalty was abolished in peacetimes; 
- dialogue with civil society was reinforced; 
- no disappearances were reported; 
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- there were projects to reintegrate former prisoners; 
- freedom of expression was improved; 
- broadcasts in other languages were allowed; 
- gender equality was improved; 
- public organisations became entitled to hold meetings and demonstrations; 
- there were some improvements in the visa policy, as well as in the migration and 
asylum fields. 
Nonetheless, on the other hand, the 2002 Progress Report was also very critical 
concerning some areas in which Turkey had not done enough92: the duration of judicial 
procedures was still too long, some articles of the Penal Code originate lack of clarity 
and legal certainty (allowing diverse, and sometimes opposite, readings), the judiciary 
did not act independently, corruption remained a serious problem, some important 
conventions on several issues were not signed or ratified, in practice, the military 
continued to exert much influence through their interferences in the political life, the 
sentences for the ones accused of torture and ill-treatment were light, between January 
and May, 40 books were banned or subject to investigation, it was introduced 
censorship to Internet content, the authorities still controlled the international relations 
of Turkish organisations, in practice, also remained many obstacles to hold marches 
and demonstrations, there were no improvements in the status of Alevis, trade unions 
were subject to restrictions, etc.  
In a nutshell, the 2002 Progress Report stated in its general evaluation that 
Turkey achieved some improvements, but that there still are “major discrepancies 
between the acquis and Turkish legislation” (Idem: 134). This conclusion implied that, 
despite the several steps that had been already taken by Turkey, several more would 
need to be taken if the country really wanted to join the Union. Yet, the Conclusions of 
the European Council of December (Council of the European Union, 2002a: 5) gave 
some encouragement to the pursuit of those changes: 
 “It strongly welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey 
towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria, in particular through 
the recent legislative packages and the subsequent 
implementation measures which cover a large number of key 
priorities specified in the Accession Partnership. (...)The Union 
encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process.” 
                                                          
92 Again, more details on the content of Progress Reports can be found in Table 12 (Appendix 7). 
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 Thus, between 1999 and the election of the AKP, Turkey led several reforms to 
harmonise its laws with the European demands, even though the country was facing 
some internal difficulties and the general environment provided some hurdles, such as 
the internal opponents to the process, the financial crisis or the fragmented political 
scene. Yet, as Kalaycioğlu (2011: 273) put it, “It is uncertain whether such progressive 
changes in the status of women could have taken place under the reign of conservative 
AKP”. Next section will focus on the party’s first term in office and the development 
of Turkey-EU relations within that time limit. 
 
9.2. AKP’s first term in office (2003-2007) 
 
 General elections were held in Turkey in November 2002, less than two months 
before the end of the year. For that reason, this section will only begin in 2003, avoiding 
the partition of 2002 and considering that the new government took the rest of that year 
to settle down and to find out about the state of the nation.  
 It was written in the 2003 Progress Report (European Commission, 2003: 16) 
that these elections were monitored by the European Parliament and the OSCE, which 
found they had met the international standards as well as reflected the improvements of 
the reformed legislation on elections. Besides, the same report highlighted the fact that 
“the goal of EU accession has been amongst the government’s main priorities. On 
several occasions, the government reiterated its commitment to fulfil the Copenhagen 
political criteria” (Idem: 18). 
In January 2003, the Fourth Harmonisation Package was adopted. Amending a 
total of 38 articles, it included a set of changes on legislation, such as the Law on 
Criminal Records, the Press Law, the Law on Penal Trial Procedure, the Law on 
Associations, the Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedure of the State Security 
Courts, the Law on Political Parties, on Foundations, the Penal and Civil Codes, etc. 
(Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 129-130). The Fifth Harmonisation Package was 
published in the following month and presented eight reformed articles within the scope 
of the Law on Penal Trial, on Associations and on Civil Trial Procedure, among others 
(Idem: 130). In fact, these two sets of new legislation reflected the priority given by the 
government to the European process, as well as the opposition’s willingness to 
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cooperate in that realm. The European Commission recognised that effort in the 2003 
Progress Report, when it stated that “Turkey’s alignment has progressed in most areas”, 
even though the institution is aware of the fact that the development “remains at an 
early stage for many chapters” (European Commission, 2003: 128). 
 In concrete, these two packages brought important changes to align the Turkish 
legislation with the demands of the European acquis. For example, the presence of a 
lawyer after detention in the State Security Courts was reinforced; journalists became 
entitled not to reveal their sources; creating an association was eased and its connections 
with foreign counterparts was facilitated; banning a political party turned out to be a 
more difficult task; penalties on Associations became less punishing, etc. (David, 2009: 
283-284; European Commission, 2003).  
 In March 2003, the AKP sought to amend three articles of the Constitution: to 
reduce the minimum age to be eligible to the Parliament (from 30 to 25); to allow the 
management of state forests by private actors; and to permit the sale of public lands 
that used to be forests (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 64-65). In an uncommon move, 
the opposition did not support the amendments, mainly the last one, and even the 
President of the Republic returned that law to the Parliament, arguing that it was in 
conflict with the public interest and the principles of the rule of law and of justice; 
besides, it would promote the destruction of forestry in the country. Nonetheless, and 
after some changes, the law was adopted at the Parliament. President Sezer vetoed it 
again and ultimately it was not approved (Idem).  
 In what comes to Turkey-EU relations more specifically, the Council adopted 
the revised Accession Partnership and, subsequently, Turkey revised its NPAA as well. 
Given the reforms adopted by the country in the previous years, both documents 
needed to be reviewed taking those adjustments into consideration. As the Conclusions 
of the Thessaloniki European Council stated,  
“with a view to helping Turkey achieve this objective [of continuing 
its efforts to progress], the Council adopted recently a revised 
Accession Partnership, which sets out the priorities that Turkey should 
pursue, supported by substantially increased pre-accession financial 
assistance” (Council of the European Union, 2003: 11).  
 Despite the above-mentioned punctual obstacle in the process of legislative 
change, in July and August, two further harmonisation packages were adopted and 
officially published. The sixth and seventh packages concretised a set of 23 and 38 
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amended articles, respectively, in a broad variety of covered fields: Law on Criminal 
Records, Penal Trial Procedure and State Security Courts, Death Penalty, Public 
Works, Census-taking, Anti-Terror Law, Turkish Penal Code, Law on Foundations, 
Military Courts, Law on Associations, on Audit Courts, anti-Terror Law, Civil Code, 
Law on Foreign Language Teaching and Education, among others.  
 These focused on various important fields of Turkish democracy, namely the 
judicial system and Human Rights (death penalty, freedom of association, etc.). In 
concrete, these changes brought increased penalties for honour killings, the 
reformulation of the notion of terrorism (only crimes can be included in its definition, 
enhancing freedom of expression), other languages and dialects were allowed to be 
broadcasted in public and private media, investigations in cases of torture and ill-
treatment gained the status of ‘urgent’, and the penalty for insulting Turkey, the 
National Assembly, the government or other national entities became less punishing. 
Regarding minorities, these reforms brought improvements, such as the recognition of 
non-Muslim communities to build places of worship; on the other hand, parents gained 
the right to name their children more freely, as restrictions at this level were eased and 
which constitutes an improvement for Kurds, for example. Concerning civil-military 
relations, this package emphasised the NSC’s consultative nature, diminished the 
frequency of its meetings, shrank the military courts’ jurisdiction over civilians and 
strengthened the civilian control over the military expenditure. Furthermore, the rights 
to demonstrations were enlarged and the limitations to establish an association were 
lessened; the maximum age to be tried in Juvenile Courts rose from 15 to 18 (David, 
2012: 284-286; Usul, 2011: 131-132; Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2007: 13-18). 
 As the 2003 Progress Report (European Commission, 2003: 17) reminds, 
besides the harmonisation packages, the Turkish Parliament has adopted 143 new laws, 
which reveals the quick pace of the legislative reforms that were taking place in 
Turkey during the early 2000s. Moreover, the establishment of a Parliamentary 
Committee responsible for ensuring the compliance of the adopted legislation with the 
European acquis (Idem: 17) is also illustrative of the concern devoted to the accession 
process. The Commission’s Report assessed positively, in a general fashion, the efforts 
made by Turkey, praising them, although it did not overlook the faults or shortcomings 
of the compliance with the required goals. In what comes to civil-military relations, 
“fundamental changes have been made” (Idem: 18), although the military continued to 
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exert political influence and the measures taken needed to be effectively implemented 
(Idem). At the judicial level, “structural changes have been made” to improve its 
efficiency, but some inconsistencies remain in the interpretation of some articles of the 
Penal Code (namely limiting the freedom of expression), as well as some problems of 
impartiality had not been addressed due to the still existing links between the judicial 
system and the executive (Idem: 21). Yet, the Commission highlighted the importance 
of this sector of the society for their role in implementing the political reforms through 
their practices and judicial decisions (Idem: 21).  
 Some progress has been achieved in the fight against corruption, in Human 
Rights and political rights; there were improvements in economic and social rights – 
despite the remaining problems with the overspread gender inequality (Idem: 22, 36). 
However, the report also draws attention towards the lack of progress regarding the 
learning of other languages and dialects besides Turkey (Idem: 38) and the 
discrimination against minorities (Idem: 38-41). The report is much longer than these 
brief comments, but, in general, the tone of the evaluations was positive, even though 
the Commission’s rapporteurs emphasise the weakness of implementation (Idem: 13), 
leaving it implied that, more than just adopting a wide list of measures, these need to 
be concretised. 
 2004 reinforced this positive environment between Turkey and the European 
Union. The AKP continued its effort to keep its word and seriously commit to the 
accession process, which also happened with the opposition. A small setback occurred 
in April with the referendum on Cyprus that invalidated a solution for the island due to 
the refusal by the Greek Cypriots93.Yet, in May it was approved a set of Constitutional 
Amendments and in July another, the eighth, harmonisation package. 
 Ten amendments were included in this new set of changes. Kalaycioglu (2011: 
268) believes the 1995, 2001 and 2004 Constitutional amendments were the ones with 
the biggest impact, since they targeted the restrictions on liberties, thus increasing the 
citizens’ freedoms. Besides, Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009: 66) wrote that  
“The 2004 constitutional amendments were also strongly motivated by 
the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU, as was clearly stated in 
the reasoning of the amendment proposal. The amendment package 
that involved changes in ten articles was one of the most significant 
steps in Turkey’s liberalization and democratization process”.  
                                                          
93 More details on the referendum, cf. Chapter 8. 
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This opinion justifies the presentation of domestic reforms within the context of the 
country’s relations with the EU, since they have been promoted by the organisation 
within the scope of the country’s accession process and constituted a response to the 
demands of the Union.  
In this case, the alterations comprised the total abolition of death penalty, the 
reinforcement of gender equality, the reduction of the military power (through the 
elimination of the NSC representation on the Higher Education Board, the abolition of 
State Security Courts and the reinforcement of the Court of Auditors over the military 
expenditure), the enhancement of the freedom of the press and the recognition of the 
supremacy of the international jurisdiction (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 66; Usul, 
2011: 134). The Eighth Harmonisation Package that followed aimed to harmonise the 
legislation with the previously adopted amendments and, therefore, seventy articles 
have been changed or adopted: on the Execution of Penalties, on Attorneyship, on 
Penal Trial Procedure, on the Protection of Minors from harmful publications, on 
Juvenile Courts, on Anti-Terror Law, on Higher Education, etc. The Turkish Penal 
Code itself was responsible for the change of 45 articles (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 
132-133). 
Nevertheless, besides this package, several other laws were introduced. The 
European Commission (2004: 19-20) estimated that, between October 2003 and July 
2004, the Parliament had adopted 261 new laws, stressing that its activities were 
dominated by political and economic reform with the overall support of the opposition. 
In 2004, therefore, press freedoms increased, restrictions on the establishment of new 
associations decreased, the military’s budgetary transparency was reinforced and 
freedom of expression was strengthened through improvements in the Penal Code, to 
name a few of the improvements. The respective Progress Report praised the achieved 
results but it also pointed out, as usual, the weaknesses that needed to be corrected or 
overcome. As a general evaluation, the Commission (Idem: 160-164) wrote that  
“Turkey’s alignment has progressed in many areas but remains at an 
early stage for most chapters. (...) Turkey has continued to make 
efforts to align with the acquis (...) [but] implementation of legislation 
formally aligned with the acquis continues to be insufficient. 
Administrative capacity in most areas needs to be strengthened to 
ensure that the acquis is implemented and enforced effectively”. 
This stresses the importance given by the European institutions to the implementation 
of the measures that are adopted, as mentioned above, in a sense that the democratic 
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(or other) improvements in the country need to be real and tangible to its everyday 
routine and its citizens. Nevertheless, the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council in October 2004 (European Commission, 2004a: 3) concluded that: 
“In view of the overall progress of reforms, and provided that Turkey 
brings into force the outstanding legislation mentioned above, the 
Commission considers that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political 
criteria and recommends that accession negotiations be opened.”. 
However, the same document alerts for the possible impact of this accession, due to the 
country’s specificities (military power, demography, borders, economy, etc.) (Idem: 3-
6), and warns:  
“the Commission will recommend the suspension of negotiations 
in the case of a serious and persistent breach of the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded.” 
(Idem: 6). 
These safeguards constitute a tangible evidence of EU’s conditionality and the 
importance attributed to certain values in these relations, as much as the lack of respect 
for them would mean the suspension of negotiations.  Besides, it is also written that the 
development of the accession negotiation does not depend exclusively on Turkey, but 
rather also on the EU itself, as the Union’s absorption capacity is an issue to take into 
consideration as well (Idem: 8). These statements disclose that, despite the generally 
positive environment boosted by the Commission’s recommendation to the Council 
and the Parliament, some doubts start to arise, mainly concerning Cyprus, that became 
a full member of the EU in this year and that the final outcome of the whole process 
not only is does not depend on Turkey alone, but also that it is uncertain.  
Nevertheless, in December 2004, the European Council follows the 
Commission’s recommendations and decides to open the accession negotiations in 
October of the following year (Council of the European Union, 2004). That decision 
constituted a major development in Turkey-EU relations; Turkey entered a new phase 
with positive signals sent by the European institutions, even though, as mentioned 
above, the enthusiasm ought to be moderate, given EU’s reservations. And although 
some voices have been heard at this point concerning the possibility of Turkey not 
joining the Union, Enlargement Commissioner Oli Rehn affirmed in a press interview 
in December 2004 that there was no Plan B for Turkey, meaning that the EU has “the 
responsibility to accept the country as a member if it fulfils the criteria (...). It will be a 
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long and difficult process and no one can guarantee that it will be successful” 
(EurActiv, 2004). 
Accession negotiations represent a new dynamic in the accession process: they 
imply that the European Union (more specifically, the Commission) monitors the 
country’s behaviour and, simultaneously, contributes to the preparation it for full 
membership (through financial assistance, technical support or other mechanisms). 
Having the acquis communautaire as the general background and as a guiding 
document, whose chapters are analysed individually, negotiations develop depending 
on the progress achieved in each field. Opening and closing a chapter requires a 
unanimous decision at an intergovernmental meeting (Usul, 2011: 63). As it can be 
perceived with more detail in the next chapter, the amounts of pre-accession financial 
assistance to Turkey increased significantly after the country has moved to this new 
stage94. 
In May 2005, Turkey’s Economy Minister was named as Chief of Accession 
Negotiations (Hürriyet, 2005) and started his functions in a difficult epoch: as the 2004 
Report stated and the Conclusions of the European Council reminded, the opening of 
negotiations depended on the fulfilment of two conditions – one was bringing into 
force six pieces of legislation approved (in the fields of Human Rights and the 
Judiciary) and the other was signing the Adaptation Protocol that would extend the 
Association Agreement to all new member states, including Cyprus. This latter 
condition raised a quandary between Turkey and the EU. Although the legislation was 
adopted and the Protocol to the Ankara Agreement was signed, Turkey issues a 
declaration in July 2005, in which the country states the following: 
“Turkey remains committed to finding a political settlement of the 
Cyprus issue and has clearly demonstrated its resolve in this regard. 
(...) The Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol is not the 
original partnership State established in 1960. (...)Turkey declares that 
signature, ratification and implementation of this Protocol neither 
amount to any form of recognition of the Republic of Cyprus referred 
to in the Protocol” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey 
2005). 
                                                          
94 In 2004, the annual value of the financial support from the EU was €250 million; in 2005, that 
amounted to €300 million, whereas in 2006 it increased to €500 million. (Source: Source: European 
Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement (in Million €). These values are, however, different 
from the ones Table 15, since these are the amounts intended to be allocated and those of the table are the 
values actually transferred). 
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As a response to this declaration that, ultimately, meant that a candidate did not 
recognise a full member of the organisation, the European Council releases a counter-
declaration: 
“1. The European Community and its Member States acknowledge the 
signature by Turkey of the Additional Protocol. (...)They regret that 
Turkey felt it necessary to make a declaration regarding the Republic 
of Cyprus at the time of signature. 2. The European Community and its 
Member States make clear that this declaration by Turkey is unilateral, 
does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey’s 
obligations under the Protocol. 3. The European Community and its 
Member States expect full, non-discriminatory implementation of the 
Additional Protocol. (...)Turkey must apply the Protocol fully to all EU 
Member States. The EU will monitor this closely and evaluate full 
implementation in 2006. (...)Failure to implement its obligations in full 
will affect the overall progress in the negotiations. (...) 5. Recognition 
of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession 
process” (Council of the European Union, 2005). 
It was made clear with this counter-declaration that the European Union would 
not accept the non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and that that 
diplomatic position would harm and jeopardise the whole accession process. 
Nonetheless, and despite this obstacle, negotiations opened in October and the 
screening process began. Still in this year, GNAT (Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey) approved seven Constitutional amendments on higher education institutions, 
the Court of Auditors, state budget, among others (Kalaycioğlu, 2011: 269), but 
Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009: 67-68) qualified these reforms as technical 
amendments regarding the budgeting process rather than deep, important content 
measures to improve democracy and human rights.   
In October, it was adopted a Negotiation Framework. In this document, a few 
key sentences can be found: “the shared objective of the negotiations is accession. 
These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be 
guaranteed beforehand” (Council of European Union, 2005a: 1). This initial warning is 
very important in the sense that it introduced a new variable in Turkey-EU relations: 
the process is open-ended, i.e., there are no guarantees (at least according to this 
document) that full membership is achieved by Turkey. Secondly, another aspect that 
is worth to be highlighted is the introduction of “long transitional periods, derogations, 
specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are 
permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures” (Idem: 5). These mean the 
intensification of conditionality or, from another perspective, widening the room for 
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manoeuvre for the EU to punish the country’s lack of achievements, delaying its 
accession. This same document also provides some information regarding the 
mechanics of the process (Idem: 7): 
“The Commission will undertake a formal process of examination of 
the acquis, called screening, in order to explain it to the Turkish 
authorities, to assess the state of preparation of Turkey for opening 
negotiations in specific areas and to obtain preliminary indications of 
the issues that will most likely come up in the negotiations. (...) the 
acquis will be broken down into a number of chapters, each covering a 
specific policy area. (...) the Council, acting by unanimity on a 
proposal by the Commission, will lay down benchmarks for the 
provisional closure and, where appropriate, for the opening of each 
chapter. The Union will communicate such benchmarks to Turkey. 
Depending on the chapter, precise benchmarks will refer in particular 
to the existence of a functioning market economy, to legislative 
alignment with the acquis and to a satisfactory track record in 
implementation of key elements of the acquis demonstrating the 
existence of an adequate administrative and judicial capacity.” 
 
Further information is provided in the Negotiation Framework, namely that, 
when a chapter is closed, it is only provisionally closed, as it may be re-opened by the 
Council, making nothing from the process definitive. Atila Eralp considered this 
document one of the reasons behind a negative turn this author believes to have 
happened since 2004 in Turkey-EU relations. According to Eralp, it damaged the 
enthusiasm of this phase because it established stricter conditions and fewer incentives. 
Besides, the newly introduced derogations and open-end character of negotiations were 
seen as a sign of double standards, also contributing to the politicisation of the process, 
instead of being a technical one (Eralp, 2009: 162-163). 
Yet, the 2005 Progress Report published by the European Commission 
continued to assess positively both the government and the opposition’s commitment 
and enrolment in the EU accession process (European Commission, 2005: 11). It also 
praised the meeting the Prime-Minister Erdoğan and Minister Ali Babacan had with 85 
NGOs to discuss ways to improve the dialogue with the civil society (Idem: 12). The 
field of civil-military relations was assessed with “good progress” (even though some 
advice was given to consolidate these changes) (Idem: 15); the judicial system was also 
object to a positive general comment – “important progress was made” –; “some 
progress” was achieved in the area of anti-corruption (Idem: 17) and “further progress” 
was made concerning the observance of international human rights law (Idem: 18). 
Regarding civil and political rights the situation is particularly complex: there are still 
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cases of torture and ill-treatment reported, although their number has been decreasing; 
extra-judicial killings have increased; there have been improvements in prisons’ 
facilities, but they are still overcrowded and under-resourced; positive development in 
the freedom of the press; limited progress in broadcasting; improvements on freedom 
of association, but still several technical requirements that hamper the creation of new 
associations; no change on the Alevis situation; etc. (Idem: 22-32). Women’s rights 
showed little progress, some shortcomings regarding children’s rights, constraints to 
trade unions’ work, remaining problems with non-Muslim minorities and other issues 
have also been reported by the Commission in the section of Economic, Social and 
Minorities Rights (Idem: 32-40). Finally, “as regards the judiciary, substantial progress 
has been made” (Idem: 110) and “further progress” in the field of justice, freedom and 
security (Idem: 114). Overall, “as regards Turkey’s ability to adopt and implement the 
EU legal order, there has been some, though uneven, progress since 2004” (Idem: 134). 
Although the Report is much more extensive than the few comments chosen in 
the previous paragraph, and several other issues are praised and warned about, the 
general tone of the report is relatively positive and recognises the improvements in the 
areas Turkey has actually progressed. Besides, it insists on some other fields that 
require further attention in order to align the Turkish legislation and practices with the 
EU’s standards. Another major concern, also written in the report, and taking into 
consideration the increased financial aid to the country, is the need to “further improve 
its capacity to manage and use these funds effectively” (Idem: 7), as well as to improve 
the implementation of the assistance, since a European Committee assessed it as 
“barely satisfactory” (Idem). 
In January 2006, the Accession Partnership is revised again, “setting out 
priorities that Turkey should address in the short- and medium-terms in the 
preparations for accession” (European Commission, 2006: 5). In April, the Ninth 
Harmonisation Package was announced by the then Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Abdullah Gül, and included several issues, such as the Laws on Court of Audit, on 
Administrative Legal Procedures, on Establishment of a Political Ethics Commission 
in the Parliament, on Foundations and on Ombudsman (Secretariat General for EU 
Affairs, 2007: 23). Besides, it was also foreseen in the document the signature or 
ratification of several international conventions and protocols. According to the 2006 
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Progress Report (European Commission, 2006: 5), the Turkish Parliament adopted a 
total of 148 laws, including some of the above-mentioned changes.  
In June, concrete negotiations began and Chapter 25 (Science and Research) 
was provisionally opened and closed (Idem: 4). However, the 2006 Progress Report 
was less positive regarding the effort of the country over the last year. Published in 
September, the report counted 148 laws adopted by the GNAT during the reporting 
period (Idem: 5) and assessed with “little progress” or “no progress” the following 
fields: aligning civil-military relations, fight against corruption, situation of the Alevis, 
difficulties of non-Muslim communities, trade unions’ rights, approach to minorities’ 
rights, minorities’ education, approach to Syriacs and Greeks, on establishing a body 
responsible for implementing the policies on Internally Dislocated People, addressing 
the problem of village guards, ensuring cultural diversity, fundamental rights, 
institutions for monitoring and promoting human rights, protection of personal data, 
conscientious objection to military service, right to property of non-Muslim minorities, 
anti-discrimination and children’s rights (Idem: 5-ff.). 
Although it will be more accurate to test this hypothesis with the quantitative 
analysis of the next chapter, it seems that the 2006 report was more critical regarding a 
wider variety of areas and less praising, possibly indicating a decrease in the pace of 
reforms. Still in 2006, there was another (technical) Constitutional amendment that 
lowered the age of eligibility to become a deputy from 30 to 25 (Özbudun & 
Gençkaya, 2009: 68).  
In November, a serious setback hit Turkey-EU relations, since the European 
Commission recommends the Council to partially suspend negotiations (European 
Commission, 2006):  
“The Commission notes that Turkey has not fully implemented the 
Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, and that restrictions to 
the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of 
transport, remain in force. In these circumstances (...), the Commission 
recommends that the Intergovernmental Conference on Accession with 
Turkey should not open negotiations on chapters covering policy areas 
relevant to Turkey's restrictions as regards the Republic of Cyprus95 
until the Commission confirms that Turkey has fulfilled its 
commitments. (...) Moreover, the Commission recommends that no 
                                                          
95 The chapters mentioned in the Recommendation are Chapter 1 (Free movement of goods), Chapter 3 
(Right of establishment and freedom to provide services), Chapter 9 (Financial services), Chapter 11 
(Agriculture and rural development), Chapter 13 (Fisheries), Chapter 14 (Transport policy), Chapter 29 
(Customs Union), and Chapter 30 (External relations). 
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chapter be provisionally closed until the Commission has confirmed 
that Turkey has fully implemented its commitments with respect to the 
Additional Protocol”. 
Thus, and due to the lack of progress on the Cyprus question, this 
recommendation is accepted by the European Council (Council of the European Union, 
2006: 8-9): 
“The Council takes note of the Commission's report of 8 November 
2006 and welcomes the findings and recommendations contained 
therein. Council welcomes the continued progress made by Turkey in 
the reform process, but regrets that the pace of reforms has slowed 
down in 2006. (...) The Council agrees that the Member States within 
the Intergovernmental Conference will not decide on opening chapters 
covering policy areas relevant to Turkey's restrictions as regards the 
Republic of Cyprus until the Commission verifies that Turkey has 
fulfilled its commitments related to the Additional Protocol.” 
In fact, the European Council not only accepted the Commission’s recommendations, 
but it also showed it regretted the slower pace of the reforms, confirming the above-
mentioned hypothesis. To worsen this negative environment that started to develop 
between the two entities, the election of Nicholas Sarkozy in France and his vocal 
opposition to Turkey’s accession gives rise to an anti-Turkey discourse across Europe, 
including in Germany96 – “the election of Nicholas Sarkozy (...) inaugurated a turning 
point in France’s official position on Turkey’s membership to the EU” (Akşit, et al., 
2010: 18). 
At the domestic level, April brings a Constitutional crisis in the country due to 
the Presidential election. President Sezer’s term was reaching its end and the AKP was 
powerful enough in terms of number of seats to elect its own President (Abdullah Gül). 
Yet, some “manoeuvrings of dubious legal validity” (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 97) 
began in order to save a key position of the defenders of the secularist republic from an 
“Islamist” – this fact about Gül (his wife wears headscarf and he is considered very 
religious) led the military to oppose to this election, as well (David, 2012: 304). In the 
first round, the opposition boycotted the election which did not reach the necessary 
quorum and the case was even taken to the Constitutional Court, which 
(controversially) agreed with the complaints of unconstitutionality. Simultaneously, the 
military issued an E-Memorandum highlighting the Kemalist values of the Republic of 
Turkey, and, once again interfering in the political life of the country. But the military 
                                                          
96 For more details on the opinions of member-states about the Turkish accession, cf. Akşit, Şenyuva & 
Üstün, 2010.  
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were not alone in this struggle against the empowerment of an Islamist: one million 
secularists marched in Istanbul against this candidacy. However, since a meeting 
between the Prime-Minister and the Chief of General Staff, the latter became less 
aggressive in his discourse against this election (David, 2012: 306).  
The AKP reacted to these obstacles with the presentation of three 
Constitutional amendments that were adopted by the Parliament: shortening the 
legislative period to four years, electing the President for a maximum two terms for 
five years each and the minimum quorum requirement for all subjects would be one 
third of the assembly’s full membership. The President returned the second proposal to 
the Parliament on the grounds that changing the election of the President would imply 
changing the political system of the country. It was approved nevertheless, but Sezer 
submitted it to a referendum. However, before the referendum, general elections were 
held in July 2007 (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 98-99) and their results ended up 
shaping the resolution to this deadlock.  
 
9.3. The beginning of the second term (2007-2009) 
 
 2007 early elections granted the AKP 340 seats in the Grand National 
Assembly, which meant that its power in that organ has been strengthened. Therefore, 
the first subject to be dealt with in the new legislature was the election of the President. 
However, the problem persisted as the opposition’s boycott would hamper the whole 
process. Yet, the MHP changed its attitude and attended the Parliamentary sessions, so 
that the country would not have to face another Constitutional crisis. That did not solve 
the problem per se, since each party voted for its candidate and the deadlock 
maintained. It was only on the third round, in August, that Abdullah Gül was elected 
(Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 101). As David (2012: 308-309) wrote, “the 
fundamental bastion of the kemalist establishment was thus broken, ending the dual 
sovereignty” that pretended to protect the secularist nature of the Turkish state. Facing 
these problems, the AKP realised that the Constitution that resulted from the 1980s 
military coup needed to be changed and its campaign promised the creation of a brand 
new civilian Constitution that would protect citizens’ rights and liberties, safeguarding 
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democracy, secularism, the rule of law and the social state (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 
2009: 103). 
 The draft of the new Constitution was delivered by a group of Constitutional 
Law Professors who were asked by Erdoğan to prepare it. According to the same 
authors (Idem: 104), the main innovations were the improvement of the standards for 
fundamental rights and freedoms (aligning it with the ECHR), the enhancement of the 
rule of law, the reinforcement of the democratic legitimacy of several state institutions 
(Constitutional Court, Supreme Council of Judges, etc.) and the removal of the 
excessive presidential powers. Even though these changes that were suggested by the 
party to be introduced in the new document seem rather democratic, secularist and pro-
Western, there are still some sectors within the Turkish society that continue to be 
suspicious concerning AKP’s hidden agenda to weaken the judicial independence and 
to politicise the judiciary (Idem: 105). The debate on the new Constitution continued 
over the following years and raised fundamental questions about the Turkish identity, 
social life and political system discussed both among the political elites (between the 
parties) and among the citizens. Some of the articles were put into a public scrutiny in 
a referendum that took place in 2010, already outside of the time scope of this thesis. 
The key aspect to retain from this Constitution issue is the political and social debate it 
has stirred, as well as a major division it brought to light between the two major 
factions of the Turkish society – the traditionalists/religious/Islamists and the 
secularists/kemalists. This struggle would characterise much of Turkish political life 
ever since. 
 Concerning the referendum on the Constitutional alteration of the type of the 
Presidential election and term, as well as the other provisions submitted by Sezer 
before the general suffrage, the result was positive: 68.95% of the voters supported the 
changes (Idem: 102). In the meanwhile, and returning to Turkey-EU relations, in June, 
two chapters had been opened in the accession negotiations (Chapter 18, Statistics; 
Chapter 32, Financial Control). This was, in fact, a positive development, although 
these chapters cannot be considered central to the process.  
 The 2007 Progress Report confirmed the legality and transparency of the 
elections held in July and the fact that the government’s programme continues its 
commitment to the reforms (European Commission, 2007: 7). However, in the field of 
civil-military relations, they alerted to the attempt of the Turkish Armed Forced to 
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interfere in the Presidential election, even though the democratic structures were able 
to overcome the problem. Besides, the military tried to restrict academic research and 
public debate, they targeted the media and there was no progress in reinforcing the 
control over the Gendarmerie and the military budget (Idem: 8-9). Some progress was 
achieved in the judiciary – efforts to modernise and to increase the funds, but concerns 
regarding its independence and impartiality remain (Idem: 9-10). There was also no 
progress on the development of a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy and 
Parliamentary immunity and the transparency of political parties funding remain to be 
addressed (Idem: 11). The Commission also exerted the country to work on the public 
awareness concerning human rights and to improve their institutional framework 
(Idem: 11-13). On the other hand, positive results have been achieved thanks to the 
adopted legislation on torture and ill-treatment and the number of reported cases 
dropped. In this area, several other recommendations are made to overcome some 
shortcomings; prisons were improved and the access to justice progressed, whereas the 
number of prosecutions on due to the non-violent expression of opinions increased, 
promoting a generalised feeling of self-censorship. Positive results were accomplished 
in the scope of the freedom of association, with an increase in the number of 
associations and membership, but freedom of religion is not fully implemented yet 
(Idem: 13-18). According to the document, there has been progress on protecting 
women from violence, but little progress on labour and trade unions’ rights; children’s 
rights need to be reinforced and implemented, as well as the rights of disabled people; 
no progress on the situation of Syriacs regarding property (Idem: 18-21). “Turkey has 
made no progress on ensuring cultural diversity and promoting respect for and 
protection of minorities” (Idem: 22) and there has been no progress on cultural rights 
(Idem: 23). Migration and asylum made limited progress, as well as in the field of 
external borders, Schengen and police cooperation; there as progress or some progress 
concerning the visa policy, fight against organised crime, trafficking in human beings, 
drugs and terrorism. There was no progress on the judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters (Idem: 63-67). 
 As a matter of fact, the 2007 Progress Report was not more positive that its 
predecessor. As usual, the achievements were recognised, but the negative evaluation 
of several fields was cause for concern in an already difficult year for Turkey-EU 
relations. The following year, 2008, began with a controversial judicial case, the 
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Ergenekon. As Isabel David (2012: 339-ff) explains, the deep state and the connection 
between the government, organised crime and the police began to be discussed due to 
some information leaks. In January 2008, military personnel (including important 
generals), lawyers, journalists and mafia members began to be arrested (Idem: 341). In 
March there were other detentions, but, at this time, the common denominator among 
the detainees was their opposition to the AKP government; among them one could find 
important individuals from the media, academia, business or the military.  
“The first process, despite the incongruities (…), had 2455 pages and 
441 evidence proofs, and accused formally 86 persons for being 
members of an armed terrorist organisation with the aim to overthrow 
the government through violence and coercion, for inciting to an 
armed rebellion against the government, for encouraging the military 
to insubordination and to incite the people to the hatred and enmity” 
(Idem: 341-342). 
 A second process was presented in March 2009 and was based on the 
accusation of 56 individuals for belonging to an armed terrorist organisation, for 
attempting to overthrow the government, for stealing documents related to national 
security, for attempting to close the GNAT, hampering its functioning, etc. (Idem: 
342). A third process (with 52 accused) was still added to the previous two and the 
three together, now merged into one big judicial process, raises several doubts 
concerning the real purposes behind it. On the one hand, it may constitute a good 
opportunity for Turkey to punish those who have acted outside the scope of the law 
and to reinforce the country’s democratic principles, such as the rule of law and 
political rights. On the other hand, and this represents another possible (and 
undesirable) scenario, it may be seen as part of a hidden agenda of the Turkish 
government to undermine and weaken its opponents, mainly those more connected to 
the kemalist/secularist side. In this latter case, not only this politically motivated hunt 
would be illegal, but it would also mean that the judiciary is so dependent on the 
executive, that its political objectives are able to be instrumentalised through the 
judicial power. This would be a very setback for Turkish democracy, its quality and 
development. The European Union, for example, believed this is a good opportunity 
for the country to show how its democratic institutions work effectively, but it revealed 
some unease regarding this case: “there were reports regarding the insufficient 
safeguarding of the rights of defence and the excessive duration of detention period 
without indictment” (European Commission, 2008: 7); “Concerns have been raised 
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about effective judicial guarantees for all the suspects” (European Commission, 2009: 
7). 
Returning to the timeline of Turkey-EU relations, in February 2008, the 
Council adopted the third revision of the Accession Partnership. This document divides 
the short-term and medium-term priorities and gives more specific ideas about the 
necessary reforms in all domains. This document was elaborated so that it would be 
adapted to the new situation of the country, that has gone several changes since the last 
Partnership, and points out as short-term priorities, changes such as: reform of public 
administration, implementation of the Ombudsman system, strengthening civilian 
control over the military, improving training to judges and prosecutors to ensure 
legislation is interpreted in line with the ECHR, to develop a comprehensive anti-
corruption strategy, to improve the implementation and protection of several freedoms, 
etc. (Council of the European Union, 2008: 6-14). In the medium-term, other priorities 
are set and they include privatisations, postal services, intellectual property rights, 
liberalisation of communication markets, etc. (Idem: 15-17). This revised Accession 
Partnership also foresaw the continuation of the allocation of financial support for 
Turkey, as well as the continuation of the monitoring activities, namely through the 
Progress Reports. The document also reminded about the conditionality mechanism, in 
the sense that the assistance is dependent on the respect for the commitments under 
several Agreements with the Union (Idem: 17-18). 
A deadlock that occurred in 2008 as well was the lift on the headscarf’s ban. 
The use of the headscarf in schools and universities was prohibited because its use 
conflicted with the secularist principles the Turkish Republic was founded upon. 
However, in February, the government presented the amendment of two Constitutional 
articles aiming to lift this prohibition. In June, the Constitutional Court annulled these 
reforms and there was even an attempt to legally ban the AKP proposed to the same 
Court, on the grounds that it had been violating fundamental principles of the Turkish 
Republic, i.e. secularism (David, 2012: 311). Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court 
did not ban the party in a very tight decision: from the seven votes necessary to ban a 
political party, the Court only gathered six, which allowed the AKP to pursue with its 
political activities. Yet, it warned the party that, although not in a sufficient extent to 
be closed, it had revealed some anti-secular tendencies (Hürriyet Daily News, 2008) 
and cut AKP’s budget in half (Voucheva, 2008). The European Union, which had 
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already opened negotiations in two further chapters (Chapter 6, Company Law; 
Chapter 7, Competition Policy), praised this decision, saying it was a good day for 
Turkey and for Europe (Idem). At the end of the year, the Turkish government, in 
response to the revised Accession Partnership, adopted a revised NPAA to adopt the 
country’s strategy to the renewed demands of the new European document. 
The 2008 Progress Report commented on these events in Turkey and, as 
always, analysed the adoption and implementation of legislation in the different fields, 
continuing its monitoring process. For the first time since 1999, the report criticised the 
government approach to the European process97 and the lack of compromise between 
the parties in the Parliament that were considered to be responsible for a negative 
impact on the functioning of political institutions; besides, the Secretariat General for 
EU Affairs continued to be under-resourced and with limited staff (European 
Commission, 2008: 7-8). 
As far as the other issues are concerned, this report kept a rather critical tone: 
public administration, civil-military relations, anti-corruption, ratification of human 
rights’ instruments, prevention of torture and ill-treatment, ensuring cultural diversity 
and promoting respecting for and protection of minorities rights, cultural rights, Roma 
situation, management of irregular migrants in Turkey, asylum, visa policy, external 
borders and Schengen, judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation 
were all areas  which the rapporteurs assess with a clear “limited progress” or “no 
progress”. It is important to notice that this list only includes the subjects with these 
denominations. For example, there were other cases, such as the work on a draft 
judicial reform strategy (Idem: 10), that were praised for their developments, but which 
raised, on another level, concerns, as it is the example of the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary (Idem: 10). Following the same reasoning, the Report 
mentioned progresses on the executions of the ECtHR judgements, but alerted 
simultaneously to the need for further efforts in this realm (Idem: 11-13). Another 
example that epitomises this situation in which an improvement is accompanied with a 
suggestion to continue the efforts, as what has been done was not enough, is freedom 
of expression: the amendment of article 301 reinforced this freedom, limiting more 
arbitrary interpretations, but Turkey was asked to ensure these and other reforms are 
                                                          
97 “However, despite its strong political mandate, the government did not put forward a consistent and 
comprehensive programme of political reforms” (European Commission, 2008: 7). 
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fully respected in practice (Idem: 16). Several other cases could be added, from 
women’s rights to the Alevis situations or even children’s rights98.  
In January 2009, Egemen Bağiş was appointed Minister for EU Affairs and 
Chief Negotiator. In July, Chapter 16 of the acquis (Taxation) is opened and as an 
important improvement, a law limiting the power of military courts was adopted 
(EurActive, 2009). This legal change is here highlighted, because it was approved 
despite the military’s threat that such move would create an increased tense between 
them and the government – it meant, therefore, that the accountable government did 
not succumb to the pressure of a non-accountable actor and pursued with the European 
measures to align with the acquis requirements. Notwithstanding this positive 
development, the EU showed serious concern over a $2.5 billion tax penalty the 
Turkish government imposed to a media group, whose annual sales are around $2 
billion. The official reason behind this fee was that the group did not properly pay its 
taxes, but some associations believed it was, in fact, caused by “its often hostile news 
coverage of the incumbent AK Party government” (EurActive, 2009a). 
To finalise this section, the 2009 Progress Report stated that, despite the 
continuation of the debate on the Constitutional reforms, there was no consensus 
between the parties yet (European Commission, 2009: 7). Besides, the appointment of 
a full-time Chief Negotiator with the status of Minister and the reinforcement of the 
Secretariat General for EU Affairs in terms of resources and staff did not mean actual 
progress, because “despite the government’s strong popular mandate and large 
majority in parliament, overall limited concrete progress was made on political 
reforms” (Idem: 8). Public administration reform only provided limited progress 
(Idem: 9), civil-military relations achieved some progress (Idem: 11) and the judiciary 
too. However, the document reported that concerning the independence of the judiciary 
there was no progress and further efforts were still required (Idem: 12). Fighting 
corruption, extending ethnic rules to other civil servants, limiting the MPs’ immunity, 
adopting legislation on the Court of Auditors and the improving the transparency of 
political parties’ financing were all negatively assessed with “limited” or “no progress” 
(Idem: 12-13). 
On the other hand, there was some progress on the observance of international 
human rights law (Idem: 15) and improvements in torture, ill-treatment and fight 
                                                          
98 More details, cf. Table 12 (Appendix 7). 
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against impunity in those cases. Nevertheless, the report warned for the need to 
implement the legislation (Idem: 15-16). Besides, although the access to justice has 
been eased, it continued to be geographically uneven (Idem: 16) and problems with 
prisons’ overcrowding and high levels of pre-trial prisoners hamper the achievements 
of the improvements on training, hiring staff and infrastructures (Idem: 17). Regarding 
freedom of expression, article 301 is no longer used so frequently to constraint this 
freedom due to its revision and prosecutions based on this article diminished. Yet, 
journalists still face prosecutions, websites are often banned and other articles from the 
Criminal Code have been used to curtail freedom of expression (Idem: 17-18). Further 
developments have been reported in the field of freedom of assembly and of 
association (even despite some limitations) (Idem: 19-20), as well as in the 
government’s attitude towards the Alevi community: the document reports the 
participation of the Minister of Culture on the opening of an Alevi Institute in which he 
apologised for past suffering caused by the State to that minority and the Prime-
Minister attended the Alevi fast-breaking ceremony, followed by workshops to discuss 
the problems and expectations of this community (Idem: 20-21). The legal framework 
for women’s rights is in place, according to the report, but its actual implementation 
remains weak; serious problems, such as domestic violence, honour killings and early 
forced marriages still occur, mainly in some areas of the country (Idem: 24). Children’s 
rights need to be improved (Idem: 25) and anti-discrimination policies need to align 
with the EU acquis (Idem: 26). 
“Overall, full respect for and protection of language, culture and fundamental 
rights, in accordance with European standards have yet to be fully achieved. Turkey 
made limited efforts to enhance tolerance or promote inclusiveness vis-à-vis 
minorities” (Idem: 28) and there has been reported no progress regarding the Roma 
situation. Migration, asylum, visa policy, external borders and Schengen, judicial 
cooperation in civil and criminal matters and fight against organised crime were all 
classified as “limited progress” areas that remain to be addressed; conversely, there has 
been some progress in the fight against drugs and in the customs cooperation (Idem: 
73-78). 
Thus, Turkey-EU relations, during this decade under analysis, have been quite 
unstable. The positive moments of the candidacy status or the opening of negotiations 
or even the major legislative reforms have been counter-balanced by some other less 
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positive moments, such as the lack of commitment from both sides, the European 
side’s lack of a coherent position in relation to the accession process and Turkey’s 
refusal to recognise a member state of the Union, Cyprus. These examples epitomise 
the instability of these relations. The aim of this thesis, concretised in the two 
following chapters, is to find out if there is any co-relation between the state of those 
relations and the commitment of both parts to the accession process on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, the development of the country’s democratisation process.  
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10. Gathering the data and applying the model 
10.1. Recalling the model and building the table 
 
 The model to assess the evolution of the Turkish democracy from 1999 to 2009 
was presented on Chapter 5, on which the methodological choices have been explained 
and some considerations regarding the selection of indicators and their sources clarified 
and justified. In the meanwhile, however, it was necessary to reflect upon the case study 
which this model would be applied to. The object of the scrutiny was Turkey, its 
modern construction and interaction with the West, in general, and with the European 
Union, in particular. Having that background outlined, it is necessary, at this point, to 
apply the model to the Turkish case. 
 To ease the operationalisation of the concept of democracy, we divided this 
phenomenon into three dimensions, eight attributes and eighty-five indicators from 
fourteen different sources. The choice of the origin and application of these indicators 
and sources was particularly careful, in order to promote the most reliable and 
trustworthy set of values. Those concerns have already been explained on chapter 5, 
namely through the worries about the geographical distribution of the source. It is also 
important to stress that it would be impossible to create such a wide table in terms of 
years and indicators with all the gaps fulfilled. The data gathered99 represents 81% of 
completeness; it means that 19% of the data was not possible to be found and there are 
several reasons for the difficulty to find a source with the data for the whole period of 
eleven years: first, several reports may have begun to be published some years after 
1999; secondly, on the contrary, some others do not have the data up-to-date and their 
results are only available a couple of years before 2009; thirdly, there are also some 
reports and statistics which are not published annually, creating some gaps in-between. 
Nevertheless, despite the carefulness to include as much data as possible, it would not 
be feasible to fulfil the entire table. 
Furthermore, it should be emphasised that some indicators only provided data 
for the last four years of the period in cause, but their inclusion was based on two 
criteria: the fact that it represented particularly relevant data and to compensate the 
considerable number of reports and sources that have not published results until the first 
                                                          
99 Cf. Table 13 (Appendix 8). 
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years of the 2000s. Having overcome this initial question of what including and what 
not including in the final table, a set of other obstacles has been raised when completing 
it and transforming it into something readable and useful, namely the comparison 
between the indicators. 
As it is known, different organisations use different scales in their assessment: 
Freedom House and the Economic Freedom of the World use a scale from 1 to 7, but 
the first is reversed and the latter is not; Transparency International uses a 0 to 10 scale 
and the Amnesty International a 1 to 5 scale. A serious problem emerged from these 
differences, which is comparability. This issue was solved by transforming all the scales 
into a 0 to 100 scale that would respect the pattern of the original one. Besides, when 
the scales were reversed, the values needed to be inverted (by subtracting them to 100). 
The objective was that a 60 value in Freedom House new scale would be something 
positive and not negative, as it would mean without this transformation. Another 
example is the Infant Mortality Rate: the higher this rate, the less efficiently the country 
was performing; hence the need to convert the values and reverse them as well. The 
lowest point of all created scales became 0 and therefore, even when it used to be a 
negative value or a 1, for example, all of them would mean the same after all. The 
schematic explanation of all conversions can be found below100: 
 Economic Freedom of the World 
[1, 7] > 100/6 = 16.67 
1 = 0; 2= 16.67; 3= 33.34; 4 = 50.01; 5 = 66.68; 6 = 83.35; 7 = 100. 
 
Ex.: 5.3  =  66.68 + 0.3 * 16.67 = 71.68 
       4.5  =  50.01 + 0.5 * 16.67 = 58.35 
 
[0, 10] >  100/10 = 10 
0 = 0; 1 = 10; 2 = 20... 10 = 100.  
 
 Transparency International 
[0, 10] 100/10 = 10        Reversed 
 
0 = 100; 1 = 90; 2 = 80; 3 = 70; 4 = 60 ... 
 
Ex. 3.1 = 70 – 0.1 * 10 = 69 
      3.2 = 70 – 0.2 * 10 = 68 
 
                                                          
100 I would like to thank Diogo Lourenço for his valuable suggestions for the improvement of this section. 
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 Freedom House 
[1, 7] 100/6 = 16.67    Reversed 
7 = 0; 6 = 16.67; 5 = 33.34; 4 = 50.01; 3 = 66.68; 2 = 83.35; 1 = 100. 
 
Ex. 2.5 = 83.34 – 0.5*16.67 = 75 
       5.6 = 33.34 – 0.6*16.67 = 22.34 
 
 Amnesty International and US Sate’s Department 
[1, 5]  100/4 = 25         Reversed 
5 = 0; 4 = 25; 3 = 50; ... 
 
 CIRI 
[0, 3]  100/3 = 33.33 
0 = 0; 1= 33.33; 2 = 66.67; 3 = 100 
 
[0, 2]  100/2 = 50 
0 = 0; 1 = 50; 2 = 100 
 
 Democracy Barometer 
[0, 2]  100/2 = 50 
0 = 0; 1 = 50; 2 = 100 
 
[0, 1]  100/1 = 100 
0 = 0; 1 = 100 
 
[0, 3]  100/3 = 33.33 
0 = 0; 1= 33.33; 2 = 66.67; 3 = 100 
 
[0, 4]  100/4 = 25 
0 = 0; 1= 25; 2 = 50; 3 = 75; 4 = 100 
 
[0, 30]  100/30 = 3.33 
0 = 0; 1 = 3.33; 2 = 6.66; 3 = 9.99; 4 = 13.32; ... 
 
[-1, 2] 100/3 = 33.3 
- 1 = 0; 0 = 33.33; 1 = 66.66; 2 = 100 
 
[1, 7] 100/6 = 16.67     
1 = 0; 2 = 16.67; 3 = 33.34; 4 = 50.01; 5 = 66.68; 6 = 83.35; 7 = 100 
 
[0, 6]  100/6 = 16.67 
0 = 0; 1 = 16.67; 2 = 33.34; 3 = 50.01; 4 = 66.68; 5 = 83.35; 6 = 100 
 
[0, 10] 100/10 = 10         
300 
 
 
0 = 0; 1 = 10; 2 = 20; 3 = 30; 4 = 40 ... 
 
[0, 5]  100/5 = 20 
0 = 0; 1 = 20; 2 = 40; 3 = 60; 4 = 80; 5 = 100 
 
 
 World Bank 
[-2.5; 2.5] 100/5 = 20 
-2.5 = 0; -1.5 = 20; -0.5 = 40; 0 = 50; 0.5 = 60; 1.5 = 80; 2.5 = 100 
 
Ex.: 0.16 = 60 – (0.5 - 0.16) * 20 = 53.2 
        -0.33 = 40 + (0.5 – 0.33) * 20 = 43.4 
 
 World Economic Forum 
[1, 7] 100/6 = 16.67     
1 = 0; 2 = 16.67; 3 = 33.34; 4 = 50.01; 5 = 66.68; 6 = 83.35; 7 = 100 
 
Ex.: 4.29 = 50.01 + 0.29 * 16.67 = 54.84 
 
 European Commission 
[0, 100]     Reversed.  
 
Ex. 35.2 = 100 – 35.2 = 64.8 
       28.4 = 100 – 28.4 = 71.6 
 
Another concern was regarding the transformation of the absolute values into a 
comparable scale of some indicators; for example, it would not be judicious simply to 
use the public expenditure on health or on research and development (as a % of the 
GDP) in the way these values were presented. In other words, although the 100 of the 
scale used for all indicators mean the possible best in a democratic regime, 100% of 
public expenditure on any field would make no sense. The same for employment rate, 
the number of hospital beds, the evolution of GDP per capita, the number of newspapers 
per one million inhabitants, membership in humanitarian organisations, participation in 
demonstrations and petitions or even the rate of women in Parliament. These are cases 
whose maximum value of 100 would be unachievable or unfeasible given their nature. 
Therefore, in order to overcome this problem, the same sources were used to find, in the 
same indicator, the best result achieved by a European Union’s member state. That 
value became, in each year, the top of the scale. The following case of the number of 
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newspapers per one million inhabitants is a good example: in 1999, the best result of a 
member state was 11.62 newspapers achieved by Luxembourg; thus, the 11.62 was 
transformed into the 100 value in a [0, 100] interval. In this case, Turkey’s value, which 
had in that same year 0.62 newspapers, was adapted to the new scale and increased its 
final figure to 5.95. In fact, this number is still quite low and far away from the ideal 
100 (the equivalent of 11.62); however, it would be unfair to demand from Turkey to 
achieve 100 newspapers per one million inhabitants when the best performance in the 
European Union was almost 12 newspapers. The other indicators in the same situation 
were solved and adapted through this procedure. Notwithstanding, it is also important to 
clarify another methodological choice concerning this subject and that is why the top of 
the scale was tantamount to the best of the member states and not the average of the EU. 
The rationalisation for that lies in the meaning of the top of the scale: 100 represents the 
best possible outcome of a democratic regime in that field. Comparing Turkey with the 
average of the European Union would misrepresent that conception and would, 
simultaneously, create an unequal situation with the rest of the indicators in which 100 
is the best any country is able to reach. 
Finally, one last consideration is related to the previous case: when comparing 
the results of the EU member states, some of them performed better in a certain field 
(like Sweden in education spending), but their values were not used for the simple 
reason that there were footnotes alerting for the fact that that result had some 
particularities, such as differences in the definition of the concepts or even 
methodological specificities. In that sense, and not to create an uneven situation, that 
value was not taken into consideration. After all this data was transformed into a 
comparable scale101, a table has been created and the subsequent graphs and charts, 
analysed further on, have been based on this table102. 
 
10.2. Introducing other variables 
 The European Union, as already mentioned several times during the previous 
chapters, seeks to promote democracy among third countries, with a special focus on its 
candidates. Europeanisation, as a process of construction and diffusion of the European 
rules and values – paraphrasing Radaelli’s definition –, implies the building and 
                                                          
101 All values have been reduced to two decimal places. 
 
102 Cf. Table 14 (Appendix 8). 
302 
 
consolidation of EU’s patterns by triggering new dynamics. Among the four 
mechanisms referred to on Chapter 4, two of them can be considered the most widely 
used (and the easiest to recognise) by the Union: socialisation, less formal, more 
cognitive and more difficult to spot; and conditionality, more formal, more connected to 
legal aspects and more tangible.  
 Therefore, if one pretends to study the influence of the European Union as a 
democracy promoter, it is necessary that these two mechanisms are taken into 
consideration. Conditionality can be traced paying attention to specific dynamics: the 
transfer of financial assistance from the EU or its monitoring, for example, can signal 
the presence of an external pressure aligned with the organisation’s normative pressure 
conveyed by public statements and official documents, such as the Progress Reports. 
Some crucial moments of Turkey-EU relations can be seen as rewards or punishments 
for the country’s performance at this level. In a functioning conditionality system, 
reforms and changes are awarded with improvements in those relations, with more 
money or supportive statements; on the other hand, Turkey’s lack of commitment would 
be object of criticisms and of a hampered accession process. 
 Socialisation overcomes the formal and legal transformations and focuses on the 
real changes at the societal level. These modifications are not easy to identify – 
quantitative data usually lags behind the real phenomenon, a foreigner’s perception may 
not be the most accurate and the closest to reality and such short time span does not help 
either. However, the consideration of this mechanism is of much importance, not only 
due to the Constructivist regard concerning this dimension, but also because of the 
notion of democracy itself. For democracy to be truly consolidated (or in the process of 
consolidating), rules and legislation are not enough; it requires the involvement of the 
whole society and, to a certain degree, its habituation to this new system. 
Democratisation can be assessed positively in case the individuals reveal they have 
embraced the new democratic values and principles, even if they are adapted to their 
own reality. 
 When choosing these two mechanisms, it is implicit the recognition of two 
(possibly three) layers of impact: the macro-level (with conditionality, formal changes, 
institutional pressures, etc.) and the meso-level (attitudinal and behavioural changes 
operated at the community/societal level). The micro-level is even more difficult to 
grasp, but the aggregated changes within the scope of the individual in terms of 
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mentality and opinion has an impact on the society in general. Thus, to a certain extent, 
these individual changes are able to be perceived somehow through the upper level in an 
aggregated manner, as long as the deductive reasoning behind it is accepted. 
 Keeping this logic in mind, the second part of the model constitutes an attempt 
to operationalise it. In fact, the above-described model is not enough to find answers to 
the thesis’ initial questions. Data gathered and presented in the previous section only 
provides the evolution in time of Turkish democracy. In order to more deeply 
comprehend the dynamics behind that evolution, it is mandatory to include a set of 
independent variables that may have hypothetically contributed to those findings. The 
aim is to look for any possible correlations between the development of the country’s 
democracy and the chosen (external) factors103.  
 The two first variables come from the European Union – they include the values 
of the EU’s financial assistance to the country and another specific amount allocated to 
the political criteria. Comparing these values with Turkey’s democratic evolution will 
allow finding out if this financial support was decisive. Besides, the Union’s evaluation 
in its Progress Reports is included here as well. This variable is important, for two 
purposes: first, to find out whether a more critical stance by the Commission negatively 
impacts the country’s democratisation; secondly, to realise whether Turkey’s 
democratic performance is fairly assessed by the EU in its reports, praising or 
condemning in appropriate time, putting the conditionality process in practice. This 
variable was achieved by counting the frequency of positive and negative expressions 
associated to the word “progress”: “further progress”, “some progress”, “important 
progress” are examples of the positive evaluation; on the contrary, “no progress”, 
“limited progress”, “further progress required” were considered negative assessments. 
At the end, the percentage of positive in relation to negative expressions was calculated 
and introduced in the table.  
As this variable has not been used in this way before, it may cause some 
concerns in terms of its validity – how linguistic expressions become, of a sudden, a set 
of numbers, a percentage and a meaning for something else. In fact, this usage is based 
on some premises: first, the relevance attributed to language by Constructivism. As 
                                                          
103 Table 15 (Appendix 8) provides a list with the other variables selected for this process and their 
absolute values. In this case, the figures were not transformed into a 100-scale because the idea is not to 
join them or compare them among each other, but to correlate their individual evolution with the progress 
of the Turkish democracy. 
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known, language is reality in itself and not only a representation of it; this means that 
the choice of the words and expressions by the rapporteurs is not innocent: “some 
progress” is not the same as “limited progress” and these nuances signify that their 
perception on the state of a certain reality is more or less positive, making it possible to 
considerate a rather positive or negative evaluation of each topic, allowing their division 
into two main fields and their subsequent counting. Secondly, the meaningful 
differences between the values permit to realise that the utilisation of those expressions 
cannot be randomly chosen or not related to the perception of the authors of the reports. 
In 2000, the percentage of positive evaluations was slightly above 22; on the contrary, 
in 2004, that value was over 66%. This wide gap carries a meaning and it is this 
meaning that matters take into consideration on next chapter. 
 On the other hand, and to avoid ignoring the influence of other external actors on 
the process, OECD’s data provided the financial assistance given to Turkey in the 
period under study in the form of grants and of technical cooperation. These values may 
reveal if the contributions of other countries have a bigger impact on the country’s 
democratisation process in case they are more positively correlated to that evolution 
than the EU’s funding, for example.  
 At the domestic level, three variables are combined to present the number of 
legislative reforms in the country; they include constitutional amendments and laws 
adopted within and outside the scope of harmonisation packages. Considering that a 
great extent of these measures were adopted following the European pressure, as 
concluded in the previous chapters, these figures will permit analysing the correlation 
between the number of legislative reforms and the democratic consolidation of the 
country. The intuitive reasoning would be a positive correlation between the two 
variables, but this hypothesis still needs to be tested by data, as several other factors 
may interfere and originate a lack of consistency at this level. 
 Two further variables are related to the European and the Turkish public opinion 
regarding Turkey’s accession process. The objective of these sets of data is to 
understand what kinds of connection exist between democratic results and the public 
opinion. Furthermore, they will also allow a better understanding of the role played by 
the public opinion in the development of the accession process or even of Turkey-EU 
relations (and vice-versa). Finally, and also at a societal level, the final variable reveals 
the number of Turkish beneficiaries of a European youth programme and its evolution. 
 
305 
 
The choice of this variable was based on the importance attained to social interactions 
between the two sides to overcome the lack of mutual understanding; the more Turks 
connect to Europe, the more linked they will be with the European values and practices. 
 These are the factors chosen to complete the model presented on chapter 5. In 
the following section, the preliminary results of these figures will be presented in 
summary. Chapter 11 will be enriched with qualitative variables (historical analysis of 
Turkey-EU relations, EU Progress Reports, qualitative interviews, academic literature, 
etc.), so that the fundamental nuances given by these sources are not ignored, but rather 
included in the final analysis and interpreted in the light of the rest of the whole thesis, 
in order to guarantee that the final conclusions come as close as possible to reality. 
 
10.3. Preliminary results 
 
 This final section aims to briefly analyse the graphs produced by the two tables 
created for the application of the model to assess the influence of the European Union 
on Turkey’s democratisation process. Figures 17 to 37 (Appendix 9) follow a pattern: 
one graph represents all the indicators of a certain attribute and the next one draws the 
annual average of those same indicators, illustrating the general tendency of that 
attribute104. 
 Figure 17 shows the evolution of the several indicators that compose the 
attribute of Political Rights. The lines drawn in the graph reveal a wide variety of 
dynamics that do not allow an easy reading; however, the subsequent figure aggregates 
the data in a single line and registers a steady behaviour in this field with a variation 
between the 57 and 64 until 2007. However, what calls the attention in this chart is the 
accentuated decrease in 2008, somehow compensated in 2009, but still not enough to 
recover the medium threshold of the 50 points. Overall, Political Rights have 
maintained a positive performance with the exception of the two last years. 
 This tendency is not observed in the following figures (19 and 20). In fact, after 
a decreasing tendency from 2000 to 2004, the aggregated values revealed a not 
                                                          
104 Figures 17 to 37 (with the exception of Figures 34 and 35) mentioned in the following paragraphs can 
be found on Appendix 9 (pages 513 to 522). They have not been inserted here for they constitute a large 
number of graphs that would jeopardise the reading.  
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accentuated but steady growth that reached the positive threshold in 2009. Nevertheless, 
ten out of eleven years, Social Rights were assessed negatively.  
 Figures 21 and 22 reflect the economic instability of the country in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. The most visible indicator, the evolution of GDP per capita, 
epitomises that situation and aggregated data shows a difficult improvement in the field 
of Economic Rights, with a positive peak in 2005 that was not able to be kept in the 
following years. This attribute also developed most time among negative results.  
 Figure 23, due to the high number of indicators of Civil Rights, becomes slightly 
difficult to read, but allows the realisation that the variety in the number of indicators 
also means variety in terms of assessments. All those numbers combined, however, 
reveal a generally growing tendency (exceptions in 2001, 2005 and 2007), but always 
below the 50 threshold.  
 On the contrary, Rule of Law (Figures 25 and 26) presented some instability 
concerning its results – some years faintly above 50 and some others below that level. 
Also contrary to the previous attribute, since 2007 it manifested a decreasing tendency 
until 2009. 
 The next two graphs (Figures 27 and 28) exemplify a different dynamic: with 
relatively steady values until 2002, manly since 2005 the indicators average combined 
in a declining curve that finished in 2009 with the negative value of 22.7. Taking into 
consideration the initial value of 63.26 or the one achieved in 2005 (68.74), this 
decrease of Horizontal Accountability is the most accentuated fall of all attributes. 
 On the other hand, and despite the low values presented by Figures 29 and 30, 
Vertical Accountability faced an intensive growth from 2007 to 2008, which allowed 
this attribute to come closer to the 50 threshold. 
 Finally, Responsiveness (Figures 31 and 32) performs positively in a first period 
until 2005, following afterwards a fading trend whose lowest result, in 2008, was 37.24 
points. In 2009, there is an improvement of this situation, but the attribute remained in 
the negative half of the chart. Figure 33 summarises the development of the eight 
attributes aggregated. From a glance at the shape of the several lines combined, it seems 
that there is a growing tendency in a first period, followed by a shrinking trend; 
interestingly, 2008 appears to be the point which most attributes converge to. This 
preliminary consideration is reinforced by Figure 34 (below).  
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In fact, when analysed each dimension, it is even more perceptible that their 
values, despite the lack of a clear pattern of development in the previous years, 
converge in a point slightly above the 40. Interestingly, 2009 brings different paths to 
each dimension: equality recovers and increases more visibly; freedom pursues a more 
modest improvement and control continues its negative curve. Combining all these 
values, it is possible to build a graph that represents the average of the all the indicators 
from all the dimensions. Thus, Figure 35 (above) constitutes the broadest representation 
of Turkey’s democratic evolution from 1999 to 2009, based on the model presented 
earlier. 
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Figure 34: Dimensions aggregated – annual evolution 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Figure 35: Democracy data aggregated – annual evolution 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
308 
 
0
200
400
600
800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Pre-Accession Aid/IPA Assistance to political criteria
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9
The annual results of this chart reveal a line which cannot be considered as 
linear. The development of Turkish democracy was, in the reported period and as a 
result of the chosen model, an uneven process. From 1999 to 2000, there was a 
considerable improvement, followed by three less positive years, a recovery in 2004, a 
stable phase until 2007, an accentuated fall in 2008 and what seems to be a new positive 
progress in 2009. Two preliminary conclusions can be drawn by this initial reading: 
first, the instability of the democratisation process and, secondly, the average values lag 
below the line of the 50 threshold. Figures 36 and 37 (Appendix) will be more closely 
observed on Chapter 11, but they tend to confirm these initial considerations. 
 The second set of charts represents graphically the data from Table 15 
(Appendix 8) and concerns the variables whose correlation with the previous 
information will be tested further on. Figure 38 (below) discloses the growing tendency 
(since 2002) of the EU funds transferred to Turkey; figure 39 (below) reveals that the 
instability of Turkey-EU relations have been reflected by the Commission’s Progress 
Reports (2000 and 2004 epitomise these extremes).  
 
 
 
Figure 38: EU financial contributions 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Figure 39: EU Progress Reports - % of positive “progress” 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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The graph of Figure 40105 calls the attention not for the usually even distribution 
of external assistance to the country, but for the uncommon value of 2003. Figure 41 is 
interesting for its pyramid-shape, disclosing the increase, the peak and the decrease of 
the legislative reforms adopted, as well as the concentration of the harmonisation 
packages in 2002, 2003 and 2004. The public opinion both from the European citizens 
and the Turks came without surprise: a declining support from the latter and a stable, 
but very low, support from the first (Figure 42). Finally, the numbers of the “Youth in 
Action Programme” epitomise the growing interest of Turks to take part in activities 
and projects in other European countries. 
 Having undergone this brief analysis of the produced graphs and the detailed 
explanation of the methodological choices and processes behind it, next chapter will 
deepen the interpretation of these results and will provide the thesis with other 
perspectives, so that the final conclusions arise as accurate and solid as possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105 Figures 40 to 43 can be found in Appendix 10 (pages 523 to 524) for the same reason mentioned 
above. Figures 38 and 39 have been inserted here, as they deal with data related to the EU, which is the 
object of study of this thesis and, therefore, the relevance of their contribution justifies their inclusion. 
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11. EU, Turkey and mediating factors: an interpretation 
11.1. Turkish democratic evolution and the EU 
 
 On the previous chapter, the evolution in time of Turkish democracy has been 
drawn from the data achieved by the application of the proposed model. Besides, some 
other variables were introduced in order to find the answers to the initial doubts this 
thesis raised. However, more than merely reading those results, they need to be 
interpreted in the light of the knowledge gathered throughout this work.  
 Recalling Figure 34, the evolution of the three dimensions of the Turkish 
democracy was regarded as volatile, since their development is not parallel, despite their 
interesting convergence in 2008. When analysing the following line graph (Figure 35), 
it is not perceptible the existence of a clear pattern. However, there are some tendencies 
that may be disclosed from its attentive reading, namely its division into three main 
periods: 1999-2005 reveals an average growth rate of 1,16%; whereas the next phase 
(2006-2008) is marked by a decrease of -2,98%; the final year, 2009, shows signals of 
recovery in terms of democratic quality with a 2,09% growth.  
This division constitutes an important initial step towards understanding the 
dynamics of the development of the Turkish democracy; only through that is possible to 
establish links with the external actors’ role. Yet, focusing first on the domestic reality, 
it is important to highlight some aspects of these values. First, and with the exception of 
2005, all the values are below the threshold of 50%. In fact, even 2005 is above that 
limit for a very tiny difference. This reveals that, according to the sources and indicators 
chosen, Turkish democracy has not performed so positively during the decade under 
analysis.  
Secondly, it is necessary to establish a bridge between the conceptual discussion 
held on Chapter 3 and the case study: although the values of its performance have been 
low, it would be unfair to qualify the Turkish system as autocratic – the elementary 
division proposed in Figure 8 presents elections as the baseline to divide these two 
notions. Since the European Commission’s APR always assessed positively the 
elections that occurred in the country (stating that they fulfilled the international 
requirements of free and fair elections), it means that Turkey is, at least, an electoral 
democracy. Given the values mentioned above, it is not possible to frame it within the 
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scope of a perfect democracy, but, regarding its evolution since its establishment, it is 
justifiable to posit that Turkish democracy is able to be covered by the notion of “liberal 
democracy”. This is possible to state because it is has been proven, on the previous 
chapters, that its system goes beyond the mere existence of elections; Turkey has shown 
to be capable of improving its democratic accounts, even though its results are poor 
when compared to consolidated democracies. 
Nevertheless, a reservation needs to be made: it is difficult (and probably even 
impossible) to compare Turkey with European democracies. The latter had several 
centuries to mature, whereas Turkish socio-cultural (maybe civilizational) environment 
is quite different; its peculiarities give the country a nuanced version of democracy, 
which does not belittle its efforts to align with the European practices nor imply that it 
does not need to reach those standards to be able to join the Union – that is a clear 
requirement for several decades. 
By process of elimination, if Turkish system cannot be regarded as an autocracy, 
electoral democracy or perfect democracy, the challenge now is to determine which 
degree, inside the liberal type, it can be found at. Adapting Table 3 (Appendix 3) (based 
on Morlino’s work) to the available data is a way of attempting to search for it: the 
average evaluation of Rule of Law is around 49%; Accountability (average of both 
vertical and horizontal) is 50%; Responsiveness: 52%; Freedom: 41% and Equality: 
48%. Thus, based on these values and on Table 3, the closest match possible to the 
proposed degrees would be “legitimate liberal democracy” – a plus would be inserted in 
the fields of accountability and responsiveness, and since all of them are positively 
marked in the Rule of Law (and the value was very close to the threshold), it seems to 
be the most appropriate level to frame the Turkish democracy in terms of its degree. 
This is, however, an attempt to frame a reality within a theoretical model; it 
would imply, for the sake of accuracy, a deeper analysis and another combination of 
positive evaluations (the set of accountability and responsiveness is not available 
without Rule of Law, for instance). Furthermore, Morlino’s scheme suggests that a plus 
in each field represents a high degree of that dimension, which is clearly not the case 
given the low values – even if they are positive, they do not overcome the threshold 
with much significance. This reveals that Turkish democracy, despite being a liberal 
one, reveals several weaknesses – some of them have been tackled, but some others 
remained to be addressed. 
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Due to the quest for reinforcing its democracy and improving it at various levels, 
it is possible to talk about a consolidation process; as argued in Part II, consolidation 
embodies the latest phase of the democratisation process – after the transition to a 
democratic regime, it is object of improvements. This does not mean that the process is 
linear, quick and irreversible; on the contrary, it is unstable, slow and with the 
possibility of backslides (as mentioned on Chapter 3, as well). Recovering Schedler’s 
consolidation model (Figure 10), Turkey can be perceived as in the process of 
deepening its democracy – the inclusion of this process at this level certainly pleases 
both the sceptics (that would regard it as an electoral democracy) and the optimists (that 
see it as a liberal democracy), because it means that whether as an electoral or a liberal 
system, Turkey is working on its structures and mentalities to improve its quality 
towards the achievement of the best possible democratic performance. 
When asked about the development of the Turkish democracy between 1999 and 
2009, the two Turkish academics shared the same view: democracy improved but not 
throughout the whole period in the same pace. Professor Uzgel stated that “Turkey is 
more democratised today than it was back in the 1980s and 1990s. But, in general 
terms, Turkey’s democratic consolidation has been weaker in the last four or five years” 
(Interview, 2013e). Professor Eralp also recognised that “from 1999 until 2005, Turkey, 
in terms of political reforms, in terms of democratisation, was doing impressively” 
(Interview, 2013h). Therefore, these opinions actually match the above mentioned 
findings in the sense that it has been perceptible (at least to those who study these 
phenomena) that there has been a variation in the country’s commitment to its 
democratisation. Sevna Somuncuoglu, a women’s rights activist, is not so optimistic; in 
fact, she recognises the improvement of Turkish democracy but focuses on the lack of 
implementation – as Somuncuoglu said, everything “looks good on paper (…), [but] 
there are a lot of steps towards implementing it” that still need to be taken (Interview, 
2013g). 
This leads to the debate on the weaknesses of Turkey’s democracy. The lack of 
implementation is certainly one of them. It has been mentioned by this interviewee and 
supported by the Progress Reports (as written on Chapter 9) that complained about the 
problem too. Yet, this issue of implementation can also be linked to another essential 
aspect, mentioned by the Ministry’s official: the lack of a democratic political culture or 
tradition in the country, “because our political culture is a bit prone to clashes, 
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especially from the 1970s onwards” (Interview, 2013i). For some authors quoted on 
Chapter 3, the pre-existence of a democratic culture is key to allow both democratic 
transition and consolidation. Nevertheless, the non-existence of such culture in Turkey 
is possibly caused by a long and firm tradition of a strong state and a strong leader – in 
these cases, it becomes truly difficult for an active and critical civil society to mature 
and step forward using the tools and mechanisms allowed by the democratic system, 
reinforcing the citizens’ connection with democracy. When asked about the subject, a 
non-identified interviewee told that  
“the problem in Turkish democracy is not about civil-military relations, etc. 
etc. You can categorise them and you can read the EU annual reports 
concerning democratisation or human rights issues in Turkey. But the point 
is this: the government itself and its Prime-Minister has a very strong 
tendency to monopolise power. (…) His authoritarian tendencies are the 
weakest point of Turkish democratisation efforts today”  
This, in fact, matches what Professor Uzgel mentioned about the decreasing pace 
of democratisation in a second half of the period under study; what happened, according 
to this academic, was a “quite contradictory process in Turkey: the more power the 
government accumulated in its hand, the less democratised actor it has become” 
(Interview, 2013e).  
The results of an online survey106 disclose that Turks and EU citizens alike 
believe the Turkish democracy has improved from 1999 to 2009. Using a scale from 1 
to 10, respondents classified Turkey’s democratic performance with 4,40 in 1999 and 
with 5,93 ten years later. When analysed individually, the results show that both groups 
recognise this improvement, as well. 
Taking into account both the survey and the interviews, it is interesting to notice 
that almost everyone perceived a positive evolution of the Turkish democracy when 
comparing 1999 to 2009, which does not match the results of the model showed above. 
                                                          
106 This survey has been conducted online and ranged a total of 30 responses from Turks and EU citizens 
from diverse institutions and backgrounds. As any online survey, it has its faults (it did not reach people 
without internet, nor those who did not speak English, for example) and therefore its results are always 
used carefully. More than pertaining to see them as representative of the whole country’s opinion, it will 
be used mostly as another indicator of the aggregated opinion of several Turks and Europeans on some 
key issues, taking into consideration that the opinions included are mostly from well-educated and 
informed people that may have, somehow, felt or assessed the phenomenon under study – Turks have 
been included as those who are affected by their country’s democratisation and relation with the EU (or 
even as a partial responsible for that – in the case of the surveyed that work at the Ministries or the EU 
delegation, for example) and Europeans who answered it have some type of connection with the country – 
mainly as a researcher devoted to the country. In fact, 80% of the European respondents are affiliated to 
an academic institution. More details on the characteristics of the respondents can be found in Appendix 
2, Figures 2 to 6. The results can also be found in Appendix 12, Tables 16 to 22 and Figures 45 and 46. 
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If one compares the values of the initial and the final years, the necessary conclusion is 
that Turkish democracy has not improved nor worsened: in 1999, the general evaluation 
was 43.05 and the 2009 value reached 43.17, an almost imperceptible variation. Also 
interestingly, however, is that about 17% of the people who responded the survey 
assessed the democratic performance of the country with the same value in the two 
years – sharing the results provided by the model. For these people, who came both 
from the EU and Turkey, there has not been any improvement in the country’s 
democracy and this is a vision not to ignore, since it involves a negative appreciation of 
both Turkey’s development in terms of its political system and the EU’s work in the 
country. Probably, more information and analysis of other variables will help clarify 
this situation. 
Despite that, the majority of the opinions believes in a consolidation of Turkish 
democratic performance during that decade. Ali Usul (2011: 15) wisely links 
consolidation to institutionalisation. In fact, democracy can be consolidated through the 
establishment and reinforcement of norms and rules among its citizens; in turn, 
promoting the compliance with norms and rules is the function of international 
organisations. Thus, it is logical to argue that international organisations (in this case, 
the EU) is supposed to play a role in the consolidation of a country’s democracy, even 
more among its candidates with whom relations are usually closer (and demanding, to a 
certain extent).  
Turkey-EU relations have been debated profoundly over the last chapters and 
will continue to be analysed. However, they are embedded in a broader (theoretical) 
question that concerns IR theorists and gives origin to several debates: the interaction 
between the domestic and the international spheres. The major (traditional or classical) 
doubt that exists in this regard is whether the domestic aspects are shaped by the 
international forces or vice-versa. Debate has evolved and, as written earlier, to clearly 
distinguish the two realms may not be easy in a globalised, interconnected world. 
Moreover, nowadays, it seems that the discussion has shifted away from this absolute or 
zero-sum question towards a more meaningful and even harder one – it makes no sense 
to wonder about which sphere shapes which, but rather the degree or the extent to which 
existing interactions mutually affect both domains. Recalling the Constructivist premise 
of the co-constitution of agents and structures, states as actors influence the 
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international organisations (structures) they are included in, but are, at the same time, 
shaped by them. 
Therefore, the interrogation here has not to do with the mutual influences the EU 
and Turkey exert on each other, because they are generally recognised, but what kind of 
role does the European Union play in the country. In other words, the challenge of the 
endeavour lies in the attempt to find out whether the EU constitutes a direct or an 
indirect influence on the country’s democratisation – which is, after all, a domestic 
process; are the external influences mediated or constrained by the national context? Or 
re-interpreted by the nationals and, consequently, adapted to their vision and 
perception? It is also important to discover whether the pressure an international 
organisation may exert is more effective through its economic leverage power over the 
country or through its discourse and the peer pressure in terms of image and position 
within the international context. Other possibilities are related to the opposition between 
being an anchor or a triggering factor – the EU can function as an external stakeholder 
that supports in the background the country’s democratisation in the sense that the 
example is there for serving as an inspiration; on the other hand, as a triggering factor, 
its role may be more proactive in the case its action induces change, its messages and 
advice are followed, its rules are complied with. 
In order to become closer to the answers to these inquiries, it is necessary to look 
for possible correlations between the Turkish democratic progress and the role of the 
EU and other international organisations. A set of additional variables was added at the 
end of Chapter 10 to introduce the external dimension that was missing in the model. 
For example, Figure 38 schematises the amounts of grants and other financial 
contributions given by the EU to Turkey; contrarily to what any realist hypothesis 
would state, EU financial assistance is not linearly correlated with the country’s 
democratic progress, in general107. The statistical methods mentioned below looked for 
a mathematical correlation between the three democratic dimensions (individually and 
aggregately – Figures 34 and 35, respectively) and EU’s assistance (Figure 38). Except 
                                                          
107 The correlations mentioned in this section are the result of the application of the Student’s t-test (a 
statistical hypothesis test) to the data gathered and provided on the previous chapter through the method 
of the slope of a regression line. The aim of this method is to verify whether the data sets are correlated 
with 95% of confidence (which means a margin of error of 5%). The correlations are assumed as linear 
only; therefore, when it is stated that data sets are correlated, it means they are linearly correlated. There 
are other types of correlations not used for being outside the scope of the thesis. For the elaboration of 
these mathematical operations, I would like to thank Ana Rebelo e Ricardo Sousa for their indispensable 
help and support. 
 
317 
 
for the Control, no significant mathematical correlation has been found. What is 
interesting in this exception is that Control is the only dimension that, in 2005, begins 
an irreversible downward path – in case this is not just a coincidence (as appears, since 
it is the only dimension with a correlation and the EU pressure on this field is not as 
intense as on others, such as Human Rights and Freedoms, for example), it reflects not 
only the alleged existence of a direct influence of the EU on Turkish political life, but 
also a diminishing presence of the Union in the country since the middle of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. 
If this study is deepened, statistical tests do not find any correlation between the 
number of laws adopted in the Turkish Parliament and the EU economic assistance 
(Figures 41 and 38, respectively). This reinforces the hypothesis that there is no direct 
causal link between the economic assistance and the country’s democratic performance. 
However, the indicator randomly chosen to represent Turkey’s socialisation within the 
European system, the participation in the Youth Programme, does not reveal a 
correlation either, except again in the case of Control. This is interesting, because this 
dimension appears to be linked to the EU’s pressure both through economic and the 
societal means. This implies a deeper scrutiny of these relations, namely through a 
historical analysis that matches the democratic evolution with crucial moments of that 
relationship. 
Two further correlations have been calculated to analyse the role of OECD. The 
intention is to bring to the discussion the possible role played by other international 
actors. Correlations did not find any particular connection between the number of laws 
adopted and the investments made in Turkey108 by other countries. The same happens 
with Freedom and Control. However, there is a linear correlation between OECD’s 
money transfers and the dimension of Equality. However, when asked about the 
importance of other actors for Turkish democratisation, the respondents of the online 
survey did not take into account individual states or other organisations besides the EU 
– Figure 46 (Appendix 12) shows that USA, Japan, Sweden and other countries are at 
the bottom of the table, meaning that Turks (and Europeans) do not regard them as 
important to Turkish democratic consolidation – they gathered around 2 or 3 points out 
of 10. International non-governmental organisations have been considered more 
                                                          
108 It is important to notice that OECD financial aid does not aim democracy only, but a wide set of other 
fields as well. 
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important than these countries or even international governmental organisations, such as 
OSCE.  
In what comes to the interviews, the general opinion matches the findings of the 
survey and also the correlations (with the exception of Equality). A Turkish academic 
said that any type of foreign involvement in Turkey is not exempt from internal 
(negative) reactions; as such, international actors may possible be helpful at the 
institutional level, but not at the societal level (Interview, 2013e). Ms Yüksel believed 
that the EU is the only external actor that seeks to improve democracy in the country 
(Interview, 2013f) and Ms Somuncuoglu included the United States and Japan as 
countries from which some funding comes from – even though it does not mean that the 
aid comes from official state sources, but rather from some (non-governmental) 
organisations or other donations. Professor Eralp (Interview, 2013h) discredits the 
possibility of an impact of countries like the USA on the Turkish democratisation; even 
though they may be more worried about democracy questions now than during the Cold 
War, they are “not much involved” (Idem). On the contrary, the Council of Europe may 
play some role, but indirectly. The criticisms of the Council of Europe are contemplated 
by the European Union in the Progress Reports, for instance (Idem).  
Official Ege Erkoçak also included these two actors in his answer to the question 
on the external influences: the USA are said, by this official, to be “always there”, 
although they do “not really care after the negotiations started” (Interview, 2013i). They 
have pressured Turkey to join and both Presidents Bush and Clinton lobbied for the 
country’s accession. Secondly, he mentioned the Council of Europe too, as an 
“important factor for democratisation, because Turkey has been a member since 1949” 
(Idem), which gives this organisation an extra leverage power, since Turkey may be 
afraid to be expelled from it (Idem). This is a curious remark, because usually academia 
perceives the offer of membership to be more influential than the threat to be expelled 
from an organisation. Also interestingly, the interviewee mentioned Iran – not as a 
magnetic attraction, but as a “magnetic distraction”, to use his words (Idem). Erkoçak’s 
point was that Iranian ideology and reality helped Turkey to follow the Westernisation 
and democratisation processes, in order to prevent from happening what it used to see 
(and still sees) in its neighbour Iran (Idem). It is the mechanism of emulation – but a 
negative type of example that leads the country to perform contrarily, so that it avoids 
the unintended situation. 
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Therefore, it is possible to infer that the European Union constitutes the most 
visible (and possible effective) international actor in the promotion of democracy in 
Turkey. Although the role of other individual countries, mostly the USA, may be 
brought to the debate, they cannot be considered as relevant actors; their role is 
subsidiary at this level. Neither the general public nor the academics attribute them 
weight enough for them to be regarded when analysing this phenomenon. The Council 
of Europe is an interesting case, as Turkey has been a member for several years, but it is 
more or less directly related to the EU, making their disentanglement more difficult to 
operate. It would not be unfair or exaggerated to say that this institution has played a 
role mainly on Human Rights and has exerted some influence also through the EU, as a 
partner to promote democracy in the country.  
Recalling the subject of legislative transformation started above, Kalaycioğlu 
(2011: 268) studied with detail the Constitutional amendments in Turkey and concluded 
that the major ones (in terms of being more meaningful for the improvement of 
democracy) were the 1995, 2001 and 2004 amendments. If one reminds the history of 
Turkey-EU relations presented above, these years are close to important moments 
between the actors: 1995 can be associated with the establishment of the Customs 
Union; 2001 was right after the declaration of candidacy status and in the year of the 
Accession Partnership and the NPAA; and 2004 was before the opening of negotiations. 
And although the number of laws adopted by the Parliament and the EU economic 
assistance are not linearly correlated, the truth is that timing constitutes an important 
variable, as the previous examples epitomise and as Eralp (2009) had already 
concluded. It is because of this connection between time and interaction that it makes 
sense to divide Turkey-EU relations (and more specifically, EU’s influence) into 
different time gaps, as done in the beginning of this Chapter. As a matter of fact, even 
more importantly than discovering the absolute impact of the Union on Turkey’s 
democratisation may be to realise in which moments its pressure has been more 
effective and led to real improvements and in which the opposite has happened. 
Identifying these smaller time units will allow a deeper understanding of the events 
behind the fluctuations in the pace of reforms, in case they are directly related to the EU 
accession process. 
One of the requests in the online survey was to classify EU’s impact on Turkish 
democratisation (Table 19). The results are interesting: Turks and Europeans disagree 
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on the subject. The former perceived the role of the Union to have grown from 1999 to 
2009, as their average answers were 4.53 to 5.88. Besides, their evaluation began as 
negative and shifted to positive. On the contrary, Europeans always assess EU’s role 
positively, but with the opposite trend, i.e., decreasing during the decade (from 5.83 to 
5.50). The difference is not significant, but reveals some perception of a less active 
European Union at this front. The opinions conveyed in the survey do not help to clarify 
the role of the EU either – in terms of the general average, its presence has been 
evaluated from 5 in 1999 to 5.73, which means being in limbo. Respondents did not 
perceive that influence, in general, to be tendentiously positive or negative; and 
although this may not solve the dilemma concerning the role of the organisation, it 
certainly reveals how uncertain Europeans and Turks are about it and that is a signal per 
se.  
Back on the comparison between the events of Turkey-EU relations and 
Turkey’s democratic evolution, some matches, besides the ones already pointed out, 
should be highlighted. In 1999, candidacy status was attributed to Turkey and, in the 
next year, its democratic evaluation improved by more than 4%. In 2000, there has not 
been much progress in relations and in 2001 the value almost did not vary. Despite the 
positive developments in 2001, 2002 and 2003 in terms of legislation adoption and 
revised official documents, Turkey’s democratic performance remained more or less 
around the same values, increasing by over 3% in 2004 – possibly as a result of the 
accumulated reforms undertaken in the previous years. Political changes continued in 
2005, the year of the best evaluation, and since then until 2008, the values have steadily 
decreased. Interestingly, it was in 2005 that major problems surfaced in Turkey-EU 
relations: the Turkish declaration of non-recognition of Cyprus and the EU’s response, 
the adoption of a harder Negotiation Framework with new conditions; in 2006, there 
was the suspension of negotiations on some chapters, Sarzkozy is elected and voices his 
opposition to Turkish accession, the Presidential crisis begins in the country and the 
Progress Reports recognise that reforms’ pace has slowed down; in 2007 there has not 
been much change and in 2009, the Ergenekon case begins and for the first time the 
APR criticises the lack of commitment of the Turkish government in relation to the 
European process. 
Therefore, it is possible to unveil some parallelism between the volatility of 
these events and the general evaluation of the Turkish democracy. However, this 
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perception is not shared by everyone: the Director of the Directorate for Political Affairs 
of the Ministry for EU Affairs said he did not “really believe democratisation process 
has always been in parallel with the EU accession process” (Interview, 2013i). Again, 
the analysis of this question is stuck – opinions are divided, data is not clear or 
conclusive and literature has not provided a categorical answer as well. 
The role of international organisations on domestic realities has been debated on 
Chapter 4. At that moment, it has been written that, based on the literature available, it 
seems that it would be fair to conclude that international influence exists, but it is 
constrained by domestic conditions; besides, IOs promote cooperation, shape the 
international environment, apply sanctions and the consequences of deviant behaviour 
and work as mechanisms of external democracy promotion through different dynamics, 
such as conditionality and socialisation – the two tools preferred by the EU. 
Constructivism also provided some important insights on this question, highlighting that 
IOs embody the set of rules and norms their members subscribed to, and therefore, they 
act as the patterns of adequate behaviour those members need to follow. Hence their 
relevance as diffuser of norms and rules. 
According to the data, it is not possible to say (straightforwardly) that the EU 
has had a direct impact on the consolidation of the Turkish democracy. However, it 
would be very coincidental that a mathematical correlation would reflect the complexity 
of such a set of events, since many nuances have been introduced during that decade 
and reshaped the whole process.  
Some of the contributions made by the interviewees may help capture these 
nuances that numbers have overlooked. Ege Erkoçak (Interview, 2013i) is rather 
sceptical concerning EU’s role: “it’s not like Europe really affected Turkey to be a 
democratic country. Everyone in Turkey knew that Turkey is almost a founder of the 
Council of Europe and part to many of the European conventions”. By stating this, the 
official was acknowledging that Turks wanted to democratise, but that willingness has 
not to do with the European process or pressure. Besides, according to the same 
interviewee, Turkey does not only want to democratise, but also to develop 
economically following the European model. For him, the EU is essentially a “litmus 
test” for Turkish democracy, as it is an external institution that monitors the Turkish 
progress; nevertheless, EU’s Progress Reports have become a magnet for journalists and 
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academics, but “unfortunately not everything is very well written in these reports; it’s 
not objective” (Idem).  
Ege Erkoçak was the only interviewee with such a sceptical position towards the 
role played by the EU; even concerning the Reports, a Turkish journalist, when asked 
about the Union’s double standards and unfairness towards Turkey, answered with 
another question: “Has Turkey done enough? In the last couple of years, I would say 
no” (Interview, 2013c). Erkoçak recognises, however, that the EU has been important to 
involve the civil society in the accession process – so that the decisions made are 
accepted by the general public, even though EU’s approach is top-down and its 
proposals “are not really based on the realities of Turkey” (Interview, 2013i). That 
approach, according to the Head of the Directorate for Political Affairs, sometimes has 
effective results, but sometimes not (Idem).  
This vision, on the other hand, is not shared by the rest of the interviewees. A 
Turkish diplomat posited that, even though the process has lost its momentum, the EU 
contributed to a “radical transformation in Turkey” namely in the promotion of “better 
democratic standards” (Interview, 2013a). A Turkish academic gave the EU a relevant 
role as a democracy promoter in the sense that the institution is the only intermediary 
position that can balance and mediate the socio-political polarisation in the country; 
besides, “the EU is the only alternative that can stop the Erdoğanisation of Turkey” 
(Interview, 2013b). This concept reminds the negative influence of the tradition of a 
strong state with a strong leader discussed earlier. In fact, and according to this view, 
the European Union, as an external actor, is capable of mitigating the gap that can 
hamper Turkey’s democratic consolidation.109 
Another Turkish academic recognises the importance of the EU’s pressure, but 
also acknowledges that “the EU membership process and the harmonisation packages 
have been instrumentalised, not internalised” by the government (Interview, 2013e). 
The theorist named torture as one of the most positive improvements in Turkish 
democracy that came from EU’s pressure, but also emphasised how media and 
intellectual life have been under the control of the government in a clear lack of 
                                                          
109 During the field work in Turkey, this social polarisation was perceptible even for a foreigner: the 
interviewees, the general public and even the media reflect this constant opposition between the two 
factions of the society. Every issue debated at the public level (the Constitution, the headscarf issue, new 
legislation, the Ergenekon case and even societal questions) always had as a background this greater 
division. It was a particularly tense period, which eventually led to the Gezi Protests a couple of weeks 
after I left Turkey. 
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democratic quality at this level – worse, “Turkey is going backwards in this area” when 
compared to previous years (Idem). Therefore, it can be inferred from these opinions 
that EU’s success has been partial, because there is a negative interference made by 
internal actors that end up jeopardising the process as a whole. However, the author 
reminds that societal aspects and mentalities of democratisation are very slow: “in 
practice, embracing and internalising the democratic principles takes time. There is 
nothing the EU can do” (Idem). 
The Turkish Ambassador, on the other hand, extended the Union’s influence to 
the cognitive domain: “mentality has changed as well” (Interview, 2013a), as taboo 
themes started to be talked about and discussed, like death penalty – which was 
ultimately abolished under all circumstances. And Madam Ambassador Gökdenizler 
goes even further when stating that Turkey would reach that point somehow, “the EU 
speeded it up” (Idem). In other words, the role played by the EU in Turkey is to trigger 
the reforms and the changes necessary to improve its democracy – in a 
Western/European way. Turkey allegedly has the means to consolidate its democracy; it 
would only have taken longer for the country to achieve it (probably also due to its 
growing polarisation) and this may be the key aspect of EU’s behaviour in the country. 
Without the EU, Professor Uzgel foresaw,  
“Turkey’s democratisation wouldn’t definitely be quicker. Without the EU 
pressure, conditionality, support… – whatever you call it –, Turkey would 
have been less and less democratised. The EU was critical in Turkey’s 
democratisation process. It was kind of an anchor, a kind of a reference point 
that contributed enormously to the democratisation process (…). [The EU 
was] important to open the way, to prepare the ground for more 
democratisation in Turkish society” (Interview, 2013e). 
Professor Eralp also believes the EU is important for Turkish democracy and  
“if Turkey stays in the EU process, it will be easier to consolidate Turkish 
democracy. Democracy is always an internal process, internally driven; but 
in the case of Turkey, a country very polarised in this way (there are major 
political frictions), we need an important anchor and the EU has been an 
important anchor in terms of restraining political polarisation in Turkey. And 
when EU process is more positive, you see less polarisation in the country” 
(Interview, 2013h). 
Eralp shares, therefore, the vision about the role of the organisation in helping 
overcoming Turkey’s polarisation; more interestingly, he directly links its stableness 
with EU process – when it is at a more positive or stable stage, society is more unified, 
which gives the Union an addition responsibility in terms of its impact on the country’s 
internal politics and society as well. This set of opinions corroborates the hypothesis 
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mentioned above: as an internal process, democratisation in Turkey is also heavily 
influenced by the EU as an external actor that stimulates and encourages the process, 
inherently complicated by the country’s features, such as its tradition as a strong state, 
strong leader, its immature (or maturing) civil society and its polarised socio-political 
environment. Besides, another conclusion that has been reached is that the evolution of 
the evaluation of Turkey’s democracy has been as unstable as the process of accession 
to the EU. Time and interaction, as proposed by Atila Eralp (2009) emerge as two 
fundamental variables to take into consideration when studying the subject. The logic of 
“action-reaction” or “impulse-response” arises as a possible explanation: the Turkish 
democratic evolution, even though shaped and led by domestic stakeholders, has been 
externally impelled by the European Union in the sense that (at least some of) its 
demands are complied with, bringing an improvement to the country’s democratic 
performance. 
Accepting the interference of time as a mediating variable can also lead to the 
acceptance of the division of the major period into some smaller units – as already done 
on this Chapter. Recalling that division, the aggregation of sets of similar dynamics 
allowed the creation of three different periods: 1999-2005; 2006-2008; 2009. These 
divisions arose from the analysis of quantitative data. When it comes to the 
interviewees, who were asked about differences in the intensity or quality of EU’s 
presence in Turkey and its subsequent more intensive pressure at the democratic level, 
their perceptions match the data – at least the main division. 
Professor Eralp said that “from 1999 to 2005. Turkey, in terms of political 
reforms, in terms of democratisation was doing impressively well. (…) [it] started to 
change after 2005 (…)” (Interview, 2013h). Another academic, Professor Uzgel, stated 
that “Turkey’s democratic consolidation has been weaker in the last four or five years 
[of the general time gap between 1999 and 2009] than in the previous 2002-2006 
period. (…) In 2004-2005 there is a peak point and then it starts to slowdown” 
(Interview, 2013e). The answer of the representative of the Directorate for Accession 
Policy of the Ministry for EU Affairs to the question about the strongest period in which 
EU’s presence has been felt in Turkey was also clear: “It was before the declaration of 
opening the negotiations in Turkey and the period afterwards until the blockage” 
(Interview, 2013f). Another interviewee from the Ministry agreed: “after 2004 or 2005, 
you see that parallel structure [between EU and democracy] less” (Interview, 2013i). 
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When asked about a breaking point in Turkey-EU relations, Ms Cakir chose 2006 – 
since then “we see a change in the attitudes of the EU” (Interview, 2013j). On the EU 
side, all the interviewees pointed 2005 and 2006 as the turning point in the relations. 
However, they believed this shift has been caused by a change in the Turkish 
government’s commitment to the accession process. 
After becoming a candidate country, “democratisation became the most 
important element of that Europeanisation” (Interview, 2013h) and, until 2005, both 
political elites (government and opposition alike) and civil society engaged intensively 
in the process of democratisation; at that point in 1999, relations with the EU became 
less formal and involved other stakeholders that reinforced the process itself (Idem). 
There was, until 2005, what Eralp called a “mobilisation in the country in terms of 
Europeanisation”. The academic goes even further when asserting that the “EU became 
a domestic actor in Turkish politics when we look after 1999” (Idem). This is a major 
consideration, since it implies that the influence exerted by the Union is not to be 
perceived as something externally imposed, but as some internal dynamic that is part of 
the domestic process of democratisation. It is as if the EU was so close to the country 
and its citizens and elites that it was like another domestic stakeholder. Since 2005, 
nonetheless, this mobilisation began to change. Surprisingly, negotiations have just been 
opened and that usually means more involvement of all actors, because “the EU process 
is linked to a process of democratisation” (Idem), as it happened in countries like 
Portugal, Spain and Greece. Conversely, however, “we start to see problems in terms of 
the EU process and this affected also the process of democratisation” (Idem). That is 
visible in the lack of enthusiasm towards the process and in the decrease of the popular 
support (Idem).  
As perceptible, the breaking moment in Turkey-EU relations of the period under 
analysis, according to both quantitative and qualitative data, was 2005. However, what 
the numbers cannot tell, contrarily to the interviewees and literature, is what happened 
so that this volte-face occurred and changed both the accession process and Turkey’s 
democratisation. Cagri Cakir provided her view as a person used to deal with this 
subject very closely: 
“We were going with great enthusiasm in 2005. We started the screening in 
January 2006 and we have devoted the whole year to that process and at the 
end of that year we had our homework done: we saw what were our faults, 
what are our shortcomings, and we were trying to overcome these faults – I 
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should say shortcomings – and then came the declarations that Turkey 
should conform to the Additional Protocol, etc. and right then our 
negotiation process has been blocked due to the Cyprus problem. And it is 
something exterior; it’s old. We backed the Annan Plan and the only one 
rejecting it is a member state and right now things are out of control. They 
locked down the negotiation process. Our negotiation process has become a 
political one. We moved away from the technical issues.” (Interview, 2013j). 
Cyprus is a central issue in Turkey-EU relations and one of the biggest obstacles 
to the pursuit of the negotiation process, due to the blockage created by this situation. In 
an informal conversation with another worker from the Ministry (not recorded or 
included in the used interviews), he unburdened himself by saying that the Additional 
Protocol, and the consequent obligation to officially recognise Cyprus, was a 
humiliating issue that prompted very negative reactions among Turks. Another 
Ministry’s official declared, in relation to this question, that  
“they [the EU] use a small island, a semi-state according to the 
Constitution (…) for the Customs Union issue. Eight chapters were 
blocked; then, Cyprus blocked six chapters and interestingly important 
chapter on Human Rights and security plus energy. (…) Having 
Cyprus as a member was a mistake. And after that mistake, Sarkozy 
and Merkel and Chirac used the Cyprus issue as a scapegoat and you 
cannot have decisions like we are suspending eight chapters and not 
chapters shall be closed if this problem is not solved. You don’t do 
that because we voted yes for the Annan Plan. The other community 
voted no for that. And the EU backed the Annan Plan” (Interview, 
2013i). 
But Cyprus was not the only problem mentioned during the interviews to 
support this twist: “the rise of Merkel and Sarkozy” (Interview, 2013e) has also been 
pointed out as a serious setback in Turkey-EU relations. One interviewee even 
mentioned that “European political leaders sometimes use Turkey for their election 
campaigns” (Interview, 2013f). Another one included the “negative statements about 
enlargement and Turkey” by Sarkozy and Merkel in a broader negative context 
(Interview, 2013i). EU’s officials, when asked about the impact of these statements, 
were rather sceptical concerning their effects and believed that, even despite these 
affirmations, Turkey is committed to an international organisation and not to the 
individual states that compose it, which means that the candidate should have continued 
to pursue its path nevertheless. In sum, “it was a vicious circle, several things coming 
together” (Idem), including internal dynamics within the EU (non-ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty, criticisms about the enlargement, debates on integration issues), 
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which made Turkey “an easy target, a scapegoat in the domestic debates, in the 
elections” (Idem). 
According to this academic, the general negative context in Europe was taken 
too seriously by the government and  
“as a result, the government also started not to implement some of the 
expectations of the EU. So we start to see a vicious circle: Turkey 
complained about the EU; EU officials complained about Turkish 
performance... (…) and then came in 2008 the economic crisis in Europe 
(…) and the EU turned more inward; (…) Turkey became a less important 
matter on the agenda (…) and started to get closer to its neighbourhood (…) 
and they [Turkish politicians] realised they were treated much better in the 
neighbourhood than in the EU; it also became a psychological matter” 
(Idem).  
 It is interesting to notice that all the conditions that are believed to have affected 
Turkey-EU relations mentioned by Professor Eralp come from Europe – the general 
negative environment that worsened the state of those relations seems to have been 
triggered by the EU itself and its internal problems. That position, largely shared by the 
interviewees, implies a former assumption: that the EU affects Turkey’s behaviour and 
its democratic commitment; only then is it understandable that a more negative 
approach by the EU has led to a decrease in the country’s political reforms and in its 
concern about democracy. EU’s officials stated in the interviews that the shift in the 
paradigm has been caused by a visible lack of interest by Turkish officials who did not 
maje the necessary changes to successfully continue the process. 
 The online survey contained a question about the link between Turkey’s 
accession and the improvement of its democracy. The average of the respondents’ 
answers, in a scale from 1 (nothing dependent) to 10 (completely dependent), was 6.83. 
If the two groups – Turks and EU citizens – are analysed independently, that value is 
lower for the former (6.41) and higher for the latter (7.92). This difference shows that 
Turks, despite recognising the role of the EU in the consolidation of their democracy, 
do not regard that role as considerable as Europeans do. However, for both groups, the 
connection between these two variables has been positively assessed and about 70% of 
the respondents evaluated it with 7 points or more, which implies that a significant share 
believes the European Union is highly responsible for promoting democracy in the 
country – similarly to what has been heard in the interviews. 
 Another question related to the presence and impact of the organisation on the 
country focused on two different years (1999 and 2009). The objective was to 
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understand whether Turks and Europeans had perceived any type of evolution between 
those years. Interestingly, the tendency was diverse: when asked to classify (from 
extremely low or absent to extremely high or influential) EU’s presence and impact on 
Turkish democratisation, EU citizens were rather critical, as they considered that 
influence had been higher in 1999 (5.83) than in 2009 (5.50). This slight decrease does 
not match the 1.35 increase in the Turks’ opinion, which regarded the initial role of the 
EU as negative (4.83) and believed it had improved during that decade, achieving a 5.80 
evaluation. If these results are contrasted with the quantitative data of the model and the 
interviews, it is possible to observe that the tendency conveyed by the Europeans 
matches both the interviewees’ opinions (who mentioned the growing problems 
between the two actors after 2005) and the quantitative data, which also disclosed a 
downward inclination of the quality of the Turkish democracy – even though other 
variables such as financial assistance remained high. On the contrary, the positive 
Turkish opinion seems not to match the rest of data. Yet, it is of much relevance to take 
that signal into consideration: despite the problems in Turkey-EU relations and all the 
obstacles to accession, the Turkish perception was that the organisation not only stayed 
in the country, but also that it continued to exert some degree of pressure or influence 
over it. 
 The first conclusion to draw from this reflection is that Turkey-EU relations, 
accession and Turkish democratisation are not linear or straightforward processes. 
Quantitative and qualitative data prove this argument in the sense that several 
fluctuations can be found within this ten-year period. Besides, the individuals involved 
or affected by these phenomena almost unanimously share the perception of the 
breaking point in which the trend begins to change. This leads to a second possible 
conclusion: despite the sensibility and volatility of all the processes, there is a clear 
division into two main phases – pre and post-2005. It matters now to dig even deeper in 
order to find out what made this route not so linear and straightforward. In other words, 
and recalling the Constructivist proposal, this already interpreted world, needs to be 
interpreted as well; i.e., what things became what they are is more important than what 
they are and, therefore, the processes behind these apprehended dimensions need to be 
taken into consideration. 
 Institutions, at the international level, are norm diffusers. Their role, according to 
Constructivism and Institutionalism (Chapters 1 and 2), is to contribute to identities and 
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interests’ formation through the socialisation of their agents; socialising also those who 
want to join them and who need to overcome some benchmarks to be able to achieve 
that goal. The European Union seeks, as stated on Chapter 4, to export its values and 
principles; its normative approach leads the organisation to try to diffuse them among 
its candidates through conjugated mechanisms of conditionality and socialisation. 
However, if democracy – one of those values – has not been reinforced successfully in 
Turkey, it means that something failed in EU’s strategy. It is understandable that the 
mentioned processes do not present linear developments, but, after ten years, 
considering the possibility of the Turkish democracy not have advanced enough, seems 
to be a failure in terms of EU’s approach; it is as if the Union has not been able to 
reshape the identity and the interests of the country, even though they have been being 
in contact for several decades. In fact, the evaluation of the action of the EU in the 
country has been, in general, positively assessed in an earlier phase, but a set of 
conditions have taken place for the alteration of the direction of those dynamics and it is 
of utmost interest to try to discover and understand them, so that this tendency may be 
reversed and both actors become able to reinforce their cooperation and to regain the 
momentum of the accession process, as well as the continuation of the country’s 
consolidation (that seems to have been affected by this remoteness). 
 
11.2. Mediating factors 
  
It has been argued, for multiple times, that the evolution of Turkey-EU relations, 
as well as of Turkish democracy, cannot be justified merely by material factors: money 
and self-interest are not enough to understand the dynamics behind the development of 
these variables. Therefore, this section uses a set of mediating factors, which are nothing 
more than group of variables that are regarded as useful, after the reflection made upon 
the subject throughout the last chapters, to interpret the numbers and to allow a deeper 
comprehension of the phenomena under study. These factors have contributed to the 
construction of Turkey-EU relations and of Turkish democratic consolidation as they 
are known; they are intrinsic parts of them and need to be analysed. 
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11.2.1. Internalisation 
 
The success or failure of a project like an accession process, as it implies the 
adoption of different formal rules and norms, but also a wide set of cognitive structures 
filled with (sometimes) new principles and values is particularly difficult to assess. It 
cannot be said that Turkey used to have a long and strong tradition of a consolidated 
democratic system. The study of the country’s history (on Chapter 6) unveiled this 
reality: from an autocratic Sultanate to a pluralist democracy, the path had been intricate 
and not exempt from ups and downs. The creation of a Modern Turkey has sometimes 
involved the painful process of re-creating an entire country, its identity, roots and 
socio-cultural features in a strong denial of its heritage. The implementation of a 
democratic system itself was a product of a non-democratic process conducted by a 
powerful leader and the establishment of a pluralist democracy had to deal with several 
military interventions and internal clashes. 
When the country’s relations with the EU became more systematic and 
intensive, in 1999, due to its new status, it also became implied (actually, it was 
explicitly formulated in official documents) that European legislation needed to be 
adopted in the country. However, the broader process of Europeanisation (which 
democracy is a part of) also required that those legal changes would be implemented 
and internalised cognitively – the definition of Europeanisation provided by Radaelli on 
Chapter 4 included this component, i.e., shared beliefs and ways of doing things needed 
to be incorporated not only in the legal body of the country being Europeanised, but 
also in its identity and discourse, which requires a level of adoption that goes beyond 
mere importation; it requires internalisation. 
Internalisation may be, therefore, one of the factors that failed during the decade 
and that originated that the quality of the Turkish democracy by the end of the period, in 
2009, was not significantly different from its evaluation in 1999. Internalisation is a sine 
qua non condition for the consolidation of democracy among the individuals of a certain 
society, since this system has to be perceived as the only possible “game in town”, as 
mentioned earlier. Professor Canan Balkir, during a Seminar110 in Turkey, said that only 
                                                          
110 Seminar held in the scope of the Gediz University International Summer School “Turkey and the EU’s 
New Borders”, 15-22 September 2011, Turkey, organised by Gediz University, University of Amsterdam, 
University of Jena and supported by the European Commission. 
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history will be able to say if Europeanisation has been being genuinely internalised by 
Turks. And this is true, since it is rather difficult to disclose imperceptibly small 
changes at the level of collective mentalities. Still, it is not impossible to expose some 
potential cognitive transformations by holding opinion surveys and inquiries.  
Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007) led such study (already presented) and some 
interesting findings may be imported to this context in order to bring some light to the 
question, since some of their questions have been replicated from a previous survey (in 
1999). The evolution of the opinions between the two can give important hints 
regarding the internalisation of some changes. One of the interesting findings of the 
study is related to the question whether political parties that base their policies on 
religion should be in the party system (Idem: 81): in 1999, 24.6% believed they do 
(against 60.6% who oppose it) and, ten years later, the fear of religious parties to 
integrate the system has vanishes, since 41.4% supported them (against 53.6% who did 
not agree with it). Noticeably, the number of people who did not answer this question 
has sharply dropped from almost 15% to 5%. This two-thirds decrease reveals that 
respondents who were previously not sure about the benefits or dangers behind the 
empowerment of religious parties became less worried about it and began to support it. 
This modification of Turks’ attitude towards religion and politics cannot be considered 
democratically positive, since the separation of the two realms is essential for the 
consolidation of democracy. It is possible to affirm that there has been a retrocession in 
this field. Although the percentage of people who refuse to have a Sharia-based regime 
in Turkey has steadily increased111, this growing willingness to see religion and politics 
intertwined does not seem to be a signal of democratic maturation. On the contrary, it 
would be expected that political parties and politics in general would be regarded as a 
sphere apart from religious life and, for that reason, clearly separated. 
Nevertheless, there are more signals that Turks’ religious feelings have been 
reinforced during that decade. Concerning Turks’ self-perceived religiosity, data 
provided by Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007: 41) proves to be very enlightening: when 
comparing the results between 1999 and 2006 (Appendix 11, Figure 44), the percentage 
of respondents who said to be “not religious at all” and “not very religious” decreased 
(12,1% in 1999 to 4,5% in 2006). Even more perceptible is the fall in the numbers 
                                                          
111 “Would you want a Sari’ah-based religious regime to be established in Turkey?” The percentage of 
“No” answers increased over the years: 1999: 67.9%; 2002: 71.1%; 2006: 76.2% (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 
2007: 81). 
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Source: Abridged from Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 63 
Table 11: Age distribution of women and head covering  
regarding the “middle-ground” religious, the ones who put themselves in the middle of 
the scale (55% to 34%). On the contrary, the share of highly religious advocates almost 
doubled (31% to 59%). These figures are informative vis-à-vis the evolution of Turks’ 
religious self-perception; the amount of people who consider themselves religious 
increased significantly, which proves again Huntington’s argument that indigenisation 
caused reinforced religious feelings. This constitutes another symptom of how Turkish 
mentalities towards religion and politics did not improve, at least in the light of the 
European standards. 
Interestingly, however, when it comes to the number of women who do not 
cover their heads, it does not match the findings above. In all the cases (simple 
headscarves, çarşaf 112 and turbans), the percentage of women wearing them decreased 
(Table 11, below). Still, it cannot be ignored that a decrease in this number is not 
generally shared by the older groups, who tend to embody a different tendency; besides, 
it may not represent the predisposition of rural areas.  
 
 Do not cover 
Wear a 
headscarf 
Wear a turban Wear Çarşaf 
Age/Year 1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 
18-24 40.5 50.7 36.1 34 20.6 11.3 2.3 0 
25-39 28 41.5 53.3 42.9 15.6 13.1 2.9 0 
40-54 22.9 28.3 61.1 58.5 12.5 9.1 3.2 3.1 
55-69 14.1 13.7 65.5 70 13.7 12.3 6.7 2.6 
+70 17.4 12.7 69 80.6 8.3 6.7 5.3 0 
 
 A growingly religious Muslim society with a decreasing number of women 
covering their heads can only imply that that religious reinforcement is accompanied by 
a developing sense of freedom or, possibly, a different, more liberal, interpretation of 
their religion. Younger generations, despite being more attached to religion, are capable 
of enjoying their freedoms, even though this scenario would have not been easy to 
foresee. What it enables, however, is to realise that attitudes towards politics, 
democracy and even religion may change in a short period of seven years and that it 
may also be the result of changing perceptions and interests – Turkish mentality has 
                                                          
112 A piece of clothing very similar to the niqab. It covers both the head (hides the lower part of the face) 
and the whole body. 
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been changing for the past years. Whether or not it is the result of Europeanisation is 
what this thesis has been trying to find out.   
Implementation and internalisation of the democratic practices are, as seen, 
pretty difficult and time-consuming processes; but both the EU and the Turkish 
government are aware of these difficulties. The Coordinator of the Directorate for 
Political Affairs explained in detail how the work of the Ministry has been done with 
Chapters 23 and 24 of the acquis (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights; Justice, Freedom 
and Security):  
“Sometimes the reforms follow the projects, sometimes first we make the 
legislation and then for the implementation... to get the implementation in 
line with the EU practices, we use the projects. One of the most important 
ones are, as I remember, is the training given to the judges and prosecutors, 
because they were trained about the European Court of Human Rights case 
law. (…) You can amend the legislation, but if it is not understood by the 
judges, there is no meaning... So, that project was really important to change 
the mind-set of these justice actors. (…) We have also implemented 
measures and reforms in the area of Fundamental Rights, for example, 
women rights was one of the focus. (…) We have designed a training 
program for these young conscripts to get their training on women’s rights... 
It was like an obligatory training, so some people, especially in rural areas, 
choose to go complete their military service when they are 18 or 18, so they 
are so young, but they got the culture from their families, so they can be 
harsh on women. (…) And also we have now local boards for human rights. 
There are like 900 all over Turkey. They work both at the district level and 
the provincial level (…). We have designed as well a project to increase the 
institutional capacity of these boards, they are also very active and compose 
a very important project.  They are composed of NGO representatives and 
they produce a report and we have a Human Rights’ Presidency and these 
boards get the complaints from the citizens and they convey these 
complaints to the Human Rights’ Presidency and they try to solve these 
complaints” (Interview, 2013j). 
 Therefore, it is possible to recognise an effort on the Turkish side truly 
implement (and through implementation, reaching internalisation) of the legislative 
changes the country has been making. The Turkish Ambassador to Portugal, who also 
has much experience in dealing with the EU for some past positions she has occupied, 
recognised that ten years ago, Ministries’ officials and administrative were not ready to 
work with and to implement EU’s measures and initiatives, but now, due to, for 
example, twinning projects, all workers at Ministries became experts in EU (Interview, 
2013a). According to the same diplomat, “although we are not a member of the EU, we 
are already part of the system, as all these years of contact and interaction created a lot 
of accumulated knowledge” (Idem). This illustrates how Turks perceive their country 
has been undergoing a long process of rule adoption and implementation; eventually, all 
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these measures and alterations, after being put in practice for some time, will be 
internalised by the Turkish population. Yet, some obstacles have been hurdling both the 
accession and the democratisation processes, so that the alterations at the level of the 
democratic quality and the Turkish mentality have not been the ones expected after the 
ten-year period of the candidacy status.  
 
11.2.2. Mutual perceptions, identity and culture 
 
Turks and Europeans have been in constant interaction for the last decades (not 
to mention earlier periods of cooperation and war). It happens that how they perceive 
each other – or better: how their mutual perception has evolved in time – is a 
fundamental variable to take into consideration when studying these relations and what 
has been affected by them. In turn, those perceptions have been filtered and constrained 
by their general visions about the world and their wishes, which means, in other words, 
their identity and interests. These are embedded in a broader context: culture. Therefore, 
these entangled concepts sustain the environment that contextualises Turkey-EU 
relations. 
EU’s strategies to improve democracy in Turkey in 1999 were negatively 
perceived by Turks (4.71 out of 10), but they started to convince them during the decade 
and, in 2009, they were assessed with 5.71. This improvement signifies that Turks 
believe the strategies the European Union have used in the country have become more 
effective, even though the EU has lost popularity and accession is not as appealing as it 
used to be. Among Europeans, the tendency is the same (5.25 in 1999 and 5.50 in 2009) 
– their enthusiasm, despite greater at the beginning, did not increase much. Ultimately, 
both societies agree when assessing the effectiveness of EU’s policies to foster 
democracy in Turkey. 
Notwithstanding, that harmony cannot be observed in the question regarding the 
obstacles to Turkish accession113. The top three motives that, for Turks, prevent them 
from entering the European Union, according to the online survey conducted, were the 
European public opinion (8.18), the lack of political will among European elites (8.00); 
and EU’s absorption capacity (7.35). On the European side, the first motives were 
                                                          
113 Cf. Table 21 and Figure 45 (Appendix 12), 
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Human Rights (8.75) and the lack of political will among European elites (8.75); 
freedoms and liberties (7.42); and culture and identity (7.35). 
Again, and even recognising that the sample gathered by this survey may not be 
representative, these results involve very interesting findings about the perceptions both 
towards the accession process and towards the “other”. First, it is interesting to notice 
that Turks’ top three reasons blame Europeans. Among the long list available, the three 
highest rated put Europeans at the centre of the obstacles that prevent Turkey to join the 
Union, which is rather thought-provoking, since Turks seem, therefore, not to find that 
the main responsibility is theirs. This has repercussions in terms of their relationship 
with Europe, because, when believing they are mostly not the ones to blame, they have 
nothing (or very little) to change. On the contrary, Europeans recognised their elites’ 
fault in terms of lack of political will, but more significantly pointed out the state of 
main democratic principles: Human Rights, freedoms and liberties. Simultaneously, 
they acknowledge the interference of cultural and identity divergences as a hurdle that 
hampers the whole process. Secondly, these results also reveal a difference in the 
perception concerning fundamental questions: for Turks, Human Rights, freedoms and 
liberties figure, in the Turkish ranking, among the sixth and eighth positions, 
respectively. There is, hence, a significant gap between what Europeans feel as 
Turkey’s problems (namely their performance at those levels) and what Turks believe 
they are. More generally speaking, the option “state of the Turkish democracy” ranked 
fourth (7.00) in the European ranking and ninth (5.59) in the Turkish ranking, almost at 
the bottom of the thirteen options contemplated. 
This mismatch in terms of European and Turkish sensitivities about what is 
causing the obstacles for the improvement of their relations and the development of the 
candidate’s path towards full membership is very significant, because, as mentioned 
repeatedly, the way actors perceive reality affects the way they respond and behave, 
creating different dynamics, depending on their vision. It is not difficult to realise that, 
as long as Turks feel that European have been unfair or lifting barriers for accession, 
they will not be as enthusiastic to engage in the process as they would be if they see the 
EU committed as well. 
A Turkish academic, in one of his answers, gave an example of these different 
perceptions:  
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“for many years, the term of ‘Human Rights’ was taken negatively in this 
country. (…) Human Rights equalled Kurdish Rights. (…) When the 
[European] officials say ‘You have to improve your Human Rights’, that 
means ‘You have to grant more freedoms to the Kurds’” (Interview, 2013e). 
This example illustrates what has been considered above: Turks do not regard 
Human Rights in the same way Europeans do – due to their own historical and cultural 
context – and EU’s comments and reactions are received with the filters of those 
contexts and perceptions history has been creating in Turks’ minds. The mismatch in 
the understanding of the same concept originates difficulties in the relationship.  
Another example, given by a Ministry’s official, is related to Fazil Say’s 
polemic statements about Islam and his 10-month imprisonment sentence114. He was 
complaining that several institutions were against the verdict, but, according to Ege 
Erkoçak, the sentence has been suspended and “postponed for five years, just supposing 
he misbehaves” (Interview, 2013i). It is interesting the use of the concept of 
“misbehaviour” in this context, as it implies that Fazil Say has misbehaved when he 
made those statements. Nevertheless, the interviewee’s point of view was that  
“one should not forget, when we talk about freedom of expression, that it is 
dependent on the culture of it; there are certain rules. (…) there are some 
general values, but, especially for freedom of expression, people might feel 
irritated through some reading materials” (Idem). 
 Again, this position with respect to freedom of expression reveals the opinion of 
some societal segments in Turkey and how they struggle with this “recent” right that 
has been introduced (or at least reinforced by implementation) in Turkish life and which 
has originated several debates, in a healthy democratic fashion. This discussion has also 
pointed out the high proportion of jailed journalists and intellectuals. Professor Genç 
stated that journalists cannot publish news freely, as they are afraid to be fired; 
professionals from Hizmet, Taraf and Sözcü115 have lost their jobs for publishing 
unpleasant news, which means that there is no opposition in Turkey (Interview, 2013b). 
Another Turkish academic (anonymously) has reiterated this situation in the country 
                                                          
114 “In April 2012, Say posted controversial tweets asking whether heaven in Islamic tradition is like a 
brothel or a pub because the Quran says there are rivers of wine and huris (very beautiful women) in the 
afterlife for those who commit good deeds while on Earth. Say also tweeted about a muezzin who recited 
the evening call to prayer in 22 seconds, wondering whether he was in a rush to reunite with his lover or 
go to a rakı table. Say explained his controversial tweets as verses from a poem by Omar Khayyam, a 
Persian poet. The prosecutor's office has found that Say's statements run contrary to the first and third 
points of Article 216 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK). These points concern the offenses of “inciting 
hatred and enmity among the public” and “insulting religious values” ” (Today’s Zaman, 2013). 
115 Hizmet is a newspaper linked to the Gülen movement; Taraf is the liberal publication that denunciated 
Ergenekon case and Sözcü is a radical-left newspaper, close to CHP and the Worker’s Party, secularists 
and nationalists. 
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and revealed that Turkey is going backwards in terms of freedom of expression, since 
the Prime-Minister is capable of firing a journalist, shifting the logics behind this liberty 
and the balance of powers in the country. The editor of Today’s Zaman also argued that 
the problem of journalists in jail needs to be addressed, but that Turkey is a very special 
case due to its military coups, as there still is, according to him, the fear of a coup, 
which justifies the need to be careful and to pay attention to the military (Interview, 
2013c). 
 The differences in the perceptions between Turks and Europeans are not limited 
to these subjects. In fact, when asked to classify a list of several actors according to their 
contribution to democratisation, there have been some divergences, as well116. Ranked 
as the first place by both Europeans and Turks are Turkish economic elites (7.67; 7.65, 
respectively). EU citizens also assessed Turkish civil society ex aequo in the first 
position. Their second and third choices were the EU (7.08) and Turkish NGOs (6.83). 
For Turks, the main contributors for their democracy were, apart from the economic 
actors, the AKP (second, 7.35) and Turkish civil society (third, 6.88). Again, some 
interesting findings can be highlighted from these results. 
 First, Turks have only included in the top-three list Turkish domestic actors. 
Therefore, it follows that they perceive their national actors (economic elites, AKP and 
civil society) as the main engines of the Turkish democratic evolution. On the other 
hand, the European Union comes only in sixth place with 5.82, which means that this 
international organisation has barely reached the positive evaluation threshold. 
Secondly, Europeans regard their organisation as the second main democratic drive in 
the country. Given these results, either Turks and underestimating the value of the EU 
or Europeans are overestimating it. Thirdly, the bottom lines of the ranking are occupied 
by individual countries, which seem irrelevant for the Turkish democratisation process. 
The military can also be included in this lower ranking by the Turks, but not so much by 
the Europeans, who granted them the sixth position. 
 The fact is that Turkey and the European Union have fed, for centuries, a set of 
mutual socio-cultural constraints: for the EU and its citizens, Turkey usually means an 
assemblage of negative clichés that, besides the historical otherness that is conveyed at 
school, range from fundamentalist Muslims that occupy European jobs to psychological 
factors like the difficulty in creating empathy. On the Turkish side, the fear of losing 
                                                          
116 Cf. Table 22 and Figure 46 (Appendix 12). 
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national sovereignty, as well as its cultural identity, the resentment of the discriminatory 
attitudes of the Europeans and the lack of hope of being treated equally are some of the 
constraints that “may lead to cultural conflicts, to the cleavage gap between Europe and 
Turkey, to alienate from Europe, and to a clash of civilizations” (Kuran-Burçoglu, 2007: 
154). Although the idea of a clash of civilisations may be an exaggerating extension of 
the argument, the point is that these differences may affect the general environment of 
Turkey-EU relations.  
 The image Turks have of the European Union has become less positive: in 2004, 
56% of the Eurobarometer’s respondents used to have a very or fairly positive image 
(and 12% a very or fairly bad); while five years later, in 2009, the positive view dropped 
10% and a negative image was chosen by 28% of the respondents (Eurobarometer, 
2004a; Eurobarometer, 2009). In relation to the knowledge about the EU, Turks 
performed very poorly, even when compared to other candidates or recent member 
states: it had the lowest score in a quiz about the Union (1.96 out of 10) 
(Eurobarometer, 2004a: 34); only 29% agreed with the sentence “I understand how the 
EU works” (36% did not) and 76% felt they were not very well or not at all informed 
about enlargement (Idem: 45, 78). This lack of knowledge may be one of the reasons 
behind the obstacles raised by Turks in terms of their approach to the EU. That is also 
clear in the question regarding the fears connected to the building of Europe – 53% of 
the Turks are afraid that integration would mean abandoning their language and 49% 
fear they will lose their national identity and culture (Idem: 84). 
 These fears are, apart from interesting, very meaningful. They constitute 
ideational aspects only (culture, identity, language) and it is very likely that they result 
from lack of knowledge. The EU has been very prone to support and defend national 
languages and there is not, within the EU, attempts to destroy or homogenise the diverse 
cultures and identities that compose the Union. Robins has been quoted on Chapter 8 to 
mention the basic fear of mortality every collective institution presents and it is a fact 
that the accession process may be perceived as a means to do that – but one should also 
remember the fact that some coherence in terms of core values needs to be maintained 
for the functioning of the organisation; besides, the EU has never tried to alter the 
Turkish costumes and habits or traditions – except for those who contradict the essence 
of the European Union, such as death penalty, honour killings and early forced 
marriages.  
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On the other hand, and probably justified by these fears, the majority of Turks 
(57%) only consider maintaining their national identity and do not think about 
introducing, to some extent and cumulatively, a European identity, which is also below 
the levels of acceptance of other candidates and recent member states (Idem: 48). 
Çarkoğlu and Toprak’s study has been quoted on Chapter 8 to show that the majority of 
Turks first and foremost felt as Muslims and only 22.9% as citizens of the Turkish 
Republic. Therefore, if they struggle to conjugate their religious and civil identities, it is 
understandable that embracing a third type of supranational identity may constitute a 
challenge. Furthermore, Turks also feel suspicious about the image of the EU in the 
Turkish media: 42% believed it was too positively and only 29% regarded it as 
objective (Idem: 43). In fact, almost one third of the respondents believe they receive 
too much information about the EU from the media (Idem: 41) – even though they 
claim not to know enough about the Union and the enlargement process. 
In contrast, the majority of the respondents (51%) feel they will become 
politically more stable as a member of the EU (Idem: 91) and 48% is whether very or 
fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union (Idem: 98). Still, 
the EU means for them economic prosperity (55%), freedom to move (49%) and social 
protection (49%) (Idem: 72). Although these values change in the 2009 Eurobarometer 
inquiry, their ranking positions remain exactly the same. Besides, when asked about the 
most important values for them personally, Turks and Europeans revealed the same top-
three options: respect for human life, peace and human rights (Eurobarometer, 2009). 
The only difference is the ranking position of peace (second for Europeans, third for 
Turks) and human rights (vice-versa). Considering the other choices, the widest gap 
between the average of the EU citizens’ answers and Turks’ is religion, since Europeans 
only granted it 6% of their votes, whereas 25% of the Turkish respondents chose it as 
one of the most important values (Idem).  
These considerations lead to the inclusion of two other main aspects in Turkey-
EU relations: identity and culture. As Subotic (2011: 314) wrote (and as it was already 
quoted in Part I), “state identity provides a fuller explanation of Europeanization’s 
success or failure than does the concept of external incentives”. In fact, this study 
supports the thesis defended by Subotic (and reached through a comparative study). The 
examples provided above and the lack of connection between the external financial 
incentives illustrate how important these variables are.  
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The alterity chacrater of Turkey/Ottoman Empire and Europe is, as repeatedly 
mentioned, a historical reality: in 1883, James Lormirr said that trying to extend rights 
to the barbarians (the Ottomans) was in vain, as they “proved to be incapable of 
performing its duties, and who possibly do not even belong to the progressive races of 
mankind” (cited in Stivachtis, 2008: 31). Nowadays, there are still debates about the 
commonness or otherness between Europeans and Turks. Onis (1999: 107) calls it a 
“Christian-Muslim divide as a central line of demarcation between Turkey and 
contemporary Europe”. This issue is even aggravated by the association of Islam with 
terrorism after the 9/11 attacks or other equally condemnable assaults perpetrated by 
fundamentalists that promoted all across Europe (and the Western world in general) the 
spread of fear of Islam, fostering fanatic positions both on the sides of Muslims and 
Christians (Kuran-Burçoglu, 2007: 154), which is a real, cultural and civilisational 
obstacle difficult to overcome. 
 However, Turkish identity, as any other identity, is not unchangeable. It is object 
of the action of several types of interactions and dynamics that shape and re-shape it 
over time. Honour killings and increasing divorces co-habit in Turkey; polygamy is 
forbidden but there are still some cases in the countryside. Moreover, there is a 
meaningful societal polarisation in Turkey, whose developments are difficult to foresee; 
what is possible to figure out, however, is that it will raise serious oppositions at diverse 
fronts: politics and decision-making, religion and society are facing lively times and are 
being constantly redefined – as written above, probably the role of the European Union 
is to function as a mediator that will enable this growing polarisation to come to some 
positive results in the sense that each part does not constantly block the other and 
prevents the country to develop and improve its democracy. Fattah’s study (quoted on 
Chapter 8) revealed that, among the Muslim countries, Turkey has the least percentage 
of Islamists and the highest of democrats. It means that it has the potentiality to become 
a truly succeeded democracy and to work as an example to other Muslim countries. Its 
identity is not incompatible with democracy, after all. As the socio-cultural profile 
traced for Turkey proved, there are many differences and obstacles that need to be 
overcome, but also several opportunities that can be used to achieve it, such as the 
reinforcement of the civil society and the collective positive attitude towards democracy 
and democratic values. 
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 The online survey conducted for this thesis also questioned about the importance 
of democracy for Turks in two different years (1999 and 2009). The results (of the 
answers given by Turks only) revealed an increase from 6.88 (out of 10) to 7.24. 
Although this is a slight increase, these values represent a high consideration of 
democracy for Turks. Europeans are also aware of the Turkish valorisation of 
democracy, as the results are really close (6.00 to 6.92). This means that it is possible 
that Europeans recognise that Turks are also interested in consolidating their democracy 
and to commit to that process, which is a positive perception – that meets Fattah’s 
conclusions regarding the democratic potentiality of Turkey. Maybe because of this, has 
Professor Uzgel stated that “if it [democracy] fails here, then we will have a problem” in 
the other Muslim societies (Interview, 2013e).  
A Turkish Ambassador goes even further and states that “EU is the final frontier 
to consolidate our European vocation. We are already part of the system; we want to be 
acknowledged as part of Europe” (Interview, 2013a). This position, certainly shared by 
many pro-European people in Turkey, indicates that there is this perception that Turkey 
belongs to Europe and that several centuries of transformation need to be concretised 
through the international recognition of the country as member of the European system 
– possibly not as an Asian country, not as a Muslim country, but as a country that 
belongs to Europe and which has embraced its principles and values (or at least which is 
struggling to). When asked about the reasons behind the decrease in the public support 
for membership, Professor Uzgel was clear: public opinion’s support will rise, as soon 
as the EU shows the door is open to Turkey, because “for the Turkish middle-class, it is 
a matter of identity (…); they want to be recognised as Europeans. To be European 
means to be modernised” (Idem). Therefore, it is possible to connect this willingness to 
join the Union for identity matters. The representative for the Ministry for EU Affairs 
also believed identity plays a role in Turkey-EU relations, “because of the prejudice 
issue. (…) And history shows it matters. Today maybe less than in the 1990s, but it still 
matters” (Interview, 2013f). 
Nonetheless, as the same Turkish academic posited during his interview, it is not 
only that:  
“The common perception here in Turkey is that the Europeans don’t know 
Turkey well. If they knew Turkey well, they would accept Turkey. I think 
the opposite: they now the Turkish society well; they are definitely against 
Turkish membership. Look at the rate of women killed by their husbands in 
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Turkey... There was a news today on the TV, in Southeast Turkey (…) 
young girls are forced to marry a man as a third wife, so he killed a young 
woman, that was 19 years old. This is so widespread. How can you 
culturally place Turkey inside the EU? If the EU’s societies in EU countries 
knew what was happening inside Turkey... I don’t think that a Turkey like 
this would have a place in European society. It is so far, so conservative” 
(Interview, 2013e).  
According to this perspective, then, Turkish culture is not ready to join the EU – 
is not an economic or structural issue anymore; it is about the country’s culture that has 
become, according to the academic, more conservative. Not materially conservative, but 
in terms of the ideology, which can become a problem in case this ideological 
conservatism is synonym with the reinforcement of religion and its entanglement with 
civil life, for example. In that case, democracy can be harmed.  
 In a discourse analysis study, Luis Garcia (2011) includes Nicholas Sarkozy’s 
remarks on Turkish accession and highlights that the then French President, in the 
middle 2000s, emphasised not only geographical, but also cultural motives not to 
support Turkey’s accession (Idem: 59-ff). Issues like identity, Christianity and Europe’s 
unity are brought to the discussion by Sarkozy who believed the Turkish integration 
would dilute the European identity and make EU’s borders indefinite. The French leader 
even stated that “making promises that you will never uphold is not to respect your 
friends” (Sarkozy cited in Garcia, 2011: 61), which can be interpreted, as Garcia wrote, 
that  
“the EU, collectively, is not going to uphold its promises. In this sense, 
Sarkozy is introducing the following theme: most EU leaders are opposed to 
Turkish membership but do not say it, as they hope Turkey will give up at a 
certain point.” (Garcia, 2011: 61). 
 What this comment (and other alike) do not take into account is what Robins 
(1996) believes to be important for Europe – “cultural interruption”, i.e. the EU has to 
be ready to accept and integrate a society that is not so similar to all the previous ones 
that entered the Union – culturally speaking, as long as the main values of the 
organisation are respected, either by Christians or Muslims. But, as a Turkish diplomat 
put it, “Is the EU a Christian club? Then, they should write it in the Treaties” 
(Interview, 2013a). 
 Comments like these certainly give the impression that there is lack of political 
will among the European political elites – in fact, that was one of the major obstacles 
identified by both Turks and Europeans in the online survey. By promoting mechanisms 
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of identity divergence117, these strategies end up intensifying the existing differences 
and amplifying the gap between the two sides, harming not only the accession process, 
but also the country’s democratisation. Identities and interests are mutable and, hence, 
these statements can contribute to their alteration, in a negative way.  
 
11.2.3. Language, coherence and credibility 
 
Sarkozy’s remarks lead the investigation to another essential issue when 
attempting to find the underlying causes and the constitution of the phenomenon being 
studied: language. Although not all constructivists agree on the importance of this 
variable118, the fact is that language is a powerful mechanism to diffuse ideas, to 
convince and to promote change – change of perspectives, of interests and, ultimately, 
of identity. Muslim public opinion, as Fattah’s study concluded, tends to be more easily 
influenced by opinion makers (Fattah, 2006: 7). Language is a powerful tool; in fact, it 
is more than a tool – it constitutes a reality per se. 
Discursive Europeanisation was one of Diez’s (2005) types of 
Europeanisation119 and was related to the adaptation of discourse to the European 
practices and standards. A practical example of that has been referred to by Madam 
Ambassador during her interview, when she acknowledged that some taboo issues in the 
country started to be talked about and discussed at various levels (Interview, 2013a); as 
also already mentioned, Professor Uzgel stated that, earlier, talking about Human Rights 
in Turkey would sound, for Turks, as Kurds’ rights and their reaction would be based 
upon that (Interview, 2013e); however, EU’s discourse – even though sometimes very 
tough – has changed those perceptions and has brought Turkish vision in line with the 
European patterns.  
Language is the means individuals have at their disposal to make commitments; 
it is, therefore, the basis of any compromise. And the expected behaviour of the other is 
to comply with those commitments. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the constant postponing 
of Turkish accession and some other problems (referred to later on) make the Turkish 
side uncomfortable or even with the feeling of unfairness: President Gül, in the context 
                                                          
117 Cf. Chapter 2 and Subotic’s notions of identity convergence and divergence. 
118 Cf. Chapter 1 – section 1.3.1.2. 
119 Cf. Chapter 4 – section 4.2.3. 
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of a brief visit of President Sarkozy to Ankara, said that the EU should respect the 
promises it made when it opened negotiations with Turkey (Rettman, 2011). Although 
the Turkish President did not specify what promises he was talking about, the idea is 
that, in Turks’ minds, there is the feeling that the EU has not respected its commitments 
with the candidate country. It is also curious that in the same news, the comment under 
the picture in which Sarkozy and Erdoğan were sat face to face talking was that 
“Sarkozy chewed gum upon arrival, considered insulting by his hosts” (Idem). This fact 
that seemed, at the outset, something nobody would notice, became another example 
media used to show how Turkey is treated disrespectfully. It is important to notice here 
how the fact that Sarkozy was chewing gum, an improper behaviour for a diplomatic 
formal encounter, was interpreted by Turks according to their traditions and cultural 
premises, and has been used to provide an example of a certain (bigger, political and 
diplomatic) situation between the two countries.  
A Turkish academic recognised the impact of these comments (and others like 
these) comments by European leaders, partially blaming them for having deteriorated 
Turkey-EU relations: “particularly the German and the French leaders, Sarkozy and 
Merkel, were making negative statements and within that context we lost our 
enthusiasm” (Interview, 2013h). Therefore, it came with no surprise that the Turkish 
Prime-Minister declared, during an official visit to Europe, that “obviously, 
developments in the accession process up till now give the impression of 
discrimination” (Rettman, 2011). This feeling of being discriminated against constitutes 
one of the problems that jeopardise Turkey-EU relations to the point that they are stuck 
(…) [and] the EU has been losing its appeal” (Interview, 2013a).  
 The fact that there is no perspective of full membership is harmful; as there is 
no timetable, the Turkish government does not feel pressured to make the necessary 
changes (Interview, 2013h). Besides, negotiations are also stuck, due to the considerable 
amount of chapters blocked. As the worker from the Ministry mentioned, “there are 
many forms, in theory, to block the process. One of them is not sending the screening 
projects to Turkey” (Interview, 2013f), which is the case of eight chapters, including 
chapters 23 and 24 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights; Justice, Freedom and Security) 
(Idem). In these cases, the Ministry is not even aware of the opening and closing 
benchmarks, not allowing the country to pursue with any type of concrete measures to 
tackle its problems. “One of them is still even not prepared by the Commission and this 
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is chapter 31[Foreign, Security and Defence Policy]” (Idem). Besides, six chapters are 
blocked by Cyprus and the whole process of negotiations is, therefore, trapped.  
The same interviewee also noted that France “said it is not a very good time for 
Turkey to open this field [chapter 17, Economic and Monetary Policy] when Turkey is 
in crisis. But, one week after, they opened this chapter with Iceland” (Idem). This 
situation creates, among the Turkish public, a sense of double standards applied by the 
EU: “the EU definitely has double standards, especially towards Turkey (…), but I 
don’t think it is necessarily related to religion itself. Religion is part of the story; it is 
more like a cultural thing” (Interview, 2013e). Possibly, this situation is prompted by 
internal problems within the EU; as another Turkish academic affirmed in relation to the 
attractiveness of Europe to other countries, “this is not a problem only for Turkey, it is 
more of a general problem. This is not only a Turkish problem. It is more the issues of 
democratisation and it is a critical problem within the EU” (Interview, 2013h), namely 
its own democratic deficit and other internal questions.  
There are, therefore, visible problems in Turkey-EU relations that affect the 
outcome of the processes these two entities are involved in. First of all, there is the 
recently introduced open-ended character of negotiations; in other words, this legal 
clause entails the possibility of the European Union not to grant full membership even if 
Turkey fulfils with all the conditions. The existence of alternatives will, in the opinion 
of Tacar (2007: 128), “remain hanging over Turkey like a ‘sword of Damocles’ (…). 
This will have extremely serious psycho-sociological consequences creating an 
atmosphere of insecurity”.  
The examples of meaningful events that undermine Turks’ trust in the European 
Union proliferate. The four examples below, more than their material or physical 
tangibility, may originate, for what they mean, an alteration in a society’s perceptions 
and interests, affecting the country’s democratic performance. The first example is 
brought by Tacar (Idem: 130), according to whom, Turks (possibly due to their religious 
mind-set) perceive treaties as forever binding documents that are never altered. Thus, 
when the Additional Protocol stated that the free flow of labour was to be implemented 
in November 1st 1986, Turks would not imagine that more than twenty years afterwards, 
the EU would have not complied with that condition, justifying its position with the 
changes in the labour market. From this conflict of perceptions, that derives from each 
one’s identity, some serious consequences can occur, such as the lack of identification 
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with the other or even a lack of trust in the partner’s commitments, undermining their 
mutual confidence and generally worsening their relations. Mr Erkoçak (Interview, 
2013i) complained about the same subject and, when talking about how the EU has 
treated Turkey unfairly in comparison to Cyprus at the time of the referendum, he 
stated:  
“we want at least the EU side to observe the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda. I mean, Turkey is, if we continue with the Latin, ready to have a 
tabula rasa, but we are sick and tired because we are working here” (Idem)  
– at this moment, Mr Erkoçak showed a 268-page report, the Ministry’s Progress 
Report. Interestingly, when commenting about EU’s double standards, Professor Uzgel 
also brought this subject to the conversation: “just consider the free movement of 
workers, it had to be started in 1997, but they said ‘we are not doing it’ – and that was a 
legal condition” (Interview, 2013e). 
 This event, certainly not the only one in the long history of Turkey-EU relations, 
is symptomatic of two further related issues: cultural arrogance and lack of coherence. 
The first idea relates to the question of the still present historical legacy of the ancient 
Europe-Ottoman Empire relations. Europe, being the model to be imitated and 
followed, at least gives the feeling that its cultural superiority entitles it to, to a certain 
extent, disregard some rules Europe itself determined, creating an unbalance with the 
partner, who, in order to achieve full membership, is not able to skip some of the 
conditions that were previously set. Conditionality process is specially criticised for the 
unequal conditions it creates and the lack of opportunity for the candidate to take part in 
the process of determining the changes and conditions that are expected from it. It is not 
this socio-political-cultural distance that is able to bring both sides together, diminishing 
their differences and promoting cooperation; on the contrary, they can widen that gap 
and make it harder for both to communicate. The official from the Directorate for 
Political Affairs gave an example of his own experience with European diplomats: 
“I gave a presentation to COELA, the Committee for Enlargement and 
Countries Negotiating Accession to the EU, in the European Council. So, I 
saw that the member states’ diplomacy (but you experience the same with 
Commission bureaucrats as well) tend to overemphasise their role. This is 
also not good for candidate countries, but also not something good for 
member states. They tend to know everything better, the Commission way. 
It’s also a spread disease to the European Council. I think this is kind of a 
danger, because countries like Turkey can easily feel offended (…) if they 
are less strong economically and they are relying on the EU and at that time, 
if the European Commissioners put some austerity measures with an 
arrogant language can have some different effects on big countries” 
(Interview, 2013i). 
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 This statement reveals the vision of someone who is used to work closely with 
the European institutions and bureaucrats and supports the argument provided above, as 
well as the relevance of language and of the actors’ attitudes towards each other in the 
creation of further responses120.  
 Concerning EU’s lack of coherence, a second and concrete example can be 
provided in order to prove this point: when Erdoğan visited Europe in February 2011 
and met with, among others, Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy, 
a diplomatic conundrum arose, because during the Turkish Prime-Minister’s visit, both 
European leaders clearly reinforced their opposition to Turkey’s accession. Sarkozy 
argued that Turkey would destabilise the EU if it joined and that therefore a privileged 
partnership was a better solution (Rettman, 2011) as Angela Merkel has defended for 
quite a long time. Erdoğan, during the same official travel, mentioned before a Turks’ 
audience that xenophobia and Islamophobia were being felt in some European countries 
(Rettman, 2011). On the other hand, however, some months before, the then recently 
elected Prime-Minister David Cameron went to Ankara and declared his total support 
for Turkish membership, stating that the opponents of Turkey’s accession were either 
protectionists or prejudiced (Público, 2010). Similarly, Italy considered that a 
“partnership” was not enough for Turkey (Reuters, 2010) and EU Enlargement 
Commissioner, Stefan Füle, said the EU was committed to allow Turkey to become a 
member: “There should be a zero doubt policy about our commitment. We have a very 
clear mandate from member states” (Füle cited in EurActive with Reuters, 2010). These 
contradictory opinions and statements coming from diverse parts and institutions of 
Europe are a clear sign of EU’s lack of coherence, maybe a reflection of its own 
indecision regarding this issue or, more likely, the overlapping of some individual 
states’ interests over the policies of the European Union. 
The third example is provided by the EU’s approach to the CEECs. For many 
authors, it was a clear case of positive discrimination with conditions that Turkey does 
not have. As Onis (1999: 108) asserts, the countries that ended up joining the EU in 
2004 were relatively easily included in the Union, highlighting “the view that the EU is 
essentially a civilizational project” that created further obstacles to the pursuit of the 
accession process for Turkey, concluding that  
                                                          
120 EU’s officials have been questioned about this alleged approach by the Union, but they preferred not 
to comment on these more sensitive issues. 
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“the comparative evidence suggests that the incentives available to Southern 
and Eastern European countries exceeded by a significant margin the 
transitional costs for implementing the necessary measures of adjustment 
[whilst] in Turkey (...) the reverse has been the case” (Idem: 131). 
Tacar (2007: 134) agrees with this position and adds the fact that, although many 
current member states did not fully complied with all the conditions in order to enter the 
Union, even small details in the Turkish process are used to delay it, leading the country 
to a feeling of frustration that results from this unfair double standards’ policy. Besides, 
Baracani (2009: 83) compared EU’s assistance to the field of Rule of Law between 
Romania, Serbia and Turkey (2001-2005) and despite the considerably bigger amounts 
transferred to Turkey in comparison with the other countries, the value per capita per 
year in the Turkish case (€1.01) was much lower than Romania’s €2.37 and Serbia’s 
€6.84.  
 Finally, the 2007 enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania also constitutes a 
relevant example for this list. These countries were not perceived by Turks as ready to 
full membership and, hence, their inclusion in the Union was regarded as unfair. 
Nicholas Sarokhanian and Yannis Stivachtis led a study exclusively based on a 
comparative approach regarding the European Commission Annual Progress Reports of 
Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania: 
 “In an effort to emphasize that Turkey has, so far, been unjustly left 
outside the European Union, many have argued that when compared to 
Bulgaria and Romania, Turkey scores better in its fulfilment of the 
Copenhagen political criteria than the other two, which jointed the EU on 1 
January 2007.” (Sarokhanian and Stivachtis, 2008: 279) 
The authors compared the different chapters of the Reports individually and 
recognised that, among other things and in relation to both countries, Turkey needs 
some improvement in the fighting against corruption and transparency (Idem: 283) – 
two important features of the rule of law. However, it is noticed that the executive 
branch of the Turkish public administration is better than the one of Romania (Idem: 
284). The criticisms regarding the implementation of the acquis in terms of the judicial 
system were similar to Romania’s and that, in this field, “at the time of accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania, Turkey was at least at the same level of meeting the criteria or 
even further along” (Idem: 286). In what comes to anti-corruption measures, the authors 
understood from the reports that, although there are some concerns with this area in 
Turkey, it is not comparable to the “major structural threat” that corruption represents in 
Bulgaria and Romania (Idem: 287). 
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 Many other fields have been scrutinised by the authors: on the one hand, for 
instance, human rights are a weakness for Turkey (Idem: 288); on the other hand, in 
terms of civil and political rights, “Turkey shows greater advancements in most areas 
when compared to Romania and it is also farther advanced than Bulgaria in some 
realms” (Idem: 292), as it also happens in the domain of economic, social and cultural 
rights. 
 After having analysed the various chapters, the researchers recognised that, 
despite the need for some further changes in the Turkish society, this country fulfils the 
political Copenhagen criteria, concluding that “The progress shown is comparable to the 
relative statutes of Bulgaria and Romania when they acceded.” (Idem: 299)121. 
 Moreover, the Bartelsmann Stiftung, a German-based research institute, enables 
the creation of tools to compare the democratic performance between different countries 
and the conclusions are similar. In relation to Bulgaria, for example, most indicators 
have been better performed in this already EU-member: the socioeconomic level, the 
stability of the democratic institutions, Rule of Law, political participation and stateness 
are the ones in which the hiatus is more visible (and the ones more important in terms of 
democracy). Still, the difference is almost always about one point out of ten. However, 
in all the other indicators both countries are quite even. Regarding Romania, there is a 
similar situation, but the difference between the two neighbours is not as remarkable as 
in the previous case. Overall in the economic domain, Turkey performs as good as or 
better than Romania. In socio-political terms, except for the socioeconomic level, 
Turkey is very closed or even sometimes at the same stage (political and social 
integration, stability of democratic institutions and the rule of law are good 
examples)122. At the diplomatic level, there was also that same perception: according to 
the words of the Turkish Ambassdor to Portugal, letting Bulgaria and Romania accede 
“was a political decision; not because they were technically ready” (Interview, 2013a). 
Another debate concerning EU’s credibility and coherence is related to Progress 
Reports. Turkish officials have been quite critical at this level:  
“every Progress Report was a good magnet for journalists and academicians 
and unfortunately not everything is very well written in these reports; it’s not 
                                                          
121 It is interesting to notice that, during a Conference these ideas have been presented at, the Turkish 
Ambassador to Canada, Mr. Amabassador Tuncay Babali, recognised that, although he has got a 
Bulgarian background, it is possible to realise Turkey is 20 years in advance of both Bulgaria and 
Romania in terms of democracy, economy, etc. 
122 For more references to this study and the impact of the 2007 enlargement on Turkish democratisation, 
cf. Matos, 2012. 
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objective” (Interview, 2013i); “Up to then [2006], when we are reviewing 
the progress reports, you can see general criticisms about human rights; they 
were not detailed. (…) but, after that, the content of the progress reports in 
terms of political criteria changed; they became too demanding. Sometimes, 
they demand some steps which were not present in the EU states as well. 
The content of the progress reports became too detailed” (Interview, 2013j); 
“We now do the reforms for our citizens, because the EU reports are unfair 
and always critical. They don’t recognise Turkey’s efforts” (Anonymous 
declaration). 
These three negative visions are not shared by the opinion of a Turkish 
academic, who believes that “they are quite fair” (Interview, 2013h); in fact, the 
criticisms conveyed by those documents represent the problems Turkey has been facing 
(Idem).  
Thus, it is possible to take into consideration these question when studying 
Turkey-EU relations. Timing, language, credibility, coherence, and trust emerge as a set 
of mediating variables that are capable of reshaping the processes of accession and, 
consequently, of democratisation, also because they affect the perceptions of those who 
constitute the core and the real sovereigns of a state – its citizens. 
 
11.3. What really happened? 
 The title of this section is more of a thought-provoking question, rather than a 
scientific inquiry to find out “true” answers to the initial interrogations. It is, however, 
the moment, to get together some of the findings presented throughout this chapter and 
also to compare them with the results of other academics’ work. The path travelled by 
this thesis helped disclose important considerations regarding Turkey-EU relations and 
their impact on the Turkish democratisation. For example, sending Turkey contradictory 
signs regarding the final outcome of its reforms towards Europeanisation can 
encompass heavy costs for the entire process. Turkish public opinion “about 
membership gives form, intensity and legitimacy to the direction of the relations” 
(Çarkoğlu, 2004: 21) and, therefore, constitutes a key element to consider in terms of 
political decision-making. Regarding its position in relation to EU membership, the 
instability of the process is reflected on the evolution of the population’s support. From 
one of the most enthusiastic supporters of accession, Turks became progressively less 
interested in the process123. 
                                                          
123 Cf. Figure 42 (Appendix 10). 
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 How Turks perceive and interpret the signals sent by the European Union has 
much to do with their support or lack of it. And public opinion is fundamental for a 
successful process of accession and of democratisation, since their enthusiasm can give 
impetus to the reforms needed to be made by the political leaders, whereas if they are 
not keen on entering the Union, the resulting political costs force politicians to avoid the 
subject and, subsequently, the reforms and changes demanded by the EU. 
 Thus, historical alterity, socio-cultural constraints, EU’s cultural arrogance and 
lack of coherence – all of them based on the differences concerning identities and 
perceptions – result in an agitated process marked by discrimination and double 
standards, Turkey’s jeopardised pride and its lack of trust in the EU, as well as of 
motivation for further reforms. The feeling of frustration for not being considered an 
equal provokes on the Turkish side a sense of “isolation, rejection, disappointment, 
geopolitical exclusion [and a] constant sense of threat to national unity” (Onis, 1999: 
134) that damages Turks’ pride, making their reaction in the long run unpredictable, 
possibly endangering all Turkey and EU’s efforts to democratise the country and to 
improve its social, cultural and economic performance during the last decades. 
 Turkish lack of motivation is one of the possible and very likely outcomes of 
this complex process. Although the Prime-Minister has already admitted that Turkey is 
undergoing these changes for its own sake and independently from EU’s demands, 
meaning that even if the Union definitely closes the door, the country would pursue 
those improvements in any case, EU’s pressure accelerates the pace of reforms and 
consolidates the process. Düzgit (2009: 57) believes that the credibility of EU 
conditionality and a real prospect of full membership would be two of the strongest 
incentives for Turkey to pursue with the needed reforms. On the contrary, insisting on 
the idea that negotiations are open-ended and that there are outcomes other than full 
membership will shadow the whole process. 
 
 
Figure 47 above schematises the effects of instability in Turkey-EU relations. 
First, instability in Turkey-EU relations is the result of a set of advances and retreats in 
negotiations, caused by particular events that originate enthusiasm or resentment, 
Instability
Changes in 
perception
Lack of 
motivation
Changes in 
behaviour
Different 
outcomes
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Figure 47: Chain of the consequences of instability 
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respectively, between the two parts. Frequently caused by problems in communication 
or in understanding and accepting the other’s differences, this instability changes Turks’ 
perceptions. At a first moment, material conditions really matter (political decisions, 
military interventions, speeches, etc.), but then they are interpreted by both political 
elites and the public opinion; it is precisely how the actors read and perceive the 
material facts that shapes their answers. That is the reason why there are more or less 
enthusiastic phases. Thus, Turks, depending on the moment of the relationship, perceive 
the European Union either as an ally that helps the country following the modernisation 
process triggered by Mustafa Kemal or as an external actor that, besides interfering in 
internal affairs, does not have serious intentions to keep what it has initially promised. 
In that sense, and if the latter reading of reality dominates the general public, 
there is a widespread lack of motivation to pursue with the changes – which already 
happen among the workers of the Ministry for EU Affairs, given the fact that the 
desired benefit of the efforts is not achievable. As a matter of fact, and borrowing 
concepts from Psychology, if there is an obstacle to reach something that is wanted, the 
individual develops a feeling of frustration and will consequently use mechanisms to 
avoid the pain or unhappiness of not getting what he desired. Moreover, if the public 
opinion does not show interest in the process, it becomes a politically costly subject that 
should be avoided not to lose votes for more nationalist parties, for example and, hence, 
their efforts to promote Europeanisation start to fade. 
A reinterpretation of reality leads to a change in behaviour, which is adapted to 
the “new (perceived) reality”, redefining the priorities of the country, for example. The 
attitudes towards the European Union become less positive and other values and 
principles are highlighted and took up again, such as the Muslim origins or national 
traditions. In case democratic culture is not strongly rooted in the society, there may be 
risks of a democratic breakdown or the erosion of the quality of democracy.  
As a consequence, all this chain ends up with different outcomes: the above 
mentioned weakening of democracy, a slower pace of reforms, the redefinition of the 
country’s foreign policy, a separation from Europe, etc. Ultimately, it can not only 
redefine the politics of an entire region, but also affect individuals’ real lives, due to the 
broader context and environment that surround them.  
Açikmeşe (2010), Börzel and Soyaltin (2012), Morlino and Magen (2009) and 
Usul (2011) have been pointed out as some of the works whose concerns have come 
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closer to the ones that guided this thesis. Therefore, a comparison with the reflections 
made here constitutes a positive way to analyse them with a new perspective given by 
the accumulated knowledge built in the meanwhile. 
 Açikmeşe (2010) stood for the inclusion of both domestic and European factors 
to explain Europeanisation. At that level, the interplay of these variables has also been 
used in this thesis. Above all, it has been stated that, in this interaction, domestic 
behaviour has been a response to external stimuli; not in the sense that the international 
dimension is more relevant, but because it seems that several alterations in EU’s 
behaviour triggered a modification in Turks’ behaviour as well. Açikmeşe’s factors, 
such as EU’s commitment, coherent strategies, societal support and government’s 
commitment, have been taken into consideration to study this phenomenon and the 
author’s conclusion that 2005 was the turning point in Turkey-EU relations is 
completely supported by the findings of this thesis too. The reasons behind the shift in 
the relationship provided by Açikmeşe also match the ones provided above: a more 
coherent, committed and with no double standards EU in the first phase against a loose 
Europeanisation caused by a change in EU’s attitudes and the exclusion of the 
organisation from the national agenda; it has become, as Açikmeşe wrote, a “non-
issue”.  
Moreover, the author wonders if some reforms in 2008 would begin a new era 
and the results of the model actually point out to a considerable improvement since in 
2009. It gives the impression that a new stage could begin, but it is not possible to 
affirm that, because further years have not been analysed. Yet, in 2010 a new chapter 
has been opened under the Spanish Presidency of the Council, but it does not seem that 
represented a considerable improvement in Turkey-EU relations. However, to support 
that affirmation, further research would be required. 
Börzel and Soyaltin (2012) focused their research on EU’s transformative power 
in Turkey and believed the organisation promoted change, but with “significant 
variation”. In fact, our findings agree with that statement: the division of the period into 
two (or three, possibly) main stages tries to reflect those variations. However, this thesis 
does not fully support their argument that the adoption of the acquis has been selective 
and decoupled from behavioural practices. Conclusions suggest that, first, acquis 
adoption depended on the phase of Turkey-EU relations (in a more positive 
environment, even difficult reforms have been taken) and, secondly, it is too early to 
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evaluate the internalisation of those changes by the population. Furthermore, when the 
authors argue that Europeanisation is used by national actors to legitimise their own 
political interests, even though that may have happened at an early stage, since 2005, it 
makes no sense to posit that, as the EU does not constitute, among the Turkish public 
opinion, an actor strong enough to reinforce the government’s unpopular decisions. 
When it comes to the conclusion that change in Turkey happened more due to 
the ruling elites’ willingness to consolidate their power, rather than due to EU’s 
pressure, the results show that it may only have happened at a later stage when the EU 
lost its impetus; the accession process, since the moment it has become irrelevant for 
Turks, was not able to exert the same influence it has done earlier: changes, when 
happened, where more of a domestic process. Therefore, their conclusion that “there is 
nothing special about Europeanization in Turkey” due to the lack of a credible 
perspective of membership (Idem: 16) is only partially supported by the findings of this 
thesis. As a matter of fact, the justification given by Börzel and Soyaltin is shared by 
this study, but their conclusions seem to be disproportionate: in the moments credibility 
existed, Europeanisation had results and worked in Turkey. Several major changes have 
been reached at this point – Human Rights’ issues, death penalty, freedoms, civilian 
control over the military, etc. Yet, when that credibility, alongside with other positive 
factors, became to fade out, EU’s pressure and influence has vanished as well. Thus, 
one is forced to conclude that Europeanisation worked in Turkey; however, when it 
started not to function properly, its results have been affected too. 
The application of EUCLIDA model by Morlino and Magen (2009) allowed 
these academics to reach a set of conclusions and to apply them to their case studies 
(including Turkey). First, they supported the rationalist theory that stated that less 
financial incentives equalled weaker compliance. This thesis, through its own model, 
refuses this argument. If one takes 2005 as the breaking point at which Turkey-EU 
relations started to become more problematic and the country’s democracy has been 
negatively affected, it is not possible to posit that it is due to the lack of financial 
incentives, since data reveals EU’s contributions have not diminished; on the contrary, 
as negotiations have opened, the transferred values have been higher. 
Secondly, Morlino and Magen provided some conditions that increased Turkey’s 
resistance to change: a) the Sévres syndrome. It is not supported by the findings either: 
Turks have been willing to change and to adopt Europeanising measures suggested (or 
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imposed) by the EU; they started not to accept them (or at least to ignore them) since 
the whole accession process has become stuck. Therefore, it is not wise affirm that they 
resisted to change because of their fear of being disintegrated as nation, since they have 
difficult improvements, namely in the field of Kurds’ rights – which is a sensitive topic 
regarding their national integrity; b) when old regime’s elites are targeted. This does not 
verify either. The most illustrative example are the military who have continuously lost 
power since 1999 and who, despite some displeasure, have tendentiously supported the 
European integration of their country; c) when Turks perceive changes to be a threat 
against a “symbolically charged collective memory”. This was an obstacle to some 
changes; however, there have been some reforms that threatened their values and 
memories and which, nonetheless, have taken place, namely, again, minorities’ rights. 
The process was slow and very delicate, but has (at least partially) succeeded.  
The same study supported “the hypothesis that external influence on rule 
adoption increases with the credibility of conditional promises and threats” (Idem: 239) 
and that there is a gap between rule adoption, implementation and internalisation, being 
the latter truly difficult to assess (Idem: 242). Our findings support these hypotheses as 
well. Besides, the authors believe that, when transition occurred more than ten years 
ago, there are some signs of habituation. It was not possible to test this hypothesis, but it 
matches the general idea of some considerations that regard democratic consolidation a 
very time-consuming and long process whose results in terms of internalisation can only 
be perceived at a later stage. In that sense, Morlino and Magen’s study backed the 
argument that timing is a very important variable (Idem: 253) and the hypothesis that 
conditionality fails is not supported by their research – and by this thesis neither. At the 
same time, they also recognise the importance of socialisation as an effective 
mechanism of change promotion, even though it is particularly difficult to detect 
empirically (Idem: 255). 
Finally, the authors wrote that: 
“To understand better such an external-internal nexus, our research 
brought to light the salience of the emergence of opportunities created 
by external actors and perceived by domestic elites, and in few cases 
transmitted to citizens. Such an open, and in some cases collective, 
perception is easier when there is a determinate and credible 
conditionality. Analytically, we could make a distinction between the 
understanding on the part of a leader or group that there is an 
opportunity to exploit and the translation of the opportunity into a 
successful change. So the end result of this entire game is in the 
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complex, multifaceted relationships between change agents and veto 
players, where the public plays an indirect role that can become 
determining one at the time of elections” (Idem: 255). 
It is not difficult to realise that this thesis also followed this premise: external 
actors create opportunities and domestic actors perceive them and conveyed them to 
their citizens who interpret them in the light of their experience, culture and identity and 
who, ultimately, internalise them in their habits, routines and cognitive structures. That 
is why Constructivism and Constructivist Institutionalism have been chosen to 
framework this study. Besides, as Morlino and Magen distinguish, there is the 
perception of an opportunity and then actors use it and transform it into a successful 
change. What this work has shown is that, in Turkey, there was no longer the perception 
of an opportunity given by the EU, and hence there is not the possibility to transform it 
into a change through the EU. Applying what the authors theorised, Turkish public 
opinion played an important role, as well as other agents did, in perceiving that lack of 
opportunity and all of them, also mediated by a set of other variables, acted accordingly.  
 Last but not least, Ali Usul (2011) also devoted much of his research to find out 
the role of the European Union’s on Turkish democracy, even though this theorist has 
chosen a different path to reach the same objective. Therefore, the major difference 
between the two works is that the former has focused on material and political 
incentives and on the conditionality process, rather than on other (more constructivist) 
aspects this thesis chose to highlight. Usul, following the contributions of several 
important authors, theorised democratisation as a complex, long-term, open-ended, not 
linear, with sudden advances and backslides process (Idem: 24, 25). This is exactly 
what has happened with Turkish democracy during the period between 1999 and 2009; 
this description matches the volatility and instability of the line graph that represents the 
evolution of Turkish democracy. 
 An important conclusion of Usul’s book, which the findings of this thesis 
partially subscribe to, is that  
“although Turkish governments realized a number of substantial political 
reforms during the period and thus the quality of democracy in Turkey was 
relatively improved, the degree of effectiveness of EU conditionality was 
limited for various reasons (…), and thus the process of European 
integration with Turkey has not yet served to consolidate Turkish 
democracy” (Idem: 100, 101).  
 The question that this conclusion raises is not so much related to the fact that 
conditionality has been limited (because it was), but to the following of the reasoning 
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that discharges the European Union from consolidating the Turkish democracy. Maybe, 
and after having analysed all the data in the form of the quantitative model, the online 
survey, the interviews and the relevant literature, it is not wise to affirm that, despite the 
political reforms, the EU did not contribute to consolidate Turkey’s democracy. It is 
true that author focuses only on the conditionality process (not embracing socialisation 
or even other mechanisms) and maybe Usul is referring to the implementation and 
internalisation of those changes; however, if the author decided to focus on material 
incentives, then it is particularly difficult to find the consequent internalisation, since 
those are not the most successful tools at this level – in other words, it is not merely 
through financial assistance that Turks embrace legal changes and introduce them in 
their cognitive structures; it requires more complex processes of habitation through 
interaction (socialisation).  
Moreover, the author sets the boundary of the period of higher compliance with 
European standards in 2007 and this division has not been supported by the different 
sources and findings of the thesis, since a bit earlier the European leaders’ remarks, the 
Cyprus issue and the lack of positive feedback from the EU had already created less 
positive responses and the tangibility of the lack of commitment to the accession 
process. On the other hand, it is also believed that, in accordance with what Ali Usul 
wrote (Idem: 141), EU’s influence has been restrained by EU’s own behaviour and 
choices. In the same line of thought, Usul recognised that, comparing Turkey now and 
in the pre-Helsinki period, certain serious reforms would not have been possible without 
EU’s conditionality (Idem: 144). Therefore, he agrees with the conclusion that the EU 
has been an important factor but (due to its own changing approach) became more 
limited in its influence since a certain point in time. 
Some other lack of common findings between this work and Usul’s book are the 
author’s conclusions regarding the improvement of certain fields in Turkey: for 
example, he posits that some significant reforms have been achieved in civil-military 
relations, but that “EU conditionality has not entirely sustained the mechanism of 
democratic control of the military” (Idem: 145). First, this is a statement very difficult 
to prove; secondly, it is also hard to realise whether civilian control has been achieved 
through the EU or not; thirdly, there are different models of civil-military relations in 
Europe and no single pattern, which makes it harder to assess the (mis)match of the 
Turkish case; and finally, some cases in this latter period have revealed that the military 
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started to accept the democratic division of powers and lowered their political 
interference, namely during the 2007 Presidential crisis.  
It is also correct to conclude that Turkey’s integration improved the relationship 
between the Turkish state and several types of organisations which are now more 
capable of pressuring the government towards action; however, Usul wrote that that 
shift “does not mean that the basic nature of state-society relations in Turkey has been 
radically transformed” (Idem: 163). However, in such a time period, should we expect it 
to change “radically”? Maybe, such change is progressive and time-consuming; besides, 
if those organisations are now able to put some pressure on politicians, and given the 
history of the country and its relations with NGOs, it reveals that something has 
changed and this improvement needs to be taken into account within the framework of 
mentalities’ alterations, which is not something particularly quick and tangible.  
Finally, this thesis’ findings match, in general, the conclusions reached by Usul: 
“the strength of EU conditionality depends largely on its credibility. 
The credibility of EU conditionality, on the other hand, depends on its 
meritocratic nature. (…) EU conditionality has not been so 
meritocratic as regards Turkey’s situation and therefore its impact on 
Turkish democracy has been relatively limited and less than it could 
have been. It is also clear that Turkey’s democratic future is closely 
related to its European orientation” (Idem: 178, 179). 
The inclusion of credibility and meritocracy among the variables that affect 
Turkey-EU relations match the findings of this thesis; however, it is necessary to 
emphasise that those factors are essentially ideational – the fact that people perceive the 
relationship as unequal or unfair is what makes credibility and meritocracy so crucial 
for the understanding of its volatility. Moreover, it is also important not to ignore that 
EU’s influence has not been the same during the entire period – as seen, there were 
different stages, meaning that different levels or degrees of leverage and influence are 
found depending on the timing. But, all together, and more importantly, Usul 
recognises, as this thesis does, that Turkish democratisation process is considerably 
connected to its relationship with the EU in general and the accession process in 
particular and that, therefore, if the country aims to keep improving its democracy, 
Turkey-EU relations need to overcome the obstacles that have hampered them in the 
past and to pursue their path with coherence, credibility and commitment. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The research question that based this whole thesis arose from the doubts about 
one specific dimension of a much debated and questioned international organisation: the 
promotion of democracy by the European Union. More than the policies behind this 
promotion, what is frequently questioned is its effectiveness and to what extent it does 
truly stimulate the establishment and consolidation of democracies among third 
countries. Therefore, ultimately this study wanted to find out whether the European 
Union has been successful in this endeavour through a case study: Turkey. 
 This inquiry led to a long and complex path: democracy (and other associated 
concepts) were defined and operationalised; a theoretical model was built and a case 
study was used to bring all these pieces together and (hopefully) to shed some light on 
the initial intellectual curiosities. The interesting results that came from it combined a 
set of different sources: a theoretical model, a quantitative survey, qualitative 
interviews, and literature review. They aimed to accomplish some objectives initially 
drawn to guide this research project: it is now time to check whether those have been 
successfully achieved or not. 
 First and foremost, this work attempted to overcome the lack of a systematic 
approach to the theme and to contribute to a set of ongoing debates around subjects like 
democracy definition and measurement, the assessment of EU policies and the analysis 
of Turkish democracy and its connection to the accession process. Secondly, it was also 
an important objective to frame this study within the broader discussion on the 
interaction between the domestic and the external spheres. However, these contributions 
sought to be provided through a less frequently used perspective of Constructivism, 
which tends to emphasise the role of ideas (and their interaction with materiality), as 
well as the possible impact of ideation aspects like identity, culture, perception and 
motivation. These concepts have been fundamental to strengthen the novelty of this 
approach, since the Constructivist thought has generated fresh hypotheses for the 
subject. 
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 Following the research model, the concept of democracy has been object to a 
deep theoretical study and to the subsequent conceptualisation and operationalisation in 
three major principles, eight dimensions and thirteen attributes. The creation of the 
model comprised the allocation of over eighty different indicators from several sources 
that tried to encompass as broadly as possible this so complex concept. Through the 
application of the model, it was possible to reach an evaluation of the development of 
Turkish democracy in the period under study – 1999 to 2009. Those results have been 
combined and correlated with the presence of the EU in the country, so that any type of 
connection between the two processes (of democratisation and of accession) would not 
be missed. The construction of this model aimed to fulfil a gap in the literature in terms 
of combining different sources and data that are available for the country but which are 
rarely used in an aggregated manner. The purpose of the utilisation of such set of 
quantitative democratic evaluations is to reflect different theoretical perspectives and 
approaches and to reinforce (or even base) further hypotheses.  
 Yet, quantitative models are not enough as reality needs to be interpreted; in that 
sense, the continuation of the thesis has respected the hermeneutical tradition presented 
earlier and valued the interpretation of historical events, of social practices, opinions 
and perceptions. The Western linkages Turkey had developed since the Ottoman Empire 
were taken into consideration, as well as the European responses and the evolution of 
the Turkish state, its struggle to democratise and the ups and downs all the process 
entailed. The strategy of abduction, which implied a quest for the meanings and the 
motives beyond the quantifying results achieves were not disregarded either. The 
underlying dynamics of the processes under scrutiny have been brought to the surface 
and several options emerged to help clarify and understand the volatility of the results 
and the characteristics of those mechanisms.  
 Trying not to replicate the results and findings already disclosed, it is 
nevertheless necessary to present, in an organised and summarised way, the most 
relevant information and considerations that resulted from this study and which 
constitute its main contribution to the development and reinforcement of the knowledge 
on these issues. 
 Therefore, it is important to stress that the application of the theoretical model to 
the Turkish case revealed what literature has said about the country’s democracy: the 
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decade under study constituted a very unstable period; there have been major 
advancements in terms of the quality of the Turkish political system (death penalty, for 
example, is one of the most illustrative changes), but some considerable weaknesses 
remained and contributed to the volatility of this period. As argued on the last chapter, 
Turkey can be said to represent a legitimate liberal democracy which is in the process of 
deepening its qualities; it means that the Turkish political system has overcome the 
phase of mere democratic transition and is in the moment of consolidating its own 
democratic records. Specially for sceptics, it is imperative to clarify that consolidating 
does not only mean that a country is constantly improving its democratic standards – 
even traditional, consolidated democracies can find themselves in some critical 
moments regarding their democracy. Therefore, it is hardly debatable that, given the 
results, Turkey has been working on the improvement of its democracy. 
 Nonetheless, a fundamental variable needs to be included in this equation: time. 
Turkey has not been committed and successful at the same level throughout all the ten 
years: in fact, the need to create a breaking point between two (possibly three) phases 
has been notorious – not only due to the quantitative results, but also due to the opinions 
of the interviewees and of academia in general. 2005 constitutes, thus, a consensual 
turning point in Turkey-EU relations with clear effects on the candidate’s democratic 
evaluation. Before 2005, Turkey and both processes were performing positively; 
afterwards, that behaviour and both sides’ approach have changed. 
 When one looks closer to the results and compares the levels of the democratic 
performance of Turkey in 1999 and 2009, the surprise is that the values are 
approximately the same; the difference lies in the fluctuations that have occurred in the 
meanwhile. Obviously, the natural conclusion is that Turkish democracy did not 
improve. However, that is not so linear, if one notices that it has, in fact, improved for 
some time and, then, worsened its performance. Another possible conclusion or 
inference that can be drawn from this reasoning is that the EU did not succeed in 
promoting democracy in Turkey and that, by generalisation, EU’s democracy promotion 
mechanisms in other candidate countries are also meant to fail. Yet, this would 
constitute a dangerous oversimplification of both data and reality. Assessing EU’s 
success pretty much depends on the phase one is looking at. Until 2005, EU was an 
active partner in Turkey and achieved important results in several domains, including 
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Human Rights and freedoms. However, since 2005, the leverage power of the Union 
started to reveal signs of stagnation or lack of effectiveness.  
 Furthermore, in neither of the phases was financial assistance a determinant 
condition, as proven by the absence of correlation between the variables. This not only 
proves that the role of material factors should not be overemphasised, but also that other 
types of dynamics needed to be uncovered, so that the motives behind these 
developments would become known. At this point, a set of intermediate variables has 
been proposed as a contribution to a deeper understanding of the phenomena involved. 
It became essential to realise what may be reasons that led to the existence of such a 
visible turning point both in Turkey-EU relations, but also in the country’s 
democratisation process. The two partially lost their impetus and the results that 
characterised them in the previous phase since the opening of negotiations. These 
intermediate variables and all the interpretations that were achieved do not constitute an 
exhaustive list; probably some other factors and perceptions may be unveiled by other 
analysts. Yet, they are very likely not to be exclusively valid for the Turkish case; on 
the contrary, they may be applicable to other cases of consolidating democracies that 
search for membership in the EU – even though, the peculiarities of each candidate need 
to be taken into account too. The idea is that these (and other) variables got in the way 
of a theoretically plain and untroubled route that would be the accession process 
(mainly after the negotiations are opened, which should mean a technical and not 
political process) and they have nuanced and reshaped it. 
 Historical events are tangible phenomena that contributed to the existence of 
some twists in Turkey-EU relations: EU’s internal problems (like the debate on its 
identity and frontiers, criticisms about enlargement or even the denial of the 
Constitutional Treaty) have prompted a negative environment for the healthy 
development of the process; besides, the 2004 enlargement brought to the Union a 
member-state whose relations with Turkey were not pacific and which originated 
several blockages of important chapters. Sarkozy’s election (and his opposition to 
Turkish accession) and the Presidential crisis in Turkey epitomise a difficult external 
and internal context for the process’ prosperous development. 
 In fact, a major shortcoming of the whole procedure was (and probably still is) 
internalisation. As a sine qua non condition for a real democratic consolidation, several 
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authors and stakeholders point out that democratic principles have not been fully 
internalised by the Turkish general population: a more active and engaged civil society 
lives alongside with meaningful social sects with reinforced religious feelings. This 
contradiction (together with others already mentioned) reflects that a democratic culture 
may have been growing in the country, but there is still a long course to go through in 
what comes to mature these concepts and frameworks. As they have not been truly and 
deeply internalised (also due to a not so old democratisation), affected relations with the 
EU meant a departure from an engagement with the improvement of their democracy as 
well. Therefore, insisting on internalisation and making formal changes meaningful and 
close to the general population much beyond the mere rule-adoption dynamic would be 
an important benefit brought by a European-led democratisation process. 
 Identity, culture and perceptions are three concepts whose analysis is the 
keystone of the Constructivist thought and they were able to suggest important clues 
about the whole question. It is not meaningless that, in the online survey, Turks 
considered all the obstacles to their integration to be caused by Europeans and that EU 
citizens were more critical and mostly blamed Turks for the problems in the 
concretisation of accession. Moreover, it has also been mentioned that the way Turks 
perceive freedom of expression and the way media should operate usually does not 
match the European standards, usually creating a gap when comparing both approaches. 
In the past, minority rights for Turks meant nothing else but Kurds’ rights and only with 
several years of growing knowledge that resulted from interaction and learning were 
Turks able to overcome that misconception. In actual fact, misconceptions and lack of 
knowledge are also relevant problems – as written before, Turks are afraid of losing 
their identity, their language and their culture. Probably due to the “otherness” feelings 
consolidated over centuries of history, this fear may jeopardise Turkey-EU relations 
since it develops a sense of insecurity or discomfort that may produce distrust and 
reinforce isolation – instead of the necessary cultural and societal exchanges that foster 
socialisation and tighten the links between two peoples. 
 The impact of discourses, speeches and formal documents has also to be taken 
into account when studying these relations. Discrimination and double standards are 
easily felt by Turks since they still feel insecure in terms of their identity belongings. 
Therefore, when it is perceived that the conditions set for Turkey to accede are different 
from the ones given to other (Christian, more European-like) countries, the idea of 
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meritocracy is shaken; in that context, it is possible that Turks understand there is not 
special need to strive for the implementation of rather unpopular and unpleasant 
measures imposed by an external actor. Suggesting that negotiations are now an open-
ended process and sending contradictory signs to the population arise meaningful issues 
of lack of coherence and of credibility. These, in a time of indigenisation, are likely to 
support the arguments of those who oppose to such relations and that would favour the 
reconnection of the country with Middle-Eastern neighbours. No timetable means no 
pressure; there is no point in making the necessary modification, since the final outcome 
of the process they are embedded in is not foreseeable. Thus, public opinion – also 
known as electors – have a word to say about the situation; hence, as soon as an issue 
becomes politically costly for a party, it needs to be dropped or forgotten, because 
internal dynamics demand so. A friendly approach and a coherent position by the EU 
would be much more successful in terms of convincing Turks to adhere to the European 
cause, as well as to the pursuit of the democratisation efforts. 
 Thus, it is possible to affirm that the process of accession to the EU and Turkish 
democratisation are two interconnected mechanisms, because, even though the Union 
may have not been yet completely successful at this level in this candidate, all the 
hypotheses support the idea that a closer relationship means more democratic efforts 
and, conversely, more problematic relations eventually lead to a lack of commitment to 
the improvement of the country’s democratisation. These are not linear nor 
straightforward; different years mean different stages of the relationship and a whole 
new set of dynamics that reshape the process – different periods signify different 
degrees of leverage.  
In fact, these are fundamental reflections since they may bring some light into 
the debate around the interaction between the domestic and the external fields. It is not a 
zero-sum influence over each other. As repeatedly argued, democratisation is an 
essentially internal process, which domestic stakeholders need to be involved in. 
However, in a country like Turkey, where society is polarised and whose heterogeneity 
makes commitments harder to achieve, the existence of an external (ideally objective 
and impartial) actor that works both as anchor and as a triggering force that drives the 
necessary centrifugal forces that foster the development and improvement of a country’s 
democracy is of paramount importance. This role has been played by the EU principally 
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from 1999 to 2005; from that moment onwards, a set of phenomena occurred and it was 
no longer the same influential stakeholder in Turkey.  
As a result, it is vital that the realities behind this change are paid attention to, so 
that the possible mistakes or weaknesses of this policy are improved in the sense that 
both the organisation and the candidate benefit from it. Time is a major variable; but the 
Union’s coherence and credibility cannot be overlooked; it is through real commitment 
and involvement that the EU gets nearer the population and shows them that the role it 
pretends to play in the country is one of help and of respect, diminishing unpleasant 
feelings of hurt pride, inferiority or frustration for not being taken as seriously as other 
partners. Changing these perceptions is fundamental to alter the behaviour they tend to 
produce. And although democratisation is an internal issue, the European Union can 
work as an intermediary that reinforces the whole process through its own (obviously 
not perfect) example and through the serious fulfilment of all its obligations and 
compromises. Turks, on the other hand, would interpret these novelties and voluntarily 
decide to apply them in their daily lives, slowly internalising the democratic principles 
that are able to improve their freedoms and rights, granting them a more pleasant place 
to live.  
Thus, this thesis aimed to bring a fresher perspective into this question and to 
highlight that merely focusing on material interests is clearly not enough to justify this 
volatility. The European Union’s policies of democracy promotion are based on noble 
principles and on some pretty successful approaches; however, the Turkish case 
revealed that, when they are not properly applied, the results may be reversed, 
jeopardising the Union’s efforts and the possibilities of democratic consolidation in the 
candidate countries. 
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APPENDIX 1 – INTERVIEWS 
 
* 1 – Turkish academics; 2 – Turkish Political Elite; 3 – Civil Society Representatives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interviewee Function Institution Group* Duration 
Ebru 
Gökdenizler 
Turkish Ambassador 
to Lisbon 
Turkish Embassy / 
Government 
2 45 min. 
Savaş Genç Academic Fatih Universitesi 1 60 min. 
Ergin Hava Business Editor Today’s Zaman 3 60 min. 
Fatih Ceran Assistant Director 
The Journalists and 
Writers Foundation 
3 90 min. 
Ilhan Uzgel Academic Ankara Universitesi 1 60 min. 
Kamile Yüksel 
Representative of the 
Directorate 
Ministry for EU 
Affairs – Directorate 
for Accession Policy 
2 60 min. 
Sevna 
Somuncuoglu 
General Coordinator Flying Broom 3 45 min. 
Atila Eralp Academic 
Middle East Technical 
University 
1 60 min. 
Ege Erkoçak Director 
Ministry for EU 
Affairs – Directorate 
for Political Affairs  
2 90 min. 
Cagri Cakir Coordinator 
Ministry for EU 
Affairs – Directorate 
for Political Affairs  
2 45 min. 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Table 1: Qualitative interviews – some details 
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APPENDIX 2 – ONLINE SURVEY 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
64%
33%
3%
18-35 36-55 56-75
53%
47%
Male Female
57%
40%
3%
Turkish EU Member State Outside Europe
Source: Online Survey 
Source: Online Survey 
Source: Online Survey 
Figure 2: Respondents’ Age 
Figure 3: Respondents’ Gender 
Figure 4: Respondents’ Nationality 
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40%
37%
23%
Bachelor's Master's PhD's
29%
39%
7%
3%
7%
4%
11%
Turkish University
European University
Turkish Ministry
Economic/Business
EU Delegation to Turkey
Turkish NGO
Source: Online Survey 
Source: Online Survey 
Figure 6: Respondents’ Affiliation 
Figure 5: Respondents’ Education 
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Source: Abridged by the author from the original: Bühlmann, et al., 2007: 47-51 
Table 4: Democratic principles, Partial Regimes, Functions and Components 
APPENDIX 3 – DEMOCRACY (CONCEPT) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rule of Law Accountability Responsiveness Freedom Equality  
+     Effective 
+ +    Responsible 
+ + +   Legitimate 
+ +  +  Free 
+ + +  + Egalitarian 
+ + + + + Perfect 
Principles Partial Regimes Functions Components 
Equality Political Rights 
Participation Equal rights to participate 
Responsiveness 
Freedom to associate 
Freedom of opinion 
Transparency Open public sphere 
Freedom Civil Rights 
Liberty Individual rights 
Rule of Law 
Equality before the law 
Equal access to the courts 
Control 
Electoral Regime 
Vertical 
Accountability 
Free and fair elections/votes 
Representation 
Universal active suffrage 
Universal passive suffrage 
Horizontal  
Accountability 
Constraint of 
executive autonomy 
Checks and balances 
Independence of the 
judiciary 
Rule of law constraint 
Effective power  
to govern 
Governmental 
autonomy 
National territorial 
dimension 
National functional 
dimension 
Global dimension 
Source: Morlino, 2002: 20 
 
“The ‘plus’ signs indicate a high presence of the dimension listed at the top of 
each respective column. This figure illustrates the various models of good 
democracy, making evident the possible transition from one result to another.” 
Morlino, 2002: 20 
Table 3: Liberal Democracy’s Degrees according to Leonardo Morlino 
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Source: Schedler, 1998 
Figure 10: Democratic Consolidation 
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Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Table 5: Mechanisms of external diffusion: Fossati vs Magen & Morlino 
APPENDIX 4 – MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY DIFFUSION 
 
 
 
 
  
Mechanisms of external democratic diffusion 
Fossati (2010) Morlino & Magen (2009) 
 Inertial emulation 
 Contagion (spontaneous) 
 Convergence (intentional) 
 Control 
 Direct (military intervention) 
 Indirect (military assistance) 
 Political conditionality (sanctions) 
 Rewards (to democratising states) 
   
 
 Control (military) 
 Conditionality (positive and negative) 
 Socialisation 
 Emulation/Example 
Figure 11: Radaelli’s Mechanisms of Europeanisation 
Source: Radaelli, 2000 
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APPENDIX 5 – MODELS’ COMPARISON 
 
 
                                                          
124 Cruz presents what he believes to be the modern characterisation of the European type of democracy. 
125 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (cfr. Beetham, et al., 2008) 
126 Includes: participation, responsiveness and transparency. 
127 Includes: individual freedoms and the rule of law. 
 Bühlman, et al., 
2007 
Bühlmann, et 
al., 2012 
Morlino, 2002 Cruz, 2005124 
Magen & Morlino, 
2009 
IDEA125 Proposed model 
D
im
en
si
o
n
s/
R
eg
im
es
/F
u
n
ct
io
n
s 
Political rights126 Transparency Responsiveness Political Rights Rule of Law Participation Political Rights 
Civil rights127 Participation Equality Rule of Law Participation Authorisation Social Rights 
Vertical 
Accountability 
Representation Rule of Law Electoral Rights Competition Representation Rule of Law 
Representation Rule of Law Freedom 
Democratic Control 
of the institutions 
Electoral 
Accountability 
Account ability Civil Rights 
Horizontal 
Accountability 
Individual 
Liberties 
Accountability 
Economic and 
Social democracy 
Inter-institutional 
Accountability 
Transparency Economic Rights 
Effective power to 
govern 
Public Sphere   Responsiveness Responsiveness 
Horizontal 
Accountability 
 Competition   Freedom Solidarity 
Vertical 
Accountability 
 
Mutual 
Constraints 
  Equality/Solidarity  Responsiveness 
 
Government 
capability 
     
Table 8: Conception of democracy by different authors 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Source Indicator 
Origi. 
Scale 
Geogr. 
Origin 
No. 
year
s 
Obs.  
CIRI Disappearance 0-2 America All 
0-frequent;1-occasional;2-never 
Disappearances politically motivated. 
1 
CIRI Extrajudicial killings 0-2 America All 
0-frequent;1-occasional;2-never 
Killings with no process of law; police abuse. 
2 
CIRI Political Imprisonment 0-2 America All 
0-frequent;1-occasional;2-never 
Imprisonment politically motivated (opposition to govt., non-violent actions) 
3 
CIRI Torture 0-2 America All 0-frequent;1-occasional;2-never 4 
CIRI 
Freedom of Assembly and 
Association 
0-2 America All 
0-severely restricted or denied to all groups;1-restricted or denied to some groups;2-virtually 
unrestricted 
5 
CIRI 
Freedom of Foreign 
Movement 
0-2 America All 
0-severely restricted; 1-somewhat restricted; 2-unrestricted 
Freedom to leave and return to the country 
6 
CIRI Freedom of Speech 0-2 America All 0-complete censorship; 1-some censorship; no censorship 7 
CIRI Electoral Self-Determination 0-2 America All 
0-inexistant; 1-limited; 2-free and open. 
Free and fair elections 
8 
CIRI Freedom of Religion 0-2 America All 
0-severe restrictions; 1-moderate restrictions; 2-almost no restrictions 
Freedom to practice religion 
9 
CIRI Worker’s Rights 0-2 America All 0-severely restricted; 1-somewhat restricted; 2-fully protected 10 
CIRI Women’s Economic Rights 0-3 America All 
0-no rights; 1-some rights; 2-some rights effectively enforced; 3- all rights guaranteed and 
enforced. 
Job security, non-discrimination, equal pay, etc. 
11 
CIRI Women’s Political Rights 0-3 America All 
0-no rights; 1-some rights; 2-some rights effectively enforced; 3- all rights guaranteed and 
enforced. 
Right to vote, to run for office, etc. 
12 
CIRI Women’s Social Rights 0-3 America 7 
0-no rights; 1-some rights; 2-some rights effectively enforced; 3- all rights guaranteed and 
enforced. 
Right to education, divorce, equality in marriage, etc. 
13 
CIRI Independence of the 0-2 America All 0-not independent; 1-partially independent; 2-generally independent. 14 
APPENDIX 6 – PROPOSED MODEL 
Table 9: Sources’ Assessment 
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Judiciary 
DB 
Constitutional Provisions for 
fair organisation of court 
system 
-1-2 Europe 9 
-1: Constitution allows civilians to be judged in military courts; 0: Constitution does not 
specify a ban on exceptional courts; 1: Constitution provides a ban, but vaguely; 2: 
Constitution provides a ban fully. 
No exceptional courts + well structuring of judicial system’s hierarchy 
15 
DB 
Constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing a public trial 
0-2 Europe 9 
0: Not mentioned in the Constitution; 1: Mentioned, but with exceptions; 2: Explicitly 
mentioned in the Constitution. 
16 
DB 
Independence of the 
Judiciary 
1-7 Europe 9 
"The judiciary in your country is independent 
and not subject to interference by the government and/or parties to the dispute." 
1: "Strongly disagree" to 7: "strongly agree". 
17 
DB 
Confidence in the legal 
system 
0-100 Europe 9 1: Low confidence; 100: High confidence. 18 
DB Confidence in the police 0-100 Europe 9 1: Low confidence; 100: High confidence. 19 
DB Freedom of Association 0-2 Europe 9 
0: not mentioned in Constitution nor binding treaty; 1: mentioned with reservations; 2: 
mentioned with no reservations or binding treaty. 
20 
DB Freedom of Assembly 0-2 Europe 9 
0: not mentioned in Constitution nor binding treaty; 1: mentioned with reservations; 2: 
mentioned with no reservations or binding treaty. 
21 
DB Trade Union density 0-100 Europe 9 0: low density; 100: high density. 22 
DB 
Membership in 
Humanitarian Organisations 
0-100 Europe 9 % of the respondents that are members of/ active in humanitarian organisations. 23 
DB Freedom of Speech 0-2 Europe 9 
0: not mentioned in Constitution nor binding treaty; 1: mentioned with reservations; 2: 
mentioned with no reservations or binding treaty. 
24 
DB Freedom of the Press 0-2 Europe 9 
0: not mentioned in Constitution nor binding treaty; 1: mentioned with reservations; 2: 
mentioned with no reservations or binding treaty. 
25 
DB Number of newspapers ≥0 Europe 9 Number of (paid and free) newspaper titles per 1 million inhabitants. 26 
DB 
Neutral/Independent 
newspapers’ circulation 
0-100 Europe 9 
Share of neutral / independent newspapers' circulation (weighted by frequency of publication) 
of a country's total newspaper circulation in % 
27 
DB 
Checks and balances 
(legislative and executive 
powers) 
0-100 Europe 9 0: unbalanced checks; 100: balanced checks. 28 
DB 
Balance between 
government and opposition 
0-1 Europe 9 
0: government or opposition controls the legislature; 1: full balance between government and 
opposition. 
29 
DB 
Confidence in the 
government 
0-100 Europe 9 0: Low confidence; 100: High confidence. 30 
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DB Governmental stability 0-100 Europe 9 0: low stability; 100: high stability = a government does not change in the legislative period. 31 
DB 
Political interference by the 
military 
0-6 Europe 9 0: high risk of interference; 6: low risk of interference. 32 
DB 
Political interference by 
religion 
0-6 Europe 9 0: high risk of interference; 6: low risk of interference. 33 
DB 
Effective implementation of 
government decisions. 
0-10 Europe 9 0: low implementation; 10: high implementation. 34 
DB 
Disclosure rules for 
contributions to political 
parties 
0-1 Europe 9 0: no provision for disclosure of income; 1: rules on disclosure of income. 35 
DB 
Corruption within the 
political system 
0-6 Europe 9 0: high risk; 6: low/no risk. 36 
DB 
Restriction of freedom of 
Information 
0-3 Europe 9 
0: no freedom of information legislation; 1: high restrictions; 2: considerable restrictions; 3: 
no restrictions. 
37 
DB 
Effectiveness of Freedom of 
Information 
0-4 Europe 9 
0: no legislation;1: Low effectiveness; 2: Quite considerable effectiveness; 3: Considerable 
effectiveness; 4: High effectiveness. 
38 
DB 
Legal Environment of Press 
Freedom 
0-30 Europe 9 0: best environment; 30: worst environment. 39 
DB 
Political Environment of 
Press Freedom 
0-30 Europe 9 
0: best environment; 30: worst environment. 
Political control over the media. 
40 
DB 
Transparency of government 
policy 
0-10 Europe 9 
0: “The government does not often communicate its intentions successfully”; 10: “The 
government is transparent towards citizens”. 
41 
DB 
Registered voters as a 
percentage of voting age 
population. 
0-100 Europe 9 % of registered voters in relation to voting age population 42 
DB 
Facilitation of electoral 
participation 
0-5 Europe 9 
0: voters can vote at specific polling station only; 1: voters can vote everywhere in the 
same district; 2: voters can vote everywhere in the country. Additional points (+1) if absentee 
ballot 
is possible; (+1) if there are mobile polling stations; (+1) if there is a 
possibility to vote in advance. 
43 
DB 
Participation rate in % of 
registered electorate 
0-100 Europe 9 % of registered electorate that votes 44 
DB 
Practice of non-
institutionalized 
participation – petitions 
0-100 Europe 9 % of respondents that indicated having signed petitions 45 
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DB 
Practice of non-
institutionalized 
participation – 
demonstrations 
0-100 Europe 9 % of respondents that indicated having participated in legal demonstrations 46 
DB 
Congruence between 
distribution of left/right 
positions among voters and 
distribution of 
left/right positions among 
members of parliament 
0-100 Europe 9 0: complete congruence; 100: complete incongruence. 47 
DB 
Proportion of female 
representatives in the 
parliament 
0-100 Europe 9 % of all seats 48 
EFW Judicial Independence 1-7 America 10 1: heavily influenced; 7: entirely independent. 49 
EFW Impartial courts 1-7 America 10 1: inefficient and subject to manipulations; 7: efficient, clear and neutral processes. 50 
EFW Military Interference 0-10 America 10 0: high interference; 10: low interference. 51 
EFW 
Integrity of the Legal 
System 
0-10 America 10 
0: Low impartiality of the legal system and low observance of the law; 10: High impartiality 
of the legal system and high observance of the law 
52 
FH Civil Liberties 1-7 America 10 1-2,5: Free; 3-5,5: Partly Free; 6-7: Not Free. 53 
FH Political Rights 1-7 America 10 1-2,5: Free; 3-5,5: Partly Free; 6-7: Not Free. 54 
FH Press Freedom Score 0-100 America 9 0-30: Free media; 31-60: partly free media; 61-100: not free media. 55 
TI 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index 
0-10 Europe 6 0: highly clean; 10: highly corrupt. 56 
OECD 
Public Expenditure on 
Health 
0-100 Global 9 % of GDP 57 
OECD Employment rate 0-100 Global All % of active labour force 58 
OECD Unemployment rate 0-100 Global All % of active labour force 59 
OECD Employment Rate of Women 0-100 Global 10 Share of employed women 60 
AI Political Terror scale 1-5 Global All 
1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is 
rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 5: Terror has expanded to the whole 
population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with 
which they pursue personal or ideological goals. 
61 
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USDS Political Terror scale 1-5 America All 
1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is 
rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 5: Terror has expanded to the whole 
population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with 
which they pursue personal or ideological goals. 
62 
UN Education Index 0-1 Global 6 
One of the three indices on which the Human Development Index is built. It is based on mean 
years of schooling (of adults) and expected years of schooling (of children). 
63 
UN Human Development Index 0-1 Global 6  64 
WB Voice and Accountability 
-2,5 - 
2,5 
Global 9 
-2,5: weak governance performance; 2,5: strong governance performance. 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media. 
65 
WB Political Stability 
-2,5 - 
2,5 
Global 9 
Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown 
by unconstitutional or violent means. 
66 
WB Government Effectiveness 
-2,5 - 
2,5 
Global 9 
Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
67 
WB Regulatory quality 
-2,5 - 
2,5 
Global 9 
Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
68 
WB Rule of Law 
-2,5 - 
2,5 
Global 9 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
69 
WB Control of Corruption 
-2,5 - 
2,5 
Global 9 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites 
and private interests. 
70 
WEF Public Trust in Politicians 1-7 Global 4 1: very low; 7: very high. 71 
WEF Reliability of police services 1-7 Global 4 1: cannot be relied upon at all; 7: can be completely relied upon 72 
WEF 
Quality of the educational 
system 
1-7 Global 4 1: not good at all; 7: very good 73 
WEF 
Global Competitiveness 
Index 
1-7 Global 4 1: not good at all; 7: very good 74 
WEF 
Macroeconomic 
Environment 
1-7 Global 4 1: not good at all; 7: very good 75 
Eurostat Hospital Beds >0 Europe 10 No. Per 100 000 inhabitants 76 
Eurostat Public Expenditure on 0-100 Europe 7 % of GDP 77 
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Education 
Eurostat Total R&D Expenditure  Europe All % of GDP 78 
Eurostat 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Intensity 
0-100 Europe 8 % of GDP 79 
Eurostat GDP/capita growth 
-100-
100 
Europe All % change on previous period 80 
EBT Trust in the government 0-100 Europe 6 % of respondents that tend to trust in the institution 81 
EBT Trust in the Parliament 0-100 Europe 6 % of respondents that tend to trust in the institution 82 
EBT Trust in the political parties 0-100 Europe 6 % of respondents that tend to trust in the institution 83 
EC Infant Mortality Rate 0-1000 Europe 10 deaths of children under one year of age per 1000 live births 84 
EC Early School Leavers 0-100 Europe 10 
Share of population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary 
education and not in further education or training 
85 
Legend: 
CIRI:    Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset 
DB:      Democracy Barometer 
FH:       Freedom House 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
AI:        Amnesty International 
USDS:  United States, Department of State 
UN:       United Nations 
Source: Author’s Elaboration 
(Cf. Weblinks on the next page) 
WB:   World Bank 
EST:   Eurostat 
EBT:  Eurobarometer 
EC:     European Commission 
WEF:  World Economic Forum 
TI:      Transparency International 
EFW:  Economic Freedom of the World 
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All the sources indicated above and whose data has been used in the model can be 
found in the following weblinks: 
 
 CIRI (Indicators 1 to 14): http://www.humanrightsdata.org/  
 Democracy Barometer (15-48):   http://www.democracybarometer.org/dataset_en.html 
 Economic Freedom of the World (49-52): http://www.freetheworld.com/reports.html  
 Freedom House (53-55): http://www.freedomhouse.org/  
 Transparency International (56): http://www.transparency.org/country  
 OECD (57-60): http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 AI + USDS (61-62): http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/  
 UN (63-64):  http://hdr.undp.org/en 
 World Bank (65-70): http://data.worldbank.org/  
 World Economic Forum (71-75):  http://www.weforum.org/reports 
 Eurostat (76-80): 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database 
 Eurobarometer (81-83): http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm  
 European Commission (84-85): http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-
and-progress-report/  
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Table 10: Indicators’ distribution 
 
D
em
o
c
ra
cy
 
 
Dimension Attribute Indicator Source 
E
q
u
a
li
ty
 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
R
ig
h
ts
 
Freedom of Assembly and 
Association 
CIRI 
Electoral Self-Determination CIRI 
Women’s Political Rights CIRI 
Freedom of Association Democracy Barometer 
Freedom of Assembly Democracy Barometer 
Disclosure rules for 
contributions to political 
parties 
Democracy Barometer 
Congruence between left and 
right 
Democracy Barometer 
Political Rights Freedom House 
S
o
ci
a
l 
R
ig
h
ts
 
Worker’s Rights CIRI 
Women’s Social Rights CIRI 
Trade Union Density Democracy Barometer 
Public Expenditure on 
Health 
OECD 
Education Index UN 
HDI UN 
Hospital Beds Eurostat 
Public Expenditure on 
Education 
Eurostat 
Infant Mortality Rate European Commission 
Early School Leavers European Commission 
Quality of the educational 
system 
World Economic Forum 
F
re
ed
o
m
 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 R
ig
h
ts
 
Women’s Economic Rights CIRI 
Employment rate OECD 
Unemployment rate OECD 
Employment rate of Women OECD 
Macroeconomic 
Environment 
World Economic Forum 
Global Competitiveness 
Index 
World Economic Forum 
GDP/capita growth Eurostat 
Expenditure on R&D Eurostat 
Foreign Direct Investment Eurostat 
C
iv
il
 R
ig
h
ts
 Politically motivated 
disappearances 
CIRI 
Political Imprisonment  CIRI 
Torture CIRI 
Freedom of Foreign 
Movement 
CIRI 
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Freedom of Religion CIRI 
Freedom of Speech CIRI 
Freedom of Speech Democracy Barometer 
Freedom of the press Democracy Barometer 
Number of newspapers Democracy Barometer 
Neutral newspapers’ 
circulation 
Democracy Barometer 
Restriction of Freedom of 
Information 
Democracy Barometer 
Effectiveness of Freedom of 
Information 
Democracy Barometer 
Legal Environment of Press 
Freedom 
Democracy Barometer 
Political Environment of 
press freedom 
Democracy Barometer 
Membership in 
Humanitarian Organisations 
Democracy Barometer 
Civil Liberties Freedom House 
Press Freedom Score Freedom House 
Political Terror Scale Amnesty International 
Political Terror Scale US State’s Department 
R
u
le
 o
f 
L
a
w
 
Extrajudicial killings CIRI 
Independence of the 
judiciary 
CIRI 
Constitutional Provisions for 
fair organisation of court 
system 
Democracy Barometer 
Constitutional Provisions 
guaranteeing public trial 
Democracy Barometer 
Independence of the 
judiciary 
Democracy Barometer 
Confidence in the legal 
system 
Democracy Barometer 
Confidence in the police Democracy Barometer 
Corruption within the 
political system 
Democracy Barometer 
Transparency of government 
policy 
Democracy Barometer 
Judicial independence 
Economic Freedom of 
the World 
Impartial courts 
Economic Freedom of 
the World 
Integrity of the legal system 
Economic Freedom of 
the World 
Corruption Perception Index 
Transparency 
International 
Rule of Law World Bank 
Control of corruption World Bank 
Reliability of police services World Economic Forum 
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C
o
n
tr
o
l 
H
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
 Checks and balances Democracy Barometer 
Balance between the 
government and the 
opposition 
Democracy Barometer 
Political interference by the 
military 
Democracy Barometer 
Political interference by 
religion 
Democracy Barometer 
Military interference 
Economic Freedom of 
the World 
Regulatory Quality World Bank 
V
er
ti
ca
l 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
 
Registered voters as % 
voting 
Democracy Barometer 
Facilitation of electoral 
participation 
Democracy Barometer 
Participation rate of 
registered 
Democracy Barometer 
Participation in petitions Democracy Barometer 
Participation in 
demonstrations 
Democracy Barometer 
Proportion of female 
representatives in Parliament 
Democracy Barometer 
Voice and Accountability World Bank 
R
es
p
o
n
si
v
en
es
s 
Confidence in the 
government 
Democracy Barometer 
Governmental stability Democracy Barometer 
Effective implementation of 
government decisions 
Democracy Barometer 
Government Effectiveness World Bank 
Political stability World Bank 
Trust in the government Eurobarometer 
Trust in the national 
Parliament 
Eurobarometer 
Trust in political parties Eurobarometer 
Public Trust in Politicians World Economic Forum 
 
Source: Author’s Elaboration 
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14
34
4
3
4
6
5
5
3
7
CIRI
Democracy Barometer
Economic Freedom of the World
Freedom House
OECD
World Bank
World Economic Forum
Eurostat
Eurobarometer
Others (<=2)
53%
26%
21%
Europe America Global
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Elaboration 
Source: Author’s Elaboration 
Figure 13: Indicators’ geographic distribution 
Figure 14: Number of indicators by source 
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APPENDIX 7 –  EU PROGRESS REPORTS 
Table 12: EU’s Annual Progress Reports Analysis 
Year Field Page 
Progress 
Comments 
P SP LP NP NM 
1999 
Democracy and RoL 9-10     X - amendment to Political Parties Law (more difficult to close party) 
The Parliament 9     X 
- no change; its powers are respected; 
- 10% threshold = non-representation of 5 million votes 
The Executive 9     X 
- “no particular development” 
- new selection process for civil servants = to avoid corruption 
Judicial System 9 X     
- adoption of amendments to remove military judges from State Security 
Courts; 
- draft of Penal Code (limiting death penalty) 
- draft law to facilitate the prosecution of public officers 
- draft law to amend Code of Criminal Procedure: protection of witnesses, 
genetic analysis, etc. 
- government intention to train judges and prosecutors in HR 
Anti-Corruption 10    X  - no legislation introduced 
NSC / CMR 10     X - military still influence political process 
HR and protect. min. 10-14   X   
- HR under observation of Council of Europe 
- several important Conventions not signed yet 
Civil and Pol. Rights 11-13 X     
- still exist: torture, disappearances and extra-judicial executions 
- impunity of law enforcement officials 
- “The situation described in the last Regular Report has therefore not 
substantially changed. Nevertheless, Turkey has taken some steps that 
clearly go in the right direction” 
- reduced the duration of police custody  
- new regulation on detention procedures 
- training courses for police already began 
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- improvements against torture in the amendments of Penal Code Articles 
(243, 245, 354) 
- freedom of expression: worrying 
- -: detentions on freedom of expression 
- prohibition of dissemination of an NGO’s report 
- freedom of the press: “situation has not substantially changed” 
- still reported cases of harassment and violence against journalists 
- conditions in prisons not improved 
- freedom of association and assembly: not changed; subject to limitations 
- freedom of religion: difference of treatment between minorities 
- women’s rights: improvement with lifting reservations to a UN 
Convention on Discrimination against Women 
- death penalty: subject of debate 
Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights 14    X  - no particular development 
Minority Rights 14   X   
- progress on Kurdish issue not made 
- broadcasting in Kurdish officially not allowed 
- emergency status active in 6 provinces 
- government intended to support socio-economic development of SE 
- right of asylum: positive changes in legislation 
Chapter 23 --------- --- --- ---   ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chapter 24 36-38     X 
- immigration: increased number of people illegally transiting in Turkey 
(destination is Western Europe) 
- need to merge the control of all borders in the same unit 
- crimes against public order increased 
- Parliament adopted law to combat organised crime (brings Turkey closer 
to EU acquis) 
- signed several international agreements regarding fight against 
organised crime and drug trafficking 
- need to devote attention on drug trafficking; Turkey is a “major 
trafficking center” 
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General Evaluation 46-47     X 
-“Recent developments confirm that, although the basic features of a democratic 
system exist in Turkey, it still does not meet the Copenhagen political criteria. 
There are serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of 
minorities. Torture is not systematic but is still widespread and freedom of 
expression is regularly restricted by the authorities. The National Security 
Council continues to play a major role in political life. Although there have been 
some improvements in terms of the independence of the judiciary the emergency 
courts system remains in place. In recent months there have been some more 
encouraging signs of democratisation. The government and Parliament have 
worked to adopt some keys laws regulating political life, the justice system and 
protection of human rights.” (p. 46) 
2000 
Democracy and RoL 12-14     X 
- Constitution needs to be revised, namely regarding freedom of 
expression; 
- Committee already working on it. 
The Parliament 12   X   
- Powers continue to be respected; 
- Opposition plays a part in its activities. 
The Executive 12 X     
- +: internal coordination on EU matters 
- created the General Secretariat for EU Affairs 
 
Public Administration  12    X   
Judicial System 12-13   X   
- +: increasing number of judges and prosecutors; 
- no measures to improve efficiency; 
- long duration of judicial procedures; 
- +: adoption of the law on the prosecution of civil servants; 
- Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure still to be adopted; 
- No changes on State Security Courts; 
- Need to change legislation on the restoration of the rights of convicted; 
- No changes on modernisation of the legal provisions sanctions to young 
offenders; 
- +: several programmes to train judges; but further efforts required. 
Anti-Corruption 14   X   - Issue is in the agenda; 
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- still a widespread practise; 
- some conventions not signed. 
NSC / CMR 14    X  
- Civilian control needs to be improved. 
- Chief of General Staff accountable to P-M 
- No change in the role of the NSC – still interfere in politics 
- Little accountability to Parliament 
HR and protect. min. 14-20     X 
-Aug/2000: signed 2 important Covenants 
- Still some other HR instruments not acceded yet 
- HR still under observance by Council of Europe (no report yet) 
Civil and Pol. Rights 15-18   X   
- problems identified in the last report, mostly unchanged 
- death penalty not abolished yet 
- torture and ill treatment: largely unchanged (still complaints, light 
penalties, etc.) 
- +: HR education included in the curricula of police academies; 
- prison conditions: cause of concern (clashes, ill-treatment); 
- authorities in the process of restructuring the prison system; 
- serious problem of freedom of expression in political sphere (legislation 
leads room for interpretation that violates that freedom; 
- freedom of the media: 40 journalists in prison; several TV and radio 
suspended; 
- freedom of association and assembly: not fully respected – NGOs 
activities need official permission; forbidden from associating with other 
NGOs; are subject to pressures or are closed down;  
- major efforts required to improve freedoms of association and assembly; 
- freedom of religion: some signs of increased tolerance towards non-
Muslims; 
- approach to Alevis kept unchanged; there should be an open debate. 
Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights 18-19   X   
- +: change to allow parents to freely choose their children’s name; 
- however, not implemented; some personnel do not accept them; 
- problems remain with use of some minorities’ languages (broadcasting 
416 
 
or education); 
- gender disparity still high (legal discriminations; higher rates of illiterate 
women, honour killings, etc.); 
- still difficulties regarding trade unions and right to strike; 
- still problems regarding children’s rights and labour. 
Minority rights 19-20      
- important conventions not signed; 
- there still is denial of some ethnic groups’ rights; 
- expression of pro-Kurdish thoughts is limited by the state; 
- state of emergency in several provinces and clashes with PKK; 
- further efforts required in respect to education, health and water supply. 
Chapter 23 --------- --- --- --- --- --- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chapter 24 63-64    X  
- “Compared to the situation in 1999 no major progress has been made” 
- data protection and visa policy: no progress; 
- migration and border control: started efforts to train staff + stimulate 
dialogue; 
- asylum: started efforts to train staff + equipment upgraded; 
- police cooperation: no developments; 
- fight against fraud and corruption: ratified OSCE Convention but none 
of the Council of Europe’s Conventions. 
- fights against drugs: no developments; 
- customs cooperation: no developments; 
- judicial cooperation: no developments. 
General Evaluation 70-72     X 
- “Overall, Turkey’s alignment with the community acquis in the areas 
covered by the Customs Union is most advanced. However, since the last 
regular report, progress in transposition of legislation in these areas has 
been limited. As a candidate country, Turkey has to start making 
substantial progress in alignment with the acquis in all other fields.” 
2001 
Democracy and RoL 15-19     X  
The Parliament 16     X 
- October: 34 Constitutional Amendments; 
- Parliament worked effectively; 
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- Broad party support; 
- -: unable to pass the law on parliamentary immunity; 
- between Oct 2000 and June 2001: 117 new laws adopted; 
- June 2001: CC dissolved Virtue Party – 2 other parties created (AKP 
and FP) 
The Executive 16     X 
- coalition in power for more than 2 years 
- President exercised his right of veto 
- General Secretariat for EU Affairs operational for a year (under 
responsibility of the Minister of State) 
- Secretariat is responsible for the implementation, coordination and 
monitoring of the NPAA 
- Established 9 inter-ministerial subcommittees (for the transposition and 
implementation of EU legislation) 
Judicial System 16-18     X 
- establishment of judges to analyse the complaints of prisoners; 
- set up 12 sections specialised in intellectual property rights; 
- created judicial sections dealing with consumer protection; 
- amendments regarding the State Security Courts entered into force (still 
some problems); 
- problems with military courts (sometimes involve civilians); 
- problems with the structure of juvenile courts; 
- still pressure on judges and prosecutors (namely in corruption cases) 
- Supreme Board of Judges and Prosec. Appointed by Minister of Justice, 
creating a problem of division of powers; 
- measures need to be incorporated in Tur’s legislation to repair 
consequences of convictions contrary to ECHR; 
- several courses to train judicial staff took place; 
- some initiatives have improved the judicial system’s efficiency. 
Anti-Corruption 18     X 
- some measures foreseen in the government programme; 
- some initiatives are being taken (to increase independence of banks, to 
liberalise energy market with transparency,...); 
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- started high-level anti-corruption investigations; 
- government created a committee on corruption to develop a strategy; 
- signed some conventions. 
NSC / CMR 19     X 
- no. of civilian members increased (5 to 9) against 5 military members; 
- emphasis on the advisory nature of the body; 
- government is required to evaluate the recommendations, rather than 
giving them “priority consideration” 
HR and protect. min. 19-30     X 
- amendments strengthened HR and freedoms 
-  limited the restrictions on fundamental rights 
- introduced the principle of proportionality 
- but some restrictions on freedoms remain 
- some other changes being finalised 
- signed Protocol 12 of ECHR, but no progress on other HR instruments 
- Eur Court of HR found Turkey violated ECHR in 127 cases 
- established several bodies for the enforcement of HR (HR Presidency; 
High HR Board; etc.) 
- police officers training on HR continues to be given 
Civil and Pol. Rights 21-27     X 
- death penalty only in terrorism activities; 
- still moratorium working on the postponement of the executions; 
- +: decided to publish the Council of Europe’s report on torture and mis-
treatment; 
- Ministry of Interior issued a circular to forbid the use of torture and ill-
treatment; 
- “In practice, the situation as regards torture and mistreatment has not 
improved since the last Regular Report and still gives serious grounds for 
concern.” – several cases of death and torture during detention; 
- no. of officials suspected of torture and ill-treatment increased, but 
sentences are too light; 
- reform of prison system – demonstrations and deaths due to 
disproportionate use of force; 
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- some measures have been adopted on prison reform; 
- Amnesty Law was adopted – decrease of 23% of detainees; 
- freedom of expression: needed more laws to give content to the 
constitutional amendments; 
- still several problems in relation to the exercise of freedom of expression 
(articles 159 and 312 used to limit this freedom); 
- there are around 9000 prisoners for crimes related to freedom of 
expression (journalists, writers, intellectuals,...); 
- freedom of the press: needed more concrete laws to give content to the 
amendments; 
- some companies had to suspend their activities and books were seized; 
- it was forbidden the broadcasting of portraying Turkey in “a state of 
weakness”; 
- field of broadcasting: needed more concrete laws to give content to the 
amendments; 
- implementation of existing law = concern; 
- freedom of association and assembly: amended with some minor 
improvements; 
- function of NGOs still controlled by state – sometimes object to 
harassment and intimidation; 
- political parties: more proportionate sanctions defined, but reasons for 
banning them unchanged; 
- in June 2001: Faziet Party was banned due to anti-secular activities 
(supported by the Eur Court of HR); 
- freedom of religion: increased signs of tolerance towards some non-
Muslim minorities; 
- some official positions more friendly towards them; 
- but still difficult to own property for Christian churches, for ex.; 
- no improvement in the situation of non-Sunni Muslim communities; 
Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights 27-29     X - several amendments improved theses rights (right to work, gender 
420 
 
equality, trade unions); 
- children’s rights: ratified conventions; 
- trade unions: more rights; 
- cultural rights: abolished prohibition to use other languages, but there is 
still missing protection for those who want to use them; 
- not improved for Armenians, Jews and Greeks (terms of education or 
broadcasting); 
- honour killings – concern. 
Minority rights 29-30     X 
- “there has been no improvement in the ability of members of ethnical 
groups with a cultural identity and common traditions to express their 
linguistic and cultural identity” 
- some conventions not signed; 
- some positive initiatives towards the Roma; 
- celebrations of Kurdish New Year banned in some cities. 
Chapter 23 --------- 
---
- 
---
- 
---
- 
--- --- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chapter 24 81-86   X   
- “Some progress has been achieved over the past year.” 
- data protection: no progress; 
- Shengen: no progress; 
- borders control: begun cooperation between different ministries + some 
measures; 
- migration: begun bilateral negotiations with several countries; several 
readmission agreements signed;  
- training sessions to prevent illegal border crossing; 
- concerns about illegal migrant flows (increasing); 
- no progress on ratifying conventions; 
- some improvement on asylum policies; 
- fight against organised crime: cooperation with Greece;  
- signed conventions on fight against fraud and corruption;  
- drugs: established an Academy against Drugs and Organised Crime + 
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some successful operations; 
- money laundering: signed some conventions; 
- judicial co-operation in criminal and civil matters: no progress. 
General Evaluation 93-96     X 
“Turkey's alignment with the acquis is most advanced in the areas 
covered by the Customs Union. Since the last Regular Report, further 
alignment has taken place in these areas. (...)Major discrepancies between 
the acquis and Turkish legislation have remained. Progress in 
strengthening administrative capacity to implement the acquis has been 
limited. (...)The Accession Partnership with Turkey was adopted in March 
2001 and Turkey has made substantial preparatory efforts for its 
implementation. . Turkey gained greater understanding of the acquis and 
the government has started an intensive process of preparation of new 
legislation.” 
2002 
Democracy and RoL 18-25 - - - - - --- 
The Parliament 18-19     X 
- adopted 45 new laws (include a new Civil Code with 1030 articles) + 3 
reform packages to implement the 2001 constitutional amendments; 
- changed its internal regulation to increase its efficiency; 
- Parliamentary Committee resumed its activities. 
The Executive 19-20     X 
- some differences have emerged between the coalition partners; 
- some MPs resigned – minority government in power; 
- President vetoed several laws, namely the increase in salaries if MPs; 
- public administration: efforts to improve the quality of the staffing; 
- action plan on transparency and good governance in the public sector; 
- General Secretariat for EU Affairs reinforced its role in the 
implementation of the NPAA and the pre-accession strategy. 
Judicial System 20-23     X 
- some changes; 
- new Civil Code adopted and entered into force; 
- State Security courts continue to work, but with differences (ex: fraud 
and organised crime do not fall into its competence; detainees are granted 
more rights) – but they still need to align with European practices; 
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- duration of judicial proceedings still long; 
- no progress in the establishment of intermediate courts of appeal; 
- some articles of the Penal Code used inconsistently, originating lack of 
clarity, transparency and legal certainty; 
- extension of Juvenile Courts, but slower than planned; 
- some reports: judiciary does not act independently and consistently; 
- concern: jurisdiction of military courts over civilians; 
- training programmes have continued. 
Anti-Corruption 23-24     X 
- remains a serious problem; 
- government has pursued anti-corruption measures; 
- created courts specialised in corruption; 
- transparency in political campaigns to be improved with the amendment 
of the political parties law; 
- some conventions not signed; 
- +: strategy to enhance transparency and good governances, but 
implementation should be taken into consideration as well. 
NSC / CMR 24-25     X 
- NSC formally an advisory board; 
- in practice, still influential; 
- military members frequently express their opinion on several political 
issues; 
- Armed forces – high degree of autonomy in establishing the defence 
budget; 
- introduction of civilians in the NSC did not change the way it operates. 
HR and protect. min. 25-43     X 
- international conventions on HR: some progress (several not signed yet); 
- reduced the pre-trial detention period in provinces under emergency to a 
four days; 
- concern: Tur’s failure to execute the judgment of Eur Court HR; 
- enforcement of HR: efforts to strengthen the mechanisms + increase the 
dialogue with civil society; 
- there are HR Boards in 81 provinces to lead work on the field 
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(awareness campaigns, people’s complaints, etc.) – not all operational yet; 
all of them meet monthly and report to the HR Presidency quarterly; some 
NGOs reluctant to participate due to the composition of the Boards that 
often include security forces’ personnel. 
Civil and Pol. Rights 28-40     X 
- death penalty abolished in peacetimes; 
- relatives of the detainees have to be informed about the detention; 
- -: often it is delayed the access to a lawyer; 
- some issues warned the officials to be vigilant against mistreatment; 
interrogation rooms cannot be painted in black and there cannot be a light 
projected onto the face of the accused during interrogation; 
- report shows improvement in conditions, but complaints still frequent; 
- no disappearances reported in 2002; 
- sentences for the accused of torture and ill-treatment are light; 
- reform of the prison system continued; some concerns regarding the 
conditions of isolation; 
- prisoners’ right to use telephone and receive visits is improving; 
- 140 enforcement judges were appointed (prisoners’ conditions, 
disciplinary punishments, etc.) 
- projects to facilitate the integration of former inmates; 
- in May 2002 there were 60327 persons in prison: 29514 convicted 
prisoners and 30813detainees; 
- freedom of expression: some changes with the reform package; 
- ex: abolished the fines for criticising Turkish Law; 
- but the word “intention” to insult institutions was kept and may be 
subject to several interpretations; 
- notion of incitement was added as an element of the offence; 
- introduced the notion of “propaganda in connection with terrorist 
organisations”; 
-  between January and May 2002: 40 books were banned or subject to 
investigation; 
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- one problems: interpretation of the law which is usually not consistent 
with the ECHR; 
- freedom of the press: fines for “terrorist propaganda” increased to 3 
billion Turkish Lira; 
- second reform package did not do much about the restrictions on 
freedom of the press; 
- Press Law continues to maintain restrictions on the freedom of the press; 
- broadcasting: first reform package: reduced the maximum closure period 
for radio and TVs for propaganda; 
- third reform package: allowed broadcasts in other languages; the 
problem was implementation; 
- narrowed the scope for bans on broadcasts; 
- re-transmission of foreign broadcasting became legal; 
- introduction of censorship of Internet content; 
- ex: TV channel was charged for broadcasting a Kurdish song; 
- freedom of association and assembly: with the 2nd reform package, lifted 
restrictions on contacts with foreign counterparts (organisations); 
- minimum age for an organiser of an association lowered from 21 to 18; 
- possibility for the authorities of exerting control over relations with 
international organisations was maintained; 
- still several restrictions on freedom of association; 
- 3rd reform package diminished the restrictions on freed. of association, 
but “discretionary powers for inspecting and auditing the facilities, books, 
accounts and transactions of the associations continue to be given to the 
authorities” (p. 36); 
- Amnesty International opened a branch in March; 
- civil society organisations became more active; 
- “the Civil Society Platform, which is made up of 175 civil society 
organisations, issued a notice urging politicians to commit themselves and 
take brave steps on the way to EU membership” (p. 36); 
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- NGOs conveyed the need for a closer relationship with the authorities; 
- 2nd reform package: public organisations gained the right to hold 
meetings and demonstrations; 
- 3rd reform package: participation of foreigners passed from the need of 
an “authorisation” to a mere “notification”; 
- yet, they require the identities, occupations, addresses and workplaces of 
the organising committees; 
- in practice remain several obstacles to hold marches and demonstrations; 
- amendment of article 101 made it harder to ban a political party; 
- freedom of religious: non-Muslim communities still feel many obstacles 
(no legal personality; lack of property rights, etc); 
-  their property rights were eased by the 3rd reform package; 
- remains the ban on training the clergy for religious minorities; usually 
have problems with residence and visa; 
- religious courses include descriptions of all religions, but these are said 
to be inaccurate and subjective;  
- no improvements in the status of Alevis. 
Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights 40-42     X 
- improved gender equality with the new Civil Code – no mention to the 
“head of the family”; 
- elimination of the ban that forbade women to wear trousers at work; 
- abolition of the requirement of virginity tests for applicants to the public 
nursing schools; 
- new Civil Code – more rights to children; 
- efforts to diminish juvenile efforts, but still 893000 children work in 
Turkey; 
- “no progress with the social and educational rights of disabled persons 
and legislation is not implemented properly”; 
- trade unions are subject to restrictions (freedom of association + right to 
strike); 
- some steps to grant social protection for unemployed; 
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- 3rd reform package allowed children to learn different languages and 
dialects;  
- before 3rd package: parents who named their children in Kurdish were 
prosecuted; a bus driver listening to Kurdish songs was suspended. 
Minority rights 42-43     X 
- “There has been limited improvement in practice in the ability of 
members of ethnic groups, with a cultural identity and common traditions, 
to express their linguistic and cultural identity.”; 
- some conventions not signed; 
- there is much prejudice against the Roma; 
- positive signs of cultural rights in the SE; 
- in SE, no bans on bands singing in Kurdish; 
- efforts continued to improve the situation of displaced people. 
Chapter 23 --------- --- --- --- --- --- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chapter 24 115-123  X    
- data protection: no progress; 
- visa policy: progress; 
- external borders: some improvements; 
- Schengen: some training activities; further changes; 
- migration: protocol on readmission between Tur and Greece ratified; 
- transit arrangements concluded with several member-states; 
- illegal migration flows continue to increase; 
- some progress regarding readmission (protocol with Greece + bilateral 
negotiations with other members); 
- increased number of staff working in borders; 
- established control checkpoints along borders; 
- more training of sniffer dogs for drug detection; 
- some conventions of illegal migration signed (not rarified); 
- asylum: a new strategy developed in accordance with the acquis; 
- training on asylum and refugees: successful; 
- fight against organised crime: amendments: greater penalties; 
- successful operations in the fight against trafficking; 
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- fight against terrorism: ratified Conventions;  
- fight against fraud and corruption: issued an Action Plan to combat 
corruption at the public and private levels; 
- drugs: revision of the national strategy is being completed; 
- money laundering: an unit concerned with the field; several cases 
opened; 
- judicial cooperation: with the new Civil and Civil Procedure Codes, 
State Security Courts’ jurisdiction was limited; 
- impartiality and independence of the judiciary: no progress; 
- creation of further juvenile courts: no developments;  
- HR: conventions ratified. 
General Evaluation 133-136      
- “Overall, Turkey has achieved a good degree of legislative alignment in 
the areas covered by the Customs Union, while in other areas this 
alignment is less advanced. Major discrepancies between the acquis and 
Turkish legislation remain. Administrative capacity needs to be 
strengthened. Considerable further efforts are needed.” (p. 134) 
- “In the field of justice and home affairs, efforts have been made to raise 
awareness on the legislation and practices of the EU, in particular in areas 
such as asylum and illegal migration. Further steps have been taken to 
strengthen the fight against organized crime, drugs trafficking and 
corruption. The legal basis for combating trafficking in human beings has 
been established. Alignment with the acquis has started, in particular on 
visa policy, but substantial further efforts are needed. The fight against 
illegal migration needs to be drastically strengthened.” (p. 136). 
2003 
Democracy and RoL 16-22 -- -- -- -- -- ----- 
The Parliament 16-17     X 
- elections in November, monitored by the European Parliament and the 
OSCE; 2 parties elected to the Parliament; 
- elections held in line with international standards + previous legal 
reforms improved framework for elections 
- adopted 2 Constitutional amendments: narrow the scope of the ban on 
428 
 
participation in elections to involvement in cases of terrorism + age limit 
for candidates lowered to 25; 
- President vetoed the first amendment but it was passed unchanged in the 
Parliament; 
- 143 new laws adopted apart from packages + ratified several 
conventions; 
- established Parliamentary Committee for EU integration, called EU 
Harmonisation Commission to check compliance of adopted laws with 
acquis; 
- Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights produced special reports on 
the human rights situation in the south-east. 
The Executive 17-18     X 
- single-party government took office in November; 
- led by Abdüllah Gül and then by Erdoğan; 
- programme: political reforms + plans to draw a new Constitution; 
- “The goal of EU accession has been amongst the government's main 
priorities. On several occasions, the government reiterated its 
commitment to fulfil the Copenhagen political” (p. 18); 
- established a Reform Monitoring Group (effective implementation of 
reforms; weekly meetings). 
NSC/CMR 18-19     X 
- “A number of fundamental changes have been made”; 
- confirmed the advisory nature of the NSC; 
- representative of the NSC removed from the Supervision Board of 
Cinema, Video and Music; 
- abolished the executive and supervisory powers of the NSC Secretary 
General; 
- post of Secretary General any longer reserved exclusively for a military; 
- frequency of the meetings: from once per month to once each two 
months; 
- new provisions to enhance transparency in defence expenditures; 
- the NSC and military exercise influence through informal means (media, 
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statements on political and social matters); 
- important that measures are effectively implemented. 
Judicial System 19-22     X 
- “A number of structural changes have been made which have helped to 
strengthen the efficiency of the judiciary” (p. 20); 
- established family courts; 
- allowed re-trial in civil and criminal cases in which the ECtHR has 
found violations; 
- age to be tried at Juvenile Courts raised from 15 to 18; 
- changes to ensure proper notification for the accused or the condemned; 
- Law on Forensic Medicine amended to accelerate judicial processes; 
- amendment ending military jurisdiction over civilians; 
- trial period in juvenile courts decreased; 
- number of judges and prosecutors increased from 9020 to 9162; 
- “in 2002 and 2003 1 132 judges and prosecutors were trained on the 
implementation of the new Civil Code adopted in November 2001, 731 on 
the harmonisation of laws with EU law, 4 594 on human rights, 350 on 
forensic medicine applications and 519 on criminal matters and human 
rights” (p.21) 
- “The judiciary plays an important role in the implementation of political 
reforms. Courts have started to apply the reforms.” (p. 21) 
- still signs of inconsistent use of articles of the Penal Code (freedom of 
expression); 
- establishment of intermediate courts of appeal: no progress; 
- reports that judiciary does not always act impartially and consistently 
(due to links between judiciary and the executive); 
- problems with processing of evidence; 
- State Security Courts: progresses, but still not in line with European 
standards. 
Anti-Corruption 
measures 
22-23  X    
- some progress, but still a serious problem; 
- conventions signed; 
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- legislation amended to criminalise bribery and money laundering; 
- established a parliamentary commission to study dimensions of 
corruption; 
- Action plan adopted in January, but many of its mechanisms not 
established yet. 
HR and protect. min. 23-41     X 
- 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th reform packages address several issues regarding HR 
and minorities’ protection; 
- international conventions on hr: progress, but some remain to be signed; 
- still problems with the execution of judgements of ECtHR; 
- not taken all measures necessary to address the violations of the right to 
freedom of expression; 
- allowed retrials of ECtHR decisions; 
- enforcement of HR: structure of boards and committees strengthened; 
- several projects for training on HR; 
- not ratified convention on discrimination by public authorities. 
Civil and Pol. Rights 26-36      
- death penalty: only in wartime; all sentences commuted to life 
imprisonment; 
- torture and ill-treatment: “zero tolerance” policy = reinforced legislation; 
- implementation led to some results, but some cases persist; 
- amendments: sentences for torture and ill-treatment not able to be 
suspended or converted into fine; 
- access to lawyer and health checks now guaranteed when prisoner 
returns for policy custody for investigation purposes; 
- circulars were distributed to the authorities to inform them of the 
legislation changes and asking for their implementation; 
- concern: punishment of perpetrators of torture and ill-treatment; 
- still some flaws regarding access to lawyers and medical treatment; 
- doctors under pressure not to reveal cases of torture; 
- reform of the prison system: “the general situation has improved 
considerably” (p. 28); 
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- Penal Code reformed: introduced new offences (ex. Prevent prisoners 
from being fed); 
-  number of “death fasts” diminished significantly with the reforms; 
- “as of 30 April 2003, there are 64173 persons in prisons and detention 
houses, of whom 32624 are convicted prisoners and 31549 are detainees.” 
(p.28); 
- lawyers and visitors having problems in meeting with prisoners + 
prisoners not receiving appropriate medical treatment; 
- freedom of expression: some restrictions have been lifted – some 
prisoners were released; 
- reduced penalties for insulting the state; 
- Amendments to the Cinema, Video and Music Works Law: narrowed 
the scope for suspending or banning works; 
- tendency to use alternative provisions of the Penal Code and of the Anti 
Terror Law to limit Freedom of Expression; 
- “interpretation and implementation of the amended legislation should be 
pursued in a consistent and systematic manner” (p. 30) 
- freedom of the press: some changes, but still concern; 
- amendment protects journalists from being forced to reveal the sources; 
- narrowed scope of motives to destroy publications; 
- implementation of amendments is not uniform – ex. Heavy penalties for 
authors that criticise state institutions and policies; 
- continued confiscation of publications; 
- censorship of internet content; 
- broadcasting: allowing broadcast in other languages with no concrete 
results; 
- continued heavy penalties on the grounds of separatist propaganda; 
- freedom of association: restrictions were eased, but several limitations; 
- difficulties in establishing an association on the basis of minority 
groups; 
432 
 
- confiscation needs the confirmation by a judge within 48 hours; 
- Turkish associations can open branches abroad or join international 
bodies; 
- in practice, “still experience considerable difficulties in cooperating 
with foreign associations and international bodies” (p. 32) 
- HR organisations had many court cases against them; 
- freedom of assembly: restrictions have been eased; 
- reduced the minimum time to request to hold a demonstration (48 to 
24h); 
- age limit to organise a demonstration reduced (21 to 18); 
- limited the possibility to postpone meetings; 
- cases of excessive force against demonstrators; 
- political parties: reforms to align with constitutional amendments; 
- possibility to impose sanctions rather than banning the party;  
- banning the party only in accordance with Constitutional principles; 
- freedom of religion: improvements in the property rights and 
construction of places of worship, but with limited effects; 
- non-Muslim communities with obstacles; 
- reform: possible to acquire properties only with the consent of the 
Directorate General of Foundations; 
- problem of confiscated properties not addressed yet; 
- the Directorate General of Foundations interferes in religious 
foundations; 
- 2001-2003: 406 foundations dissolved (ex. If elections are not held, they 
property confiscation may occur); 
- ban remains on the training of clergy for religious minorities; 
- Alevis: change: Union of Alevi and Bektashi Associations was granted 
legal status (it was banned). 
Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights 36-38      
- gender equality: increased sanctions for “honour killings”; 
- violence against women is widespread (>50% women subject to 
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violence within the family); 
- new Labour Law: equal treatment, but does not guarantee the 
prohibition of discrimination; 
- limited implementation of equal sharing of goods during marriage; 
- representation of women in elected bodies is low (24 women out of 550 
MPs); 
- rights of the child: age limit for child labour increased (12 to 15), but 
many children under 15 employed; 
- ratified European Convention; 
- trade unions: no progress; 
- cultural rights: some changes: broadcast in other languages; parents can 
name their children as they wish;  
- learning of different languages and dialects: no progress – applications 
to establish courses rejected. 
Minority rights 38-41      
- OSCE for the first time permitted to visit Turkey due to minorities but 
no dialogue followed the visit; 
- limited the right of ethnic minorities to enjoy their own culture;  
- electoral system (10% threshold) makes it harder for minorities to be 
represented at the Parliament; 
- “Minorities have been subject to certain discriminatory practices by the 
authorities” (p. 38); 
- history books induce the feeling of hostility towards minority groups; 
- religious minorities not recognised by Lausanne Treaty not allowed to 
establish schools; 
- strong prejudice against the Roma; 
- state of emergency lifted in the two remaining provinces – positive 
psychological effects, some clashes, but increasing security; 
- cultural manifestations were authorised; 
- situation of internally displaced people is critical – very poor conditions; 
- Implementation of the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project has 
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continued, but very slowly and inconsistently; 
- many landmines in the region caused causalities.  
Chapter 23 --------- --- --- --- --- --- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chapter 24 110-119      
- visa policy: continued with the alignment of the EU visa list; 
- Schengen: no development; 
- external borders: increased and upgraded infrastructures; adoption of the 
new strategy; 
- migration and asylum: strategy for alignment with the EU acquis; 
- new law regarding working permits – secondary legislation necessary; 
- Law on Turkish Nationality was amended to prevent marriages of 
Convenience; 
- illegal migration via Turkey has shown a decrease, as a result of the 
intensified efforts and initiatives targeting illegal migration; 
- readmission agreements: some progress; 
- improved conditions for asylum-seekers and refugees; 
- continued intensive training activities on asylum issues; 
- police cooperation and fight against organised crime: conventions 
signed; 
- new law on combating smuggling of goods; 
- legislative amendments are being implemented with more arrests and 
more serious penalties; 
- training on the new anti-trafficking legislation; 
- recommendations of the Task Force for the fight against trafficking were 
adopted by the Prime-Ministry as a National Action Plan (hotlines, 
shelters for victims, etc); 
- drugs trafficking: successful operations; 
- fight against terrorism: signed protocol; 
- fight against fraud and corruption: new legislation that introduced new 
offences at this level; 
- notified the OECD that it was ready to receive its examiners regarding 
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the 1997 Convention; 
- government announced an Emergency Action Plan (corruption and 
transparency); 
- fight against drugs: signed an agreement with the EU; 
- no progress regarding the completion of the national drug strategy; 
- money laundering: new regulation on customer identification; 
- number of reported cases increased significantly; 
- customs cooperation: continued upgrade in facilities and infrastructures; 
- judicial co-operation in criminal and civil matters: adopted a National 
Action Plan to implement the acquis; 
- improved cooperation in criminal matters; 
- created an organisation to train judges, public prosecutors and legal 
professions; 
- end of the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians; 
- HR instruments: some conventions signed. 
General Evaluation 128-131      
- “Turkey’s alignment has progressed in most areas but remains at an 
early stage for many chapters. It is most advanced in chapters related to 
the EC-Turkey Customs Union but in this respect it is not fully meeting 
its obligations. Alignment is also more advanced in areas where other 
international obligations exist which are similar to the acquis. Further 
legislative work is required in all areas, and Turkey should focus on 
implementing its National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, in 
line with the Accession Partnership priorities, more consistently across all 
chapters. Also, new legislation should not move away from the acquis.” 
(p. 128, 129); 
- “In many fields implementation is weak. Administrative capacity in 
different areas needs to be strengthened to ensure that the acquis is 
implemented and enforced effectively. In some cases, administrative 
reform should entail the establishment of new structures, for example in 
the field of state aid and regional development. Where new regulatory 
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bodies have been set up, their autonomy should be assured and they 
should be provided with sufficient staff and financial resources.” (p. 131) 
2004 
Democracy and RoL 19-29 - - - - - -- 
The Parliament 19-20      
- activities dominated by political and economic reform; 
- strong consensus between the government and the opposition on EU 
process; 
- several laws adopted; 
- October 2003 and July 2004: 261 new laws. 
The Executive 20-21      
- government is committed to meet the Copenhagen criteria; 
- government gave priority to opening the negotiations; 
- Secretariat General for EU Affairs continues coordinating the works, but 
concern that staff is not enough; 
- President used his veto power 8 times; 
- June and July: set of Laws adopted to improve the division between and 
the performance of the four levels of administration to promote a 
decentralized, participatory, transparent, responsive and accountable 
system. 
NSC / CMR 21-23      
- civilian control strengthened since 1999; 
- January 2004 a new regulation implementing previous legislative 
changes; 
- Secretariat General of the NSC purely consultative; 
- previous special funds now under control of the P-M; 
- staff reduction + abolition of some units; 
- August 2004: the first civilian appointed as the Secretary General; 
- decrees governing the activities of the SG of the NSC no longer secret; 
- measures increased transparency of military and defence expenditure; 
- members chosen by the NSC to the Higher Education Board and High 
Audio-Visual Board were removed; 
- defence expenditure reduced, being overcome by education; 
- but the military still enjoy a degree of autonomy; 
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- depending on the interpretation of legislative texts, the military can have 
room for manoeuvre; 
- continue to exercise influence through informal mechanisms; 
- “Overall, reforms over the last year concerning the functioning of the 
NSC have further shifted the balance of civil-military relations towards 
the civilians and encouraged public debate in this area.” (p. 23). 
Judicial System 23-27      
- since 1999, important improvements have been made; 
- State Security Courts have been abolished and replaced by Regional 
Serious Felony Courts; 
- amendments improved the rights of defence; 
- training on international law and HR intensified – judges as important 
actors to implement measures; 
- recognised the supremacy of international and European treaties ratified 
over domestic legislation; 
- new Penal Code (September 2004) – with modern European standards, 
strengthening sanctions against HR violations and new offences; 
- the Justice Academy started to operate (judicial staff training); 
- approved the Law on Establishing the Intermediate Courts of Appeal – 
reduce the caseloads of other courts; 
- expert advisory mission: significant progress since first visit; 
recommendations followed by the Ministry; 
- Law on Notification was amended; 
- Regulation on Apprehension, Detention and Statement Taking was 
amended – to extend the rights of the detainees; 
- Law on Juvenile Courts was amended to establish more Juvenile Courts; 
- Commercial Code was amended to establish courts for maritime cases; 
- Law on Family Courts was amended; 
- Regulation on Legal Aid was adopted; 
- There has been a reduction in the average trial period; 
- number of judges and prosecutors are stable; 
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- National Judicial Network Project has continued to progress; 
- all judges and prosecutors received training on the ECHR and the case 
law of the ECtHR + several seminars around country on other issues; 
- Courts continue to apply the reforms; 
- some cases go to trial with no preparation due to the lack of supervision 
on the police officers during investigation; 
- judges are no longer prohibited from forming professional organisations; 
- independence of the judiciary is foreseen in the Constitution, but 
undermined by other principles – such as the link and dependence to the 
Ministry of Justice. 
Anti-Corruption 28-29      
- anti-corruption measures, but still a serious problem; 
- some conventions signed; 
- improved transparency with the adoption of the Law on the Foundation 
of an Ethical Board for Public Servants; 
- Anti-Corruption Committee proposed parliamentary inquiries to former 
ministers; 
- debate but no improvements on the Parliamentary immunity – 
considered one of the problems of Turkish corruption; 
- effectiveness of bodies created to fight corruption is cause of concern. 
HR and protect. min. 29-51      
- eradicated all remaining death penalty provisions; 
- strengthened gender equality;  
- broadened freedom of the press; 
- aligned the judiciary with European standards;  
- established the supremacy of international agreements in the area of 
fundamental freedoms over internal legislation; 
- progress on international conventions on HR; 
- Council of Europe lifted the monitoring procedure; 
- progress in relation to the execution of judgements of the ECtHR, but 
still some cases in which its decisions have not been implemented; 
- HR Presidency has intensified its work (promoting HR, awareness, etc. 
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but without a nation-wide impact); 
- several bodies working on HR; 
- fight against discrimination: limited progress. 
Civil and Pol. Rights 33-45      
- abolished death penalty in all circumstances; 
- prevention of torture and ill-treatment: “Turkey still needs to pursue 
vigorously its efforts to combat torture and other forms of ill-treatment by 
law enforcement officials.” (p. 33) 
- improved the rights of detainees; 
- “Pocket-sized cards setting out a suspect’s rights, including his right to 
see a lawyer, have been distributed to police officers, who have been 
instructed to read the rights to a suspect immediately upon arrest.” (p. 34) 
- policy of zero tolerance led to a decline in the cases of torture; 
-  2 454 law agents were tried in 2003 (for torture or ill-treatment): 1 357 
were acquitted and of the 854 defendants that were convicted, 138 were 
imprisoned; 
- improvements in detention facilities and in treatment of detainees; 
- access to lawyers improved; 
- some procedures still not respected; 
- still reports of arbitrary detentions, disappearances, extra-judicial 
executions, etc.; 
- prison system: “the situation has improved significantly since 1999” (p. 
36); 
- Dec,2003: 64296 prisoners (37056 convicted; 27240 detained on 
remand); 
- isolation of prisoners – a serious problem; 
- monitoring boards continue the inspections (several recommendations, 
some of them acted upon); 
- some visitors continue to face difficulties; 
- some prisoners do not receive proper medical treatment; 
- freedom of expression: issue was being addressed; 
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- there have been improvements and the number of people convicted for 
the expression of non-violent opinion has decreased, but still some people 
prosecuted; 
- broadcasting in other languages has begun; 
- “Overall the new Penal Code provides limited progress on freedom of 
expression” (p. 38) – some articles used to limit freedom of expression; 
- freedom of the press: “notable progress has been made, although further 
efforts are required to address outstanding issues” (p. 38); 
- amendments made it impossible to apprehend printing equipment under 
any circumstance; 
- strengthened journalists’ rights not to disclose their sources; 
- prison sentences largely replaced by fines; 
- foreigners became able to edit or own Turkish publications; 
- fines still excessive, mainly for local media (may contribute to self-
censorship); 
- journalists and writers continue to be sentenced for reasons that 
disregard the ECHR; 
- 2003: banned 43 books; 37 writes + 17 publishers put on trial; 
- broadcasting: “significant progress and previously adopted measures 
were implemented” (p. 39) 
- first broadcasts in other languages aired; 
- private TV and radio channels allowed to broadcast in other languages; 
- broadcasting is limited to 4 (TV) or 5 (radio) hours per week; 
- children’s programmes in other languages are banned; 
- freedom of association: “several legislative reforms undertaken since 
1999 have lifted a number of restrictions” (p. 40); 
- reduced the possibility of the state to interfere in the activities of the 
associations; 
- civil society organisations continue to face restrictions in practice; 
- adopted the new Law on Associations (but not in force due to the 
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President’s veto); 
(vetoed: - removed some limitations to the establishment of new 
associations; 
Vetoed; - removed the requirement to seek prior permission to open 
branches abroad); 
- NGOs reported that dialogue with authorities is more open, some 
changes need to be implemented still; 
- circular instructed the authorities to deal with marches and 
demonstrations in a way that would not attack rights of assembly; 
- Kurdish Writers’ Foundation was established, but was charged against 
by the state due to meetings with the European Commission without 
previous request; 
- NGOs, HR defenders, etc. subject to considerable judicial harassment;  
- prohibited or postponed demonstrations: 2001: 141; 2002: 95; 2003: 41; 
- detentions related to demonstrations increased from 2003 to 2004; 
- political parties: no developments: 
- freedom of religion: obstacles to non-Muslim communities in their 
freedom of worship – lack of legal personality, not allowed to train 
clergy, limited property rights, etc; 
- religious foundations subject to interference of the Directorate General 
for Foundations; 
- technical requirements invoked to prevent construction of churches; 
- Christians often subject to police surveillance; 
- no change in the status of non-Sunni Muslim communities. 
Ec. & Social Rights 45-47      
- gender equality: some reforms improved it; 
- Constitution and Penal Code improved to promote equality; 
- still some problems of discrimination and domestic violence in practice; 
- Penal Code: life imprisonment to crimes based on tradition and customs 
(like honour killings); 
- sexual assault within marriage can lead to prosecution; 
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- prison sentence for those who order or conduct virginity tests without 
court order; 
- increased awareness of domestic violence against women; 
- Law on the Protection of Family not implemented; 
- women still vulnerable to discriminatory practices; 
- rights of disabled people: increased number of disabled persons 
recruited; 
- children’s rights: child labour still significant problem; 
- right to education not implemented, mainly with girls; 
- Conventions ratified; 
- school attendance particularly low in rural areas; 
- street children still a serious problem; 
- trade unions: significant constraints (collective bargaining, strikes, etc). 
Minority rights, 
cultural rights and 
the protection of 
minorities 
48-51      
- some Conventions not signed; reservations to some articles; 
- abolished a Committee for Minorities that aimed to carry out security 
surveillance on minorities; 
- school books still with prejudices against minorities; 
- some minorities not allowed to establish schools; 
- cultural rights: important progress since 1999; 
- broadcast in other languages, first private courses on other languages; 
- “There has been a greater tolerance towards the use of the Kurdish 
language and the expression of Kurdish culture in its different forms.” (p. 
49) – celebrations allowed, ex. 
- electoral system (10% threshold) not changed; 
- limitations on the use of other languages by political parties; 
- situation in E and SE of country has improved gradually; 
- some clashes have been reported; 
- situation of internally displaced persons still critical. 
Chapter 23 --------- --- --- --- --- --- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chapter 24 138-147 X     - “Progress since the last Regular Report. Further progress has been 
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made since the last Regular Report.” (p. 138); 
- data protection: not much progress; 
- visa policy: continued alignment with the EU; 
- Schengen: some development; 
- external borders: begun work on drawing up an Action National Plan; 
- protocol with Bulgaria on border control; 
- migration: begun work on drawing up an Action National Plan; 
- undertook negations agreements; 
- conventions ratified; 
- increased coast surveillance; 
- intensified efforts against illegal migration diverted the flows from 
Turkey; 
- illegal migrants apprehended: 2000 and 2001: around 100 000 each year; 
2002: 83 000; 2003: 56 000; 
- asylum: begun work on drawing up an Action National Plan; 
- slight decrease in arrivals of asylum seekers; 
- continued training activities; 
- police co-operation and the fight against organised crime: ratified 
protocols; 
- enhanced cooperation; 
- training on HR; 
- agreements with NGOs to provide help to victims of trafficking; 
- directive adopted to exempt victims of trafficking from paying medical 
treatment; 
- fight against terrorism: improved international cooperation; 
- fight against fraud and corruption: signed and ratified Conventions; 
- established an Ethics Board (supervise ethical conduct of public 
officials); 
- Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Commission discussed at Parliament; 
- no development on parliamentary immunity; 
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- law on the right of information adopted (transparency of public 
administration); 
- various investigations carried out, several convictions; 
- fight against drugs: several documents ratified; 
- some successful operations; 
- money laundering: several documents ratified; 
- new Banking Law; 
- several investigations; 
- customs cooperation: improving infrastructures at border gates. 
General Evaluation 160-164      
- “Turkey’s alignment has progressed in many areas but remains at an 
early stage for most chapters. Further work is required in all areas, new 
legislation should not move away from the acquis” (p. 160); 
- “Turkey has continued to make efforts to align with the acquis in the 
area of justice and home affairs. Nevertheless, progress is required in 
important areas such as the reform of the judiciary and the fight against 
corruption. Co-operation both at national level among all relevant 
administrative bodies and with the EU should be improved on issues such 
as illegal migration and trafficking, including through the negotiation of a 
readmission agreement. The geographic limitation to the Geneva 
Convention on refugees should be lifted and co-operation among the 
relevant institutions should be improved.” (p. 163); 
- “Implementation of legislation formally aligned with the acquis 
continues to be insufficient. Administrative capacity in most areas needs 
to be strengthened to ensure that the acquis is implemented and enforced 
effectively.” (p. 164). 
2005 
Democracy and RoL 10-18 - - - - - --- 
The Parliament 10-11      
- some deputies from AKP and CHP changed their affiliations and created 
their own parties, increasing the number of parties in the Parliament to 6; 
- no change to the electoral system; 
- Oct,2004-Jun,2005: 166 new laws adopted; 
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- since Oct 2004, President returned laws to Parliament 13 times + applied 
to the C.Court 8 times; 
- EU Harmonisation Committee continued its work; 
- established a new Committee on Violence Against Women and 
Children; 
- Parliamentary HR Investigation Committee continued its work, but its 
impact is limited by limited resources. 
The Executive 11      
- the government has reiterated its commitment to the reform process on 
several occasions; 
- the opposition party, CHP, has also extended its support to the process; 
- relations with the EU at the forefront of the political agenda. 
Public Administration 11-12  X    
- some progress, but difficulties in adopting a comprehensive strategy, 
mainly at the central administration level; 
- central law to reform public administration was vetoed by the President 
(aimed to re-distribute the powers and duties of central and local 
government, to rationalise bodies, to increase responsiveness and 
transparency); 
- some laws adopted regarding local government (Law on Association of 
Local Government, Law on Metropolitan Municipalities, Law on 
Municipalities, Law on Special Provincial Administration, etc); 
- these laws will require secondary legislation to allow implementation; 
- no progress in establishing an Ombudsman; 
- 25, May, Ali Babacan appointed as EU Chief Negotiator and responsible 
for the Secretariat General for EU Affairs; 
- September: Erdogan and Babacan met with 85 NGOs to discuss ways to 
improve dialogue with civil society. 
NSC/CMR 12-15 X     
- more changes were introduced to align with the European practices; 
- the implementation of reforms of the NSC started to be implemented 
(Secretary General is a civilian, composed by 7 civilians and 5 military, 
staff decreased); 
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- NSC meets every 2 months; 
- to increase transparency, a press briefing was organised; 
- defence expenditure increased (but still the 2nd biggest after education); 
- budgetary transparency and Parliamentary control improved; 
- new regulations promoted an ex-post audit of defence expenditure; 
- Secretary General was preparing a draft of the new National Security 
Policy Document; 
- no progress regarding the Military Criminal Code; 
- the civilian control over the Gendarmerie should be reinforced; 
- TAF continue to exercise political influence; 
- “Since 2002, Turkey has made good progress in reforming civil-military 
relations” (p.14); 
- Turkey needs to consolidate the changes + improve accountability and 
transparency in the security field + promote better public understanding of 
reforms at this level. 
Judicial System 15-17 X     
- “The judicial system has been further strengthened via the adoption of 
structural reforms. Important progress was made (...)” (p. 15); 
- the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Law on 
Enforcement of Sentences and the Law on the Establishment of the 
regional Courts of Appeal entered into force in June 2005; 
- the adoption of the Code of the Criminal Procedure was a fundamental 
step: introduced the cross examination of witnesses, plea bargaining, 
criminal investigations carried out by a judicial police force under the 
authority of the public prosecutor, etc.; 
- witnesses whose mother tongue is not Turkish are entitled an interpreter 
free of charge, but there are no people trained in legal interpretation, 
which should be addressed; 
- concern that juveniles are in adult prisons; 
- Intermediate Courts of Appeal were to be established in 2 years (the law 
came into force in June); 
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- minor offences by juveniles to be tried by one judge instead of three; 
- 27 new Family courts established; 
- judicial independence is foreseen in the Constitution but undermined by 
several other provisions (judges attached to the Ministry, close 
relationship between judges and prosecutors, for ex.); 
- widened the scope of compulsory legal representation; 
- the number of detainees asking for a lawyer increased (although some 
reports state that they are discouraged); 
- Turkish law and ECHR are not interpreted consistently.  
Anti-corruption 17-18  X    
- “In the last year, some progress has been achieved in adopting anti-
corruption measures.” (p. 17); 
- but corruption continues to be a serious problem; 
- new Penal Code has more severe penalties; 
- 2 corruption-related commissions were established; 
- Turkey has no law on financing and auditing of political parties; 
- Ethical Board for Public Servants has started to operate + code of ethics 
for public employees; 
- no developments on the parliamentary immunity; 
- coordination and cooperation of polices on corruption are weak. 
HR and protect. min. 18-40 - - - - - -- 
Observance of HR 18-22 X     
- “Turkey has made further progress with regard to international human 
rights instruments.” (p. 18); 
- several conventions and documents signed and ratified; 
- not submitted the reports to the UN committees; 
- progress in the execution of the judgements of the ECtHR, but needs to 
ensure that its case-law is given effect; 
- lack of government cooperation with the ECtHR; 
- bodies to ensure the enforcement of HR continue to work, but need to be 
strengthened in their capacities (resources); 
- continued training on HR; 
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- fight against discrimination: no progress on new legislation on 
discrimination in employment. 
Civil and Pol. Rights 22-32      
- prevention of torture and ill-treatment: reports of torture and ill-
treatment are still frequent, but the incidence is diminishing; 
- efforts are required to ensure full implementation of legislation 
(especially fight against impunity); 
- the new Codes strengthen the fight against torture and ill-treatment; 
- some legislative changes cause concern (ex. Transferring individuals 
from their prisons to other places to help onsite investigations); 
- overall implementation has improved; 
- fight against impunity: several cases against security forces on trial; 
- still several challenges: 1631 out of 1831 cases were acquittals; 
- not clear if detainees are made aware of their rights; 
- medical examinations: training continues, but neither quality or 
independence are ensured; 
- extra-judicial killings have increased; 
- prison system: new law introduced new concepts, such as community 
service and probation; 
- rehabilitation, cultural and social and educational activities are ongoing 
in prisons; 
- May 2005: 57 670 people in prison (out of which: 31812 convicted; 
26858 detained on remand); 
- significant progress regarding prison conditions, but some are still 
overcrowded and under-resourced; 
- freedom of expression: significant number of people serving prison 
sentences for the expression of non-violent opinion were set free; 
- there has been a reduction in the number of prosecutions and convictions 
in cases related to freedom of expression; 
- amendments to Penal Code in May improved freedom of expression: 
aggravating sentences, excluding acts of expression with the aim to 
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inform or criticise not to be criminalised, slightly diminishing the scope of 
the article on defamation, deleting the reasonsing associated with article 
305 on offences against fundamental national interests; 
- still some articles are used to limit freedom of expression and were not 
addressed (ex. Article 301, vaguely defined); 
- some progress on open and free debate; 
- publication of books on sensitive issues is easier, but some are still 
banned; 
- freedom of the press: some positive developments (acquittals and 
releases); 
- no journalists imprisoned because of their work; 
- some articles can still create a climate of self-censorship and should be 
addressed; 
- 60 writers, journalists and publishers under judicial processes; 
- journalists find it still hard to found a trade union; 
- broadcasting: limited progress; 
- strict time limits for broadcasting in other languages and dialects; 
- heavy penalties, monitoring by the police; 
- freedom of association: the new Law on Associations entered into force 
in November 2004; 
- reduced possibility of state interference in the activities of associations 
already brought positive results; 
- March 2005 legislation imposes some limits on the registration of 
associations whose objectives are considered to be contrary to the Turkish 
Constitution; 
- several technical requirements that make it difficult to register; 
- despite the restrictions, some associations based on different identities, 
races, etc. were able to register; 
- new legislation is not being uniformly implemented; 
- HR defender s continue to face judicial harassment in practice; 
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- peaceful assembly: during a manifestation in women’s day, police 
intervened with excessive force; 
- political parties: closure of 7 political parties was denied; 
- parties cannot use other languages but Turkish; 
- freedom of religion: very limited progress has been made; 
- improvements in the legislation, but still not able to have legal 
personality;  
- in practice, several restrictions and limitations; 
- Law on Foundations is under consideration, but, as it is, it will not 
improve the situation much; 
- some efforts were made to ensure other places of worship would be 
allowed; 
- religious foundations continue to be subject to the interference of the 
Directorate General for Foundations (to be dissolved, to be seized from 
their properties, etc); 
- ban on training clergy continued; 
- some non-Muslim communities have been violently harassed; 
- Alevis situation: no change. 
Ec. & Soc. Rights 32-35      
- women’s rights: little progress; 
- new Penal Code = some important improvements concerning women’s 
rights; 
- main problems: domestic violence, honour killings, high illiteracy rate, 
low participation in the Parliament, in local bodies and in the labour 
market; 
- created an Advisory Board on the Status of Women: composed by 
representatives from ministries, NGOs and academic institutions to 
provide advice on policies concerning women; 
- established two further committees for women’s rights; 
- other problems: abuse within family, sexual abuse, early marriages, 
unofficial religious marriages, polygamy, etc. 
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- courts are starting to apply legislation, but further training is required; 
- need for further shelters for women; 
- women remain vulnerable to discrimination; 
- women participation in workforce among the lowest in the OSCE; 
- children’s rights: right to education not respected in some areas, mainly 
girls education; 
- shortcomings in the application of the law on child work; 
- new Law on Protection of Children adopted: framework to safeguard 
children’s rights, well-being, etc. (but does not fully comply with 
international standards); 
- some articles of European Conventions not accepted yet; 
- some steps were taken to address the problem of street children (new 
Committee, new schemes...); 
- rights of disabled people: adopted the New Law on Disabled People; 
- Turkey has no mental health law and care for mentally disabled is 
scarce; 
- use of unnecessary institutionalisation, physical restraints, inadequate 
feeding, etc.; 
- trade unions: several constraints on the right to organise, to collective 
bargain and to strike; 
- Public Employee Trade Union Law – amended in 2004, has some 
shortcomings not addressed yet; 
- imprisonment is foreseen for those who force others regarding 
membership of and participation in trade union activities; 
- reports of workers being fired or moved because of their trade union 
activities; 
- Turkey falls short of ILO standards. 
Minority rights 35-40    X  
- “Turkey’s approach to minority rights remains unchanged since last 
year’s report.” (p. 35); 
- HR Advisory Board’s Report: encouraged Turkey to align its policy on 
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minorities with international standards + revision of the Constitution to 
guarantee people from different identities and cultures to enjoy their 
rights – the report was object of lively debate, but its author and the 
chairman of the Board were investigated and ended up resigning; the 
Board has not been operating ever since; 
- Turkey’s reservations to some articles or conventions are of concern; 
- work on reviewing school books’ discriminatory language against 
minorities, but not used in schools yet; 
- Greek minority still with problems to teach and to inherit property; 
- Roma still prevented from entering the country as immigrants; 
- Roma with difficulties in accessing housing, education, health, etc.; 
- cultural rights: limited progress; 
- broadcasting in other languages is possible, but still several constraints; 
- teaching of Kurdish faced setback with the closure of the 5 remaining 
schools (due to lack of financial resources, restrictions on the appointment 
of teachers, the timetables and the attendees); 
- greater tolerance towards Kurdish culture in the last years, tension arose 
again; 
- situation in the East and Southeast: progress slow and uneven; 
- no comprehensive law has been established to address the socio-
economic problems of the region; 
- level of violence has increased again; 
- the implementation of the Law on Compensation of Losses Resulting 
from Terrorist Acts has been delayed and uncertain; 
-  situation of internally displaced people (IDP) continues critical; 
-  no progress on addressing the problem of village guards (reported to 
have attacked IDPs.  
Chapter 23 103-110      
- independence and impartiality of the judiciary: several legal provisions 
foresee the judiciary’s independence, but there are others that attach the 
judiciary to the Ministry of Justice (financially dependent, appointed by 
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them, transfers, promotions, etc.), hampering its autonomy; 
- law to establish and association of judges not adopted yet; 
- salaries increased, but still modest; 
- quality and efficiency of the judiciary: extensive training on the new 
Codes, on HR, money laundering, asylum law, etc.; 
- all judges and prosecutors are regularly evaluated; 
- budget of the Ministry of Justice increased 16,5%, but remains low 
when compared to other EU member-states; 
- progress on computerisation; 
- number of judges (5952) and prosecutors (3179) is stable; 
- legal guarantees including access to justice: arbitrary arrest: individual 
arrested is entitled to know the reason; 
- pre-trial detention maximum 24hours; 
- presumption of innocence to be applied in criminal trials; 
- Constitution guarantees the right to a fair and public trial; 
- Constitution guarantees the right of defence (during investigation and 
trial, the access to a lawyer, to an interpreter free of charge, etc.); 
- other principles also foreseen: legality of criminal offences, non-
retroactivity of penalties, proportionality between the offense and the 
penalty, ne bis in idem. 
- fundamental rights: individual petition possible since 1987; 
- several institutions established to work in the area of HR (Reform 
Monitoring Group, HR Presidency, Parliamentary HR Investigation 
Committee); 
- torture and ill-treatment: legislation put in place and reports of cases 
decrease but full eradication implies further work; 
- prison system: improved significantly since 1999; 
- major development was the adoption of the new Law on the Execution 
of Sentences; 
- integrity of the person: new Penal Code criminalises trade in human 
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organs; 
- right to privacy enshrined in the Constitution; 
- data protection foreseen in the Penal Code; 
- right to marry, to found a family are foreseen; 
- freedom of conscience is foreseen in the Constitution, but some 
obstacles in practice; 
- Turkey does not recognise the right of conscientious objection regarding 
military service and has no alternative civilian service; 
- freedom of expression, of assembly and of association, non-
discrimination, rights of the child: cfr. Above; 
- Conclusion: 
“As regards the judiciary, substantial progress been made (...).However, 
considerable concerns remain regarding the independence of the judiciary, 
and in particular the influence of the Ministry of Justice over the 
recruitment of judges and prosecutors. Further steps also need to be taken 
to ensure equality of arms between prosecution and defence before the 
court and to ensure that all citizens enjoy access to justice. In the last year, 
some progress has been achieved in adopting anti-corruption measures 
(...)In general, the situation as regards fundamental rights in Turkey has 
improved significantly since 1999. However, the momentum of the 
reform process slowed in the reporting period and further progress is 
required, particularly in terms of the implementation of reforms” (p. 110). 
Chapter 24 110-114 X     
- “Further progress has been made” (p. 110); 
- Schengen and external borders: no developments, but work continued on 
the National Action Plan; 
- visa policy: continued alignment; 
- migration: National Action Plan adopted in March 2005 (training, family 
reunification, long-term residence, etc); 
- asylum: National Action Plan adopted in March 2005 and should now be 
implemented; 
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- the number of new asylum seekers decreased significantly; 
-  still some reports that state that some asylum seekers are prosecuted for 
illegal entry and deported; 
- sometimes difficulties in submitting asylum applications; 
- police cooperation and fight against organised crime: new Code of 
Criminal Procedure contains new powers and a law concerning organised 
crime was amended; 
- Ministry’s circular sought to ensure better cooperation and coordination 
between the police, the gendarmerie and the coast police; 
- criminal investigation methods and forensic capacity need to be 
improved; 
- increased penalties for smuggling and trafficking persons; 
- several successful operations; 
-  fight against money laundering: some progress regarding the alignment 
with the acquis; 
- fights against terrorism: signed conventions; 
- fight against drugs: signed an Agreement with the Council of Europe; 
- no further progress regarding the alignment with the acquis; 
- some successful operations; 
- customs cooperation: substantial increase in apprehension of smuggled 
goods and drugs (due to X-ray equipment, CCTV, etc.); 
- inter-agency cooperation needs to be enhanced; 
- judicial co-operation in criminal and civil matters: established the Courts 
of Appeal; 
- more judicial staff appointed; 
- Conclusion: 
“ Turkey continued to make further progress in aligning its legislation 
with the acquis and EU practices in the area of justice, freedom and 
security, and the Turkish legislation is aligned to a certain extent with the 
EU acquis. Nevertheless, progress is needed in a number of important 
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areas, such as implementation of the National Action Plan for alignment 
with the acquis on migration and asylum, intensified and active co-
operation with the European Union on illegal migration and in combating 
trafficking, as well as development of the national strategy against 
organised crime and the legislative framework for combating money 
laundering. Further steps should be taken to improve co-ordination and 
co-operation among relevant institutions.” (p. 114). 
General Evaluation 134-136      
- “As regards Turkey’s ability to adopt and implement the EU legal order, 
there has been some, though uneven, progress since 2004.” (p. 134); 
- “In the areas covered by the judiciary and fundamental rights, Turkey 
has made progress in aligning with EU standards and practices concerning 
the judiciary and anti-corruption measures. However, further steps are 
needed to ensure the independence and efficiency of the judiciary. On 
corruption, further action is necessary to improve the efficiency of the 
relevant bodies established to combat corruption and to raise public 
awareness of corruption as a serious criminal offence. 
Turkey continued to align its legislation with the acquis in the area of 
justice freedom and security. Overall, the Turkish legislation is partly in 
line with the acquis. Further progress is necessary in a number of areas 
such as adoption of a law on protection of personal data, adoption and 
implementation of the National Action Plan on Border Management, 
implementation of the National Action Plan on Migration and Asylum, 
lifting the geographic limitation to the Geneva Convention and  
developing inter-agency co-operation.” (p. 135). 
2006 
Democracy and RoL 5-10 - - - - - --- 
The Parliament 5-6      
- since October 2005, 148 laws adopted (of 429draft bills presented); 
- EU Harmonisation Committee and HR Committee played an important 
role in addressing political criteria; 
- public debate about changing electoral regime (due to 10% threshold). 
The Executive 6      - the government has repeatedly confirmed its support for the EU process; 
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- the Chief Negotiator presented in October 2005 the negotiating team; 
- the Secretariat General for EU Affairs has coordinated the process 
(alignment, financial cooperation, etc.), but given its growing importance, 
it needs to be reinforced in terms of resources. 
Public Administration 6-7  X    
- Ombudsman (established recently) will deal with petitions concerning 
administrative acts; 
- some progress regarding better regulation; 
- no progress on adopting the Framework Law on Public Administration 
(fiscal decentralisation not achieved); 
- no progress concerning the establishment of city councils; 
- amended the Law on the Associations of Local Governments (more 
local joint projects); 
- no progress concerning the drafting of the Civil Servant Law; 
- “Overall, there has been some legislative progress in public 
administration reform. The implementation of reforms adopted in 
previous years has continued. Further efforts are needed in the area of 
decentralisations.” (p. 7). 
NSC/CMR 7-8    X  
- no civilian can be tried in a military court (unless the crime involves 
military personnel); 
- possibility of retrial in military courts was introduced; 
- National Security Policy Document was revised by the NSC and adopted 
by the government without Parliamentary discussion; 
- TAF continue to exert political influence expressing their opinions on 
several issues; 
- no measures taken to enhance civilian control over the gendarmerie; 
- revealed the existence of a protocol that foreseen the possibility of the 
military to carry out operations without civilian permission in case of 
internal threats; 
- reforms in defence expenditure started to be implemented; 
- parliamentary overseeing of military budgets: no progress; 
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- “Overall, limited progress has been made in aligning civil-military 
relations with EU practices.” (p. 8). 
Judicial System 8-10 X     
- authorities focused on the implementation of the new legislation; 
- around 100 circulars issued by the Ministry of Justice aiming to create a 
clearer framework for the implementation of new legislation; 
- Courts continue to apply the ECHR; 
- 620 new judges recruited; 
- continued training activities; 
- article 301 used to restrict the expression of non-violent opinion; 
- some cases revealed inconsistency in the interpretation of legislation; 
- prosecutors report difficulties in supervising the judicial police (tension 
between both); 
- independence of the judiciary: some factors still undermine it; 
- “Overall, there was continued progress in the area of judicial reform. 
However, implementation of the new legislation by the judiciary presents 
a mixed picture so far and the independence of the judiciary still needs to 
be further established.” (p. 10). 
Anti-corruption 10    X  
- Law on Access to information was amended; 
- some reports reveal a wide range of corruption activities; 
- corruption remains widespread, despite all the efforts; 
- need to improve the legislation on financing and auditing political 
parties; 
- parliamentary immunity remains a serious problem; 
- corruption of investigations hampered by the need for hierarchical 
authorisation; 
- there should be an independent body that would coordinate and monitor 
the implementation of anti-corruption measures; 
- “Overall, there has been some limited progress in the fight against 
corruption, notably on increasing transparency in the public 
administration. However, corruption remains widespread and anti-
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corruption authorities and policies are still weak.” (p. 10) 
HR and protect. min. 10-23 - - - - - -- 
Observance of HR 10-13 X     
- some international documents ratified; 
- some reservations held, some others were lifted; 
- during the first 8 months of 2006, ECtHR issued 196 judgements finding 
that Turkey violated the ECHR; 
- 2004 and 2005 reforms had positive consequences on the execution of 
the judgements of the ECHR; 
- several cases are pending before the Committee of Ministers; 
- continued training on HR and HR violations; 
- HR Presidency received 778 applications on HR violations, but it lacks 
independence from the government and is under-resourced; 
- HR Advisory Board continues not to operate since the report in October 
2004; 
- Parliamentary HR Committee with an active role in collecting 
complaints; received 864 applications (Oct2005-Jun2006), conducted 
several investigations and published 3 reports, but has no legislative role 
and is not consulted on legislation; 
- “Overall, Turkey has made progress on the ratification of international 
human rights instruments and in the execution of ECtHR judgements. 
However, there is a need to further upgrade the human rights institutional 
framework.” (p. 14). 
Civil and Pol. Rights 13-17      
- torture and ill-treatment: comprehensive legislative framework in place; 
- decreasing trend in the number of reported cases; 
- reforms in detention procedures had positive results; 
- implementing legislation still a problem and there still are reported 
cases; 
- rights to notify a relative and to have access to a lawyer are not 
consistently applied; 
- concerns with the confidentiality and quality of medical examinations – 
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need to improve the autonomy of the Forensic Medicine Institute; 
- HR situation in the SE is of particularly concern; 
- fight against impunity remains an area of concern; 
- access to justice: concerns regarding the lack of review of past 
sentences; 
- considerable increase in the appointment of legal aid lawyers; 
- prison system: regulations adopted to implement the legislation; 
- physical infrastructures improved; 
- training has been strengthened; 
- but there is still: lack of communal activities, limited interaction 
between custodial staff and prisoners, inadequate health-care and 
psychiatric resources, overcrowded cells; 
- reported cases of ill-treatment by prison staff; 
- prisons not open to independent monitoring; 
- solitary confinement too extensive; 
- freedom of expression and media: the Ministry of Justice issued a 
circular instructing prosecutors to take into consideration, regarding 
freedom of expression in the media, Turkish and ECHR legislation; 
- broadcasting in other languages: some progress; 
- the prosecutions and convictions due to the non-violent expression of 
opinion create a feeling of self-censorship that is cause of serious concern; 
- article 301 needs to be brought in line with European standards; 
- the impact of the anti-terror law on freedom of expression raises 
concerns; 
- the independence of the media regulatory body is dubious due to the 
appointment procedure; 
- freedom of assembly: fewer restrictions to demonstrations; 
- but security forces used excessive force against demonstrators; 
- freedom of association: legislation in line with international standards; 
- the impact of the legislation on the ground has been positive; 
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- to notify the authorities in case of receipt of finances from abroad results 
in difficulties for the NGOs; 
- foundations need permission to apply to international projects or funds; 
- difficulties in registering an association; 
- some associations are subject to court proceedings; 
- no progress in aligning the law on political parties with EU practices; 
- civil society organisations: reforms led to positive results; 
- they became more vocal and better organised; 
- increasing variety of organisations; 
- freedom of religion: freedom of worship continues to be generally 
respected; 
- an official delegation met with the leaders of non-Muslim communities 
and discussed their problems and solutions; 
- ID-cards still include religious information about the individual and may 
lead to discrimination; 
- still problems with legal personality, owning property, restrictions on 
clergy training, ... 
- no developments in the situation of the Alevis; 
- no progress regarding the difficulties of non-Muslim communities. 
Ec.& Social Rights 18-20      
- women’s rights: report by a Parliamentary Committee has been 
published and indentified some problems; a circular followed the report 
and gave priority to the fight against violence; 
- the campaign “Stop domestic violence” entered the second phase and 
was supported by several entities, namely media, targeting girls 
education; 
- legislation is satisfactory, but the problem is implementation; 
- East and Southeast still many cases of honour crimes and suicides 
influenced by the family, often not object of criminal investigation; 
- several girls not registered at birth, hampering their tracing (and the fight 
against early marriages, for ex.); 
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- need for more shelters; 
- women still vulnerable to discrimination; 
- participation of women in political bodies and the workforce still low; 
- the Directorate General for the Status of Women is under-resourced; 
- children’s rights: the right to education (especially girls) remains a 
problem in some areas; 
- further implementation of legislation is requires; 
- rights of disabled people: legislation has been implemented; 
- need for decentralised structures and services for disabled people 
(namely in the access to education); 
- discrepancies in the quality of the services of mental health (mainly in 
rural areas); 
- no progress on trade union’s rights; 
- there are two legislative proposals to amend legislation in this field, but 
no further progress; 
- the shortcomings (restrictions on the right to organise, to strike, etc) 
remain; 
- Turkey falls short of ILO standards. 
Minority rights 20-23    X  
- approach to minority’s rights unchanged; 
- some minorities not recognised; 
- OSCE visit was not followed up and no progress was made concerning 
dialogue with minorities; 
- deepening of the dialogue is necessary (education, languages, 
broadcasting, public life, etc); 
- some reservations towards international conventions; 
- limited progress concerning education (ex. Further efforts needed to 
remove discriminatory language from textbooks); 
- no progress in relation to Syriacs or Greeks; 
- cultural rights: permission given to two Kurdish channels, but still 
several restrictions (ex. Educational programmes not allowed; Turkish 
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subtitles mandatory, etc.); 
- public school system does not allow children to learn their mother 
tongue when it is no Turkish; 
- no other language but Turkish is allowed in political life; 
- situation in East and Southeast: progress made regarding the 
compensation of losses resulting from terrorist acts; 
- situation in the region has deteriorated (several attacks, riots, etc.); 
- difficult overall socio-economic situation; 
- almost no dialogue between the authorities and locally elected 
politicians; 
- internally displaced persons (IDP): issue of concern; 
- no progress on the establishment of a body responsible for implementing 
the policy on IDP return; 
- several factors still need to be tackled: infrastructures, capital, 
employment, etc.; 
- no progress on addressing the problem of village guards; 
- Roma: amended law improved discrimination against Roma, but some 
discriminatory provisions remain; 
- still face discriminatory treatment (housing, education, health, etc.); 
- “Overall, Turkey made little progress on ensuring cultural diversity and 
promoting respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with 
international standards.” (p. 23). 
Chapter 23 57-62      
- independence of the judiciary: several provisions of the Constitution 
ensure it, but some factors undermine it; 
- in June 2006 established an association, the “Union of Judges and 
Prosecutors”, to safeguard judicial independence and impartiality; 
- impartiality of the judiciary: some progress; 
- candidate judges and prosecutors now fall under the Ethical Board for 
Public Servants; 
- now all have a seminar on ethics; 
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- salaries increased in 40%; 
- professionalism and competence of the judiciary: extensive training on 
new legislation; 
- efficiency of the judiciary: continued progress; 
- the budget of the Ministry of Justice increased and is now 1% of the 
whole budget; 
- progress on computerisation; 
- plea bargaining was introduced by the new Code of Criminal Procedure; 
- judicial reform: progress; 
- fight against corruption: some progress; 
- no overall strategy and action plan to prevent and fight corruption; 
- corruption continues to be a widespread problem in Turkey; 
- Ethical Board for Public Servants not operating effectively due to lack 
of resources; 
- Law on Public Financial Management and Control not implemented 
properly; 
- fundamental rights: limited progress; 
- implementation continued, but legislative progress not; 
- no progress regarding institutions responsible for monitoring and 
promoting HR; 
- abolition of death penalty: Protocol 13 to the ECRH ratified in February 
2006; 
- torture and ill-treatment: continued implementation, reported cases 
decreased, but there are still cases; 
- protection of personal data: no progress; 
- freedom of thought, religion and conscience: no progress addressing the 
problems of non-Muslim communities; 
- no progress regarding conscientious objection to military service; 
- article 301 restrictive interpretation raises problems with freedom of 
expression; 
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- freedom of assembly and association: diminishing restrictions on civil 
society continued, but excessive use of force by security forces; 
- right to education: further efforts needed (mainly girls); 
- right to property: no developments in the situation of non-Muslim 
minorities, Greeks and Syriacs; 
- anti-discrimination: no legislative developments; 
- gender equality and women’s rights: growing public attention, 
satisfactory legal framework, but not protected in practice; 
- rights of the child: little change; 
- right to an effective remedy and a fair trial: criminal trial and civil 
proceedings average duration increased; 
- pending cases before criminal courts remained stable; 
- pending cases before civilian courts increased slightly; 
- right to legal aid: restriction introduced under the scope of the anti-terror 
law regarding access to legal aid; 
- right of defence: considerable increase in the appointment of lawyers for 
free legal aid – but fees to state lawyers are low, so it raises concerns on 
the quality of legal aid; 
- difficulties reported concerning the principle of cross-examination; 
- approach to minorities’ rights unchanged; 
- no progress aligning practices with international and EU standards. 
Chapter 24 62-65  X    
- external borders and Schengen: some progress; 
- National Action Plan was adopted and meant a progress in aligning with 
European practices; 
- Still some serious shortcomings: inter-agency cooperation at a very early 
stage and information exchange needs improvement; train and 
professionalism of border staff need to be improved, as well as some 
infrastructures;  
- visa policy: limited progress; 
- migration: limited progress has been made; 
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- Action Plan is being implemented but does not provide details on the 
deadlines for the transposition of the acquis; 
- apprehension of illegal immigrants increased; 
- asylum: some progress with the introduction of some amendments to 
legislation; 
- but the capacity at reception centres needs improvements; 
- preparations for alignment at an early stage; 
- police cooperation: some progress; 
- fight against organised crime: limited progress; 
- trafficking in human beings: progress; 
- money laundering: limited progress; 
- fight against terrorism: some international conventions signed and an 
anti-terror law adopted; 
- fight against drugs: limited progress; 
- customs-cooperation: some progress; 
- judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters: limited progress; 
- “Overall, some progress can be reported, particularly in the areas of 
asylum, border management, fight against trafficking in human beings, 
customs and police cooperation. Alignment with the acquis in this chapter 
is underway but considerable and sustained efforts are required in areas 
such as migration, the fight against organised crime, money laundering 
and judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters.” (p. 65). 
2007 
Democracy and RoL 6-11 - - - - - -- 
Constitution 6      
- In May, there was a set of Constitutional amendments; 
- introduced the election of the President by popular vote and a renewable 
term of 5 years + government’s term from 5 to 4 years + establishment of 
a quorum of one third for all sessions and decisions at the Parliament; 
- the October referendum endorsed these changes; 
- minimum age to be elected to Parliament lowered (30 to 25). 
The Parliament 6-7      - July 2007, elections – turnout 83%; 
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- OSCE + Council of Europe report: pluralism, public confidence, 
transparency and efficiency; 
- 3 parties overcame the 10% threshold (AKP, CHP, MHP); 
- 20 of the 26 independent candidates formed their own party; 
- desirable to lower the threshold. 
The President 7      
- election of the new President in April was boycotted by opposition in the 
first two rounds, leading to early elections;  
- Gül elected in the third round. 
Government 7-8      
- the new government was endorsed on 5 September by the Parliament; 
- government programme continues its commitment to the reforms, 
especially aligning with international standards on HR + push forward the 
accession process; 
- need to strengthen Secretariat General for EU Affairs staff and 
resources. 
Public 
Administration 
8  X    
- Public Financial Management and Control was amended in April; 
- a regulation adopted to establish city councils; 
- some progress on better regulation (circulars, simplification drive,...); 
- ombudsman law suspended by the CCourt and not implemented; 
- no progress on Framework Law on Public Administration (to reform 
central administration); 
- more financial resources to local administration: no progress; 
- draft law on Civil Service was not sent to Parliament. 
NSC/CMR 8-9 X     
- army tried to interfere in the President’s election, but democratic 
practices were reaffirmed; 
- decreased the number of the staff in general and of the military staff; 
- but continue to exercise political influence (public comments, reactions 
to government decisions, publishing memorandum, etc); 
- several attempts by the military to restrict academic research and public 
debate on some issues + targeted the media; 
- no progress in enhancing civilian control over the Gendarmerie; 
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- no progress in strengthening parliamentary control over the military 
budget. 
Judicial System 9-10  X    
- some progress concerning the efficiency of the judiciary (due to the 
amendments of December 2006); 
- progress in the implementation in the area of probation; 
- continued efforts to modernise the judiciary; 
- increased funds for the judiciary (€409M in 2005; €482M in 2006; 
planned €865M in 2007); 
- concerns regarding the independence and impartiality of the judiciary 
(dismissals, tensions, etc.). 
Anti-Corruption 11   X   
- for the first time, a military court sentenced a general to imprisonment 
for corruption; 
- no progress on the adoption of the Law on the Court of Auditors; 
- parliamentary immunity and transparency in political parties law remain 
to be addressed; 
- no progress on the development of an anti-corruption strategy; 
- institutions involved in the fight were not strengthened. 
HR and protect. min. 11-24 - - - - - -- 
Observance of HR 11-13      
- progress on ratification: several documents ratified or signed; 
- 330 ECtHR judgements finding that Turkey had violated the ECHR; 
- progress on the execution of ECtHR judgements, but several are 
awaiting enforcement by Turkey; 
- need for better public awareness of the work of HR institutions; 
- further efforts are needed to improve the institutional framework for 
human rights. 
Civil and Pol. Rights 13-18      
- torture and ill-treatment: legislative changes had positive effects; 
- confirmed the diminishing trend of reported cases; 
- continued efforts to strengthen the system for medical examination in 
cases of abuse; 
- the number of forensic medicine centres increased; 
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- some cases still being reported (especially during arrest and outside 
detention centres); 
- no independent monitoring of detention centres; 
- need to strengthen the independence of the Council for Forensic 
Medicine and the quality of its reports; 
- fight against impunity of HR violations remains an area of concern; 
- judicial proceedings on allegations of HR violations are often delayed; 
- access to justice: some progress; 
- most detainees consulted lawyers after detention, but the access varies 
across the country; 
- amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code were adopted in December 
2006; 
- prisons: improved physical infrastructures + continued training of staff; 
- problems: overcrowding, lack of consistent implementation of 
provisions, restrictions to correspondence, inadequate health resources; 
- freedom of expression: continued open debate in the media; 
- prosecution and conviction for the non-violent expression of opinions 
are cause of concern – number of individuals prosecuted almost doubled 
in 2006 compared with 2005; 
- further increase in the number of prosecutions in 2007; 
- article 301 needs to be brought in line with the relevant EU standards; 
- general climate of self-censorship; 
- freedom of assembly: broadly in line with European standards; 
- investigation into use of excessive force by police at the 1st May 
demonstration; 
- freedom of association: amendments had positive results; 
- increasing number of associations and membership; 
- positive developments in the registration of religious associations; 
- remains the obligation to notify the authorities in case of financial 
support from abroad; 
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- civil society organisations have taken a more active role in shaping 
policy and address causes; 
- freedom of religion: freedom of worship generally guaranteed; 
- continued dialogue between the government and non-Mulsim 
communities; 
- circular recognises that there has been an increase in the crimes against 
non-Muslim minorities and asks governors to take necessary measures; 
- ID-cards include and entry on religion that may be filled or left blank; 
- language to incite hatred against non-Muslim minorities has been 
unpunished; 
- non-Muslim communities still difficulties (legal personality, property 
rights, etc.); 
- local authorities differ on issuing construction permits for places of 
worship; 
- Alevis still with difficulties to open their places of worship; 
- restriction remain on the training of clergy; 
- “Overall, the environment as regards freedom of religion has not been 
conducive to the full respect of this right in practice. A legal framework 
has yet to be established in line with the ECHR so that all religious 
communities can function without undue constraints. No real progress can 
be reported on the major difficulties encountered by the Alevis and non-
Muslim religious communities.” (pp. 17-18).  
Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights 18-21      
- women’s rights: amendments extended the Law on Protection of the 
Family to all individuals in the family; 
- continued campaigns to prevent violence against women; 
- number of shelters increased; 
- NGO’s campaign regarding women in politics was successful: in 2007 
elections the number of women elected to Parliament almost doubled; 
- but violence against women still widespread, honour killings and early 
marriages continue to happen; 
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- “Overall, progress has been achieved on protecting women from 
violence” (p. 18); 
- children’s rights: efforts to combat child labour continued; 
- gender gap in education decreased; 
- national strategy started to be developed against child poverty; 
- Law on Child Protection: strengthens children’s rights in courts and 
when taken into custody, for example; 
- efforts needed to reduce regional disparities in education; 
- ratio of children who die at birth still high; 
- issue of children not registered needs to be addressed; 
- the way children are treated in institutions is a cause for concern; 
- needed significant improvements of detentions centres and in the quality 
of care and protection provided to children by staff; 
- disabled people: directive issued to regulate the use of electro-
convulsive therapy; 
- no progress regarding access to education, health, etc. for people with 
disabilities; 
- labour rights and trade unions: lifted the requirement to have worked at 
least for 10 years to manage bodies of trade unions; 
- restrictions on the exercise of full trade union rights remain; 
- “Overall, little progress has been achieved with regard to labour rights 
and trade unions” (p. 20); 
- anti-discrimination: enshrined in the Constitution, but no specific 
protection against discrimination on grounds of age and sexual 
orientation; 
- property rights: no progress in the situation of Syriacs. 
Minority rights 21-24      
- law reconfirmed the of non-Muslims to hold schools; 
- minority rights: Turkish approach remains unchanged; 
- full respect for origin, language, etc. should be fully achieved; 
- OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities’ proposal to visit the 
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SE was not accommodated; 
- still some reservations regarding international conventions; 
- Greek minority still with problems; 
- “Overall, Turkey has made no progress on ensuring cultural diversity 
and promoting respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with 
European standards.” (p. 22); 
- cultural rights: new channels broadcasting in other languages allowed, 
but still several restrictions; 
- children with mother tongues different from Turkish cannot learn it at 
school; 
- there are no opportunities to learn Kurdish in public or private schools; 
- no measures to facilitate the access of non-Turkish speakers to public 
services; 
- use of other languages in political life not allowed; 
- no progress regarding the status of Roma; 
- “Turkey has made no progress in the area of cultural rights.” (p. 23); 
- situation in the East and SE: overall socio-economic situation difficult; 
- no comprehensive strategy to achieve economic and social development; 
- deterioration of the situation in terms of attacks by the PKK; 
- established three security zones; 
- landmines remain a security concern; 
- internally displaced persons: progress continued on the process of 
compensation; 
- IDPs in urban areas live in poverty with little or no access to basic 
services; 
- no progress on village guards. 
Chapter 23 58-63      
- “Overall, some progress can be reported on the judiciary” (p. 58); 
- independence of the judiciary: YARSAV (association of judges and 
prosecutors) sought to limit the role of the Ministry of Justice in the 
selection of judges and prosecutors; 
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- YARSAV also sought other changes and improvements; 
- no progress on the composition of the High Council of Judges; 
- no progress on the reporting lines of the judicial inspectors; 
- concerns remain regarding impartiality of the judiciary; 
- professionalism and competence of the judiciary: continued training, but 
without an independent training provider; 
- efficiency of the judiciary: positive results of the National Judicial 
Network Project; 
- funds for the judiciary increased; 
- established new courts + others in construction; 
- mediation and cross-examination not used sufficiently; 
- no developments in the area of judicial reform; 
- “Limited progress can be reported in the area of anti-corruption.” (p. 
59); 
- transparency in public administration: right of access to information 
increased; 
- no progress in strengthening the legal framework and institutional set to 
combat corruption; 
- no developments in limiting parliamentary immunity; 
- ethical principles for deputies and other groups are lacking; 
- no particular developments regarding the implementation of the Council 
of Europe’s recommendations on corruption; 
- corruption remains a widespread issue in the public sector; 
- lacking a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy; 
- “As regards, fundamental rights, there has been limited progress” (p. 
60); 
- no developments regarding the institutions in charge of monitoring and 
promoting HR; 
- torture and ill-treatment: positive effects of legislation + decreasing 
number of cases, but still reports of cases and impunity remains; 
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- respect for private life and family life and communications: needed 
alignment with Data Protection Directive; 
- freedom of thought, conscience and religion: (cfr above) improved 
dialogue between government and non-Muslim minorities; Alevis 
continued problems; 
- no progress regarding conscientious objection; 
- freedom of expression, pluralism and media: several cases of 
prosecutions and convictions of people for non-violent expression of their 
opinions (on Armenian and Kurdish issues, the role of the military, etc.); 
- climate of self-censorship; 
- freedom of assembly and association: citizens able to exercise these 
rights without interference, but there is a case under investigation due to 
excessive use of force by the police; 
- treatment of disabled people and non-discrimination: signed a UN 
Convention + new legislation on gender discrimination on labour market; 
- right to education: continued campaign to enrol girls in schools; 
- right to property: no developments regarding problems faced by non-
Muslim communities; 
- gender equality and women’s rights: improvements with the Law on the 
Protection of the Family adopted in April 2007; 
- alleviated the financial burden of legal proceedings for victims; 
- still low rates of political participation and high rates of violence; 
- rights of the child: decreasing proportion of working children; 
- national strategy against child poverty; 
- rates of unregistered children still high; 
- treatment in institutions is cause of concern; 
- liberty and security, and right to a fair trial: no progress on the 
establishment of an organised professional interpretation system in courts; 
- introduced the compulsory commissioning of a defence lawyer; 
- not enough time to hearings due to workload; 
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- Turkey’s position regarding minority and cultural rights unchanged; 
- no developments regarding EU citizens’ rights. 
- Conclusion (p.63): 
“As regards the judiciary, some progress can be reported, in particular, on 
its efficiency. However, concerns remain regarding its independence and 
impartiality. There is no overall National Reform Strategy for the 
Judiciary or a plan to implement it. As regards corruption, little progress 
has been made in developing a comprehensive anticorruption strategy and 
strengthening the legislative framework. There is still no overall strategy 
or action plan to prevent and fight corruption. As regards fundamental 
rights, there has been limited progress in legislation and in practice. No 
major issue has been addressed and significant problems persist. Finally, 
the atmosphere in the country in particular as regards issues related to 
minorities and religion has not been conducive to the full respect of 
fundamental rights and might de facto restrict their exercise.” 
Chapter 24 63-67      
- limited progress in the field of migration; 
- steps taken to implement the National Action Plan on migration; 
- number of apprehended illegal migrants declined; 
- ongoing readmission agreements with several countries; 
- asylum: limited progress in preparing for the decentralisation of 
procedures and for improved reception conditions; 
- number of asylum seekers rose; 
- new brochures in several languages were published; 
- children of applicants for asylum have the right to attend Turkish 
schools; 
- new legislation is required to ensure uniform implementation in this 
field; 
- visa policy: some progress; 
- further alignment was achieved; 
- external borders and Schengen: limited progress has been made; 
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- judicial cooperation in criminal matters: no progress; 
- police cooperation: limited progress; 
- fight against organised crime: progress; 
- trafficking in human beings: progress; 
- fight against terrorism: progress; 
- fight against drugs: progress; 
- customs cooperation: some progress; 
- Conclusion (p. 67): 
“Turkey continued to make further progress in aligning its legislation with 
the acquis and EU practices in the area of justice, freedom and security, 
and the Turkish legislation is aligned to a certain extent with the EU 
acquis. Progress can be reported particularly in the areas of organised 
crime, drug trafficking and human trafficking. Considerable and sustained 
efforts are required in areas such as police cooperation and external 
borders. The same applies to migration and asylum, where there is a need 
to establish an asylum authority.” 
2008 
Democracy and RoL 6-11      
- In March, the C.Court received a request to dissolve the AKP and to ban 
from politics several of its members, including the Prime-Minister and the 
President of the Republic. Reason: party was a focal point for anti-secular 
activities. In July, the C.Court ruled that the party should not be banned, 
but recognised that it had carried out activities against the secular 
principles of the Republic; 
- in November, the DTP was also requested do be banned to engage in 
activities against the unity and integrity of the state; the case is pending; 
- an investigation started (Ergenekon) and led to the arrest of several 
people, including former military personnel; the charges: forming a 
terrorist organisation, attempting to overthrow the government, to 
undermine the government’s operation by use of violent means. 
Constitution 6-7      
- AKP gave a group of academics a mandate to revise the 1982 
Constitution to align Turkey with international standards on HR; draft not 
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presented; 
- articles amended to lift the headscarf ban for university students, but the 
Constitutional Court annulled the amendments to be contrary to the 
secular nature of the state. 
The Parliament 7      
- adopted 116 bills; 
- in March, Law on elections was amended and Turkish citizens living 
abroad became entitled to participate in parliamentary elections; 
- the C.Court ruled that postal voting was unconstitutional. 
The President 7      
- tried to play a conciliatory role; 
- good relationship with the government; 
- repeatedly called for the acceleration of the EU-related reforms; 
- active role in foreign policy; 
- paid a first-ever visit of a President to Armenia. 
The government 7-8      
- expressed its commitment to the EU accession process and political 
reforms; 
- “However, despite its strong political mandate, the government did not 
put forward a consistent and comprehensive programme of political 
reforms” (p. 7); 
- announced a draft NPAA and started a consultation process, but it was 
not adopted yet; 
- staff and resources of the Secretariat General for EU Affairs remain 
weak; 
- adopted a Law on municipalities establishing new, merging or closing 
down districts and municipalities; 
- continued implementation of local administration laws; 
- Law on Municipalities is still under review in the C.Court; 
- city councils have worked efficiently in a limited number of cities; 
efforts are needed to strengthen city councils, transparency and 
accountability; 
- lack of dialogue and spirit of compromise between the main political 
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parties had a negative impact on the functioning of political institutions. 
Public 
Administration 
8   X   
- a circular was issued to reduce red tape; 
- recruitment and promotion based on merit-based competitive 
examination; 
- politicisation of senior level appointments has been criticised; 
- several issues remain to be addressed: administrative burden, 
simplification, impact assessment, transparency, etc.; 
- strategy development units need to be strengthened; 
- not sent to Parliament a comprehensive draft law on Civil Service. 
NSC/CMR 8-9    X  
- control over the military applied in practice in the military operations in 
Iraq; 
- armed forces continue to exert political influence; 
- no change in some laws that provide the military room for manoeuvre; 
- no progress on civilian control over the gendarmerie; 
- secret protocol on security (to carry military operations without request 
from civilian authorities) remains unchanged; 
- no progress on strengthening parliamentary control over military budget; 
- Court of Auditors can only carry out ex-post audits of military 
expenditure; 
- “Overall, no progress has been made in ensuring full civilian 
supervisory functions over the military and parliamentary oversight of 
defence expenditure. Senior members of the armed forces have made 
statements on issues going beyond their remit.” (p. 9) 
Judicial System 9-10      
- Ministry of Justice has been working on a draft judicial reform strategy 
– a comprehensive document that covers several issues; 
- 846 judges and prosecutors appointed; 
- judges: 6785 in 2007; 6914 in 2008; prosecutors: 3744 in 2007; 3917 in 
2008; 
- funds to the judiciary in 2007: 865€  million; 
- no progress on establishing courts of appeal; 
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- concerns about the impartiality of the judiciary; 
- “Overall, the work to date on the draft judicial reform strategy has been 
a positive development. The Ministry of Justice needs to continue and 
expand the consultations with all stakeholders, including civil society, and 
build the necessary broad support for the strategy. However, concerns 
remain as regards the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Reforms in the area of the judiciary are a priority of the Accession 
Partnership.” (p. 10) 
Anti-corruption 10-11   X   
- Turkey has implemented one third of the recommendations of GRECO’s 
report (and the most important ones were not addressed); 
- it made efforts to ensure implementation of legislation; 
- government failed to prepare a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy; 
- corruption cases frequently reported by the media; 
- no progress on limiting parliamentary immunity; 
- no progress regarding new legislation on the Court of Auditors; 
- no progress on strengthening  Parliamentary oversight over public 
expenditure; 
- “Overall, there has been limited progress in the area of anti-corruption. 
Corruption remains a widespread issue. There has been limited progress 
towards strengthening the legal framework and institutional set-up to fight 
corruption.” (p.11) 
HR and protect. min. 11-28 - - - - - -- 
Observance of HR 11-13      
- no developments regarding ratification of HR instruments; 
- ECtHR delivered 266 judgements finding that Turkey violated ECHR 
(an increasing number); 
- Turkey abided by the final judgment of the ECtHR in the majority of 
cases, but several are waiting for enforcement; 
- progress on the execution of ECtHR judgements, but further efforts are 
needed; 
- several state-sponsored bodies have the task to ensure promotion and 
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enforcement of HR (HR Presidency, HR Investigation Committee, HR 
Advisory Board) – Ombudsman suspended by the C.Court; 
- HR defender have faced criminal proceedings because of their work or 
threats from extremist groups; 
- overall, institutions lack independence and resources; fundamental the 
introduction of an Ombudsman. 
Civil and Pol. Rights 13-19      
- torture and ill-treatment: rights of the detainees protected by safeguards 
to prevent these cases in custody; 
- Ministry continued its work for establishing and independent mechanism 
to investigate complaints against law enforcement officers; 
- Council of Forensic Medicine is preparing for ISO quality accreditation; 
efforts to improve the quantity and quality of these centres; 
- number of people applying to NGOs for cases of torture and ill-
treatment has increased; 
- law amendments: police not entitled to use force unless they face 
resistance; 
- medical reports inaccurate due to lack of resources and expertise; 
- in some cases, law enforcement officers were present even without the 
request of the doctor during medical examinations; 
- impunity for HR violations is cause for concern; 
- lack of prompt, impartial and independent investigation into allegations 
of HR violation; 
- “Overall, there have been limited efforts as regarding the prevention of 
torture and ill-treatment” (p. 14); 
- access to justice: in rural areas, there have been cases where defendants 
did not have access to a lawyer; 
- prison: physical infrastructures continued to improve; 
- staff training continued to improve; 
- greater transparency in the operations of the penal institutions and 
detention houses; 
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- restrictions on prisoners’ correspondence and inadequate health 
resources; 
- reported cases of ill-treatment by prison staff; 
- “Overall, good progress was made on improving infrastructures and on 
training of staff. However, shortcomings as regards restrictions on 
prisoners' conditions, on solitary confinement and on occasional ill-
treatment remain to be addressed.” (p.15); 
- freedom of expression: open debates continue in the Turkish media on 
several issues; 
- Article 301 was amended: to strengthen the safeguards for freedom of 
expression, lowering the upper limit of the penalty, abolishing the higher 
penalty for insults in a foreign country, introducing a requirement for 
permission to be obtained by the Justice Minister to launch a criminal 
investigation + issued a circular on implementing the amended article; 
- however, the wording of the article remains largely the same; 
- other legal provisions that restrict freedom of expression (articles 215, 
216, 217, 288, 318); 
- statements by senior figures criticising the press; 
- frequent and disproportionate website bans; 
- TAF deny access to receptions and briefings to journalists and media; 
- “Overall, with the amendment of Article 301 there has been some 
progress in the efforts to strengthen the safeguards for freedom of 
expression, which is a priority of the Accession Partnership. However, 
only a consistent track record of implementation will show whether or not 
the revised article is adequate. Moreover, further legislative reforms are 
needed to ensure full respect of freedom of expression, in law and in 
practice” (p. 16); 
- freedom of assembly: broadly in line with European standards; 
- problems with implementation (arbitrary limitations have been applied, 
for ex.); 
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- some investigations initiated into allegations of excessive use of force, 
but they depend on the authorisation of the Governor; 
- “Overall, further efforts are needed to ensure freedom of assembly in 
practice in line with European standards, as arbitrary limitations and 
disproportionate use of force against demonstrators still occur.” (p. 17); 
- freedom of association: legal framework improved with amendments; 
- conditions for establishing an association were relaxed and the 
framework for their activities was eased; 
- introduced tax incentives for donations to foundations; 
- foundations are represented in the Foundations Council; 
- remains the obligation to notify the authorities before receiving financial 
support from abroad; 
- “Overall, there were improvements to the legal framework on freedom 
of association. However, some associations faced disproportionate 
administrative difficulties or judicial proceedings” (pp. 17-18); 
- civil society organisations: governmental bodies regularly consult 
NGOs, but no coherent legal framework organising this cooperation (so, 
consultations are at a ad hoc basis);  
- the breadth and scope of civil society organisations need to be 
strengthened; 
- freedom of religion: freedom of worship continued to be generally 
respected; 
- Law on Foundations addresses the issue of property of non-Muslim 
minorities; 
- Alevis: announced an initiative to improve dialogue with this 
community, but this decision was not followed through and Alevis 
continue to face the same problems; 
- Alevis were refused plots to construct Cem houses; 
- reported attacks against non-Muslim clergy and places of worship; 
- still lack of legal personality; 
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- restrictions on training of clergy remain; 
- continued judicial proceedings against conscientious objectors; 
- “Overall, there has been some progress, in particular as regards adoption 
of the Law on foundations. However, the implementation of the Law, 
together with the resolution of the outstanding property-related issues 
regarding non-Muslim minorities remains a challenge.” (p. 19) 
Ec. & Soc. Rights 19-24      
- women’s rights: circular helped improve cooperation between public 
institutions on the fights against violence and honour killings; 
- awareness-raising campaigns organised for members of the judiciary and 
law enforcement bodies; 
- the number shelters has increased; 
- examples of high-level presence of women in several fields; 
- gender gap in primary education decreased; 
- political representation of women still low; 
- women’s access to education is lowest among EU members and OECD; 
- domestic violence, honour killings and early forced marriages still a 
serious problem; 
- women are reluctant to have recourse to the police or the courts due to 
lack of confidence in provision of effective protection; 
- Gender Equality Body and a Parliamentary Committee on Gender 
Equality have to be established; 
- “Overall, the legal framework guaranteeing women's rights and gender 
equality is broadly in place. However, further significant efforts are 
needed.” (p. 21); 
- children’s rights: increase in primary enrolment;  
- increased number of pupils in pre-school; 
- e-school database was created to control children’s attendance;  
- mobile schools trying to reach out children working in agriculture; 
- decreased the proportion of children experiencing poverty; 
- minimum standards on care and protection for children living outside 
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parental care have been developed; 
- the number of specialised staff increased; 
- reception centres have been opened in some provinces; 
- but respect for and implementation of children’s rights continue to be a 
matter of concern; 
- some progress in the juvenile justice system; 
- “Overall, there has been progress on access to education, social services 
and the juvenile justice system. However, efforts need to continue in all 
areas related to children's rights, including administrative capacity, 
education, the juvenile justice system and child labour.” (p. 22); 
- persons with disabilities: increase in the resources allocated to care 
services; 
- progress on electro-convulsive therapy (in line with medical standards); 
- people with disabilities not receiving adequate public services (ex. 
accessing facilities); 
- labour rights and trade unions: Turkey needs to ensure these rights are in 
line with EU standards and ILO; 
- reported restrictions on trade unions rights; 
- social dialogue mechanisms are weak; 
- anti-discrimination: enshrined in the Constitution and other laws; 
- LGBT community refused to register for legal status; 
- homosexuals can be exempted from military service, but the verification 
of their orientation is made through degrading medical and psychological 
tests or demanding proof of homosexuality; 
- homophobia sometimes results in violence; 
- property rights: Law on Foundations was adopted in February; 
- new law allows foundations to own and manage property + some 
specificities for non-Muslim communities; 
- problems with Greek minority and property rights continue to be 
reported; 
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- Syriacs continue to report problems of seizure of properties; 
- “Overall, adoption of the Law on foundations has been a welcome step 
forward. However, implementation of the Law will be crucial. The 
outstanding issues also need to be addressed. Finally, the quality of the 
dialogue between the authorities and the communities concerned will be 
instrumental in creating an environment conducive to achieving 
progress.” (p. 24). 
Minority rights, 
cultural rights and 
protection of 
minorities 
24-27   X   
- minority rights: situation of Treaty of Lausanne unchanged; 
- Turkey should grant specific rights to certain Turkish citizens on the 
grounds of their origin, religion, etc. 
- Turkey has some reservations regarding rights of minorities in 
international treaties; 
- management of minority schools remains an issue; 
- Greek minority still problems with property and education rights; 
- “Overall, Turkey has made no progress on ensuring cultural diversity 
and promoting respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with 
European standards.” (p. 25); 
- cultural rights: following amendment, the public service broadcaster is 
allowed to broadcast nationally all day long in other languages; 
- a new radio channel was authorised to broadcast in Kurdish; 
- launching a channel broadcasting in other languages has been delayed; 
- educational programmes not allowed to be broadcasted in Kurdish + 
other restrictions; 
- children whose mother tongue is not Turkish cannot learn it in public 
schools; 
- no courses of Kurdish available; 
- no measures to improve the access to public services for non-speakers of 
Turkish; 
- using other languages but Turkish is forbidden in political life; 
- Roma: no steps have been taken to amend the Law on the Movement 
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and Residence of Aliens; 
- Roma face social exclusion and marginalisation; 
- “Overall, Turkey made some limited progress on cultural rights, but 
restrictions continue, particularly on the use of languages other than 
Turkish in broadcasting, in political life and when accessing public 
services. There are no opportunities to learn these languages in the public 
or private schooling systems. There has been no progress in the situation 
of the Roma” (p. 27). 
Situation in the E 
and SE 
27      
- investments scheduled to develop the SE; 
- terrorist attacks by the PKK continued; 
- landmines continue to be a security concern. 
Refugees and IDP 27-28      
- progress on the process of compensation of losses due to terrorism; 
- shortcomings in the implementation of the Law (uneven and inequitable 
calculation of compensation); 
- IDPs situation in urban areas remain a cause for concern; 
- IDPs suffer from economic and social marginalisation + no overall 
strategy to address their situation; 
- no steps to abolish the system of village guards. 
Chapter 23 66-71      
- “There has been some progress on the judiciary” (p. 66); 
- independence of the judiciary: improvement with the adoption of new 
laws that promote transparent scoring and specific selection criteria; 
- some criticisms: new selection criteria open to subjective interpretation; 
- recruited more judges and prosecutors; 
- no progress regarding the composition of the High Council of Judges; 
- impartiality of  the judiciary: concerns remain; 
- professionalism and competence: continued training, but no independent 
training provider; 
- efficiency: positive results of the national judicial network project + 
software developed + increasing number of judges and prosecutors; 
- no developments on establishing courts of appeal; 
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- judicial reform: some developments; draft strategy was discussed with 
judges and prosecutors; 
- anti-corruption: limited progress; 
- fundamental rights: some legislative progress; 
- institutions monitoring and promoting HR: no developments; 
- torture and ill treatment: further efforts needed; 
- respect for private and family life: need to align legislation with data 
protection acquis; 
- freedom of thought, conscience and religion: progress; 
- freedom of expression and freedom of the media: some progress, but 
some issues remains as a cause for concern; 
- freedom of assembly and association: broadly in line with European 
standards, but sometimes excessive use of force + other restrictions on 
associations; 
- treatment of disabled persons and non-discrimination: progress has been 
made regarding mental health; difficulties in accession to public services, 
lack of legal protection on the grounds of sexual orientation; 
- right to education: gender gap diminished, primary school enrolment 
increased, e-school database contains information on school attendance; 
but children out of school remain a problem; 
- right to property: Law on foundations was an improvement, but does not 
address non-Muslim communities’ problems; 
- gender equality and women’s rights: some progress; 
- rights of the child: progress, but efforts need to continue; 
- liberty, security and right to a fair trial: rural areas do not have 
immediate access to lawyer, interpretation in other languages in courts is 
an issue of concern; 
- minorities rights: limited progress; 
- Conclusion (p. 71): 
“As regards the judiciary, there has been some progress, in particular on 
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establishment of a judicial reform strategy. However, concerns remain 
about the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. The reform 
strategy is expected to address these issues. Limited progress can be 
reported on anti-corruption. The government has continued to implement 
its initiatives. However, there is no legislation in place that would 
guarantee transparency of election campaign financing. There has been no 
progress on the immunity of Members of Parliament. Codes of ethics 
and/or conduct for Members of Parliament and other groups of public 
officials are lacking and an anti-corruption strategy and action plan need 
to be developed and to receive the political support necessary for 
implementation. As regards fundamental rights, there has been some 
legislative progress, but vigorous further efforts need to be made to ensure 
full respect of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR and the 
case law of the ECtHR”. 
Chapter 24 71-75      
- migration: some progress; 
- management of irregular migrants in turkey: limited progress; 
- asylum: limited progress; 
- visa policy: no progress; 
- external borders and Schengen: limited progress; 
- judicial cooperation in criminal matters: no progress; 
- police cooperation: limited progress; 
- fight against organised crime: some progress; 
- trafficking in human beings: progress; 
- fight against terrorism: some measures taken; 
- fight against drugs: some progress; 
- customs cooperation: some progress; 
- Conclusion: (p.75) 
“Overall, some progress can be reported, particularly to prevent drugs and 
human trafficking. Alignment with the acquis in this chapter is underway, 
but sustained efforts are required in areas such as visa policy and judicial 
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co-operation in criminal matters. The same applies to the fight against 
organised crime, which remains a serious concern. The capacity to 
manage asylum and migration needs to be improved. Efforts need to be 
stepped up to implement the national action plan on integrated border 
management. The negotiations for an EC-Turkey readmission agreement 
need to be re-launched.”. 
2009 
Democracy and RoL 6-13      
- Ergenekon investigations continued; concerns about the effective 
judicial guarantees for all suspects; 
- the case for closure of the DTP is still pending before the C. Court; 
- “is an opportunity for Turkey to strengthen confidence in the proper 
functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law. It is 
important that proceedings in this context fully respect the due process of 
law, in particular the rights of the defendants.” (p. 7). 
Constitution 7      
- debate on constitution reform continued – growing awareness that the 
1982 Constitution needs to be changed to further democratisation; 
- there is no consensus between political parties regarding the reforms. 
The Parliament 7      
- established a consultative Committee on Equal Opportunities for Men 
and Women; 
- work on improving parliament’s rules of procedure has yet to be 
completed. 
President 8      
- President made efforts to promote dialogue between political parties and 
civil society; 
- continued to promote and encourage EU-oriented reforms. 
Government  8      
- reaffirmed its commitment to the European process; 
- appointed a full-time EU Chief Negotiator with the status of State 
Minister; 
- EUSG placed under the EU Chief Negotiator + increased staff + wider 
and clearer responsibilities; 
- Reform Monitoring Group met more regularly; 
- “However, these efforts need to translate into more concrete progress. 
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Despite the government's strong popular mandate and large majority in 
parliament, overall limited concrete progress was made on political 
reforms.” (p. 8) 
- local elections were free and fair; 
- no progress on transferring powers to local governments; 
- some problems regarding transparency and municipalities that should be 
addressed. 
Public 
Administration 
9    X   
- a regulation established the principles and procedures for the 
administration to improve its services; 
- key challenges that remain: reducing red tape, establishing 
administrative procedures,  enhancing transparency, etc; 
- implementation of the Public Financial Management and Control Law 
remains cause for concern; 
- little progress has been made concerning the civil service system; 
- “Overall, little progress has been made on public administration reform. 
Considerable further efforts are needed, in particular on the modernisation 
of civil service. Reducing red tape and promoting administrative 
simplification, as well as further developing a professional, independent, 
accountable, transparent and merit-based civil service remain priorities.” 
(p. 9). 
NSC/CMR 9-11  X    
- new legislation passed allowing civilian courts to try military personnel; 
- amended the Regulation on the Organisation and Duties of the 
gendarmerie, clarifying the powers of the police and the gendarmerie;  
- allegations of senior members of the armed forces being involved in 
anti-government activities; 
- jurisdiction of military courts needs alignment with EU standards; 
- TAF continue to exercise political influence through direct and indirect 
means; 
- no changes to Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law or to the Law 
on the National Security Council; 
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- no progress regarding the legislative oversight of the military 
expenditures; 
- Parliament has no mandate to develop security and defence policies; 
- “Overall, some progress has been made, in particular on limiting the 
jurisdiction of military courts.” (p.11). 
Judicial system 11-12  X    
- judicial reform strategy was adopted by the government – positive, as it 
is a comprehensive document; 
- hiring judicial staff: some progress (7081 judges, 4040 prosecutors); 
- independence of the judiciary: no progress on the composition of the 
High Council of Judges and Prosecutors;  
- impartiality: some statements made put it at risk; 
- efficiency: regional courts of appeal have not been established; 
- high-profile cases raised concerns about the quality of the investigations; 
- need to improve the working relationship between the gendarmerie and 
the police,  and the judiciary; 
- reports of violation of procedural rights of the accused and leaks of 
information in the Ergenekon case; 
- pre-trial detention does not limited to the necessary; 
- “Overall, some progress has been made in the area of the judiciary. The 
adoption by the government of the judicial reform strategy following a 
process of consultation with all stakeholders is a positive step. The 
measures taken to increase staff and funding are also positive. However, 
these efforts need to be continued, and concerns remain with regard to the 
independence, impartiality and effectiveness of the judiciary, such as the 
composition of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors and the 
establishment of the regional courts of appeal.” (p. 12). 
Anti-corruption 12-13   X   
- fighting corruption: limited progress; 
- Penal Code and the Code of Misdemeanours were amended to follow 
international recommendations; 
- government developed a consultation with stakeholders (including 
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NGOs) to prepare the national anti-corruption strategy; 
- the commission created to enhance transparency and good governance 
had almost no political initiative; 
- the Ethics Board for Civil Servants published four decisions for the first 
time; 
- no progress concerning extending the ethic rules to academics, military 
personnel and the judiciary; 
- no progress on limiting the immunity of the MPs regarding corruption-
related cases; 
- no progress on the political parties’ financing; 
- no progress on adopting the legislation on the Court of Auditors; 
- “Overall, the legislative framework designed to prevent corruption has 
been improved. However, corruption remains prevalent in many areas. 
Turkey needs to finalise an anticorruption strategy and to develop a track 
record of investigations, indictments, prosecutions and convictions.” (p. 
13).  
HR and protect. min. 13-31 - - - - - --- 
Observance of HR 13-15  X    
- some international documents signed and ratified; 
- ECtHR delivered 318 judgements finding that Turkey violated the 
ECHR; there were more applications to the ECtHR against Turkey; 
- continued progress on executing ECtHR judgements; 
- implementation of ECtHR judgements that required legislative measures 
is delayed; 
- several state bodies promote and enforce HR in Turkey: applications to 
these bodies increased; staff training continued; 
- HR defenders continue to face criminal proceedings; 
- adoption of the Ombudsman Law was annulled by the C. Court, which 
implies that the Constitution is changed, but that has not been met due to 
lack of agreement in the Parliament; 
- “Overall, there was some progress on observance of international human 
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rights law. However, implementation of some ECtHR judgments 
requiring legislative amendments has been outstanding for several years. 
Further efforts are needed to strengthening the institutional framework on 
human rights, in particular as regards the establishment of an independent 
human rights institution and of an Ombudsman. The ratification of the 
OPCAT is overdue.” (p. 15). 
Civil and Pol. Rights 15-22      
- torture and ill-treatment: continued efforts to comply with the legal 
safeguards; 
- efforts continued in the training and in the improvement of equipment; 
- drafted the creation of an independent national mechanism to investigate 
the citizens’ complaints that will cover law enforcement officials; 
- Council of Europe carried out a mission to Turkey and paid attention to 
prisons, detainees, etc.; this report needs to be published; 
- forensic medical doctors only recognised if they belong to the Forensic 
Medicine Council, which creates a monopoly and harms independence 
and effectiveness; 
- fight against impunity: need to improve the efforts to reduce impunity 
for HR violations; 
- “Overall, while the Turkish legal framework includes a comprehensive 
set of safeguards against torture and ill-treatment, efforts to implement it 
and fully apply the government's zero tolerance policy have been limited. 
Allegations of torture and ill-treatment, and impunity for perpetrators are 
still a cause for great concern” (p. 16); 
- access to justice: easier in urban areas, but problems in rural areas; 
- “Overall, effective legal assistance is limited and a number of criminal 
defendants remain unrepresented. Defendants' awareness on the 
availability of free legal assistance needs to be raised.” (p. 16); 
- prison: reform programme brought improvements in prison conditions 
and infrastructures; 
- programme was implemented with the opening of new prisons and the 
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closure of outdated ones – but implementation is uneven; 
- rapid growth of inmates led to overcrowding problems; 
- still high proportion of pre-trial detainees; 
- national framework for prison monitoring falls short of the 
requirements; 
- concerns regarding imprisoned juveniles; 
- restrictions on the use of other languages on the phone was eased; 
- healthcare resources are inadequate; 
- reported cases of ill-treatment by prison staff; 
- “Overall, some progress was made on improving training and 
infrastructure, and recruiting additional prison staff. However, the 
problem of overcrowding and the high proportion of prisoners in pre-trial 
detention remain to be addressed.” (p. 17); 
- freedom of expression: article 301 no longer used systematically to 
reduce freedom of expression – its revision led to a decrease in the 
prosecutions; 
- C.Court annulled the provisions of the Anti-Terror Law making media 
owners responsible for publishing terrorist propaganda; 
- intensive public debate took place about the Armenian genocide; 
- legislation often interpreted in a restrictive way that limits freedom of 
expression; 
- amendments to the Anti-Terror Law resulted in the suspension of several 
periodicals; 
- journalists face frequent prosecutions; 
- frequent website bans; 
- “Overall, there is an increasingly open and free debate in Turkish 
society, including on issues traditionally perceived as sensitive. Article 
301 of the Turkish Criminal Code is no longer used systematically to 
restrict freedom of expression. However, there are prosecutions and 
convictions based on a number of other articles of the criminal Code. 
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Turkish law does not sufficiently guarantee freedom of expression in line 
with the ECHR and the ECtHR case law. Political pressures on the media 
and legal uncertainties affect freedom of the press in practice.” (p. 19); 
- freedom of assembly: further efforts were made; 
- circular stressed the need for the correct implementation of detention 
and apprehension procedures (namely use of force); 
- need to improve the difficult working conditions of the police; 
- some demonstration took place peacefully, but some reports of video-
taping of demonstrations and NGO’s activities; 
- freedom of association: number of associations and membership 
continued to increase; 
- relaxed the conditions for establishing a foundation; 
- annulled the restriction of university’s professors right of association; 
- some legal provisions place an undue burden on the operations of 
associations (high fines, notification of foreign financial support, etc.); 
- still problems with registration of associations and foundations (ex. local 
representations of international NGOs); 
- continued obstacles to trade unions; 
- “Overall, the legal framework on associations is broadly in line with 
European standards. However, considerable progress needs to be made as 
regards its implementation, as associations still face disproportionate 
scrutiny of their activities, which in some cases has led to judicial 
proceedings.” (p. 20); 
- civil society organisations: growing awareness of the role of civil society 
organisations; 
- difficulties with the consultation procedure reveal the lack of trust 
between the state and civil society organisations; 
- tax exemptions for NGOs need to be strengthened in line with EU 
practices to ease NGOs’ financial sustainability; 
- freedom of religion: freedom of worship continues to be generally 
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respected; 
- implementation of the Law on Foundations proceeded smoothly 
- progress on obtaining working permits for foreign clergy; 
- Turkish authorities visited non-Muslim communities to discuss their 
problems; 
- Minister of Culture participated in the opening in the first Alevi Institute 
and apologised for past sufferings caused by the State; 
- the Prime Minister attended an Alevi fast-breaking ceremony; 
- government held workshops to discuss the problems and expectations of 
the Alevis; 
- 3 municipal councils recognised Cem houses as places of worship and 
granted them the same financial advantages as mosques; 
- administrative courts ruled that Alevi students should be exempted from 
attending the mandatory religion and ethics course; 
- but religious culture and ethics classes remain mandatory and the 
ECtHR demanded Turkey to bring its education system into line with the 
ECHR; 
- non-Muslim communities still face problems with their lack of legal 
personality; 
- restrictions on the training of clergy remain; 
- ID cards still contain information on religion; 
- non-Muslim communities report discrimination and administrative 
uncertainty regarding places of worship; 
- there are claims that minorities’ worship activities are monitored and 
recorded by security forces; 
- reported attacks and threats against non-Muslim clergy and places of 
worship; 
- continued judicial proceedings against conscientious objectors on 
religious grounds; 
- “Overall, implementation of the law on foundations has been smooth. 
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The Government has undertaken a dialogue with the Alevi and non-
Muslim religious communities. However, their specific problems have yet 
to be addressed. Attacks against minority religions still occur. A legal 
framework in line with the ECHR has yet to be established, so that all 
non-Muslim religious communities and Alevi community can function 
without undue constraints, including as regards training of clergy. Further 
efforts are needed to create an environment conducive to full respect of 
freedom of religion in practice.” (p. 22). 
Ec. & Social Rights 22-27      
- women’s rights: established a Parliamentary committee on Equal 
Opportunities (to monitor gender equality, give opinions, propose steps, 
etc.); 
- amendment ensures public servants are paid maternity leave for 16 
weeks; 
- improvement in mother and child health indicators over the last five 
years, but still with regional differences; 
- awareness-raising activities and training programmes continued (to 
health personnel, judiciary staff, etc); 
- gender equality remains a major challenge; 
- political representation of women remains very low; 
- women’s participation in the labour market remains very low; 
- domestic violence, honour killings and early and forced marriages are 
still serious problems; 
- family courts take long time to issue restraining orders to protect 
women; 
- need for more shelters; 
- lack of an effective dialogue between the government and civil society 
organisations on gender issues; 
- “Overall, the legal framework guaranteeing women’s rights and gender 
equality is broadly in place. However, further significant efforts are 
needed to turn the legal framework into reality and to narrow the gap 
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between men and women in economic participation and opportunity, 
political empowerment and access to education. Domestic violence, 
honour killings and early and forced marriages remain serious problems 
in some areas of the country. There is a need for further training and 
awareness-raising on women’s rights and gender equality, for both men 
and women.” (p. 24); 
- children’s rights: gender gap in primary education was halved; 
- children in pre-school increased by 14%; 
- number of pre-school teachers increased too; 
- e-school system allows the Ministry to identify children who are out of 
school; 
- infant, child and under-five mortality rates have decreased; 
- child courts need to be established in all provinces; 
- poverty rate of children increased; 
- regional disparities persist; 
- no progress on combating child labour; 
- juvenile justice: anti-Terror Law provides children between 15 and 18 
years old can be tried as adults – the number of cases against them 
increased, there are reports of ill-treatment while in detention and 
convictions often based on police’s statements rather than firm evidence; 
- physical conditions and quality of services provided in juvenile 
detention centres need to be improved; 
- “Overall, efforts need to be further stepped up in all areas related to 
children’s rights, including administrative capacity, health, education, the 
juvenile justice system and child labour. Cases of juveniles tried as adults 
and facing disproportionate sentences raise serious concerns.” (p. 25); 
- disabled people: conventions ratified; 
- mental health is cause for concern; 
- further efforts needed regarding treatment programmes, physical 
infrastructures and training; 
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- no comprehensive data on persons with disabilities; 
- disabled persons not provided with accession conditions in the elections; 
- labour rights and trade unions: reinstatement of May 1st as public 
holiday + allow trade unions to demonstrate at Taksim Square two 
symbolic improvements; 
- efforts to reform trade union legislation did not bear fruit – legislation 
still not in line with EU standards and ILO Conventions; 
- reported cases of restricting trade unions’ rights and of dismissals due to 
trade union’s membership; 
- social dialogue in Turkey is weak; 
- anti-discrimination: enshrined in the Constitution and other laws; 
- government raised public awareness on anti-discrimination and decided 
that the first lecture of the school year should be this issue; 
- legal framework not aligned with the EU acquis; 
- several cases of discrimination at the workplace (ex. LGBT members 
fired due to their sexual orientation); 
- homophobia has resulted in cases of violence (courts often use the 
principle of “unjust provocation” in favour of perpetrators); 
- TAF consider homosexuality as a illness and demand photographic 
proof to exempt from military service or humiliating medical 
examinations; 
- property rights: implementation of the Law on Foundations occurred 
smoothly; 
- Turkish authorities met with members of non-Muslim community 
foundations to discuss property-related issues; 
- properties seized and sold to third parties and properties of foundations 
merged before the new legislation were not addressed yet; 
- Syriacs continue to face problems with property; 
- Greeks continue to report problems with inheriting  and registering 
property; 
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- “Overall, the Law on Foundations has been implemented smoothly over 
the reporting period. However, it does not address the issues of properties 
seized and sold to third parties or of properties of foundations merged 
before the new legislation was adopted. Turkey needs to ensure full 
respect of the property rights of all non-Muslim religious communities.” 
(p. 27). 
Minority rights & 
Cultural Rights 
27-30      
- public debate on minorities has developed; several reports and studies 
published; 
- work under way to remove discriminatory language from school books; 
- approach to minorities rights remains restrictive; 
- still some reservations to or not signed international documents; 
- need for a dialogue between Turkey and the OSCE on minorities – that 
would improve the alignment with international standards; 
- Greek minority: still problems with education and property; 
- some hate speeches against the Jewish community (after the intervention 
in Gaza in 2008); 
- “Overall, full respect for and protection of language, culture and 
fundamental rights, in accordance with European standards have yet to be 
fully achieved. Turkey made limited efforts to enhance tolerance or 
promote inclusiveness vis-à-vis minorities.” (p. 28); 
- cultural rights: public service broadcaster started to broadcast in Kurdish 
24h/day; 
- allowed an university-based institute for post-graduate education in 
Kurdish and other languages; 
- At the channel’s inauguration ceremony, the P-M spoke some words in 
Kurdish; 
- public radio network started to broadcast in Armenian; 
- during local election campaigns, some parties used Kurdish in political 
activities – it is still forbidden legally, but almost no legal action 
launched; 
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- educational programmes in Kurdish not allowed; 
- Children whose mother tongue is not Turkish cannot learn their mother 
tongue in the Turkish public schools; 
- no measures taken to facilitate access to public services for non-speakers 
of Turkish; 
- Roma: no steps taken to amend the law on the Movement and Residence 
of Aliens; 
- Turkey needs to establish a strategy to address these issues with the 
Roma; 
- Roma face social exclusion, marginalisation and discrimination in 
several fields; 
- “Overall, Turkey has made some progress on cultural rights, especially 
in the form of starting the Kurdish-language TV channel TRT 6. 
However, restrictions remain, particularly on use of languages other than 
Turkish in private TV and radio broadcasting, political life, education and 
contacts with public services. The legal framework on the use of 
languages other than Turkish is open to restrictive interpretations and 
implementation is inconsistent. There has been no progress in the 
situation of the Roma, who frequently face discriminatory treatment. 
Demolitions of Roma districts without provision of alternative housing 
continue.” (p. 29-30). 
Situation in the E 
and SE 
30-31      
- continuous terrorist violence – loss of lives; 
- President’s visit to Iraq created a more positive environment regarding a 
solution to the Kurish issue; 
- additional resources continued to be allocated to the SE to promote its 
socio-economic development; 
- Kurdish celebrations passed peacefully; 
- Parliament adopted a Law on the De-mining of the Turkish-Syrian 
Border (in part suspended by the C. Court); 
- use of anti-terror law resulted in restrictions to fundamental freedoms; 
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- landmines remain a concern; 
- no steps to abolish the system of village guards; 
- “Overall, despite continuing terrorist violence, the government has 
opened a wide-ranging public debate -covering cultural, political and 
economic matters- on the Kurdish issue. It is crucial that this debate be 
followed by concrete measures. The Law on the de-mining of the Syrian 
Border is another positive step. However, the broad interpretation of anti-
terror legislation has resulted in undue restrictions on the exercise of 
fundamental rights. The village guard system still needs to be phased 
out.” (p. 31). 
Refugees & IDPs 31      
- process of compensation of losses continued to make progress; 
- situation of IDPs in urban areas remains a cause for concern: economic 
and social marginalisation, lack of access to health and education; 
- national strategy to address IDPs’ situation not finished yet; 
- asylum-seekers: several limitations on the access to procedural rights in 
detention. 
Chapter 23 69-73      
- “There has been some progress on the judiciary” (p. 69); 
- anti-corruption: limited progress; 
- “As regards fundamental rights, there has been some progress” (p. 71); 
- minorities rights and cultural rights: some progress; 
- Conclusion (p. 73): 
“Overall, there has been some progress as regards the judiciary. The 
adoption by the government of the judicial reform strategy following a 
process of consultation with all stakeholders is a positive step. The 
measures taken to increase staff and resources are also positive and need 
to be continued. However, concerns with particular regard to the 
independence, impartiality and effectiveness of the judiciary have yet to 
be addressed.”. 
Chapter 24 73-78      
- migration and asylum: limited progress; 
- visa policy: little progress; 
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- external borders and Schengen: limited progress; 
- judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters: no progress; 
- fight against organised crime: limited progress; 
- fight against drugs: some progress; 
- customs cooperation: some progress; 
- Conclusion (p. 78): 
“Some, but uneven progress was made in the area of justice, freedom and 
security. Turkey has achieved limited progress on external borders and 
Schengen. Limited progress can also be reported in the field of migration 
and asylum. In the face of a sharp increase in asylum seekers efforts need 
to continue to reorganise the system. As to the EC-Turkey readmission 
Agreement, Turkey recently accepted to resume formal negotiations 
blocked since December 2006. Turkey has shown efforts with a view to 
conclude a working arrangement with FRONTEX. There has been little 
progress on visa policy and none on judicial cooperation in criminal and 
civil matters”. 
 
Legend: Democracy and RoL – Democracy and Rule of Law 
 HR and protect. min. – Human Rights and protection of minorities 
 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights (only since 2005) 
Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security (in 1999: “Justice and Home Affairs”; 2000- 2005: “Co-operation in the field of justice and home 
affairs”) 
NSC: National Security Council; CMR: Civil-military relations 
Civil and Pol. Rights: Civil and Political Rights 
Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 P – Progress; LP – Limited Progress; NP – No Progress; NM – Not mentioned. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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APPENDIX 8 – MODEL – DATA  
 
 
Attribute Indicator 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
R
ig
h
ts
 
Freedom of Assembly and Association 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Electoral Self-Determination 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Women’s Political Rights 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
Freedom of Association 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Freedom of Assembly 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Disclosure rules for contributions to 
political parties 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Congruence between left and right 94.84 94.84 93.60 56.87 56.87 56.87 56.87 56.27 56.27   
Political Rights 4  4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
S
o
ci
a
l 
R
ig
h
ts
 
Worker’s Rights 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Women’s Social Rights 1 1 1 1 1 1   1   
Trade Union Density 12.4 10.6 9.9 10 9.5 8.9 8.3 7.8 7.2   
Public Expenditure on Health   5.6 5.9 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.8 6.0 6.1  
Education Index  0.51     0.56 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.6 
HDI  0.65     0.68 0.69 0.70 0.7 0.71 
Hospital Beds  200.2 205.8 207.06 208.4 216.3 220.3 234.8 242.8 242.3 249.4 
Public Expenditure on Education 0.47 0.48 0.54 0.53 0.48 0.52 0.59 0.58 0.72 0.73 0.85 
Infant Mortality Rate  31.5 28.4 25.6 23.1 20.9 18.9 17.5 16.7 16.0 15.3 
Early School Leavers  58.1 58.1 55.1 52.9 52.2 50 49.1 47.2 45.7 44.6 
Quality of the educational system        3.88 3.51 3.37 3.36 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 
R
ig
h
ts
 
Women’s Economic Rights 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 
Employment rate   47.8 46.7 45.5 46.1 44.4 44.6 44.6 44.9 44.3 
Unemployment rate   8.6 10.6 10.8 10.6 10.9 10.5 10.5 11.2 14.3 
Female employment rate   26.3 26.6 25.2 22.3 22.3 22.7 22.8 23.5 24.2 
Macroeconomic Environment        4.29 4.66 4.79 4.66 
Global Competitiveness Index        4.14 4.25 4.15 4.16 
Table 13: Turkey’s democratic performance – absolute values 
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GDP/capita evolution -4.7 5.3 -7 4.8 3.9 8 7.1 5.6 3.4 -0.6 -6.1 
Expenditure on R&D 0.47 0.48 0.54 0.53 0.48 0.52 0.59 0.58 0.72 0.73 0.85 
Foreign Direct Investment    0.3 0.4 0.5 1.2 2 1.9 1.5 0.8 
C
iv
il
 R
ig
h
ts
 
Politically motivated disappearances 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Political Imprisonment  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Torture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Freedom of Foreign Movement 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 
Freedom of Religion 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Freedom of Speech [CIRI] 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Freedom of Speech [Democracy 
Barometer] 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Freedom of the press 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Number of newspapers 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.84 1.10 0.92 0.98 1.17 1.29   
Neutral newspapers’ circulation 42.26 42.11 42.11 42.11 41.37 40.62 39.88 39.88 40.82   
Restriction of Freedom of Information 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2   
Effectiveness of Freedom of 
Information 
0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2   
Legal Environment of Press Freedom 7 8 8 4 7 12 14 13 11   
Political Environment of press freedom 16.67 23.33 23.33 17 17 17 19 20 21   
Membership in Humanitarian 
Organisations 
4.2 4.2 3.4 2.6 1.8 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.2   
Civil Liberties 5  5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
Press Freedom Score    58 55 52 48 48 49 51 50 
Political Terror Scale [Amnesty 
International] 
4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 
Political Terror Scale [US State 
Department] 
4 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 
R
u le
 
o
f 
L
a w
 Extrajudicial killings 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Independence of the judiciary [CIRI] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
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Constitutional Provisions for fair 
organisation of court system 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Constitutional Provisions guaranteeing 
public trial 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Independence of the judiciary [DB] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Confidence in the legal system 69.83 71.37 70.08 68.79 67.50 66.21 64.92 64.97 65.02   
Confidence in the police 70.44 72.4 71.88 71.37 70.85 70.33 69.81 69.37 68.92   
Corruption within the political system 2 2.58 2.83 2 2.33 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5   
Transparency of government policy 4.39 6.03 3.71 3.38 3.73 4.43 5 4.24 4.17   
Judicial independence  5.3 3.3 4.5 4.5 4.3 5.3 5.7 5 4.5 4 
Impartial courts  6.5 2.8 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.7 4.5 3.8 4 4.2 
Integrity of the legal system  6.7 6.7 6.7 8.3 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
Corruption Perception Index     3.1 3.2 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.6 4.4 
Rule of Law  -0.06  -0.06 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.09 
Control of corruption  -0.33  -0.71 -0.23 -0.17 -0.02 0 0.09 0.08 0.09 
Reliability of police services        4.24 4.55 3.96 3.63 
H
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
 Checks and balances 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75   
Balance between the government and 
the opposition 
0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65   
Political interference by the military 1 2 3 2.92 2.92 4 4 3 2   
Political interference by religion 3.92 4 4 4 4.42 5 5 5 4.5   
Military interference  5 5 5 6.7 6.7 6.7 5 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Regulatory Quality  0.36  0.09 0.03 0.07 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.27 0.32 
V
er
ti
ca
l 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
i
li
ty
 
Registered voters as % voting 92.29 92.29 92.29 95.95 95.95 95.95 95.95 95.95 87.92   
Facilitation of electoral participation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Participation rate of registered 87.09 87.09 87.09 76.94 76.94 76.94 76.94 76.94 75.86   
Participation in petitions 13.79 13.84 13.80 13.76 13.73 13.69 13.65 12.42 11.19   
Participation in demonstrations 6.16 6.27 6.38 6.49 6.61 6.72 6.83 6.39 5.95   
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Proportion of female representatives in 
Parliament 
4.2 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 9.1   
Voice and Accountability  -0.44  -0.34 -0.12 -0.03 -0.04 -0.16 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 
R
es
p
o
n
si
v
en
es
s 
Confidence in the government 51.31 51.83 54.52 57.22 59.92 62.62 65.31 63.09 60.87   
Governmental stability 68.72 68.72 68.72 93.85 93.85 93.85 93.85 93.85    
Effective implementation of 
government decisions 
3.84 5.56 4.18 4.16 4.55 5.14 5.78 4.98 5.22   
Government Effectiveness  0.02  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.29 0.26 0.34 
Political stability  -0.84  -0.88 -0.82 -0.85 -0.6 -0.6 -0.82 -0.84 -1.06 
Trust in the government      72 76 67 71 47 57 
Trust in the national Parliament      72 73 64 74 47 58 
Trust in political parties      24 28 19 23 18 26 
Public trust in politicians        2.62 2.79 2.38 2.18 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on sources indicated on Table 9 
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Table 14: Turkey’s democratic performance – converted values 
Attribute Indicator 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
R
ig
h
ts
 
Freedom of Assembly and Association 50 0 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 0 0 
Electoral Self-Determination 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 0 50 
Women’s Political Rights 66.67 66.67 66.67 66.67 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 66.67 66.67 66.67 
Freedom of Association 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50   
Freedom of Assembly 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50   
Disclosure rules for contributions to 
political parties 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
Congruence between left and right 94.84 94.84 93.60 56.87 56.87 56.87 56.87 56.27 56.27   
Political Rights 50.01  50.01 50.01 66.68 66.68 66.68 66.68 66.68 66.68 66.68 
S
o
ci
a
l 
R
ig
h
ts
 
Worker’s Rights 50 100 50 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 50 
Women’s Social Rights 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33   33.33   
Trade Union Density 12.4 10.6 9.9 10 9.5 8.9 8.3 7.8 7.2   
Public Expenditure on Health   53.85 55.66 48.62 49.1 48.65 52.78 54.55 54.96  
Education Index  51     56 57 59 59 60 
HDI  65     68 69 70 70 71 
Hospital Beds  21.96 22.84 23.34 23.83 25.22 26.02 28.3 29.47 29.5 30.27 
Public Expenditure on Education 14.83 14.33 16.27 15.77 13.95 15.07 16.95 16.67 20.75 19.73 21.57 
Infant Mortality Rate 64.8 68.5 71.6 74.4 76.9 79.1 81.1 82.5 83.3 84 84.7 
Early School Leavers  46.04 44.77 47.31 49.37 49.95 52.58 53.64 55.29 57.22 58.26 
Quality of the educational system        48.01 41.84 39.51 39.34 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 R
ig
h
ts
 
Women’s Economic Rights 66.67 33.33 66.67 66.67 66.67 66.67 33.33 33.33 66.67 33.33 33.33 
Employment rate   62.98 61.13 60.59 60.66 58.5 57.62 60.27 57.64 58.6 
Unemployment rate   93.08 91.79 92.63 93.61 93.3 03.23 92.84 91.55 88.99 
Female employment rate   35.78 36.24 34.62 30.97 31.02 30.93 31.15 31.71 33.29 
Macroeconomic Environment        54.84 61.01 63.18 61.01 
Global Competitiveness Index        52.34 54.18 52.51 52.68 
GDP/capita evolution -47.47 51.46 -92.12 60 34.82 90.91 73.20 54.37 30.63 -8 -381.25 
Expenditure on R&D 14.83 14.33 16.27 15.77 13.95 15.07 16.95 16.67 20.75 19.73 21.57 
Foreign Direct Investment    1.97 2.78 4.67 8.51 13.99 10.05 14.71 6.84 
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C
iv
il
 R
ig
h
ts
 
Politically motivated disappearances 50 100 50 50 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Political Imprisonment  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Torture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Freedom of Foreign Movement 0 0 0 0 50 100 50 100 100 100 100 
Freedom of Religion 50 50 0 50 50 0 0 50 0 0 0 
Freedom of Speech [CIRI] 50 0 50 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 
Freedom of Speech [Democracy 
Barometer] 
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50   
Freedom of the press 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50   
Number of newspapers 5.95 6.2 4.42 6.25 8.28 5.19 4.82 5.84 6.23   
Neutral newspapers’ circulation 42.26 42.11 42.11 42.11 41.37 40.62 39.88 39.88 40.82   
Restriction of Freedom of Information 0 0 0 0 0 66.67 66.67 66.67 66.67   
Effectiveness of Freedom of 
Information 
0 0 0 0 0 50 50 50 50   
Legal Environment of Press Freedom 23.31 26.64 26.64 13.32 23.31 39.96 46.62 43.29 36.33   
Political Environment of press freedom 55.51 77.69 77.69 56.61 56.61 56.61 63.27 66.6 69.93   
Membership in Humanitarian 
Organisations 
21.57 18.91 15.31 11.71 8.1 4.5 0.9 0.6 0.6   
Civil Liberties 33.34  33.34 33.34 50.01 50.01 66.68 66.68 66.68 66.68 66.68 
Press Freedom Score    58 55 52 48 48 49 51 50 
Political Terror Scale [Amnesty 
International] 
25 25 25 50 50 50 50 25 25 50 50 
Political Terror Scale [US State 
Department] 
25 50 25 25 50 50 25 50 25 25 25 
R
u
le
 o
f 
L
a
w
 
Extrajudicial killings 0 0 50 50 50 50 0 50 50 0 0 
Independence of the judiciary [CIRI] 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 0 0 0 
Constitutional Provisions for fair 
organisation of court system 
66.66 66.66 66.66 66.66 66.66 66.66 66.66 66.66 66.66   
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Constitutional Provisions guaranteeing 
public trial 
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50   
Independence of the judiciary [DB] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Confidence in the legal system 69.83 71.37 70.08 68.79 67.5 66.21 64.92 64.97 65.02   
Confidence in the police 70.44 72.4 71.88 71.37 70.85 70.33 69.81 69.37 68.92   
Corruption within the political system 33.34 43.01 47.18 33.34 38.84 41.68 41.68 41.68 41.68   
Transparency of government policy 43.9 60.3 37.1 33.8 37.3 44.3 50 42.4 41.7   
Judicial independence  71.68 38.34 58.35 58.35 55.01 71.68 78.35 66.68 58.35 50.01 
Impartial courts  91.69 30 41.68 46.68 48.34 61.68 58.35 46.68 50.01 53.34 
Integrity of the legal system  67 67 67 83 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Corruption Perception Index     69 68 65 62 59 54 56 
Rule of Law  48.8  48.8 52.6 52.6 53.2 50.2 49.8 48.8 51.8 
Control of corruption  43.4  35.8 45.4 46.6 49.6 50 51.8 51.6 51.8 
Reliability of police services        54.01 59.18 49.34 43.84 
H
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
 Checks and balances 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75   
Balance between the government and 
the opposition 
96 96 96 96 65 65 65 65 65   
Political interference by the military 16.67 33.34 50.01 48.68 48.68 66.68 66.68 50.01 33.34   
Political interference by religion 65.35 66.68 66.68 66.68 73.68 83.35 83.35 83.35 75.02   
Military interference  50 50 50 67 67 67 50 33 33 33 
Regulatory Quality  57.2  51.8 50.6 51.4 55.4 55.8 56.4 55.4 56.4 
V
er
ti
ca
l 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
 
Registered voters as % voting 92.29 92.29 92.29 95.95 95.95 95.95 95.95 95.95 87.92   
Facilitation of electoral participation 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20   
Participation rate of registered 87.09 87.09 87.09 76.94 76.94 76.94 76.94 76.94 75.86   
Participation in petitions 13.79 13.84 13.8 13.76 13.73 13.69 13.65 12.42 11.19   
Participation in demonstrations 19.20 19.22 23.07 25.05 26.92 28.93 31.19 28.84 26.54   
Proportion of female representatives in 
Parliament 
9.84 9.84 9.84 9.71 9.71 9.71 9.71 9.3 19.24   
Voice and Accountability  41.2  43.2 47.6 49.4 49.2 46.8 47.2 47.4 47.2 
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R
es
p
o
n
si
v
en
es
s 
Confidence in the government 51.31 51.83 54.52 57.22 59.92 62.62 65.31 63.09 60.87   
Governmental stability 68.72 68.72 68.72 93.85 93.85 93.85 93.85 93.85    
Effective implementation of 
government decisions 
38.4 55.6 41.8 41.6 45.5 51.4 57.8 49.8 52.2   
Government Effectiveness  50.4  50.8 50.8 50.8 53.2 53.2 55.8 55.2 56.4 
Political stability  33.2  32.4 33.6 33 38 38 33.6 33.2 28.2 
Trust in the government      72 76 67 71 47 57 
Trust in the national Parliament      72 73 64 74 47 58 
Trust in political parties      24 28 19 23 18 26 
Public trust in politicians        27.01 29.84 23.01 19.67 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Table 13 
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Table 15: Other variables 
                                                          
128 Source: European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement (in Million €). 
129 Source: 2002-2006: Baracani, 2009: 64; 2007-2009: European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, National Programme for Turkey, IPA Component 
I, Priority Axis 1: Political Criteria (in Million €). 
130 Source: OECD.StatExtracts. ODA: Official Development Assistance. The values were originally presented in million USD, but in the ones included in the table 
have been converted to EUR, according to the exchange rate on the 1st of January of each of the respective years (in million €). 
131 Based on Kalaycioglu, 2011: 269, 270. 
Domain Indicator 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
European 
Union 
Pre-accession 
Aid/IPA128 
 209 219 126 144 236 276 500 497.2  538.7 566.4 
European 
Union 
Assistance 
allocated to 
political 
criteria129 
   2.04 9.5 21.02 48.24 9.79 25.65 52.14 30.92 
OECD ODA: Grants130 342.5 421.8 310.4 524.7 1302.9 408.9 393.0 645.3 657.8 686.6 716.0 
OECD 
ODA: Technical 
cooperation3 
110.2 80.9 90.2 91.0 124.4 144.0 111.9 230.3 146.0 235.6 135.1 
Domestic 
Constitutional 
amendments131 
3 0 29 2 0 10 7 1 6 0 0 
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132 Number of adopted laws in the scope of harmonisation packages. Based on Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 128-133. 
133 Number of Laws adopted by the Parliament; these values do not include the laws adopted through the harmonisation packages. Source: Progress Reports, Section on 
“Democracy and the Rule of Law”. 
134 Proportion of “progress” or “some progress” in the Annual Progress Reports in relation to “limited progress” or “no progress”. The counting was made by the 
author. 
135 Source: Standard and Candidate Countries Eurobarometers. Percentage of Turkish citizens who are in favour of Turkey’s accession. When the Eurobarometer presents two 
results for one same year (the Spring and the Autumn Reports, usually), the average of the two values was calculated to represent the year in consideration.  
136 Source: Eurobarometer. Percentage of European Union citizens who are in favour of Turkey’s accession. When the Eurobarometer presents two results for one same year 
(the Spring and the Autumn Reports, usually), the average of the two values was calculated to represent the year in consideration.  
137 Number of beneficiaries of the Community Programme “Youth in Action”, “set up for young people. [with the aim] to inspire a sense of active European citizenship, 
solidarity and tolerance among young Europeans and to involve them in shaping the Union's future” (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 2010: 2) 
Domestic 
Adopted Laws 
(harmonisation 
packages)132 
0 0 0 73 107 70      
Domestic 
Adopted Laws 
(excl. harmon. 
pack.)133 
  117 45 143 261 166 148  116  
European 
Commission 
Progress 
Report134 
51.35 22.39 33.33 54.34 57.41 66.51 48.45 46.32 46.38 51.33 42.76 
Domestic 
Public support 
for accession135 
     62 74 68  61 44 
European 
Union 
Public support 
for 
enlargement136 
29.5 30 34 31   33 26  31  
Turkey-EU 
Youth in 
Action137 
     2979 5186 8139 8478 9360 10031 
Source: Several sources (indicated below) 
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Source: Author’s elaboration 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Figure 17: Political Rights indicators – annual evolution 
Figure 18: Political Rights aggregated – annual evolution 
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Figure 19: Social Rights indicators – annual evolution 
Figure 20: Social Rights aggregated – annual evolution 
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Figure 21: Economic Rights indicators – annual evolution 
Figure 22: Economic Rights aggregated – annual evolution 
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Figure 23: Civil Rights indicators – annual evolution 
Figure 24: Civil Rights aggregated – annual evolution 
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Figure 25: Rule of Law indicators – annual evolution 
Figure 26: Rule of Law aggregated – annual evolution 
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Figure 27: Horizontal Accountability indicators – annual evolution 
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Figure 28: Horizontal Accountability aggregated – annual evolution 
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Figure 29: Vertical Accountability indicators – annual evolution 
Figure 30: Vertical Accountability aggregated – annual evolution 
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Figure 31: Responsiveness indicators – annual evolution 
Figure 32: Responsiveness aggregated – annual evolution 
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Figure 33: Attributes aggregated – annual evolution 
Figure 36: Dimensions data aggregated – annual growth rate 
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Figure 37: Democracy data aggregated – annual growth rate 
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APPENDIX 10 – OTHER VARIABLES 
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Figure 40: Official Developmnet Assistance to Turkey by type per year 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on OECD’s values 
Figure 41: Legislative change in Turkey 
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Figure 42: Public support for Turkey’s accession 
Figure 43: Number of beneficiaries of the Community Programme “Youth in Action” 
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Figure 44: Turks’ religiosity according to their self-evaluation 
Source: Abridged from Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 41 
0 (Not religious at all) – 10 (Extremely religious). 
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APPENDIX 12 – ONLINE SURVEY’S RESULTS 
 
 
Q1+2: How would you classify Turkey’s democratic performance? [1- Extremely 
poor; 10 - Excellent] 
 1999 2009 Progress 
Average 4,40 5,93 + 1,53 
Mode 5 6  
% of [1-5] 70% 40% -30% 
% of [6-10] 30% 60% +30% 
 Turkish citizens 4,41 6 +1,59 
 EU citizens 4,25 5,75 +1,50 
 
 
 
Q3+4: How important do you think democracy used to be for Turks? [1- Not 
important at all; 10 – Extremely important] 
 1999 2009 Progress 
Average 6,60 7,17 +0,57 
Mode 7 9  
% of [1-5] 33,33% 20% -13,33% 
% of [6-10] 66,66% 80% +13,34% 
 Turkish citizens 6,88 7,24 +0,36 
 EU citizens 6,00 6,92 +0,92 
 
 
 
Q5: How do you perceive the link between the improvement of Turkish democracy 
and the country’s accession to the EU? [1-Nothing dependent; 10 - completely dep.] 
Average 6,83 
Mode 8 
% of [1-5] 20% 
% of [6-10] 80% 
 Turkish citizens 6,41 
 EU citizens 7,92 
 
 
Source: Online Survey 
Source: Online Survey 
Source: Online Survey 
Table 16: Online Survey – Questions 1 and 2 
Table 17: Online Survey – Questions 3 and 4 
Table 18: Online Survey – Question 5 
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Q6+7: How would you classify EU’s presence in Turkey and its impact on Turkish 
democratization? [1-extremely low/absent;10-extremely high/present] 
 1999 2009 Progress 
Average 5,00 5,73 +0,73 
Mode 3 6  
% of [1-5] 63,33% 40% -23,33% 
% of [6-10] 36,67% 60% +23,33% 
 Turkish citizens 4,53 5,88 +1,35 
 EU citizens 5,83 5,50 -0,33 
 
 
 
Q8+9: How would you assess EU’s strategies to improve Turkey’s democracy? [1-
completely ineffective;10-completely effective] 
 1999 2009 Progress 
Average 4,87 5,63 +0,76 
Mode 3 7 +4 
% of [1-5] 60% 80% +20% 
% of [6-10] 40% 20% -20% 
 Turkish citizens 4,71 5,71 +1 
 EU citizens 5,25 5,50 +0,25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Online Survey 
Source: Online survey 
Table 20: Online Survey – Questions 8 and 9 
Table 19: Online Survey – Questions 6 and 7 
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Q10: How do you assess each of the following factors in relation to Turkey’s accession 
to the EU between 1999 and 2009? [1 - Not an obstacle at all; 10 - A considerable 
obstacle] 
 Average  Turkish 
citizens 
 EU 
citizens 
Turkish 
Ranking 
EU 
Ranking 
Turkish economy 4,70 4,41 4,92 12 9 
Human Rights (include 
minorities) 
7,60 6,76 8,75 6 1 
Rule of Law 7,07 7,24 6,83 4 6 
Civil-military relations 6,67 6,53 7,00 7 4 
Cultural aspects/Identity issues 7,20 7,12 7,25 5 3 
EU’s absorption capacity 7,10 7,35 6,92 3 5 
Lack of political will among 
Turkish elites 
5,17 4,94 5,50 11 8 
Lack of political will among 
European elites 
8,20 8,00 8,75 2 1 
Freedoms and Liberties in 
Turkey (include media issues) 
6,60 6,12 7,42 8 2 
European Public Opinion 7,63 8,18 6,92 1 5 
Turkish Public Opinion 4,93 5,59 4,08 9 10 
General state of Turkish 
democracy 
6,10 5,59 7,00 9 4 
Turkish general 
unpreparedness to join the EU 
5,83 5,47 6,50 10 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Online Survey 
Table 21: Online Survey – Question 10 
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Q11: How do you assess each of the following actors or stakeholders according to 
their relevance for the Turkish democratization process (1999-2009)? [1-Not 
important at all; 10-extremely important] 
 
Average 
Turkish 
citizens 
EU 
citizens 
Turkish 
Ranking 
EU 
Ranking 
Tur. economic actors/elite 7,50 7,65 7,67 1 1 
Turkish civil society 7,17 6,88 7,67 3 1 
Turkish NGOs 6,67 6,76 6,83 4 3 
International NGOs 6,37 6,29 6,75 5 4 
AKP 7,10 7,35 6,50 2 5 
CHP 4,43 4,06 5,25 10 8 
MHP 3,53 3,29 4,08 12 12 
BDP 4,77 4,35 5,67 8 7 
PKK 3,93 3,59 4,67 11 10 
Military 4,70 4,18 5,75 9 6 
EU 6,27 5,82 7,08 6 2 
OSCE 4,53 4,06 4,92 10 9 
USA 4,97 5,12 4,50 7 11 
Japan 2,90 3,00 2,33 13 15 
Sweden 3,23 3,59 2,75 11 14 
Other individual countries 2,97 2,88 2,92 14 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Online Survey 
Table 22: Online Survey – Question 11 
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Figure 45: Obstacles to Turkish accession 
Figure 46: Stakeholders’ relevance for Turkish democratisation 
